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ABSTRACT
The shift in the balance between the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of the National 
Health Service is an established trend in health care. This has been motivated by various 
factors, including the desire to improve access to services. However, service shifts can 
stimulate further demand and thus undermine efforts to improve services overall. There is 
a need for “joined-up thinking” in respect of service shifts since existing analyses have 
been limited to isolated parts of the system, and little attention has been given to the 
actual mechanisms of the feedback or knock-on effects. The model-based methodology of 
system dynamics could be useful as it is designed for the study of the connections 
between different parts of systems and feedback effects.
This thesis assesses the usefulness of system dynamics as a planning and evaluation tool 
for service shifts. A case study approach is followed, based upon a shift in cardiac 
catheterisation services from the established tertiary level to the secondary level involving 
three hospitals in England.
The factors involved in service shifts are described, and the processes and causative 
forces at play across the different health service boundaries are captured by means of the 
system dynamics-based model procedure. The study reveals several interacting feedback 
mechanisms underlying changes in demand. It also demonstrates that by understanding 
the feedback structure, “joined-up solutions to joined-up problems” maybe designed. For 
example, a more effective policy would be the service shift (to improve access) combined 
with the use of clinical guidelines (to suppress demand) and with changes to the forces 
that drive activity rates (to ensure that both the average waiting time and the waiting list 
length are controlled). In feedback terms, using clinical guidelines weakens existing 
feedback mechanisms whilst changing the forces that drive activity rates creates new 
feedback mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION
The shift in the balance between the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of the National 
Health Service (NHS), is an established trend in health care that is bringing services 
closer to home. It has been driven by various factors, including the desire to improve 
access to services and reduce costs. However, improving access can stimulate further 
demand and thus undermine efforts to improve services overall. There is a need for 
“joined-up thinking” in respect of service shifts since existing analyses have been limited 
to isolated parts of the system, and little attention has been given to the actual 
mechanisms of the feedback or knock-on effects. The model-based methodology of 
system dynamics (SD) could be useful as it is designed for the study of the connections 
between different parts of systems and feedback effects.
1.2 PURPOSE AND APPROACH
This thesis aims to assess the usefulness of SD as a planning and evaluation tool for 
service shifts in health care. Usefulness is considered in terms of the ability to contribute 
to the policy making process. This probes beyond the ability to provide policy insights, to 
also consider the value of these insights, and the ease of use of SD.
A case study approach was followed, based upon a shift in cardiac catheterisation (CC) 
services in the NHS from the established tertiary level to the secondary level. The study 
involved three hospitals in England: one tertiary centre and two of its referral centres. The 
analysis focused on explaining how the shifts in CC services helped and hindered the 
provision of NHS cardiac services over time and, how NHS purchasers and providers 
could have effectively intervened to alleviate pressure on the system.
16
1.3 THESIS OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 sets the context to the research. This chapter concentrates on the NHS as this 
formed the context to the case studies. However, other health systems are also considered 
since the key features that contribute to the stimulation of demand, the phenomenon of 
interest, are also present in these systems. An overview is provided of the NHS in terms 
of the people, processes and pressures involved. The primary, secondary and tertiary 
service levels are described, and the motivation underlying the shift in the balance of care 
is discussed. This chapter also highlights the increasing scrutiny that is being placed upon 
health care and the associated calls for greater evaluation, which forms a recurrent theme 
in this thesis.
The shift in the balance of care is explored further in Chapter 3. Its diversity is discussed 
by describing the various service reconfigurations and changing roles which have 
occurred. The evaluation theme continues by considering calls made for service 
innovations to be evaluated. The established approach to evaluation, economic appraisal 
is reviewed. It is argued that relying upon economic appraisal alone is incomplete and can 
lead to misleading assessments, as this approach cannot fully consider the potential 
ramifications of shifts in the balance of care. In particular, it cannot explore the 
mechanisms underlying the stimulation of latent demand for services in response to 
increases in access. SD is introduced as a way of addressing this limitation.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to describe SD and clarify its role in health care. This is 
achieved via a comparative review of the health care simulation modelling literature, 
which follows from SD adopting a particular approach to simulation modelling. The SD 
approach is compared and contrasted with the more traditional approach to simulation 
modelling. The latter approach is more aligned with the emphasis in health care on 
individual patient detail, and subsequently has a higher profile in health care. To clarify 
the differences between the two approaches, and thus emphasise the potential benefits of 
SD, a 3-dimensional classification of complexity is defined. This chapter concludes by 
addressing a number of potential obstacles to the use of SD.
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Having offered some insight into how SD might be used to evaluate shifts in health 
services, Chapter 5 expands upon §1.2 to clarify the research design that was followed in 
order to probe further. The shift in CC services, from the established tertiary level to the 
district (secondary) level, was selected to form the basis of a case study. In this chapter, 
the CC procedure and its use are described to explain the issues involved in deciding who 
should undergo this procedure and where it might be safely undertaken. The collaborative 
centres are introduced and the research methods are briefly described.
The literature on the shift in CC services is reviewed in Chapter 6. The issues regarding 
the general trend of the shift in the balance of care, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, are 
considered with specific reference to the case of CC services. This involves a discussion 
of the motivation for, and provision of, district services, and concerns about stimulated 
demand and the appropriateness of the use of these services. Evidence of the shift in CC 
services generating further demand is highlighted, thus supporting a call for an SD 
analysis.
Chapter 7 describes the experiences of the shift in CC services at the case study centres in 
detail. The tertiary perspective is first considered before examining its two referral centres 
in turn. For each, the extent of the service shift and the impact on CC activity are 
described. The existence of corroborative evidence of the shift in CC services generating 
demand is highlighted. Also addressed are issues relating to the costs of, and the different 
attitudes to, the shift in services.
Chapter 8 presents the first phase of the SD study of the shift in CC services, a process 
known as conceptualisation. As part of this process, the effects of the service shift were 
defined using a series of graphs. A conceptual model was constructed to portray the key 
processes that were understood to generate these effects. The purpose of the model was 
also clarified.
In Chapter 9, the description of the study progresses from the informal conceptual model 
to the formal simulation model. An overview of this model is presented before describing 
it in further detail. This chapter also describes the procedures that were applied to gain 
confidence in the model. This involved a series of tests that targeted both the model’s 
structure and its behaviour.
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Chapter 10 presents how the model was used to perform base case analyses for the two 
case studies. These experiments sought insight into how the shifts in CC services helped 
and hindered the provision of NHS cardiac services over time, thus addressing the first 
question stated in §1.2. For each case, the problematic behaviour was explained with 
reference to the underlying feedback structure. This led to some suggestions into how 
more desirable behaviour could have been achieved. Further suggestions for improvement 
arose from the sensitivity analyses that were carried out to probe further into the base case 
behaviour.
The suggestions for improvement were followed up with a series of policy experiments, 
as explained in Chapter 11. These experiments sought insight into how purchasers and 
providers could have effectively intervened to alleviate pressure on the system, thus 
addressing the second question stated in §1.2. Note that this chapter concentrates upon the 
causes and effects of these experiments, whilst the policy implications are discussed in the 
next chapter.
Chapter 12 forms the final chapter of the thesis. The base case analyses and policy 
analyses are first summarised in lay man terms, in contrast to Chapters 10 and 11 which 
are quite technical in nature. The policy implications of the results of the experiments are 
then derived. The issue of the usefulness of SD is addressed in the context of the case 
studies. The validity of the research hypothesis is considered thus producing a revised 
statement regarding the causal mechanisms and the usefulness of SD. Moving on from the 
case studies, the findings of the research are generalised. To conclude the thesis, the 
research contributions are highlighted and a number of directions for future research are 
suggested.
The references are followed by a set of appendices. The abbreviations used within this 
document are listed in Appendix A. Abbreviations have been made selectively to restrict 
their number. Appendix B provides glossaries of the health care and modelling terms 
used. Efforts have been made to keep the health-related jargon to the minimum, and 
technical terms are explained as they arise. The health care glossary is intended to 
consolidate these definitions and descriptions. The inclusion of the modelling glossary is 
intended for the reader who is unfamiliar with modelling in general, and/or SD modelling
19
in particular. Appendix C provides further details about the collaborative work, including 
the dates of site visits and meetings, brief notes about the purposes of the meetings, and 
the sources of numerical data. For confidentiality reasons, all parties involved are referred 
to by the use of pseudonyms. Appendix D contains several diagrams and notes regarding 
the conceptual model. Appendix E refers to the simulation model. It includes full 
documented listings of the model and detailed tabular output of the simulation runs.
20
CHAPTER 2
THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND 
OTHER HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to set the context to the research. The different types of 
health care systems are briefly introduced (§2.2) before focusing on the NHS, the UK 
health care system. The structure of the NHS is outlined (§2.3) in three different ways in 
order to highlight the existence of several different types of linkages (§2.3.1-§2.3.3). This 
is followed by a description of the broad aims of the NHS (§2.4), in preparation for a 
discussion of a number of challenges that arise in attempting to achieve these aims (§2.5). 
The funding constraints in the NHS are addressed (§2.5.1) and the subsequent challenge 
of balancing the competing demands on the limited resources (§2.5.2). The changing 
health care environment is examined with respect to two trends. Firstly, the service 
reconfigurations and changing roles, that are producing a shift in the balance of care 
closer to home (§2.5.3). Secondly, the increasing scrutiny placed upon health care 
(§2.5.4). The subsequent need for greater evaluation leads to a discussion of several 
difficulties associated with evaluation (§2.5.5). The chapter is summarised in the final 
section (§2.6).
2.2 HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
Three types of health care models appear in western economies: national health service 
models, public subsidies to private insurance funds, and national insurance schemes, 
which are supported by compulsory levies. In a national health service, the state assumes 
direct powers to provide health for the entire population. It owns the institutions where 
services are provided and it is responsible for the employment of staff. In the past, this
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arrangement has been referred to as ‘socialized medicine’. Italy, Spain and New Zealand 
also possess national health systems but the UK system, the NHS, remains closest to the 
ideal and, thus, is of particular global interest (Webster 1998).
The focus of this research is on the NHS as this is the context for the case studies but, 
actually, the key features that contribute to the phenomenon of interest apply to other 
health care systems. Later chapters will describe the phenomenon of interest as the 
stimulation of demand in response to increased access. This is a common response in the 
NHS and it is a consequence of services being, primarily, free at the point of delivery. 
However, it could also be argued that services in other health care systems, whether 
insurance-based or private, are all free in one sense or another.
2.3 STRUCTURE OF THE NHS
The structure of the NHS is undergoing constant changes and the period that was studied 
(April 1995 to April 2001) was no exception. To set the context, it is necessary to 
consider a longer period, dating back to significant policy changes in the late 1980s/early 
1990s. These changes will be described over several sections in this chapter.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to present the structure of the NHS in three 
different ways: from an organisational perspective, from a health provision perspective 
and from a patient needs perspective. This highlights the management, contractual, 
administrative and patient referral links.
2.3.1 An Organisational Perspective
The structure of the NHS is typically presented using a diagram that shows the key 
individuals and groups and their inter-relationships. Figure 2.1 is one such example, 
which depicts the managerial, contractual and administrative linkages that were in place 
in 1998.
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Figure 2.1 The National Health Service in England, 1998
Referring to Figure 2.1, the Secretary of State in the Department o f Health is answerable 
to Parliament for the provision of health services. The Department of Health is 
responsible for: setting the policy framework for the NHS; negotiating the overall level of 
funding with the Treasury and allocating funding; and, monitoring the performance of the 
NHS health authorities and the NHS Trusts and holding them to account (carried out by 
the regional offices o f the NHS Executive). The policy board within the Department of 
Health sets the broad strategic direction for the NHS whilst operational matters are dealt 
with by the NHS Executive. The health authorities have several functions including 
assessing their populations’ needs for health care and purchasing health care for their 
population.
The figure includes the term ‘purchasers’, although the term ‘purchasing’ was gradually 
replaced by ‘commissioning’ in order to play down the market and competitive 
connotations (Webster 1998). GP fundholding practices, which were later abolished, were 
general medical practices that had been allocated a budget for the purchase of certain 
hospital services - elective (non-emergency) surgery, outpatient (OP) attendances, 
pathology and community care. NHS Trusts are independent self-governing units. They 
consist o f hospitals and other units providing patient care. They are accountable to the 
NHS Executive (Ham 1998).
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Associated with the evolution of the NHS since the late 1980s/early 1990s are a series of 
White Papers, other documents and Acts of Parliament. These have led to a simplification 
of the structure of the NHS. Examples are the White Papers, Working for Patients (NHS 
1989a), Managing the New NHS (NHS 1993a), Making London Better (NHS 1993b), The 
New NHS (NHS 1997b) and the Tomlinson Report into the future of London’s services 
(NHS 1992). Acts of Parliament include the National Health Service and Community 
Care Act in 1990, Health Authorities Act in 1995, Primary Care Act of 1997 and the 
Health Act of 1999. All the above provided details, recommendations and legislation for: 
the creation of the policy board and regional offices; the introduction of the ‘internal 
market’; the introduction of the concepts of GP fundholding and NHS Trusts; creation of 
the health authorities; rationalisation of London’s hospital services; development of 
various forms of locality commissioning involving GPs and health authorities; 
replacement of the ‘internal market’ with a system based upon co-operation and 
partnership; abolition of GP fundholding; creation of Primary Care Groups; and, 
implementation of Primary Care Trusts.
The above description provides a useful basis upon which to establish the context for the 
research and to introduce the distinction between the purchasing/commissioning and the 
provision of health services. This research focuses upon the purchase and provision of a 
particular health service at the local level. This does not directly concern policy makers at 
the national level such as the Secretary of State for Health or those at the Department of 
Health (NHS 1997a). Furthermore, the issue of interest for this research concerns 
developments in the provision of services involving service reconfigurations and 
changing responsibilities. Therefore, a more detailed representation of the provision of 
services is required.
2,3.2 A Health Care Provision Perspective
An alternative representation is shown in Figure 2.2. This concentrates on the provision of 
health services and the referral of patients (including self-referrals) between the three 
levels of health care: primary, secondary (or district) and tertiary levels. NHS services 
only are considered, although this diagram also applies to the provision of services in the 
private sector.
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Figure 2.2 The Patient Referral Chain Across the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Levels
A common description o f the primary, secondary and tertiary divisions refers to the 
location of services and the key inputs in terms of the professionals involved. Based upon 
this viewpoint, primary care is that which takes place in the community and is provided 
by GPs and practice nurses, and a host o f community health professionals. These include 
district nurses, speech therapists and chiropodists. The secondary and tertiary levels 
comprise hospital care. The secondary level refers to district general hospitals (DGHs). 
These can offer patients more sophisticated investigations and treatments and 24-hour 
supervision which cannot be provided in the community. The tertiary level refers to the 
most advanced hospital care. This is delivered in highly specialised units. They provide 
services to patients that have been referred from the primary and secondary levels for 
specialised investigation and treatment.
GPs may receive referrals from another primary care health professional, such as a district 
nurse or pharmacist. The usual route to hospital care is via a GP referral for an OP 
appointment. Patients may be referred directly to a tertiary centre or via a DGH, but the 
latter forms the usual route. Patients may also obtain direct access to hospital services by 
self-referring to a hospital accident and emergency (A&E) department or one o f a few 
other specialist services, such as genito-urinary clinics. Therefore, doctors primarily, filter 
patients along the referral chain, which spans across the three levels o f health care. The 
degree and method o f filtering will depend on a variety o f factors, including the patients’ 
symptoms, medical history and preferences, the doctors’ expertise and the facilities 
available to them. Patients flow in both directions along the referral chain. Referrals
Patients
(via A&Es{D;pt) District General 
Hospitals Tertiary Centres
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backwards involve patients who have successfully undergone the necessary 
investigations, treatments and follow-up procedures.
Some services are not easily classified using a description based upon the service location 
or professionals involved (NHS 1994c). For example, in practice, some primary care is 
provided to patients in a hospital A&E department (Dale et al 1995). An alternative 
description of the different service levels focuses upon service attributes. For example, the 
attributes of primary care include: direct access (WHO 1978a); service delivery in the 
community as opposed to in a hospital (Hughes and Gordon 1992); ambulatory care 
(Peckham 1992); and, “first-contact, continuous, comprehensive and co-ordinated care, 
provided to populations undifferentiated by gender, disease or organ system”, as described 
by Starfield (1994). However, Godber et al (1997) emphasise the lack of robustness in 
these definitions. Again, A&E care is cited as an example where conflicts occur. A&E 
departments offer patients direct access, which is an attribute of primary care. However, 
care is condition-specific and is delivered in a hospital rather than the community. Godber 
et al offer a robust definition of primary care based upon a concise, comprehensive and 
exclusive set of attributes: direct access, generalist and longitudinal care, and delivery in a 
community setting.
Godber et al only provide an attribute-based definition for primary care but the basis of 
this thesis involves all three levels of care. The primary care attribute set of Godber et al 
may help in attempting to derive a suitable set of attributes to describe secondary and 
tertiary care. Indirect access could be considered as a suitable attribute for hospital care as 
it is clearly the opposite of direct access. Specialist care is the opposite of generalist care. 
Godber et al appear to use the term longitudinal to encapsulate Starfield’s attributes, 
“continuous” and “co-ordinated”. Occasional care may be used to capture the essence of 
non-longitudinal care. Finally, delivery in a non-community setting implies delivery in a 
hospital. This produces the following set of attributes: indirect access, specialist and 
occasional care, and delivery in a hospital-based setting.
Providing a robust definition which will differentiate between the secondary and tertiary 
levels is difficult. Secondary care and tertiary care differ by the degree of specialisation 
with the latter involving the use of highly specialised staff and facilities, concentrated at 
regional centres. A robust definition cannot be derived from the mode of access as with
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primary care, since although tertiary care is usually accessed by a referral from a 
secondary specialist, this is not always the case (NHS 1994c). For cardiac services, 
secondary care is traditionally characterised by the exclusive use of non-invasive methods 
of diagnosis and treatment where invasive methods are defined as involving penetration 
of the skin (LIG, 1993; BCS/RCP 1993). Due to their geographical location, a patient 
could be referred directly to a tertiary centre for investigation. It is possible that this 
patient may subsequently undergo investigation by non-invasive methods alone. 
Therefore their care could be defined as either secondary or tertiary. The distinction 
between secondary and tertiary levels is thus blurred. However, the distinction is clear 
when considering the need for a method of investigation or treatment of high complexity, 
such as invasive methods, which are traditionally conducted at the tertiary level.
2.3.3 A Patient Needs Perspective
The primary/secondary/tertiary split is a useful basis upon which to introduce and discuss 
the shift in the balance of care. However, for the purpose of this research, the referral 
chain is also conceptualised in different terms, focusing upon the patient pathways 
through the processes of care. Figure 2.3 shows a simple example. This is not restricted 
by the location of services, professional boundaries or service boundaries. Instead, this 
view is built around the needs of the patient (Harrison 2001).
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Figure 2.3 A Patient Needs View of the Patient Referral Chain
2.4 AIMS OF THE NHS
The underlying principles of the NHS are to provide a universal, comprehensive, first- 
class health service, which is free at the point of delivery, except for a few items, and is 
largely financed from general taxation (NHS 1946). The inception of the NHS, in 1948,
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was announced in a leaflet, The New National Health Service, which was distributed to all 
homes. This leaflet contained the following:
It will provide you with all medical, dental, and nursing care. Everyone - rich or poor, man, 
woman or child - can use it or any part of it. There are no charges, except for a few special items.
There are no insurance qualifications. But it is not a charity. You are all paying for it, mainly as 
taxpayers, and it will relieve your money worries in time of illness.
(Webster 1998, p.24)
The basic principle remains unchanged (Webster 1998): to provide a service according to 
need and for this service to be financed by the community according to their means (NHS 
1974).
The broad objectives of NHS policy makers are to maintain and improve the quality of the 
health service. Different aspects of service quality encompass the structure of the health 
service, process issues and resulting outcomes (Maxwell, 1984; Hopkins 1990; Caiman 
1992). Structural aspects of quality involve the skill base in terms of the knowledge, skill 
and competence of the staff, and the scope o f services provided regarding the nature and 
capability of facilities available. Process issues involve equity or fairness in terms of the 
provision of services and health status, efficiency or resource use, cost-effectiveness, 
relevance of service availability with respect to the population’s needs and utilisation of 
services, and responsiveness to patient needs including the respect, dignity and humanity 
shown. Further quality issues relate to the accessibility of services. This involves the 
distribution and location of services (geographical access), the numbers and time spent 
waiting for services (access times) and also the ability to fund services (financial access). 
Service outcomes involve the effectiveness of care in reducing mortality and morbidity 
and, patient satisfaction with the services provided.
The broad objectives of NHS policy makers are connected to the World Health 
Organisation’s goals (WHO 1985), which are associated with the broad concept of ‘health 
gain’: to reduce disease, disability and avoidable deaths, and to improve the quality of life 
and equity (Rathwell 1994).
The objectives of the NHS translate into a number of targets. These include those outlined 
in the Health o f  the Nation health strategy document (NHS 1991b), the service delivery
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standards encapsulated in the Patient’s Charter (NHS 1991a, 1996a), and clinical 
guidelines (e.g. RCP/RCS 1992; ESC 1997). Further targets arise from national directives 
filtering down to the local level and combining with other targets and goals. These include 
the activity and waiting time targets which are stipulated in health care purchasing 
contracts.
Policy makers, throughout the tiers of the NHS, face a number of challenges in attempting 
to meet these broad objectives and the specific targets which arise from them. Difficulties 
are presented in both identifying ways in which the quality of services may be improved, 
and in implementing the necessary changes to obtain improvements (Cumow 1972; 
Rosenhead 1978; Lee and Mills 1982).
In formulating new policies, NHS policy makers have to balance competing demands for 
resources, whilst operating within funding constraints. They also have to deal with a 
number of other difficulties relating to the changing health care environment and the 
evaluation of health care policies. These challenges are discussed in the next section.
2.5 CHALLENGES TO NHS POLICY MAKERS
2.5.1 Funding Constraints and Funding Crises
The NHS has often been described as being in a continual state of crisis of under-funding 
(Webster 1998; Rivett 1998). This leads to various problems. In addition to having to 
make sacrifices, difficulties arise in funding improvements to services. Often presented as 
evidence of this funding crisis are the budget deficits that apply to many purchasing 
authorities and providers, and the existence of rationing.
Increasing pressure is being imposed on NHS budgets by the rise in demand for health 
services. This rise is associated with medical advances, rising public expectations, 
demographic changes and other factors. Medical advances have provided new and 
sophisticated treatments and improved prospects for survival. Advances in technology 
have led to increasing technological sophistication, which is expensive and requires 
highly trained personnel for its operation and maintenance. Improvements in the skills of 
doctors and medical technicians have led to demands for higher wages. As medical 
technology has advanced, so have public expectations and there are some instances where
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the public have imposed greater demand on health services even when all hope of 
recovery is lost (Cohen, 1993). Disappointment can lead to litigation when treatment or 
practitioners fail to deliver.
Demographic changes are illustrated by an aging population, arising from the post-war 
‘baby boomers’ reaching retirement age and increases in the average life expectancy. In 
1991 the population in the UK over 60 years of age was 11.9 million (21%) and the 
estimate for 2011 is approximately 13.3 million (22%) (OPCS, 1991). In the developed 
world, the average life expectancy in 1950 was 66, rising to 72 in 1985, with the United 
Nations forecasting 78 years by the year 2025 (NERA, 1993). Corresponding to the 
increase in life expectancy is the need for treatments for longer periods. Unlike the 
simple, quick therapy which is appropriate to infectious disease, complicated and 
prolonged care is required for the results of degenerative changes associated with aging. 
The elderly are the major consumers of health care but there are relatively fewer people in 
employment to pay for the associated costs.
Increasing demand on health care is also associated with other factors, including the 
emergence of new illnesses such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), and 
the development of new drugs by the pharmaceutical industry.
As in other industrialised economies, health care expenditure in the NHS has increased 
significantly. For example, in 1949, the NHS expenditure was £444 million (Ham 1990) 
but by 1999 it had risen to nearly £52 billion (OHE 2000). The proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) devoted to the NHS has also risen. The mechanisms underlying 
the rise of health care expenditure are very complex and are not confined to demand 
factors. The costs incurred are also understood to be influenced by supply factors in terms 
of the availability of funds. This is reflected in the proportion of GDP devoted to health 
care and the method of payment for health services. The incentives associated with the 
method of payment may be to either economise or overuse health care (NERA 1993). 
Compared with other health systems in developed economies, the NHS does have a 
number of cost-saving features (Sweeney 1994; Abel-Smith et al 1995). These include the 
referral system in which GPs play the role of ‘gatekeepers’ to hospital services. Another 
important feature is the global budget which is determined by the state of the UK 
economy and the competitive status of health care among the Government spending
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departments. The use of a global budget ensures that in the UK, a lower proportion of its 
GDP is spent on health care, compared with other OECD countries. However, this 
coupled with the fact that demand continues to outstrip the supply is often presented as an 
argument for the NHS being under-funded (Dixon 1997).
2.5.2 Balancing Competing Demands
Given the limited resources available, trade-offs have to be made when setting priorities 
between the various demands (New and Le Grand 1996; Lenaghan 1996). Balances have 
to be made between different treatments, and between emergency needs and elective care. 
Priorities also have to be set between the immediate health care needs and the other 
determinants of health which produce long-term benefits such as diet and education 
(Heginbotham et al 1992; Langham et al 1993; Abel-Smith 1994; Evans et al 1994). 
Stakeholder conflict often arises in decisions about health care especially about priority 
setting which is often regarded as a euphemism for rationing (Reinke 1988; Abel-Smith
1994) - a term which politicians are reluctant to use (Smith 1995). Rationing is 
manifested in the inability to obtain certain treatments on the NHS, cancellations of 
operations, closures of hospital facilities and long waiting lists for elective hospital 
services (Dixon 1997).
The NHS inherited a significant waiting list for hospital treatment (Yates 1987). 
Excessive waiting lists and waiting times have persisted in spite of a series of policy 
interventions which have been applied over the years to tackle them (Harrison and New 
2000). It was only fairly recently in 1994 that the Government acknowledged that the 
delay for an OP appointment should also be considered as part of the total delay for 
treatment although a Royal Commission (1979) had argued this 15 years earlier.
Efforts to reduce the waiting list by funding activity increases have been criticised for 
failing to address the increases in referrals that occur as a response, thus undermining the 
impact of the activity increases (Hamblin et al 1998a, 1998b). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the waiting time should be the key concern, not the waiting list length (Royal 
Commission 1979; Hamblin et al 1998a, 1998b). Whilst this may be true from the 
perspective of the patient, for those funding and delivering services, the waiting list length 
is also important. It indicates the level of activity required to meet the desired waiting
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time; the longer the waiting list, the greater the activity rate required in order to maintain 
the desired waiting time.
Public opinion of the NHS has always been influenced by the presence of excessive 
treatment delays. Opinion is reinforced by the considerable media attention that long 
treatment delays attract. Some patients choose to supplement NHS care with private 
health insurance and thus overcome the limits imposed by rationing. However, many 
cannot afford this luxury. In 1996, 17% of the respondents of a British Social Attitudes 
Survey were covered by private health insurance with a significant differential across the 
different income groups (Mulligan 1998).
2.5.3 The Shift in the Balance o f Care
The dynamic nature of the health care environment presents a host of further challenges to 
NHS policy makers. One important health care trend is the ongoing shift in emphasis 
away from the acute hospital sector towards primary and community care. This trend has 
arisen, to some extent, as a response to the pressures arising from funding constraints. 
This is because one of the many factors motivating this shift has been the perceived cost 
benefits. Also instrumental in the development of this trend were the 1991 NHS reforms, 
and the change in the focus of government policy towards primary care. This policy shift 
began in the 1980’s (Hughes and Gordon 1993) and has led to the current goal of a 
primary care-led NHS (NHS 1983, 1991c, 1994b, 1998a, 2000b).
The 1991 NHS reforms arose from a radical review, which the Government carried out in 
1988. This review had followed renewed pressure for additional funding for the NHS. The 
results of this review were published in 1989 in the White Paper, Working for Patients 
(NHS 1989a). The reforms were enacted as law in the NHS and Community Care Act in 
1990, and were implemented in 1991. The broad aims were to improve efficiency and 
make services more responsive to patients’ needs by delegating power down from 
Regions to Districts, and from Districts to hospitals. The reforms involved management 
changes and the introduction of competitive forces by the separation of the purchasing 
and provider roles in an arrangement known as the ‘internal market’. Hospitals and 
community services were permitted to opt out of district control and assume independent 
status as NHS Trusts. Another change was that some GPs were eligible to become
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fundholders. Further reforms that focused on primary care included pilot schemes to 
extend the purchasing roles of GPs (Beecham 1994; TPET 1996, 1997; NHS 1994b), and 
later, the replacement of GP fundholding with Primary Care Groups and the conversion of 
these groups into Primary Care Trusts (NHS 1997b).
The implementation of the 1991 NHS reforms led to various pressures, including the need 
for health professionals to quickly develop new skills as they assumed new 
responsibilities for contracting (Ham and Shapiro 1995; Maynard and Bloor 1996). 
Furthermore, a number of structural changes followed. The Government formed a 
committee, chaired by Sir Bernard Tomlinson, to examine the future of London’s health 
services (NHS 1992). In response to the Tomlinson report, the Government announced a 
number of changes. These were to scale down London’s hospital services, with hospital 
mergers and bed closures, and to improve primary and community services (NHS 1993b). 
Additional funding was provided to support the shift in balance from the hospital sector to 
primary and community care.
The shift away from hospital care has been driven by financial pressures and promoted by 
financial incentives. Financial pressures were created by the internal market which 
encouraged trusts to reduce the length of stay in order to maintain or increase patient 
activity levels. Associated with both the 1990 GP contract (NHS 1989b) and GP 
fundholding were various incentives to GPs to provide an enhanced range of practice- 
based services such as minor surgery, chronic disease management for diabetes and 
asthma, and consultant outreach clinics (NHS 1989b, 1993c; Glennerster et al 1994).
The shift in the balance of care has also been motivated by consumer pressure, and it has 
been facilitated by technological advancements (Hensher et al 1999). Technological 
developments have led to shorter hospital stays and have enabled a greater number of 
procedures, which formerly required in-patient stays, to be conducted on an OP or day 
surgery basis (Newchurch 1993; Wickham 1994).
Other driving factors have involved the change in the supply and planning of the NHS 
medical workforce (Ham et al 1998). There have been several major policy developments 
in medical staffing, including the new deal on junior doctors’ working hours (NHS 
1993d) and the Caiman report on specialist medical training (NHS 1993e). These have
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combined with and reinforced the shift in the balance of care by leading to a 
reconfiguration of clinical services within and between hospitals, centralising services and 
involving fewer hospitals. The assumption is that centralising services provide economies 
of scale and improve quality although the evidence is conflicting (Fergusen et al 1997; 
Posnett 1999).
Hospital facilities are being used more intensively with fewer beds and higher patient 
throughput (Vetter 1996). District general hospitals are expected to form linkages with 
regional tertiary centres and primary care-based services, and thus form health care 
networks. These arrangements are considered to offer a means to maintaining local access 
and ensuring high quality care. As the reconfiguration of hospital services develops, 
further mergers of NHS Trusts are expected (Ham et al 1998). These changes will impose 
great pressure on DGHs. It is expected that they will be squeezed between pressures to 
regionalise some services and decentralise others as services are shifted to primary care 
and closer to home (Warner and Riley 1994; Vetter 1996). Some DGH’s may close or 
reduce services whilst for others, their path to survival will involve forming alliances with 
GPs and other agencies and networks with other hospitals (Pollard 1998; Ham et al 1998).
In addition to the reconfiguration of services, the shift in the balance of care has been 
reflected in the increasing emphasis on health promotion and the prevention of ill health. 
This formed an integral part of the reforms to general practice (NHS 1987) and the 
Government’s Health o f the Nation health strategy which acknowledged the various 
determinants of health, such as exercise and diet in addition to health care (NHS 1991b). 
The goals of the Health o f  the Nation strategy embraced an integral part of the World 
Health Organisation’s Health for All targets (WHO 1985). The Government’s strategy 
was mapped out further in the recent White Paper, Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation 
(NHS 1999).
The shift in the balance of care in the NHS will be explored further in the next chapter.
2.5.4 Health Care Coming Under Increased Scrutiny
In addition to the shift in the balance of care, another important trend that is altering the 
health care environment is the increasing scrutiny placed upon health care and the gradual
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erosion of clinical autonomy. This trend is also, to some extent, a response to funding 
pressures, given the increased emphasis placed on the costs and cost-effectiveness of 
services.
Doctors’ actions are being scrutinised by their peers and those outside the medical 
profession, including hospital managers, purchasers and patients. The 1991 NHS reforms 
formalised audit procedures conferring the responsibilities for financial and medical 
audits on the Audit Commission and the medical profession respectively. Medical audit 
involves the systematic examination and review of medical performance and outcome. It 
is not a new concept, nor is the need to assess evidence rather than succumb to personal 
bias (West 1992). However, the collection, analysis and social context of the use of 
medical evidence has changed over time. There has been an increasing appreciation of 
probabilistic reasoning and population-based studies over anecdotal evidence and clinical 
case studies, and the benefits of meta-analysis which combines evidence from different 
sources (Mulrow 1994; Davidoff et al 1995). These changes are reflected in the focus of 
the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement (EBM 1992; Davidoff et al 1995; Sackett 
et al 1996). EBM emerged in recognition of the fact that certain differences exist between 
research evidence and clinical practice. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) form the 
central focus of EBM. A RCT is commonly acknowledged as the ‘gold standard’ method 
of formal evaluation of treatments. EBM involves the systematic review of RCTs by the 
Cochrane Collaboration, a worldwide collaborative group that embraces the concerted 
efforts of doctors, scientists and epidemiologists. These reviews are basically designed to 
identify treatments whose efficacy has been proved by individual RCTs and overviews of 
RCTs. EBM is not restricted to RCTs. Where RCT data is not available, the practice of 
EBM considers reviews of other evidence. EBM also considers the use of diagnostic 
procedures with established and documented high sensitivity and specificity.
The 1990s brought the assessment of medical technologies under greater scrutiny (Warner
1994). In 1985, it was estimated that only one fifth of medical interventions at most had 
been evaluated by an RCT (Brook and Lohr 1985). The situation will have improved 
since then. However, a large proportion of patients are unable to enter a RCT. For 
example, of all the patients screened for entry into a major trial which compared two 
treatments for coronary heart disease, only 3% were eligible for randomisation (RITA
1993). A further problem is that when the results of clinical trials are known, they are
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often out of date, because treatments are constantly being updated. Observational studies 
can overcome some of the limitations of RCTs (Black 1996), but considerable uncertainty 
remains.
The increased emphasis on evidence was also reflected in government policy. EBM was 
expressed in the Government’s expectations of primary care in its expanded role (NHS 
1996b). The government also embarked upon an ambitious NHS R&D health technology 
assessment programme. The term, health technology, extended beyond treatments alone 
to any method used by health professionals to promote health, treat disease and organise 
services. The aim was to create a “knowledge-based health service” where all clinical, 
managerial and policy decisions are based upon sound evidence. Assessments would 
consider the issues of costs, effectiveness, outcomes and acceptability (Smith 1994; Stein 
and Milne 1998; NHS 1998a).
It is understood that the general lack of evaluation of the majority of medical 
interventions, coupled with clinical uncertainty, are the primary causes of the wide 
variations which exist in all areas of medical practice (Anderson and Money 1990). 
Attempts have been made to standardise medical practice by the development of protocols 
and guidelines. These may incorporate recommendations for treatments that have been 
evaluated by RCTs. Further challenges are presented in disseminating new evidence 
effectively (Smith 1994) and in ensuring that changes in behaviour are made as a result. 
The absence of a hierarchy of authority in health care can impede the necessary changes in 
behaviour (Cumow 1972).
Medical practice is also coming under further scrutiny in the wake of various scandals, 
involving gross incompetence, cases of murder and sexual abuse of patients by their GPs 
and the illegal retention of human organs (Carvel 2001). Health professionals are under 
pressure to improve the quality of services. Moreover, increasing pressure is being placed 
upon hospital doctors to justify their use of resources, as both purchasers and hospital 
managers are demanding cost-effective care. These aims are encapsulated in the concept 
of managed care (Fairfield et al 1997), which is gaining increasing popularity in the NHS 
(Dixon et al 1998). Some doctors have found it difficult to adapt to the market culture 
and, in addition, perceive satisfying managerial demands as a threat to clinical freedom 
(Frostick et al 1993).
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Meanwhile, patients are insisting on a greater role in decision making. Patient’s 
expectations have been fuelled by the Government initiative, The Patient's Charter (NHS 
1991a, 1996a), which specifies service delivery standards for patients, and patients’ 
increasing knowledge. These service delivery standards include waiting time targets for 
surgery and OP appointments, and other issues, such as complaint procedures and 
standards of hospital food. The gain in patients’ knowledge has been facilitated by the 
plethora of medical information that is available via the media. Patients are also 
increasingly accessing information via the internet. Furthermore, the rising incidence of 
medical litigation suggests that patients are not afraid to question the doctors’ authority. In 
fact the costs of medical negligence in the NHS has been reported as doubling in three 
years to almost £150 million in 1995 (Warden 1995). Formerly these claims were met by 
an NHS Trust’s revenue or by borrowing. However, in response to this increasing 
problem, an insurance scheme was set up to help trusts spread the costs of settlements.
The two broad trends, which are associated with the changing health care environment - 
the shift in the balance of care and the increasing scrutiny placed upon health care - are 
connected. Like any other health care technological innovation, the shift in the balance of 
care is going to be subjected to close scrutiny by its various stakeholders.
2.5.5 Evaluation Difficulties
Calls are made to evaluate the technologies, innovations and other aspects of the health 
service. However, this leads to several difficulties that present a further set of challenges 
to policy makers as evaluation may not be straightforward. As discussed in §2.5.4, it may 
not be feasible to employ the ideal evaluation approach such as an RCT, or the results of a 
RCT may be out of date. There are various other evaluation problems including trade­
offs, stakeholder conflict, measurement difficulties and the unexpected consequences of 
policy changes.
In theory, the quality of the health service may be evaluated with reference to the 
objectives described in §2.4. However, in practice, difficulties arise in the 
operationalisation of these objectives and the inevitable trade-offs involved. Trade-offs 
are often made between efficiency and effectiveness, and between efficiency and equity
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(Reinke 1988). The increased emphasis in the UK on efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
(NHS 1989a) is often in conflict with considerations of equity (Lees and Mills 1982; 
Abel-Smith 1994). Challenges are presented by the prevailing inequalities in health status, 
use and provision of health services (Wilkin 1992; McPherson 1994; Benzeval et al 1995; 
Webster 1998). Further problems arise in accommodating the different stakeholders 
involved, and in addressing potential conflicts between their respective objectives (Kitson 
1992; Benton 1996). In health care, stakeholders may comprise politicians, purchasers, 
providers, patients and other interested parties. Each party will be influenced by their 
particular values and beliefs. Kitson (1992) provide an example where nurses and doctors 
held opposing views on what constitutes a quality issue. Whilst nurses were concerned 
about the dignity of elderly men who had undergone prostrate operations, doctors focused 
on the incidence of post-operative infection rates.
Some aspects of quality are difficult to quantify. For example, measuring infection rates 
requires a quantitative approach which is more straightforward compared to the 
measurement of patient dignity which involves a more qualitative approach. Equity is 
another aspect of quality that is notoriously difficult to quantify (Reinke 1988). 
Measurement difficulties can lead to a tendency to focus on factors that are easily 
measured, to the neglect of others (Nutley and Smith 1998). Kitson highlighted that in 
1992 considerably more resources (eight times more) were devoted to medical audit 
compared to nursing audit. In evaluating the performance of a health service, it might be 
considered desirable to measure the outcomes but difficulties in measurement can shift 
the balance towards the health service process (Davies and Crombie 1995).
It is important to have a broad set of evaluation measures which fully address an 
organisation’s activities. Otherwise, the activity of an organisation may be skewed 
towards dysfunctional behaviour. For example, some health care policy changes can have 
unintended and undesirable consequences. If the evaluation is too narrow and these 
unintended effects are ignored, they may be reinforced or misleading conclusions may be 
drawn. Unintended and undesirable consequences of policy changes include counter­
productive effects and the creation of new problems (Forrester 1961; Rittel and Webber 
1973).
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Consequences of policy changes are often difficult to anticipate in view of the multiple 
factors involved, which combine to produce many different effects. An example of a 
policy change which has led to counter-productive effects concerns NHS waiting lists. 
Resource increases may only offer temporary relief to excessive waiting lists as referral 
rates may rise in response to the increased access, thus causing waiting lists to ‘bounce 
back’ (e.g. Buttery and Snaith 1979, 1980; Roland and Morris 1988; Worthington 1991; 
Pope 1992; Newton et al 1995; Hamblin et al 1997; The Economist 1998; Goddard and 
Tavakoli 1998; Hamblin et al 1998a; Earwicker and Whynes 1998; van Ackere and Smith 
1999). In fact, given that patients’ expectations are so high, any policy change which 
increases access to services can potentially stimulate further demand and thus impose 
pressure on the system. However, although this phenomenon is well-known, this policy is 
frequently employed in order to reap short-term benefits.
The introduction of GP fundholding is an example of a policy change that created a new 
problem of a two-tiered service in the provision of hospital care. This caused great public 
concern. The two-tiered system arose because GP fundholders were in control of their 
budgets and so were able to secure privileges that were denied to non-fimdholding GPs. In 
addition, they could finance operations for their patients when access for others was 
withdrawn because block contracts had been filled and the health authorities’ funds had 
been exhausted (Honigsbaum, 1993). Reductions in NHS hospital beds provides another 
example of a policy change which may lead to the creation of a new problem. It might be 
assumed that efficiency levels will rise to ensure that emergency admissions are not 
compromised by this policy change. However, if the scope for efficiency savings is 
limited, what occurs in practice is that elective care acts as a safety valve creating a new 
problem of excessive levels of elective cancellations (Lane et al 2000).
In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the interactions between different 
elements of the NHS with the use of the terms like “joined-up thinking” or a “whole 
systems” approach (Harrison 2001; Spurgeon 2001). For example, on the long-term 
planning of hospitals (NHS 2000b; Smith 1999) and national priorities on improving 
access to services (NHS 1998b). To fully understand the consequences of policy changes, 
it is necessary to consider an overview of the system and the system interactions. In other 
words, “joined-up thinking” is required.
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2.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, health care systems were introduced in general before focusing on the UK 
system, the NHS, which formed the context to the case studies for this research. The 
structure of the NHS was presented in three different ways considering: its organisation; 
its provision of health care across the primary, secondary and tertiary levels; and, patient 
pathways with respect to patient needs. The broad aims of the NHS were outlined before 
discussing a number of challenges that arise in attempting to achieve these aims. Several 
key obstacles associated with the policy formulation were highlighted. Amongst these is 
the need to balance competing demands whilst operating within resource constraints. 
Other challenges are associated with the changing health care environment involving two 
important inter-related trends. The first trend is the gradual shift in balance away from the 
acute hospital sector towards primary and community care. The second trend is the 
increased scrutiny placed upon health care.
The shift in the balance of care, like any other health technology innovation, is being 
subjected to further scrutiny. However, several problems with the evaluation of health 
technologies were highlighted including the trade-offs that occur between different 
performance measures and stakeholder conflict. Several further problems that were 
considered were the difficulties in measuring the quality of services and how these 
difficulties can skew measurement towards what it easily measurable, to the neglect of 
certain aspects of service quality. In evaluating policy changes, the importance of 
addressing the possible unintended and undesirable consequences of these changes was 
also discussed. These issues form the focus of later chapters.
The shift in the balance of care and its evaluation are explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF CARE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter set the context to the research by presenting an overview of the UK 
health system, the NHS. The changing health care environment was discussed, with 
particular reference to service shifts (or reconfigurations) and changing roles (shifts in 
responsibility) that are collectively referred to as the shift in the balance of care. The 
motivation underlying this trend was reviewed. Several driving forces were identified 
including the need to reduce costs and improve access. The increasing scrutiny placed 
upon health care was also discussed.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore further the shift in the balance of care and its 
evaluation. Note that changes in individual services associated with this trend will be 
referred to as service shifts.
This chapter considers the diversity of service shifts (§3.2). The broad range of patient 
groups that have been affected is described (§3.2.1), and the varying degree to which 
shifts in health services have occurred (§3.2.2 and §3.2.3) is reviewed. The reservations 
that have been expressed about this trend developing without being properly evaluated are 
discussed (§3.3). An established approach to the evaluation of shifts in health services, 
economic appraisal, is described (§3.4), briefly reviewing its principles (§3.4.1) and the 
assessments of service shifts (§3.4.2). Opportunities are highlighted for the application of 
SD, which forms another evaluation approach (§3.5). The chapter is summarised in the 
final section (§3.6).
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3.2 THE DIVERSITY OF HEALTH SERVICE SHIFTS
The development of the shift in the balance of care, both within and outside the UK, has 
led to extreme diversity. This is reflected in two ways. Firstly, in terms of the broad range 
of patient groups which have been affected. Secondly, in the different types of service 
shifts which have occurred, both across different service levels and within the same 
service levels (Warner and Riley 1994; Coulter 1995; Godber et al 1997).
3.2.1 Scope o f Health Service Shifts
The scope of service shifts which have occurred extends across a vast range of specialties. 
These include opthalmology (Gillam et al 1995), physiotherapy (Hackett et al 1993), 
orthopaedics (Hollingworth et al 1993; O’Cathain 1994), dermatology (Black et al 1997), 
rheumatology (Helliwell 1996), paediatrics (Atwell and Gow 1985; Strayer et al 1980) 
and surgery (O’Cathlain et al 1992) amongst others. This trend has not been prioritised 
towards any particular patient group. It has affected both services for high profile diseases 
such as cancer (NHS 1995; Selby et al 1996) and heart disease (BCS 1997; de Bono
1998), and the ‘cinderella’ specialties such as mental health (Shah 1995; Knapp et al 
1994; Muijen et al 1992). Moreover, it has affected both established specialties such as 
maternity care (Brooten et al 1994; Scott 1994) and services for new illnesses such as 
HIV/AIDS (Tramarin et al 1992).
The shift in the balance of care is primarily represented by shifts in services from the 
secondary level to the primary level. Subsequently, commentators have tended to focus on 
these, but in fact, shifts have occurred across the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. 
Furthermore, shifts to primary care do not exclusively originate from the secondary level. 
For example, the tertiary level is the established place for CC services. This procedure is 
increasingly being carried out on a day case basis with early discharge and community 
follow-up, as opposed to on an inpatient basis. Therefore, this constitutes a shift across 
the primary/tertiary interface.
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3.2.2 Shifts Between Service Levels
In §2.3.2, differences between the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of health care 
were discussed in terms of their respective inputs, locations and service attributes. Godber 
et al (1997) have argued that an attribute-based definition provides the most robust basis 
upon which to discuss service shifts. They recommend that the set of attributes, direct 
access, generalist and longitudinal care, and delivery in a community setting serve as 
suitable descriptors of primary care. Based upon this definition, a shift towards primary 
care is said to occur when the new service acquires additional primary attributes. In 
§2.3.2, Godber et aVs classification was extended by proposing attribute sets for 
secondary and tertiary care. The attribute set of indirect access, occasional and specialised 
care, and delivery in a hospital-based setting, was proposed, with the degree of 
specialisation differing between tertiary and the less specialised, secondary care.
A full shift to the primary level is said to involve the gain of all four service attributes of 
primary care when previously there were none (Godber et al, 1997). Full shifts to primary 
care include substitutions for hospital-based services. Associated with this are GPs 
undertaking minor surgery (O’Cathlain et al 1992; Lowy et al 1993) and the substitution 
of hospital A&E services in a community setting (Roberts and Mays 1998). Other 
examples are ‘near patient testing’ which involves standard diagnostic tests being carried 
out at the GP surgery rather than in a hospital (Rink et al 1993; Grieve et al 1999) and GP 
practices employing physiotherapists (Hackett et al 1993). Further examples are early 
discharge schemes with community follow-up (Brooten et al 1994; Hollingworth et al 
1993; Atwell and Gow 1985; Scott 1994; Beech et al 1999).
Partial shifts to primary care involve shifts to a lesser degree. They comprise shared (or 
integrated) care (Strayer et al 1980; Muijen et al 1992; Tramarin et al 1992; DICE 1994; 
GRASSIC 1994) and hospital-at-home schemes (Knowelden et al 1991; Hensher et al
1999). They also include the provision of specialist services in outreach clinics in the 
community (Bailey et al 1994; Shah 1995; Gillam et al 1995; Helliwell 1996; Russell- 
Jones 1996; Black et al 1997; Bowling et al 1997). Another example is early discharge 
with secondary sector community follow-up as opposed to the case of a full shift where 
the follow-up is by primary sector staff (Bums et al 1993). Partial shifts to primary care 
also include radiological telemedicine to remote communities (Halvorsen and Kristiansen
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1996), and direct bookings onto surgical waiting lists that dispense with the usual 
specialist OP consultation (Coulter 1995). Further examples are open access clinics, 
which provide direct access to certain diagnostic services by eliminating the need for a 
referral by a specialist. This has involved gastroscopy, endoscopy, echocardiography and 
radiological services, (Tybulewicz et al 1996; Chawda et al 1997; BMA 1997; de Bono 
1998).
Although service shifts have tended to be away from acute hospital care, some shifts 
across the secondary/tertiary interface have occurred in the opposite direction. This has 
been intended to concentrate complex work in order to maintain a critical volume and 
skill base. Specialities effected have been obstetrics, radiology, trauma and surgery (HSM 
1996).
Shifts from the tertiary level to the secondary level, have been designed to improve local 
access and enable tertiary centres to concentrate on more complex work, whilst less 
complex cases, which nevertheless require specialised hospital care, are delegated to 
secondary centres. This arrangement has been referred to as a “hub and spoke” model 
(Ham et al 1998) or “network of expertise” (NHS 1995). It has involved cancer services 
(NHS 1995; Selby et al 1996) and cardiac services (BCS 1994a, 1997).
The Calman-Hine cancer report on the organisation and delivery of cancer services (NHS
1995) called for a new structure composed of a network extending from cancer centres 
out to cancer units and beyond to primary care. Cancer units would only treat common 
cancers, whilst only the more specialised cancer centres would treat the rarer cancers. The 
New NHS document (NHS 1997b) proposed that the Calman-Hine proposals should be 
used as a model for national service frameworks covering other major services.
Regarding cardiac services, facilities have been developed at DGHs to provide low risk 
diagnostic CC. This service development has been intended to improve local services and 
to enable the tertiary centres to concentrate on emergency care, high risk diagnostic and 
treatment procedures. Further connections within the hub and spoke model involve the 
primary level, which plays an important complementary role in prevention and 
rehabilitation in the management of heart disease.
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As these shifts in cancer and cardiac services involve substitutions for tertiary services, 
they represent full shifts to the secondary level. The shift affecting cancer care is poorly 
defined, from irregular service provision, delivered on an ad hoc basis with gaps in 
provision. Therefore, the shifts from the tertiary level to the secondary level will be 
accompanied by the expansion of tertiary services.
3.2.3 Shifts Within Service Levels
Further service shifts occur within a particular service level rather than across the 
interface between different service levels. These include the use of telephone 
consultations in general practice, which provide an alternative to consultations in the 
surgery and home visits (Brown and Armstrong 1995; Salisbury 1997). They also improve 
the degree of direct access within primary care, in terms of reducing the access time, by 
offering out-of-hours services. Other examples of shifts within primary care, based upon 
telephone-based services, also involve the delegation of responsibility from doctors to 
nurses. This includes the NHS Direct helpline which is a 24-hour telephone-consultation 
service delivered by nurses, and practice nurses conducting telephone-based triage (or 
prioritisation) in GP surgeries (Gallagher et al 1998; Shekelle and Roland 1999). In these 
cases, access to primary care is improved but access to GP services becomes indirect. 
Another example involves the NHS ‘walk-in’ centres which are nurse led although the 
skill mix may involve GPs (Walker 1999; Merry 2001). These offer free consultations 
without an appointment at convenient times. They may substitute for hospital usage as 
some patients who find access to their GPs difficult seek health care at an A&E 
department.
Shifts within the secondary level include the replacement of long-term beds with acute 
beds (Stevens et al 1990) and the switch from inpatient care to day surgery (Warner and 
Riley 1994). Another example is the transfer of patients from DGHs to community 
hospitals which represent an intermediate institutional setting (Hine et al 1996).
Further service shifts are expected in the future, both across and within the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels, reducing the need for hospital services and gradually 
bringing care closer to home (Warner and Riley 1994; NHS 2000b). This will involve 
internet access to NHS services, an increase in the use of home-based diagnostic kits,
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genetic engineering and, eventually, the use of vaccines for conditions that are currently 
incurable, such as HIV/AIDS.
3.3 CALLS FOR FORMAL EVALUATION
As discussed in §2.5.4, there has been an increasing call for all health technologies and 
technological innovations to be properly evaluated. Following these calls, many have 
expressed concern about the lack of evaluation of the shift in the balance of care (Scott 
and Maynard 1991; Harris 1994; Coulter 1995; Haines and Iliffe 1995; Scott 1996; 
Godber et al 1997; Pedersen and Leese 1997; BMA 1997; Scott and Wordsworth 1998; 
Hensher et al 1999). This lack of evaluation is, perhaps, surprising given that the shift to 
primary care has been high on the agenda of government policy.
The evaluation of service shifts could focus on the effects on the quality of services. 
Different aspects of service quality were outlined in §2.4 including the access to services, 
patient satisfaction and cost-effectiveness. Service shifts could also be evaluated on the 
basis of other factors such as changes in the workload of the staff involved.
Service developments may involve shifting a workload away from the established service 
to alleviate pressure on that service. However, this may create a new problem by imposing 
additional workload pressures on the health professionals who are responsible for the new 
service. This is of particular concern for the service developments in primary care where 
the intensity of the GP workload is already high and there is a recruitment crisis (BMA 
1996, 1997; Scott and Vale 1998). Furthermore, shifting services may lead to unintended 
financial pressures. Shifting a workload to a new service may be cost-effective. However, 
if the new service facility is used to augment rather than substitute for the established 
service, or both, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, then demands on staff are increased and 
pressure is imposed by calls for further funding (Lowy et al 1993; Rink et al 1993; Scott 
and Wordsworth 1998).
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Figure 3.1 Changes in Workload Associated with Service Shifts
Increases in the overall workload may be driven by increases in demand, which have been 
stimulated by the improved access associated with the service development. As described 
in §2.5.4, patients have high expectations for the NHS to deliver and these expectations 
will be fuelled by service developments. Demand may also be stimulated by the reduction 
in waiting times derived from increased capacity. This well known phenomenon was 
highlighted in §2.5.5. Hamblin et al (1998b) describe another mechanism whereby 
demand may be stimulated. When GPs gain new skills, as a result o f taking on new 
duties, they identify more patients in need of treatment.
Allowing demand to be met may cancel out any cost benefits associated with a service 
development that is deemed to be cost-effective (Harris 1994). Coulter (1995) suggests 
that cultural change is required to ensure that the cost benefits are not cancelled-out by 
increases in inappropriate demand. Attempts to stem the levels o f inappropriate demand 
have been made by the use of clinical guidelines (Coulter 1995; Edwards and Hensher
A further issue to consider in evaluation, which is associated with changes in workload, is 
the remuneration for services delivered. This is a cause o f concern for GPs, as they are not 
remunerated for all new tasks that they have adopted within the service innovations in 
primary care. In cases where GPs have not been remunerated, further investment is 
required. For shifts in NHS services between the hospital sectors, remuneration concerns 
do not arise because hospital doctors are salaried. This difference between GPs and 
hospital doctors may change in the future. A government white paper signalled a number
1998).
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of proposals for certain changes to primary care, including the option of GPs being 
salaried by practices or NHS trusts (NHS 1996c).
Therefore, there are various issues, which need to be considered in evaluating the shift in 
services, considering both the direct effects of the service shift and its ramifications. 
These issues include the access to services, patient satisfaction, cost-effectiveness, 
financial and workload pressures, appropriateness of service use and remuneration.
There are various approaches to evaluating shifts in services. For example, a survey may 
be carried out to sample patient preferences and patients’ attitudes to service 
developments, or to evaluate changes in GP workload (e.g. Bailey et al 1994; Gillam et al 
1995; Scott and Wordsworth 1998). An expert panel could convene to evaluate the 
appropriateness of service use. An established approach to the evaluation of the shift in 
the balance of care is economic appraisal.
3.4 AN ESTABLISHED EVALUATION APPROACH
5.4.1 Economic Appraisal
Economic appraisal represents a well recognised and established health care evaluation 
approach although it has yet to reach full acceptance in health care (Hutton 1994; Rutten 
and Drummond 1994). Since the 1960s, the growth in health economic appraisal has been 
exponential. It has been the subject of a number of texts (Drummond 1980; Warner and 
Luce 1982; Drummond et al 1987; Luce and Elixhauser 1990) and the focus of numerous 
other publications in the medical and health care literature. These include overviews of its 
basic principles (Weinsten and Stason 1977; Detsky and Naglie 1990; Robinson 1993a, 
1993b, 1993c, 1993d, 1993e; Petrou and Renton 1993; Mason et al 1993), bibliographies 
and reviews (Adams et al 1992; Backhouse et al 1992; Udvarhelyi et al 1992; Coyle and 
Drummond 1993; Elixhauser et al 1993; Rutten and Drummond 1994).
There are a number of different variants of economic appraisal. They are often 
collectively referred to by the term cost-effectiveness analysis. This can be misleading, 
given that cost-effectiveness analysis is the specific name given to one such variant. The 
other variants, which are mainly applied to health care, are cost-minimisation analysis 
(also known as cost-analysis), cost-benefit analysis and cost-utility analysis. The basic
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principle underlying each is to assist in the choice between several different procedures or 
programmes by compiling a ‘balance sheet’ o f the expected costs and benefits associated 
with each option. More formally, costs and benefits are referred to as, inputs and outputs 
(or outcomes) respectively (Figure 3.2).
INPUTS HEALTH CARE
PROCEDURE
Resources Consumed (or PROGRAMME)
OUTPUTS
c
Cl = Direct Costs 
C2 = Indirect Costs
(Production Losses) 
C3 = Intangible Costs
Health Improvement
Possible Measurements
In Natural Units In Utility Units 
(Health Effects) (QALYs)
B
Economic Benefits (£) 
B1 = Direct Benefits 
B2 = Indirect Benefits 
(Production Gains) 
B3= Intangible Benefits
Figure 3.2 Components o f Economic Evaluation 
(Source: Rutten and Drummond 1994)
Inputs may comprise direct, indirect and intangible costs. Direct costs o f health care are 
primarily the responsibility o f the health service but they may also fall upon patients and 
their families. Indirect costs are productivity losses that arise when patients are withdrawn 
from the workforce to undergo care. Intangible costs refer to the pain or discomfort 
associated with treatment. Outputs (or outcomes) may encompass direct, indirect and 
intangible benefits. Direct benefits are the savings in other direct medical care, which are 
achieved as a result o f the medical intervention. Results o f the medical intervention might 
also include productivity gains associated with an earlier return to work. These are 
referred to as indirect benefits. Intangible benefits include the value o f improved health 
from the patient’s perspective. Although economic evaluations rely upon comparisons 
between different health care procedures or programmes, doing nothing can constitute a 
viable alternative.
Costs are measured in monetary terms. The four types o f economic appraisals differ in 
their analysis o f the outputs (or outcomes) of the different options considered. The 
application o f cost-minimisation analysis is appropriate when the outcomes o f the 
different options are assumed to be similar. In this case, only the costs are considered. 
Cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses also measure outcomes but 
different units are used.
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Cost-benefit analysis imposes monetary values on all outcomes. Given that intangibles are 
difficult to measure in these terms, they are often ignored and this has led to severe 
criticism against cost-benefit analysis. Criticism has also been directed against the 
measurement of benefits by productivity gains in cost-benefit analysis. More recent 
approaches consider individuals’ observed or stated preferences.
Cost-effectiveness analysis measures outcomes in natural units (health effects), such as 
life-years gained or positive cases diagnosed. This approach has two key limitations. 
Firstly, it cannot be used to compare programmes with different natural units of outcomes. 
Secondly, it cannot combine improvements in mortality with improvements with 
morbidity.
Cost-utility analysis, which is the most sophisticated form of health economic appraisal, 
aims to overcome these two limitations by producing a combined index of utility. Several 
indices have been developed including the quality adjusted life year (QALY) which 
provides a common universal unit for cost-utility analysis -  cost per QALY gained. 
Although the QALY has been criticised on various levels, it is the index most commonly 
used (Robinson 1993d; Petrou and Renton 1993). However, in considering service shifts, 
the QALY is not appropriate, as the use of this measure assumes that the length and 
quality of life are the key benefits. Scott (1996) argues that the appropriate measures, for 
service shifts, relate to the health care process, such as the waiting time and convenience 
of the service.
The standard approaches to economic evaluation produce a single index score to compare 
different options, such as cost per QALY gained or cost per positive case diagnosed. By 
contrast, an alternative, non-standard approach, which has been applied to evaluate the 
cost-effectiveness of service shifts, has been to produce costs accompanied by a range of 
outcome measures. These may include clinical variables and process variables such as 
waiting times, convenience of the service and patient satisfaction with the service (Godber 
et al 1997). Drummond (1994) refers to this approach as cost-consequence analysis. 
Whilst this approach has the advantage of making the various outcome measures explicit, 
it has been argued that multiple process measures can be considered within standard
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approaches to economic evaluation using techniques such as willingness-to-pay and 
conjoint analysis (Scott 1996; Godber et al 1997).
Most decisions in health care are concerned with how much a service should be provided, 
not whether or not it should be provided at all. Therefore, in presenting results of 
economic appraisals, incremental analysis is generally shown. Focusing on average costs 
may produce misleading results because there is often a significant difference between the 
average costs and marginal costs. Discounting and conducting sensitivity analysis are also 
regarded as constituting good practice. Adjustments should be made for costs and benefits 
occurring at different time points by discounting to present values, because it is assumed 
that costs incurred now are more important than those incurred in the future. Sensitivity 
analysis should be conducted to address any uncertainties.
Whilst there is a high level of agreement among health economists on some issues, such 
as the importance of sensitivity analysis and the use of discounting, various debates exist 
about other issues. Examples of issues of contention are the inclusion of indirect costs and 
benefits, and the actual choice of discount rate for health benefits (Drummond et al 1993). 
The Department of Health and UK Treasury support the view that health benefits should 
not be discounted (Cairns 1992). The rationale for using a zero discount rate for health 
benefits is that health has no monetary value, it cannot be invested, and there exists no 
evidence to suggest that people consider that future health states are less important than 
present health states (Parsonage and Neuberger 1992).
The shift in the balance of care may be supported by economic appraisal in several 
different ways. For example, economic analysis may be applied to determine the 
appropriate number and location of health service facilities. To promote the appropriate 
use of facilities, economic evidence may be incorporated into clinical guidelines and 
medical audit procedures. Furthermore, when operating within a limited budget, cost- 
effectiveness data may be used to make decisions about whether or not a service shift is 
appropriate. Purchasers/commissioners may not support a service shift if it is not deemed 
to be cost-effective.
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3.4,2 Economic Assessments o f  Service Shifts
Several reviews and discussions have reported poor evidence of the cost-effectiveness of 
some service shifts and methodological shortcomings in the assessments of service shifts 
(Maynard 1994; Haines and Illife 1995; Sowden et al 1995; Scott 1996; Godber et al 
1997; Roberts and Mays 1998; Miller et al 1999; NHS 2000b).
The extent of evidence in favour of service shifts varies considerably (Haines and Illife
1995). For example, specialist outreach clinics (Harris 1994; Black et al 1997) and 
services substituting for hospital A&E services (Roberts and Mays 1998) present little 
evidence, and the cost-effectiveness of integrated care for asthma and diabetes has been 
found to be inconclusive (GRASSIC 1994; DICET 1994). There is sound evidence of 
cost-effectiveness, based upon a RCT, for the provision of care attendants for elderly 
patients discharged from hospital (Townsend et al 1988) and the early discharge of stroke 
patients into the community (Beech et al 1999). As discussed in §2.5.4, the RCT is the 
acknowledged gold standard method for collecting evidence. However, conducting RCTs 
of the organisation and delivery of services is not always feasible. Furthermore, it is quite 
different to conducting RCTs of medical interventions, for which the potential volume of 
evidence is so much greater, as evidence can be derived from large multi-centre trials and 
meta-analyses. Therefore, for service delivery innovations, it is necessary to consider 
other study designs such as observational studies and comparative trials. The evaluation 
of hospital-at-home schemes is one such example where modest evidence of cost- 
effectiveness has been provided, based upon a non-RCT approach (Marks 1991).
Methodological shortcomings have included: ambiguity of definitions; incomplete data;, 
failing to justify why outcomes have not been evaluated; the absence of sensitivity 
analysis; and, failing to control for differences between the study and control groups. 
Godber et al (1997) have expressed concern that inappropriate comparisons may be made. 
For example, if a new service is substituting for the established service, then the 
appropriate comparison is between the new service and the established service. However, 
this is not the appropriate comparison to make if the new service is augmenting, rather 
than substituting for, the established service (as illustrated in Figure 3.1). In this case, the 
new service should be compared with either no service or, with appropriate discounting, 
delayed treatment from the established service.
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The strength of evidence of the cost-effectiveness of a service development may also be 
weakened by the inability to draw generalisations from a study. Sometimes, important 
information about the study setting such as staffing levels and skill mix is not reported. 
On other occasions, the reported outcomes of a service development may only be specific 
to a particular setting. For example, the evaluation of an early hospital discharge 
programme based in urban location may not easily translate to the same service in a rural 
setting where domiciliary care may not be feasible (Casiro et al 1993). Evaluations may 
rely upon restrictive assumptions about the resources available. For example, GPs 
conducting minor surgery may be considered to be cost-effective (O’Cathain et al 1993), 
but the additional workload requirements may be so high that only a limited number of 
GPs may be able to adopt this new role. Another example relates to early discharge 
policies with community follow-up. Although they may be deemed to be cost-effective, if 
there is insufficient capacity, these policies may lead to unacceptable delays for 
community services. Generalisations may also be difficult to make across international 
boundaries. For example, assumptions about changes in demand in response to primary 
care innovations in the US, where availability varies, will differ from that in the UK, 
where there is universal access (Roberts and Mays 1998).
In summary, the evidence on the cost-effectiveness of service shifts is fragmented and of 
poor quality. Moreover, whilst economic appraisal forms an established evaluation 
approach in health care, the emphasis has tended to be on the assessment of new 
treatments rather than other health technology innovations, such as service shifts. Over 
the course of time, the situation will improve as more service innovations are subjected to 
the scrutiny of economic evaluation. In its evaluation of health care technologies, the 
NHS Executive gave a high priority to the evaluation of several service shifts (NHS 
1994c). These include diagnostic facilities, specialist outreach clinics and shared (or 
integrated) care schemes. With greater awareness of the methodological shortcomings, 
these should also be reduced over the course of time.
3.5 A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR SD MODELLING
However, the scope of evaluation will be restricted for as long as the emphasis is on the 
need to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of health service innovations without seeking to
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fully understand their ramifications. An important ramification of improved access is the 
stimulation of latent demand. In other words, “joined-up thinking” is required.
As discussed in §3.3, in calling for the service shifts to be evaluated, commentators have 
recommended that cost-effectiveness analyses should be carried out. However, implicit in 
a simple cost-effectiveness analysis of a service shift is the assumption that demand will 
remain constant. Service developments are conceptualised as simple service shifts and 
substitutions, in isolation of the potential secondary or knock-on effects, most notably the 
stimulation of latent demand for services. Given that secondary effects can impact upon 
both service costs and benefits, a simple cost-effectiveness analysis can be misleading.
Commentators have acknowledged that service shifts may stimulate demand and their 
response has been to call for the use of clinical guidelines to stem the inappropriate 
demand. Cost-effectiveness data about the appropriate use of medical procedures may be 
incorporated into clinical guidelines. However, the stimulation of demand cannot be fully 
addressed by the use of a clinical guideline because it is an inherently complex process, 
involving a series of decisions. By contrast, the focus of a guideline is on a single 
decision.
It is possible to deal with increases in demand associated with a service shift with 
economic appraisal via a cost-benefit analysis; considering both expansions in demand 
along the existing demand curve and shifts in the demand curve. However, economic 
appraisals of the cost-benefit type cannot explain the feedback mechanisms underlying 
increases in demand.
It would therefore be useful to present a coherent framework in which to seek an 
understanding of the mechanisms and consequences of the stimulation of latent demand. 
With this understanding, guidelines and other policy interventions may be applied 
effectively to alleviate pressure on the system. Such a framework may be provided by the 
application of SD.
SD has a considerably lower profile in health care and there are no documented cases of 
SD studies of service shifts. Therefore, it is not surprising that, whilst calls have been 
made for cost-effectiveness analyses to be carried out on service shifts and service use, no
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such calls have been made for these to be accompanied by SD analyses. Unlike the 
emphasis of economic appraisal on fine detail, the analysis of SD is based upon an 
overview of the system. An SD model could elucidate the key mechanisms underlying 
both existing and potential primary and secondary effects of policy changes (i.e. support 
“joined-up thinking”).
As an evaluation tool, SD could be applied in cases where service shifts have occurred 
and produced undesirable effects. Insights could be provided on how to intervene to 
produce a better future without triggering further side effects. Alternatively, SD could be 
used as a planning tool when planning a service shift to indicate what effects to anticipate 
and thus prepare for a better future. Mass (1981) refers to SD models constructed within 
the ‘evaluation mode’ and ‘planning mode’ as “type 1” and “type 2” models respectively. 
SD will be explored further in the next chapter.
3.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, the diversity of service shifts was reviewed. It was considered how they 
have applied across a host of different specialties and to varying degrees, both within and 
across service levels. Following concerns expressed about the need for this trend to be 
rigorously evaluated, the available evidence was reviewed. Economic appraisal was 
presented as an established health care evaluation approach. Economic evaluations of the 
costs and benefits of service shifts, based on cost-effectiveness analyses, were reviewed. 
The inability to consider ramifications of service shifts, in particular the stimulation of 
latent demand, was highlighted as a key problem arising with simple cost-effectiveness 
analyses. It is possible to study shifts in the demand curve by applying another variant of 
economic appraisal, cost-benefit analysis, which is used less frequently in health care. 
However, various questions remain about the mechanisms underlying changes in demand. 
It was argued that SD could be applied to explicate the mechanisms underlying existing 
and potential cases of the stimulation of demand and other dynamic ramifications of 
service shifts. SD, which has a considerably lower profile in health care, will form the 
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter considered the evaluation of service shifts in the NHS and economic 
appraisal which forms an established approach to evaluation. It was argued that an SD 
analysis could complement economic appraisal by explaining both existing and potential 
secondary effects of health service shifts, most notably the stimulation of latent demand. 
SD has a considerably lower profile in health care.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the SD approach and clarify its role in health 
care. This is achieved via a comparative review of the health care simulation modelling 
literature which follows on from SD adopting a particular approach to simulation.
Simulation modelling is first introduced (§4.2). Complexity, which forms the focus of 
simulation, is described with the aid of a 3-dimensional classification to differentiate 
between the different types of complexity (§4.2.1). A brief overview of the processes of 
simulation modelling is offered (§4.2.2). The next section considers the different variants 
of simulation modelling (§4.3). Using the 3-dimensional classification of complexity 
introduced in §4.2.1, SD is compared and contrasted with the more traditional approach to 
simulation modelling, which has a higher profile in health care. Discrete event simulation 
(DES) exemplifies the traditional approach. For the purposes of this research, DES serves 
as a suitable vehicle to illustrate the relative advantages of SD over the traditional 
approach to simulation modelling and the potential benefits obtainable by the use of the 
SD approach. The comparison is conducted by first introducing the DES approach (§4.3.1 
and §4.3.2), and then the SD approach (§4.3.3 and §4.3.4). The differences between the
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two are illustrated with a specific health care example (§4.4) and then summarised (§4.5). 
The low profile of SD is addressed (§4.6) before concluding the chapter (§4.7).
4.2 SIMULATION MODELLING
4.2.1 The Focus o f Sim ulation: Complexity
Health care policy problems are inherently complicated and a powerful feature of 
simulation is its ability to explore complexity over time (Davies and Davies 1986). 
Complexity, broadly defined, may be classified into three dimensions: detail, dynamic and 
organisational complexity. The general distinction between detail and dynamic 
complexity has been alluded to in the SD literature and articulated by Senge (1990). This 
categorisation is extended by identifying a third dimension, organisational complexity.
Detail complexity originates from the existence of multiple variables which potentially 
can produce an enormous number of possible connections and effects. It is prevalent in 
health care, and presents great difficulties to planners and policy makers. It generally 
focuses on the system’s physical processes and tangible elements, and often involves the 
interaction between patients and resources. Examples are the multiple characteristics of 
patients and resources. Resource constraints may determine when and if patients receive 
care. Further examples are the inherent uncertainty and variability about demand, clinical 
events, length of stay, survival times, emergency arrival times, and the various patient 
pathways through the processes of care. Associated with detail complexity are difficulties 
in scheduling and the associated trade-offs between patients queuing and resource 
inefficiency and various other trade-offs (Lee and Mills 1982; Reinke 1988; Abel-Smith
1994).
Dynamic complexity arises in situations where the consequences, over time, of the cause 
and effect relationships are not obvious. It might include counter-intuitive secondary or 
knock-on effects of policy changes, variations between short-term and long-term 
responses and complications arising from the global consequences of policy changes 
(Forrester 1961; Rittel and Webber 1973). Delays are important determinants of dynamic 
behaviour, and a distinction may be made between delays in physical flows and the lags in 
the transmission of information, such as cognitive and perception delays. Non-linearities 
are also important in determining the behaviour of social systems (Forrester 1961, 1987).
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An example of a non-linearity is presented by hospital admission rates not being simply 
proportional to the number of available beds, as admission policies may be modified to 
account for periods when vacant bed numbers are low. Another source of non-linearity 
exists when decisions about hospital admissions are not independently responsive to 
several factors, such as available beds and demand; 100% bed occupancy renders the level 
of demand irrelevant in determining admission rates.
The mechanisms of dynamic complexity may be illustrated by the discussions in the 
literature about the dynamics of NHS waiting lists and waiting times (e.g. Buttery and 
Snaith 1979, 1980; Roland and Morris 1988; Worthington 1991; Pope 1992; Newton et al 
1995; Hamblin et al 1997; The Economist 1998; Goddard and Tavakoli 1998; Hamblin et 
al 1998a; Earwicker and Whynes 1998; van Ackere and Smith 1999). A policy of 
injecting more resources into the system may be intended to reduce waiting lists and 
waiting times. Whilst this policy may be effective locally, in the short-term, by increasing 
throughput and therefore reducing waiting lists and waiting times, the long-term effect 
might be an increase in these variables. This may arise because, once doctors have 
perceived a reduction in waiting times, they may respond by increasing their referral rates, 
thus stimulating demand. Therefore, although increasing the level of available resources 
may seem to be a reasonable reaction to concern about excessive waiting lists and waiting 
times, the benefits may eventually be cancelled out due to counter-intuitive, compensatory 
system behaviour. As non-linearities are responsible for shifts in the dominant feedback 
structure in a system, the significance of this phenomenon may vary according to the 
circumstances.
The third dimension, organisational complexity, may be crudely defined as a collection of 
social factors which influence the operation of the system. It includes elements that are 
difficult to quantify including the quality and value of outcomes (Pierskalla and Brailer
1994) and intangibles. Intangibles can have significant effects on the dynamics of the 
system. Examples of intangibles and affected variables are: frustration about contractual 
constraints and treatment decisions (Mullen 1994; Black et al 1996); incentives or 
disincentives and the costs generated (Beech and Morgan 1992); waiting times and 
treatment decisions (Starkley 1993; RCS/ RCP 1993); patient expectations and emergency 
admission rates (Edwards 1996); and, various pressures and purchasing behaviour (Shaw
1995). Organisational complexities also include uncertainties that cannot be assigned
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probabilities relating to the lack of knowledge about present and future dimensions such 
as system responses to unprecedented actions and the preferences of individuals 
(Rosenhead 1989). Other examples of organisational complexity are the poor quality of 
information due to biases, distortion or incompleteness as frequently encountered in NHS 
waiting times data (Mullen 1994; Black et al 1996), and the nature of organisational 
decision making which evolves typically out of tradition rather than being based on 
rationality (Simon 1979). Further examples are the predominantly non-quantitative and 
non-planning culture within health care (Clayden 1995) and its pluralistic context. This 
involves the powerful force of the medical professions and the long tradition of clinical 
freedom (Lee and Mills 1982; Jones and Hirst 1986; Ham 1995) which has repeatedly led 
to conflict during government attempts to reform the NHS (Webster 1998).
Health care problems and other issues may span all three dimensions of complexity. 
These problem situations often share many characteristics with “wicked” (Rittel and 
Webber 1973) or “squishy” problems (Strauch 1975) and “messes” (Ackoff 1979), as 
described in the social sciences literature. For a certain class of policy problems for which 
time is an important factor, the application of simulation modelling can assist policy 
makers in learning how to “tame” or unravel the “mess” to some extent. The shift in the 
balance of care spans all three dimensions of complexity and involves significant 
consequences that propagate over time. Therefore, simulation modelling may be 
effectively employed to explore the shift in the balance of care.
Fundamentally, a computer simulation model can offer a powerful, experimental policy 
analysis tool with logical, flexible, explicit, comprehensive and rigorous dynamic 
analyses. It provides a cheap, risk-free environment in which to seek insight into the 
effects of current policies. In addition, without making a commitment to change, it 
provides an opportunity to test out ideas, explore the likely effects of alternative policies 
and design more robust policies (Meadows and Robinson 1985; Davies and Davies 1986; 
Vennix 1990; Davies and Davies 1994; Pierskalla and Brailer 1994). A computer 
simulation model can also offer a relatively painless way to study controversial or emotive 
issues. Holmes et al (1994) provide such an example, where a computer simulation model 
was used to address the emotive issue of treatment withdrawal in an intensive care unit. 
This model was used to implement an algorithm, which estimated the number of bed-days
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that could be released if treatment were withdrawn from the patients who were expected 
to die before hospital discharge.
Compared with other stochastic models and optimisation approaches, a powerful feature 
of simulation is its ability to address and explore different aspects of complexity. It can 
effectively be applied to study many problems that are intractable by analytical means, 
such as markov, semi-markov and mathematical programming methods (Boldy 1976; 
Lambo 1983; Davies and Davies 1994). Simulation, as opposed to optimisation, also 
avoids certain criticisms made against the quest for optimal solutions in social systems, 
including oversimplifying assumptions and a lack of appreciation of the transiency of 
optimal conditions (Rittel and Webber 1973; Ackoff 1979; Rosenhead 1978, 1989; Lane 
1992).
4.2.2 Basic Processes o f  Simulation
Various definitions of the term, ‘simulation’, exist (Kleijnen 1974; Pritsker 1979) and 
sometimes, the definition is extended to include optimisation methods (e.g. WHO 1978b). 
For the purposes of this research, simulation is defined as a pragmatic, non-optimising 
approach which involves the construction and dynamic analysis of a model. This model 
represents the salient features of a system, and is constructed for a specific purpose 
(Banks and Carson 1984). Figure 4.1, which was adapted from Clark and Cole (1974), 
provides a schematic representation of the processes of simulation modelling which are 
both sequential and iterative.
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Figure 4.1 Processes o f Simulation Modelling 
(Source: Taylor and Lane 1998)
Simulation modelling is based on the premise that a problem has been identified as the 
focus for the study (Shannon 1975; Randers 1980). An unambiguous definition o f the 
central problem is first derived. This is achieved by examining its characteristics or 
‘symptoms’, consulting experts, considering related studies and analysing various data, 
including historical time series. A preliminary conceptual model or ‘diagnosis’ is 
produced, comprising the key factors and interactions, which are understood to represent 
the basic mechanisms underlying the central problem. The conceptual model is then 
formalised into mathematical terms and converted into an executable computer program 
so that dynamic analyses may be performed in order to investigate existing policies and 
develop more effective policies. Embedded within the different modelling phases is a 
process whereby the model is subjected to considerable scrutiny and evaluation in order to 
amend conceptual and computational errors. Sensitivity analysis plays an important role 
in this process in testing the robustness o f model-based insights. The experimental phase 
forms the predominant, though not exclusive, source o f policy insight. Dynamic effects 
may be monitored using both graphical and tabular output.
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In Figure 4.1, a broader context is illustrated than that given by many traditional 
simulation authors as it also depicts the stages beyond the delivery of policy insights and 
recommendations. These ‘prescriptions’ are evaluated and may contribute to policy debate 
within a broader political context. They may be accepted or rejected and may contribute to 
further research endeavours.
In simulation studies, many complexities can be explicitly modelled, such as assumptions 
about patient and resource characteristics, delays, non-linearities and system interactions. 
Patient pathways may be traced at various levels of detail, with the purpose of the study 
determining what is appropriate (Davies and Davies 1994). Uncertainties associated with 
risk may be represented using constant probabilities or values sampled from a probability 
distribution. Organisational complexity presents some difficulties; if  it is ignored, 
acceptance of the study’s conclusions is unlikely. It may be considered implicitly by: 
acknowledging the organisational context and adopting a facilitative, rather than expert 
role; making simulation modelling more accessible to the client by using powerful visual 
interactive computer facilities; constructing transparent models and analyses to facilitate 
communication and debate; and, promoting a high degree of client participation to ensure 
a sense of ‘ownership’ over the model and the policy recommendations which thus 
emerge (Rosenhead 1978; Jones and Hirst 1986; Clayden 1995).
It is important to be aware that whilst great benefits may be obtainable from the use of 
simulation modelling, as with all modelling methodologies, it is not without certain 
problems and potential pitfalls. These include applying a particular model inappropriately; 
seeking academic rather than policy goals; failing to keep the model comprehensible and 
relevant to the policy problem; and, ignoring the by-products of modelling (Quade 1980; 
Law and Kelton 1991). One such by-product is the model acting as a communication 
facilitator and learning tool. Simulation can also have certain drawbacks. For example, 
stochastic simulation is time consuming, because various values have to be repeatedly 
sampled to construct a realistic representation of the system. Further difficulties relate to 
problems with data acquisition (Davies 1994) and model validation. Validation, in the 
sense of confirmation, can never be absolute (Popper, 1959). However, in simulation 
modelling, a pragmatic approach is adopted to establish confidence in whether the model 
is sufficiently accurate for its intended purpose (Forrester 1961; Richardson and Pugh 
1981; Neelamkavil 1987; Pidd 1998).
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There are several different varieties of simulation modelling. The SD method differs from 
the traditional approach to simulation modelling. Therefore, it is important to clarify this 
distinction.
4.3 VARIANTS OF SIMULATION MODELLING
4.3.1 A Traditional Approach: DES
Traditionally, health care simulation modelling has focused on the analysis of localised 
decisions and problems orientated towards individual patient detail. The scope of the 
traditional approach may be illustrated by considering DES, which represents the most 
sophisticated variant. For non-DES examples, see Bensley et al (1995) and Mather 
(2000). The 3-dimensional framework of complexity, introduced in §4.2.1, is used as a 
basis for this discussion. For the purposes of this research, the principles of DES are not 
described in detail. Further details may be found in standard simulation texts (e.g Banks 
and Carson 1984; Law and Kelton 1991; Paul and Balmer 1993; Pidd 1998).
DES models focus on individual activities - discrete events - which proceed according to 
the logic of the system under study. In the context of the health services, a discrete event 
may represent an arrival or death of an individual patient. Distinctive features of DES 
studies often include the analysis of heterogeneous patient flows, queues for hospital 
personnel and facilities, and resource utilisation. Individual patient detail is fundamental 
in issues addressed by DES studies, as it determines the interactions between resources 
and patients as they progress through the system. This detail may reflect the patients’ 
initial needs, the risk of subsequent clinical events and an estimate of the time they spend 
in hospital.
Referring to the 3-dimensional framework of complexity, DES modelling primarily 
concentrates on detail complexity. It is therefore considered the most appropriate 
methodology for modelling health care problems dominated by detail complexity (Davies 
1985; Davies and Davies 1994). Dynamic complexity is also considered to some extent in 
DES modelling. However, the consequences of policy changes are restricted to the local 
level, as the emphasis tends to be on isolated or closely interlinked decisions. Whilst 
queuing and the subsequent physical delays are central themes of DES modelling,
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information delays are not considered explicitly. Intangible elements tend to be ignored 
but attempts are made to implicitly consider other organisational complexities, as 
described in §4.2.1. In constructing DES models, generic computer packages are often 
inadequate to address the subtleties of the system, such as patient prioritisation and the 
flexibility of resource scheduling and sharing (Davies and Davies 1994). Subsequently, 
modellers often resort to writing their own programs using a high-level general purpose 
computing language (Dumas 1985; Jones and Hirst 1986; Davies 1994).
4.3.2 Health Care Applications o f DES
The literature on DES in healthcare is vast, extending back over many years with DES 
applied to numerous issues. These studies involve problems relating to patient scheduling, 
admissions, routing and flow schemes (e.g. ‘fast track’ schemes); staff sizing, scheduling 
and planning; bed planning; facility sizing and planning; and, budgeting. Studies have 
occurred within a variety of settings, both within and outside the UK.
Examples of different settings include casualty (Badri and Hollingsworth 1993; Huang et 
al 1995; Blake and Carter 1996), outpatients (Wilt and Goddin 1989; Babes and Sarma 
1991; Lehaney and Paul 1994), radiology (O’Kane 1981), surgery (Kwak et al 1975; 
Wright 1987; Jones and Hirst 1986; Fitzpatrick et al 1993), intensive care (Williams 
1983; Romanin-Jacur and Facchin 1987) pharmacy (Vemuri 1984; Mukheijee 1991) and 
ambulance services (Savas 1969). DES has also been applied to issues associated with 
treatment for renal disease (Davies 1979; Roberts et al 1980; Bolger and Davies 1992; 
Davies and Flowers 1995; Davies and Roderick 1998) and coronary heart disease (Davies 
1994). By modelling changes to demand, supply and utilisation variables, studies have 
sought improvements in efficiency and other aspects of health care.
Bed planning simulation studies have focused on improving the efficiency of the 
configuration of hospital beds and patient placement policies. For these studies, important 
outputs have included bed occupancy rates and patient misplacement rates, which occur 
when bed shortages lead to placements in an inappropriate department or patients being 
sent to another hospital. Examples are studies by Dumas (1985) and Butler et al (1992).
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Further DES health care examples include the analysis of a diagnostic radiology 
department (O’Kane 1981) which, as a support service, has important implications for the 
overall hospital efficiency, and studies of surgical units (Jones and Hirst 1986; Wright 
1987). Wright’s (1987) study of inpatient care for the general surgery and urology 
specialities in a health district evaluated ways in which efficiency might be improved in 
the context of proposed reductions in the number of beds. Another example involved an 
investigation of the number of personnel required to achieve minimum performance 
standards in a hospital OP pharmacy (Johnson et al 1972). OP studies, such as those by 
Wilt and Goddin (1989), Babes and Sarma (1991) and Lehaney and Paul (1994) 
considered efficiency by addressing the common problem of trade-offs between patients 
waiting and doctors being idle. DES has also been used to assist hospital managers in 
assessing the potential impact of a merger between two different clinics (Mahacheck and 
Knabe 1984).
In hospital casualty DES studies, assistance has been given in preparing for a range of 
scenarios including unforeseen events such as serious road traffic accidents. Hospital 
casualty models were constructed by Badri and Hollingsworth (1993) and Huang et al 
(1995). DES has also been applied to the ambulance service. A simulation model by 
Savas (1969) evaluated different allocations of ambulances and assist in balancing an 
effective service against cost considerations.
Although resource limitations are generally included to examine bottlenecks in the 
system, unconstrained DES models have considered other health care issues, such as the 
cost-effectiveness of different treatment strategies for end-stage renal disease (Roberts at 
al 1980), the dynamics of the HIV infection and AIDS (Brailsford et al 1992), and the 
development, in an African village, of trachoma which is a contagious eye condition 
(Hawkins 1989). The trachoma study provided predictions of the long-term effects of 
different preventative strategies, including vaccination and antibiotic treatment. Other 
DES studies which have predicted the effects of changes in treatment strategies, are the 
renal study by Bolger and Davies (1992) and the coronary heart disease study by Davies 
(1994). These studies considered the effects on future demand and costs, and thus assisted 
in purchasing, planning and budgeting. Further unconstrained DES models were used to 
evaluate screening services for the loss of vision associated with diabetes (Davies et al 
1996, 2000).
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Further examples and descriptions of DES applications to health care problems are given 
by Davies and Davies (1994), Lehaney and Hlupic (1995), and Jun et al (1999).
As the pressure on scarce health care resources continues, further calls will be made to 
reduce costs and improve efficiency. This will provide opportunities for new applications 
of DES. This will be facilitated by technological developments providing more powerful 
and user-friendly software. These developments are discussed by Jun et al (1999).
4.3.3 SD Simulation
Although the DES approach is extremely powerful, some problems are beyond its scope 
such as those dominated by dynamic or organisational complexity. There is, therefore, 
scope for the application of an alternative methodology. SD is proposed as one such 
alternative. Detailed accounts of this methodology are provided in SD texts (e.g. Forrester 
1961; Richardson and Pugh 1981, Wolstenholme 1990; Sterman 2000). SD is often 
referred to as systems thinking, with some authors referring to SD in general and others 
referring to qualitative SD only (Senge 1990; Wolstenholme 1999b) but, it should not be 
confused with other schools of system thinking (see Richardson et al 1994; Checkland 
1981).
As with the description of DES, the discussion of SD is based on the 3-dimensional 
complexity framework that was introduced in §4.2.1.
Practitioners of SD probe beyond individual detail and isolated events and, adopting a 
more holistic perspective, study the relationship between the underlying structure of a 
system and its behaviour over time. Structure refers to the integrated network of 
information which links the different flows in the system, such as flows of people, 
resources and money. Information feedback loops are traced out. An information feedback 
loop arises from a decision, based upon information about some property of the system, 
resulting in an action, which is intended to influence the value of that property. The action 
changes the property of the system and thus leads to new information about that property. 
This may lead to further actions. A closed causal relationship thus propagates through the
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system as time unfolds. The policies continuously transform information into decisions. 
Isolated feedback loops can have a balancing, goal-seeking effect or a reinforcing effect.
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Figure 4.2 Examples o f  Information Feedback Loops 
(2 lines - Delay; B - Balancing loop; R - Reinforcing loop; Polarities o f causal links: 
s/o - Variables change in the same/opposite direction, ceteris paribus)
Figure 4.2 shows the basic structure o f an information feedback loop (Figure 4.2(a)), and 
simple examples o f the structure-behaviour linkage for a balancing loop with no delay 
(Figure 4.2(b)) and a reinforcing loop (Figure 4.2(c)). Figure 4.2(b) depicts how, if  the 
desired level o f emergency reserve in a hospital is increased, then the elective admission 
rate has to be reduced to achieve this goal. The polarity o f the causal link between 
“Elective Admission Rate” to “No of Occupied Ward Beds” is such that when the elective
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admission rate increases, this causes an increase in the number of occupied ward beds. 
The change occurs in the same direction ceteris paribus and is indicated by an ‘s’. By 
contrast, when the number of occupied ward beds increases, this leads to a decrease in the 
level of emergency reserve. The change occurs in the opposite direction ceteris paribus 
and is indicated by an ‘o’. Figure 4.2(c) shows the initial growth pattern of a new 
successful treatment. It illustrates how, if there is an increase in the willingness to adopt 
the new treatment, perhaps due to the release of a report of its benefits, the number of 
doctors using the treatment will rise. This will generate more information about the 
treatment’s benefits and thus encourage the adoption of the new treatment. This will lead 
to an exponential growth in the number of doctors using the new treatment.
The relative significance of different information feedback loops is determined by non- 
linearities which alter their strength (or, more technically, their gain). In doing so, non- 
linearities establish which loops are dominant and are responsible for shifts in loop 
dominance.
The SD focus is on the feedback effects, or repercussions, of policy changes, including 
reactions to exogenous events. Using SD, endogenous-based insights into dynamic policy 
problems are sought. The feedback structure may not necessarily be immediately apparent 
as a correct ‘conceptual distance’ (Forrester 1961; Richardson 1991), or perspective, is 
necessary so that:
“..events and decisions are deliberately blurred into patterns of behavior and policy structure” 
(Richardson 1991, p. 346, italics added).
SD insights are most relevant to those who require an overview of the system, such as a 
hospital chief executive or a clinical director, but perhaps not the junior doctor who is 
preoccupied with the detail complexities of isolated decisions and individual patient 
events. In SD, these events are viewed as:
“..riding on the surface of an underlying tide of policy, pressures and, dynamic pattern” 
(Richardson 1991, p. 323, italics added).
Computer models are employed in SD to explore the dynamic implications of structure as 
erroneous inferences can be made from static analyses (Richardson 1986). Practitioners of
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SD recognise that the mental database of expert knowledge, based on observation and 
experience, is by far the greatest source of information, compared to the formal, written 
and numerical databases (Forrester 1961, 1975). Knowledge about non-linearities resides 
primarily within the mental database.
SD modelling concentrates primarily on dynamic complexity and may encompass all the 
elements outlined in §4.2.1. Detail complexities are considered but considerably fewer 
compared to DES modelling, so software with extensive in-built functionality very often 
suffices for SD analyses such as STELLA (High Performance Systems 1997) or VENSIM 
(Ventana Systems 1996). Unlike in DES, the formation of a queue by the arrival of 
individual patients is not usually represented in an SD model. However, the reaction to a 
queue might be included in an SD model, such as the effect of NHS waiting times on the 
decision to switch to a more easily accessible treatment or to private care (Starkley 1993; 
BCS/RCP 1993).
Organisational complexity is an important feature in SD and this is reflected in several 
ways. Intangibles and the distinction between perceived and actual values are explicitly 
represented in SD models (Richardson and Pugh 1981, Sterman 2000). The organisational 
context is frequently discussed in the SD literature where authors have exploited the 
knowledge about group processes thus probing further than discrete event simulators. 
(Morecroft 1983; Lane 1992; Sterman 1994; Vennix 1990, 1996). The development of 
qualitative SD (see Wolstenholme 1999b) in its own right also reflects connections 
between SD and organisational complexity. Qualitative SD is presented as an approach to 
map out and achieve a shared understanding about the interactions between different parts 
of systems amongst the different stakeholders.
4.3,4 Health Care Applications o f SD
The application of SD to health care policy problems is not as well established as DES 
and involves considerably fewer studies. Nevertheless, the principles of SD have been 
applied to a number of health care issues involving a high degree of dynamic complexity. 
These include: the evolution of the effects of changes to community care (Wolstenholme 
1993, 1999a); diffusion of new medical technologies (Finkelstein et al 1984; Homer 
1983, 1987); transmission of HIV and AIDS (work by Roberts and Dangerfield 1990,
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1996, 1999a); evolution of waiting lists (van Ackere and Smith 1997, 1999; Gonzalez- 
Busho and Garcia 1999); escalation of health care costs (Vennix and Gubbels 1992); and, 
formation of kidney stones (Mojtahedzadeh et al 1992).
In order to address important group process issues, some authors have reported their 
findings before proceeding to the quantitative, simulation phase. For example, Vennix and 
Gubbels (1992) studied the counter-intuitive effects of a policy designed to reduce the 
escalation of health care costs. Their aim was to illustrate an effective method of 
knowledge elicitation for SD models. Coyle (1984), Cavana et al (1999) and 
Wolstenholme (1993) demonstrated how SD could contribute to the policy debate with 
qualitative SD models to share worldviews amongst stakeholders. Wolstenholme later 
provided a dynamic analysis (1999a).
Whilst the boundaries of DES studies are often confined to an individual hospital 
department, many SD health studies cross organisational boundaries. Bernard et al (1977) 
offer one example. They constructed an SD model to study the social impact of changes to 
services which aimed to integrate children with disabilities into the community. Other 
work was that by Finkelstein et al (1984) and Homer (1983, 1987). They considered the 
emergence and evolution of medical technologies with case studies focusing on two 
interventions for heart disease, coronary angioplasty and the cardiac pacemaker, and the 
antibiotic clindamycin. These studies crossed the boundaries between clinical practice, 
manufacturing of medical technology and government. In these studies, the interactions 
between practitioners’ perceptions of clinical effectiveness, technological substitution, 
market penetration and innovation diffusion were brought into a coherent simulation 
framework. Homer’s work was interesting in that he illustrated how the same model could 
explain the different diffusion dynamics of successful and unsuccessful technologies. 
Another study which crossed organisational boundaries was that by Wolstenholme (1993, 
1999a). He considered the consequences of proposed changes in responsibility for 
community care services. By examining the dynamic and organisational complexities 
between the health services, social services and community, he illustrated how SD could 
contribute to a strategic debate.
SD has been applied to epidemiological issues. Roberts and Dangerfield (1990, 1996, 
1999a) used SD to contribute to the HIV and ADDS debate, by providing an endogenous
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theory of the dynamics of transmission, and a tool to explore the efficacy of different 
intervention strategies. Richie-Dunham and Mendez Galvan (1999) used to SD evaluate 
interventions to manage dengue (a mosquito-transmitted virus) fever in Mexico. The 
authors emphasised how SD provided an effective forum to address multiple viewpoints 
on this contentious issue. Homer et al (2000) presented a preliminary study of the 
dynamics of antibiotic resistance.
SD has been used in the Department of Health to model a range of issues of varying 
degrees of complexity (Royston et al 1999). Three examples were presented based upon 
screening for cervical cancer, the sexually transmitted disease, chlamydia, and emergency 
health and social care. Beech (1995) highlighted the potential for SD to be used to 
evaluate health screening strategies for another disease, cystic fibrosis, in terms of the 
evolution of costs and outcomes over time. Another example of SD applied to emergency 
services was provided by Lane et al (2000). They illustrated how erroneous conclusions 
may be drawn about the success of policy changes if they are evaluated too narrowly. 
They considered that although reducing hospital bed capacity does not adversely affect 
emergency admissions, this is at the expense of elective care, as cancellations of elective 
admissions sharply rise to compensate. Elective services were also considered by van 
Ackere and Smith (1997, 1999). They used an SD model to simulate the variation of NHS 
hospital waiting times which results from the interaction between supply and demand 
variables including hospital capacity, efficiency levels and referral rates. They 
demonstrated how injecting further resources to reduce waiting times may only be 
effective in the short-term, as waiting time reductions could lead to the release of latent 
demand.
Mojtahedzadeh et al (1992) provide an example where SD has been applied to tackle a 
clinical rather than policy issue. They used SD to examine the dynamics of renal stone 
formation and thus sought insight into responses to different treatments.
Further health-related applications of SD include a study of the dynamics of heroin 
addiction involving the complex interconnections between the rate of drug abuse, police 
action and drug-related crime (Levin et al 1975).
71
4.4 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
4.4.1 Use o f  DES
To illustrate the differences between the DES and SD approaches, let us consider the 
problem o f reducing NHS waiting times for coronary heart disease treatment within 
certain budgetary constraints. Difficulties arise from the expected increases in demand 
due to improved survival prospects, the introduction o f new technologies and rising 
public expectations. Treatment for coronary heart disease includes coronary bypass 
surgery, coronary angioplasty and medical therapy. A DES model could be used to 
investigate the effects o f changes to treatment strategies, and other localised decisions, on 
the development o f both hospital waiting lists and patient queues within a hospital. A 
DES model would be very detailed (Figure 4.3), describing how arrivals of different types 
o f patients ‘compete’ for staff and facilities. Various patient attributes would be 
highlighted to model the heterogeneity o f patient flows, which result from the variations 
in patient needs, risk o f clinical events, probability o f transfers between different 
treatments and the estimated length of stay.
Detailed Model of
Physical Processes
Model OutputsExogenous
Inputs
Experimentation
Figure 4.3 Policy Analysis Using Discrete Event Simulation 
(Source: Taylor and Lane 1998)
The study could examine the quantitative effects o f adjustments to treatment strategies 
under different assumptions regarding demand levels by altering the relevant exogenous 
inputs to the model. Alternative interventions might involve changes to bed-borrowing 
strategies, staff or resource schedules, or length o f stay distributions. Different 
interventions might be compared using the model outputs. Outputs would include detailed 
DES predictions over time o f various outcome measures for each treatment group. For 
example, financial costs, average waiting times, average numbers waiting, incidence of 
various clinical events and treatment cancellations and resource utilisation measures. In
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this way, a DES study might indicate to purchasers and providers where the priority for 
resource expenditure lay, and may estimate the cost o f reductions in waiting times.
4.4.2 U seofSD
Now, let us consider how an SD analysis might help to reduce waiting times for coronary 
heart disease treatment. The emphasis and focus o f enquiry o f an SD policy analysis 
would be considerably different from a DES analysis. The SD model (the causal 
hypothesis) would be more transparent (Figure 4.4), only focusing on the information 
feedback mechanisms underlying a well-defined dynamic problem over a specific time 
frame. This last point is important; in a single SD model it would be inappropriate to 
combine the day-to-day dynamics of hospital queues and the long-term dynamics of 
hospital waiting lists. Instead, an SD study could focus on the inability o f a specific policy 
to reduce NHS bypass surgery treatment delays in the long-term.
Model of Information 
Feedback Loops
Exogenous
Inputs
Model
Outputs
Experimentation
Figure 4.4 Policy Analysis Using System Dynamics 
(B = Balancing loop; R = Reinforcing loop; Dashed arrow = New link;
Concentric circles = Policy intervention point. Source: Taylor and Lane 1998)
One such policy might be the promotion of angioplasty as an alternative treatment for 
certain patients. However, this policy may be a ‘fix that fails’ (Senge 1990). The 
underlying structure for this dynamic pattern is two feedback processes. Angioplasty has 
several advantages over bypass surgery, including its shorter NHS waiting times and 
lower initial costs. A balancing process arises as some bypass patients may be reallocated 
to angioplasty to avoid long treatment delays (Starkley 1993; BCS/RCP 1993), and thus 
counterbalance bypass surgery undersupply. However a higher proportion o f post­
angioplasty patients subsequently require early re-intervention (RITA 1993), and thus 
contribute to further demand on purchasing budgets for bypass surgery. This contributes
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to a reinforcing process: whilst effective in the short-term in dealing with waiting list 
problems, the long-term consequences require yet greater use of the angioplasty ‘fix’. 
This simple model (or this model extended to a more complex model) could be used as a 
basis upon which to investigate the use of coronary stents which are designed to improve 
angioplasty re-intervention rates (Bittl 1996).
The focus of SD models requires fewer exogenous inputs than those of DES. 
Furthermore, an SD model would not focus on the detail complexity concerning the 
formation of waiting lists, but instead would concentrate on the feedback processes 
underlying changes to waiting lists and waiting times. This would concern how treatment 
delays are perceived, the associated perception delays, reactions to these delays (including 
corrective actions taken) and their consequences over time. Reductions to hospital waiting 
times might trigger various responses (e.g. increases in referral rates) which may produce 
further dynamic complexity.
In SD policy analyses, both parameter and structural changes are made to intensify or 
diminish the intensity of existing feedback loops, or create further loops to reinforce or 
control the effects of the dominant loops. Parameter changes which might diminish the 
intensity of reinforcing process might include an increase in the number of bypass surgery 
procedures purchased, or the introduction or promotion of certain treatment guidelines. 
These might alter the tendency of clinicians to reallocate patients to angioplasty according 
to the current average waiting times for bypass surgery. A structural policy change might 
involve the prioritisation of patients by need, and thus control demand responses to some 
extent. Structurally, this would involve the introduction of a new link. This would 
represent the use of information about the levels of patients who are returning for re­
intervention and who therefore might be assumed to have the more advanced disease. 
This information would be used to prioritise other patients.
SD practitioners evaluate both quantitative and qualitative effects of policy changes. They 
do not provide point predictions as in DES. Instead, they seek insight into the underlying 
processes which are responsible for the endogenous mode of behaviour (or dynamic 
pattern) of the system. The angioplasty ‘fix that fails’ exemplifies a ‘better before worse’ 
mode for NHS waiting times. Modes of behaviour corresponding to other policies might 
include periods of exponential decay or oscillation.
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4.5 OFFERING COMPLEMENTARY INSIGHTS
The differences between the DES and SD approach to simulation are summarised in 
Table 4.1. Note that whilst this discussion follows an applied agenda, a more technical 
comparison is provided by Mak (1992).
Table 4.1 Two Contrasting Approaches to Policy Analysis
Discrete Event Simulation System Dynamics
Aims Complex behaviour output resulting 
from exogenous factors.
Point predictions (e.g. demand 
forecasting)
Understanding basic mechanisms of 
modes of endogenous behaviour. 
Behavioural insights including reactions 
to exogenous events.
Perspective Details
Emphasis on detail complexity
Holistic
Emphasis on dynamic complexity
Clients Operational level
Clinical (individual patient) level
Strategic level
Policy (aggregate patient) level
Resolution Individual patients 
Primarily stochastic
Aggregated and systemic 
Primarily deterministic
Models
Flows
Delays
Feedback Loops 
Elements
Physical
Physical
Physical
Tangible
Physical and information 
Physical and information 
Physical and information 
Tangible and intangible
Data Sources Emphasis on numerical and written 
databases
Extending beyond the numerical and 
written databases to the mental 
database
(Source: Taylor and Lane 1998)
As simulation-based methods, both DES and SD address complexity but they focus on 
different aspects of complexity. DES concentrates on problems associated with detail 
complexity whilst SD concentrates on those associated with dynamic complexity. Their 
respective aims and models reflect these different emphases. Whilst discrete event 
simulators construct models to generate detailed output to produce point predictions, 
system dynamicists consider the underlying trends and probe beyond to identify the 
structure which is responsible for those trends. DES-based policy insights generally 
appeal to decision makers at the operational level whilst SD-based policy insights are 
designed for those at the strategic level. The passage of an individual patient through the
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physical processes of care would be represented in a DES model. In contrast, an SD 
model would reflect an aggregated view of patient flows. Moreover, in an SD model, the 
flow of patients and other physical flows would be secondary to the information network 
linking these different flows. Finally, whilst data about physical processes and other 
elements in DES models may be derived from numerical and written sources, mental data 
is the richest source of information about information feedback.
In §3.5, it was argued that an SD analysis could complement an economic appraisal in 
evaluating shifts in health services by explaining increases in demand. With SD, insight 
may be sought into the basic mechanisms underlying the primary and secondary feedback 
effects and also demonstrate how these effects may vary under different conditions. By 
conducting an SD-based policy analysis, an understanding may be sought into how the 
behaviour of the system could have been altered by changes in referral responses, waiting 
list management policies and funding policies.
In fact, a DES study could also be employed to complement an economic appraisal. A 
DES model may be used to consider how to improve the implementation of a service 
innovation, which is deemed cost-effective. Policy insight may be obtained into how to 
improve the utilisation of the available capacity by reducing potential bottlenecks in the 
system which may arise as a result of the shift in services. In §3.4.2, it was mentioned that 
capacity constraints might hinder the generalisations of a cost-effectiveness analysis to 
other settings. By helping to release further capacity, a DES study may enhance the ability 
to generalise from a cost-effectiveness analysis. Moreover, if  the cost-effectiveness is 
evaluated on the basis of process variables, such as waiting times (as a cost-consequence 
analysis, which was mentioned in §3.4.1), a DES study may help to improve the cost- 
effectiveness of the service. However, this research does not concern these issues. Instead, 
the focus is on the potential secondary effects of shifts in services, which would not lie 
within the scope of DES modelling.
4.6 THE LOW PROFILE OF SD IN HEALTH CARE
Although DES and SD clearly have different roles in health care, and both roles are 
important, the profile for SD has been low. DES has dominated the agenda whilst SD has 
been conspicuous by its absence. The culture of the NHS traditionally leads to a
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preoccupation with isolated events and individual patient detail. Meanwhile, shocking 
headlines about individuals and isolated cases, which are perpetuated by the media, fuel 
the public perception of the NHS. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that DES is 
frequently advocated as the most appropriate simulation modelling approach (Davies 
1985; Davies and Davies 1994). However, no single modelling approach can offer a 
panacea to policy problems. The ability to explore different aspects of policy problems 
can be greatly enhanced by an improved appreciation of different methods.
One can speculate about the reasons for the historically low status of SD in health care. 
The volume of DES health care studies is vastly greater than that of SD, so DES might be 
expected to dominate the agenda. For the same reason, the modelling and health care 
research communities might be expected to be unfamiliar with SD. It is also possible that 
the profile of SD health care case studies is too low. Efforts have been made to raise the 
profile of SD both within the health care and modelling communities (Taylor and Lane 
1998; Dangerfield and Roberts 1999b; Coyle and Morecroft 1999).
In common with other modelling methodologies, SD is not without its critics within the 
modelling community. Obviously, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of a 
method and to understand its scope, which will develop over time as limitations are 
addressed. Furthermore, in SD, as with all modelling approaches, there are examples of 
bad modelling and these misrepresent SD.
Critiques and discussions have frequently misrepresented SD. For example, one 
description of SD demonstrated a lack of awareness of the dangers of carrying out a static 
analysis without proceeding to a dynamic analysis with a computer simulation model 
(Keys 1990). The dangers of static analyses have been emphasised in the SD literature 
(Richardson 1976, 1986; Wolstenholme 1999b, Homer and Oliva 2001). However, the 
publication of static SD analyses may mislead those who are unfamiliar with SD into 
believing that accurate policy insights may be derived without a dynamic analysis. 
Another example is that erroneous assertions have been made that SD is about seeking 
optimal behaviour and high quality predictions (Flood and Jackson 1991). Further 
examples are suggestions that SD modelling neglects the importance of client 
participation and implementation (Keys 1990; Flood and Jackson 1991).
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SD has also been described as incapable of engaging in complex, pluralistic contexts 
(Flood and Jackson 1991). It would be incorrect to adhere to this view, as there are 
several cases where SD has been used to engage in complex, pluralistic contexts (see 
§4.3.4). There are also examples of SD practitioners connecting with other work relating 
to the organisational context and complexity of human decision making (e.g Morecroft 
1983; Lane 1992).
Critics have failed to acknowledge the richness of the SD approach that arises from the 
distinction between the model and the modelling process (Forrester 1985). SD was first 
perceived as merely another simulation technique (Forrester 1968) and this misperception 
seems to have continued as comparisons with DES (e.g. Mak 1992; Pidd 1998) have only 
focused on technical differences. The seminal text of SD (Forrester 1961) has been 
described as over ambitious (Ansoff and Slevin 1968; Pidd 1998) and SD considered as 
merely a simplified approach to modelling feedback, following the sophisticated design 
and analyses of servomechanisms by engineers. A narrow view of SD is that it only 
addresses the stability of dynamic systems and responses to external shocks and is 
therefore only concerned with reducing oscillatory behaviour (e.g. Flood and Jackson 
1991; Pidd 1998). However, this ignores the extensive analyses of other modes of system 
behaviour that are more widely employed in the field.
Undue emphasis appears to have been placed on the physical elements of systems. 
Furthermore, if the issue of conceptual distance is ignored, then the appreciation of 
information feedback loops becomes merely superficial. Whilst efforts have been 
successful in raising the awareness of the feedback perspective and SD in the US 
(Meadows 1989 1991; Sterman et al 1997), it would appear that the profile of SD 
amongst modellers in the UK is only beginning to gather momentum (Lane 1994).
A number of health care policy problems have been successfully conceptualised and 
explored using SD, and there exist many opportunities for further applications of this 
methodology. This is particularly true given the increased appreciation of the importance 
of system interactions in determining the consequences of policy changes and the 
associated need for “joined-up thinking”. This has been acknowledged in the Department 
of Health in the NHS (Royston et al 1999). However, the use of SD within the health care
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domain is still in its infancy. Consequently, in exploring the applicability of SD in health 
care, many issues remain unresolved.
For example, little has been documented about the practical issues involved in 
conceptualising problems and working with professionals in the health service. Related 
work includes the guidelines by Randers (1980), Richardson and Pugh (1981), Sterman 
(2000) and the research of Vennix (1990, 1996) on how to elicit information from 
experts. Another issue concerns the identification of an effective way to accommodate the 
pluralist nature of the NHS and the inherent conflicts. Conflict may arise during the 
process of constructing a model and in evaluating policy changes as disagreements arise 
about what factors should be included and excluded and their relative importance. 
Gardiner and Ford (1980) and Reagan-Ciricione et al (1991) have proposed that decision 
analytic methods may be useful for addressing these issues. However, as SD and decision 
analysis emerge from different decision making schools, a number of questions arise 
about the appropriateness and limitations of such a merger. A further issue concerns the 
limitations of SD in health care, given that it tackles issues at the aggregate level, which is 
in contrast with the emphasis in the NHS on individual patient detail. The question arises 
as to how this restricts the phenomena that may be investigated and the insights that may 
be generated.
These are interesting issues associated with the practicality of applying SD. Some of these 
issues will be considered, to some extent, as part of the research.
4.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter, the SD approach to simulation modelling was described and its role in 
health care was clarified. In doing so, some insight was provided into how it might be 
used to offer policy insight into shifts in the balance of care.
Following an applied health care agenda, simulation modelling was first introduced. A 3- 
dimensional framework of complexity was developed - detail complexity, dynamic 
complexity and organisational complexity - to differentiate between the different types of 
complexity. The stimulation of demand was presented as an illustration of dynamic 
complexity. The 3-dimensional framework was used to discuss the focus of simulation
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and its different variants, and an overview of the processes of simulation was presented. 
The SD approach to simulation was compared and contrasted with the traditional 
approach to simulation. The latter is characterised by an emphasis on individual patient 
detail and has a considerably higher profile in health care. Some reasons were suggested 
why the traditional approach to simulation modelling has dominated the agenda of health 
care simulation modelling, and several criticisms and limitations of SD were addressed.
So far, the discussion of the potential usefulness of SD, in studying shifts in the balance of 
care, has been relatively abstract. To investigate further, it is necessary to adopt a ‘hands- 
on’ approach and conduct an SD study of a specific service shift. The next chapter will 
describe how this was achieved.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPLORING THE CASE OF CARDIAC 
CATHETERISATION SERVICES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the SD approach was described and its role in health care was 
clarified. In doing so, some insight was provided into how SD might be used to evaluate 
service shifts in the NHS. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the research design that 
was applied to probe further into the ability of SD to contribute to the policy making 
process.
The research design (§5.2) involved a case study-based research strategy (§5.2.1). The 
selected case of the shift in CC services (§5.2.2) and the case study centres (§5.2.3) are 
introduced. The CC procedure and its use are described (§5.3). This serves to provide 
background and insight into the issues involved in deciding who should undergo this 
procedure and where it might be safely undertaken. The different types of CC procedures 
are summarised, from the most basic procedure to the most complex (§5.3.1). The 
description of the use of CC focuses on the patients who undergo this procedure (§5.3.2), 
and the role for CC in context with other medical procedures (§5.3.3). An outline is given 
of the research methods that were employed (§5.4) to collect data (§5.4.1), apply SD 
(§5.4.2), evaluate the model-based policy experiments (§5.4.3), and those that will be 
applied to draw insights from the SD study of the shift in CC services (§5.4.4). The 
chapter is summarised in the final section (§5.5).
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5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
5.2.1 The Basic Approach
There exists two broad philosophical approaches to research. Empiricism (or positivism) 
represents the first approach, and this encompasses quantitative research methods. The 
second approach is interpretism which supports qualitative methods of enquiry (Rein 
1976; Bryman 1984; Little 1993). Although some feel that these philosophical beliefs are 
irreconcilable, others advocate the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Bryman 1984; Yin 1994a). This exploits the advantages of both, and thus implies a 
pragmatic approach to research. The intention for this study was to pursue such an 
approach in addressing the following research question:
How useful is SD, in planning for and evaluating service shifts in the NHS, in
terms of its ability to contribute to the policy making process?
The ability to contribute to the policy making process will first involve the issue of 
modelling power, more specifically, the ability to both explain the effects of service shifts 
and inform purchasers and providers about how they could improve the situation. The 
extent of modelling power will be assessed on the basis of the quality of the analysis, its 
significance and completeness. The assessment of usefulness will then probe further to 
address important questions about the value of the policy insights in terms of whether the 
recommended interventions are feasible and whether purchasers and providers are being 
given any new information. Finally, the process of applying SD will be considered by 
assessing issues associated with the ease o f use of SD. This will refer to the skill, time and 
client involvement requirements and the need to modify the basic SD paradigm.
The actual use or implementation of the policy recommendations in the real world will 
not be considered. This is ruled out because using something does not imply that it is 
useful; it could in fact be useless but in use because there is a reluctance to change from 
what is familiar - the ‘better the devil you know’ attitude.
The usefulness of SD in planning for and evaluating shifts in the balance of care was 
explored via a case study. Yin (1994b) describes case study research as an empirical 
inquiry, which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context in
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cases where the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context, are not clearly 
evident. Case study research is also characterised by the use of multiple sources of 
evidence. Case studies are based upon certain research questions and stated propositions 
(or theories) that both reflect important theoretical issues and suggest where to look for 
evidence to address the key questions. Generalisations are made to theory, as with 
experiments. This is referred to as analytical generalisation. In selecting a suitable case (or 
cases), the emphasis is not on finding a typical or representative case (or cases) but on 
having a suitable basis upon which to explore broad theoretical issues. Making 
generalisations from a sample to a population is referred to as statistical generalisation. 
This is appropriate for survey-based research but not case study research (Yin 1984).
To probe towards the potential primary and secondary effects of shifts in the balance of 
care the following questions were posed:
How do shifts in services help and hinder the provision of NHS services over time? 
How can NHS purchasers and providers effectively intervene to alleviate pressure 
on the system?
These questions prescribed an explanatory case study research strategy as the appropriate 
research approach.
5.2.2 The Research Hypothesis
The hypothesis that drove the research was as follows:
Health service shifts, intended to improve access to services, may actually 
reduce access by stimulating further demand. By improving access to 
services, patients become more demanding. Those who refer patients on for 
services, from the number of requests for assessment, may stimulate demand 
in response to increased patient pressure and reduced waiting times. Service 
shifts may also stimulate demand if they produce increases in the skill of 
identifying patients in need. The increased patient pressure may also lead to 
higher demand for assessment. The stimulation of demand will impose 
increasing calls for further funding. A new referral guideline may be
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introduced in an attempt to suppress the inappropriate use of services. 
However, this may only have a limited impact in reducing pressure because 
the mechanisms underlying secondary effects are so complex. By applying 
SD, it is possible to explain the primary and secondary effects of policy 
changes, and provide policy makers with valuable information about how to 
intervene more effectively in the system. Therefore, SD can present a useful 
planning and evaluation tool for exploring health service shifts.
This research hypothesis encapsulated theories about the effects of the shift in health 
services and the value of SD. This hypothesis arose from evidence presented in the 
literature (see §3.3) combined with assumptions about the effectiveness of clinical 
guidelines and the value of SD. In order to follow good practice in case study research, 
rival theories were posed. Doing so provided a sound basis upon which to challenge the 
assumptions presented within the research hypothesis. The rival theory regarding the 
value of SD was that SD is useless because it cannot contribute to the policy making 
process. For example, this would apply if it were shown that there was no dynamic 
complexity involved, where increases in demand were simply explained by exogenous 
factors rather than endogenous, feedback mechanisms. Based upon this view, SD would 
be irrelevant and the costs and benefits of the shift in the balance of care could be 
adequately evaluated with a simple cost-effectiveness analysis. The inability to contribute 
to the policy making process would also apply if there were insurmountable practical 
problems in applying SD, if the analysis could only offer infeasible policy 
recommendations or if it offered nothing new to the debate about service shifts.
The assessment of the value of SD was not confined to the dichotomy SD is useful verses 
SD is useless as the degree of usefulness of SD was considered. However, it was not 
deemed appropriate to pose several theories based upon the degree of usefulness of SD, 
such as SD is very useful, SD is moderately useful, SD has limited use and SD is useless, 
as these distinctions would be arbitrary.
A rival theory about the effects of service shifts would already be represented in the rival 
theory about the value of SD i.e. the theory that the changes in demand were simply 
explained by exogenous factors. The causal theory (or dynamic hypothesis) represented in 
the research hypothesis was based upon the existing literature about the stimulation of
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latent demand for health services. The evidence from the literature was limited in that it 
involved anecdotal or unsubstantiated assertions that service shifts could stimulate 
demand. The research sought to verify and revise these assertions, thus producing some 
hard empirical evidence.
5.2,3 Case Study Selection and Access
The case of the shift in CC services, from the established tertiary level to the district 
(secondary) level for low risk patients, was selected for the study. This choice was based 
on pragmatic considerations. The study of a single health service was limited by the 
research design, which involved time-consuming activities to be undertaken by a single 
individual. The consideration of a shift relating to cardiac services was restricted by the 
conditions of the funding for the research. The study of this single service was regarded as 
providing a legitimate basis upon which to form theoretical generalisations.
The shift of CC services could be considered at both the national and local levels, but it is 
easier to discern problem ‘owners’ at the latter. It is very important to have a problem 
owner, or client, to provide a purpose for the study. The owners of health care delivery 
problems who hold a national perspective include those located in the Department of 
Health and the medical professional bodies and societies. Although the Department of 
Health policy makers, who are responsible for the NHS in England, are interested in the 
shift in the balance of care, they do not become involved with individual clinical 
initiatives, such as the evolution of district CC services (Phillips 1997). The Royal 
Colleges and the British Cardiac Society are interested in individual clinical initiatives, 
and frequently publish clinical practice guidelines. However, their policy 
recommendations need to account for variations in local access to CC services and other 
issues. Therefore, it was decided to study the shift in CC services at the local level.
The research used a multiple case study design in that shifts in CC services to two centres 
were considered. In multiple case studies, the replication logic is quite different to 
sampling logic, where the emphasis is on the frequency of a particular phenomenon. In 
case study research, each case must be selected to either predict similar results or different 
results for predictable reasons. The former is referred to as literal replication and the latter 
is called theoretical replication (Yin 1984). The case study centres were chosen for
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pragmatic reasons, given the convenience o f their location. They were composed of two 
DGHs and one tertiary centre. The DGHs presented histories o f two different variants of 
the basic district policy: a temporary district service which temporarily alleviated capacity 
shortages and a permanent district service which created capacity shortages. The inclusion 
of the tertiary centre provided an opportunity to study the evolution o f district services 
from the tertiary perspective as well as the district perspective. Again, the number o f 
centres was limited by the research design, which involved time-consuming activities to 
be undertaken by a single individual. The study of two district hospitals was considered to 
be a realistic number, and they were regarded as providing a legitimate basis upon which 
to form theoretical generalisations.
Access was granted on the condition that all parties concerned would remain anonymous. 
Therefore, pseudonyms are used. The tertiary centre, which is a major cardiac tertiary 
centre in South East England, is referred to as ‘Heartwick Hospital’. The DGHs are 
referred to as ‘Veinbridge General Hospital’ and ‘Ribsley General Hospital’. Heartwick 
Hospital is the main tertiary referral centre for both these DGHs. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
relationships between these three collaborative centres.
PRIMARY LEVEL SECONDARY LEVEL TERTIARY LEVEL
Veinbridge General Hospital
n  ^ ~9°% —■ 
10%
Ribsley General Hospital 
 |___   9 5 % "
Heartwick Hospital
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I 1 — — 5%
Other District General Hospitals
Other Tertiary Centres
Figure 5.1 The Collaborative Centres and Referral Links 
(The percentages relate to referrals which are sent from the secondary centres to 
the tertiary centres in the absence o f  a district service.)
Prior to the introduction o f district CC services, cardiologists from Ribsley General and 
Veinbridge General carried out CC procedures at Heartwick Hospital. District services 
were originally introduced to compensate for the temporary closure o f one o f Heartwick’s 
catheter laboratories. The laboratory was closed, for repairs, from May 1996 to March
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1997. District services for CC investigations on low risk patients opened at Veinbridge 
General in May 1996, and one month later at Ribsley General. After Heartwick’s 
laboratory re-opened, the service at Veinbridge General continued and was developed into 
a permanent service. In contrast, the CC service was withdrawn from Ribsley General. A 
further temporary service was offered at Ribsley General between February 1998 and May
1998. Sessions for the first two months were supported by Waiting List Initiative funding. 
Heartwick Hospital funded the district service for a further two months to compensate for 
a second period of construction work at Heartwick’s laboratories.
For the case of Ribsley General, numerical data were collected for the period April 1995 
to the end of May 1998 (38 months). By that time, a permanent service had not been 
introduced to Ribsley General, and there were no plans to do so. Mental and written data 
were collected until August 1999 and the analysis extended to the end of September 1999 
(54 months). For the case of Veinbridge General, numerical, written and mental data were 
collected between April 1995 and the end of August 1999 (53 months), and the analysis 
considered the period April 1995 to the end of March 2001 (72 months). The certainty 
about the continuation of district services at Veinbridge General justified the longer time 
scale compared to the Ribsley General case.
By studying both Veinbridge General and Ribsley General, the usefulness of SD as both 
an evaluation and planning tool was considered. SD in the ‘evaluation mode’ was 
examined as both hospitals had a history of a shift in CC services. SD in the ‘planning 
mode’ was also considered to some extent by modelling the hypothetical case of a 
planned reintroduction of services to Ribsley General. Further consideration will be given 
to SD in the ‘planning mode’ when the results of the case studies are generalised to other 
DGHs and health services.
From an initial contact with a consultant cardiologist at Heartwick Hospital, a series of 
meetings were arranged with various health professionals. This led to the development of 
a collaborative network of health professionals associated with Heartwick, Veinbridge 
General and Ribsley General Hospitals. The health professionals comprised: consultant 
cardiologists; medical and nursing support staff; information technology staff; hospital 
managers; senior members of health authorities; and, managers of the company which 
supplied CC facilities and consumables to Ribsley General and Veinbridge General. This
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company is referred to as ‘Cardiocare’. The main collaborators were: three consultant 
cardiologists, one from each of the three hospitals; one hospital manager from each of the 
three hospitals; four purchasers/commissioners, two from the host district of Ribsley 
General, and two from the host district of Veinbridge General; and, the business manager 
at Cardiocare. During the course of the research, contacts were also made with two 
consultant cardiologists and a hospital manager based at hospitals outside the 
collaborative centres.
In order to appreciate the arguments of the research, it is important that the subject of the 
shift in CC services is clearly understood. It is explained over two chapters. The next 
section describes the CC procedure and its use. The shift in CC services is addressed in 
Chapter 6.
5.3 CASE STUDY FOCUS
5.3.1 CC Procedures
CC is an invasive clinical procedure which uses long, narrow, flexible tubes called 
catheters to carry out investigations of, and treatments to, the heart. A catheter is inserted 
into a major artery or vein, either in the arm or groin. Under X-ray guidance, the catheter 
is manoeuvred along the arterial passageways until the tip reaches the heart. There are 
several different types of cardiac catheters as they are manufactured to different 
specifications for special purposes. A CC procedure may only be used for diagnostic 
purposes, where information is obtained about the coronary anatomy and the function of 
the heart’s pumping chambers and valves. Measurements may be taken of the blood 
pressure and oxygen saturation levels inside the heart. The coronary anatomy may be 
studied by using contrast agents, which produce images called coronary angiograms. The 
distribution of the dye is followed by a series of high speed X-rays. These images can 
highlight sections of the coronary arteries, which supply blood to the myocardium (heart 
muscle), which have been narrowed, and are thus restricting the blood flow. CC is 
preferably undertaken under local anaesthetic for several reasons. For example, the patient 
may be required to assist in the procedure by coughing at certain points. Information 
derived from investigational CC may be used to confirm a diagnosis, stratify risk or to 
plan therapy (Charles and Marshall 1989; Grace et al 1993; Swanton 1998).
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Throughout the CC procedure, the patient’s blood pressure and heart rhythm are 
monitored. If the procedure is completed successfully, the patient will be discharged onto 
the ward to recuperate. However, during this procedure, there is a small risk o f mortality 
and other complications, some of which result in the need for emergency surgery. These 
risks depend on various factors including the expertise o f the operator, the severity o f the 
patient’s medical condition and the complexity o f the procedure (Stewart et al 1990). A 
confidential multi-centre enquiry into complications for diagnostic CC procedures 
reported 0.8% complications overall o f which 0.12% involved mortality and 0.08% 
emergency surgery (de Bono 1993).
The Coronary Angioplasty Procedure
1.
2 .
J.
4 .
5.
Figure 5.2 Coronary Angioplasty 
(1. Insertion o f balloon catheter into the heart; 2. Insertion o f  catheter guide wire;
3. Balloon in place; 4. Balloon expanded; 5. Balloon withdrawn and improved blood flow.
Sources: BHF 1996; Bonner 1994)
More complex CC procedures involve interventions (treatments), in particular, the 
coronary angioplasty procedure (Griintzig 1978, Griintzig et al 1979), as shown in Figure 
5.2. This is carried out by passing a fine guide wire through a catheter and down the 
coronary artery past an area which has been narrowed. A special catheter with a deflated
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balloon at its tip is passed over the guide wire. The balloon is then inflated to give a 
controlled stretch of the narrowed section of the artery and to split and compress the 
material blocking it and thus improve the flow of blood.
The coronary angioplasty procedure has associated risks and other problems. These have 
led to the development of more sophisticated catheter systems. A serious complication 
with the coronary angioplasty procedure is that the balloon inflation may cause the vessel 
wall to dissect. This is the most common cause of abrupt vessel closure, which in turn 
accounts for the majority of the serious complications of coronary angioplasty - death, 
myocardial infarction (‘heart attack’) and the need for emergency surgery. Various 
factors, including improvements in catheter design, have led to an increased success rate 
of coronary angioplasty over time. This is despite an increasing average age of patients 
who undergo this procedure, and the more frequent occurrence of patients with more 
complex disease. A multi-centre study recently reported the complication rates for death, 
myocardial infarction and emergency surgery at 0.9%, 5.2% and 2.7% respectively (Ellis 
et al 1995).
Another significant problem with coronary angioplasty relates to the healing process 
which may cause the artery to return to its narrowed state - a process known as restenosis. 
This process is understood to occur because the angioplasty procedure damages the inner 
lining of the blood vessel wall, so that splits form in its inner layer and muscle cells migrate 
into the centre. It can occur in 25-50% of patients (Serruys et al 1993) but little is known 
about why it occurs in some patients and not others.
Improving Coronary Angioplasty
Various attempts have been made to overcome the limitations of coronary angioplasty 
(Sigwart 1990; Corr 1994; Bittl 1996). These attempts have included the use of powerful 
drugs and various mechanical approaches. Some mechanical approaches have been to 
extend the duration and magnitude of the inflation of the angioplasty balloon. Other 
approaches have involved the development of complex catheter systems (Waller 1989). 
These have ingenious devices such as fluid jets, drills, shavers and lasers which remove 
the blockage in the artery by cutting away the obstructing material and collecting the 
debris or pulverising the obstruction. Devices that are widely used are mesh tubes called
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coronary stents which are inserted to support the vessel wall after the angioplasty balloon 
has been withdrawn.
Whilst stenting is still undergoing formal evaluation, it is understood to be the most 
successful technique currently available in overcoming the limitations of coronary 
angioplasty. Stents can be used to hold back and seal dissections in the artery and thus 
reduce the need for emergency surgery - ‘bail out’ stenting. They also reduce the need for 
reintervention by helping to keep the arteries open (Serruys 1996; Meads et al 2000). The 
use of stenting is escalating, and its practice is rapidly developing. Advancements include 
the refinement of post-stenting drug regimens to reduce complication rates (Schomig et al 
1996), and the design of more sophisticated stents (Serruys 1996). Examples of 
refinements to the early stents include the use of special markers, so that the location of the 
stent can be monitored on a coronary angiogram, and special coatings to reduce the risk of 
clotting. Stents of varying sizes are becoming available so that a greater number of sections 
of the arteries can be targeted (Meads et al 2000).
5.3.2 CC Patients
Coronary heart disease (CHD), also referred to as coronary artery disease or ischaemic 
heart disease, accounts for the vast majority of patients who undergo CC. The second 
largest group of patients are those with heart valve disease, and those with congenital 
heart disease form the third largest group (Charles and Marshall 1989). Congenital heart 
disease relates to problems during fetal development and causes the malformation of the 
heart or major blood vessels. It affects approximately 0.8% of live births (Swanton 1998). 
Heart valve diseases prevent the valves of the heart from opening or closing properly. 
There are a number of underlying causes of valve defects including congenital 
abnormalities and scarring from rheumatic fever.
CHD refers to the presence of degenerative changes in the walls of the coronary arteries 
with deposits of hard, fatty substances called atherosclerotic plaques. These deposits lead 
to narrowings in the coronary arteries, and thus lead to an inadequate blood supply 
(ischaemia) to the myocardium. Further complications arise as the arterial wall may crack, 
causing clotting, or it may weaken, which will eventually lead to haemorrhaging. The 
process of CHD has yet to be completely understood but this slow, progressive disease is
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recognised to begin in childhood. Research has also identified certain risk factors which 
might predict its development including smoking, family history of heart disease, 
hypertension (high blood pressure) and elevated levels of blood cholesterol (Mann 1993; 
Patterson and Treasure 1993).
Clinical Manifestations o f CHD
Some people with significant CHD experience no symptoms. Others may experience 
angina, a myocardial infarction or sudden cardiac death. Angina is a choking sensation in 
the chest, which results from insufficient blood reaching the myocardium. It typically 
occurs during exercise or excitement, when the myocardial demand for oxygen increases. 
Normally, the blood flow in the coronary arteries will increase to meet this demand. 
However, the potential to increase demand is limited by a coronary artery which is 
narrowed by the presence of CHD. Myocardial infarction is caused by the complete 
blockage of a coronary artery. This leads to the death of the surrounding cells in the 
myocardium and the formation of an area known as an infarct. Sudden cardiac death is 
believed to be associated with a fatal disorder of the heart rhythm. CHD may also 
eventually lead to heart failure where the pumping ability of the heart muscle is 
diminished. CHD is chronic and unpredictable. Its complexity is such that over a patient’s 
lifetime, their symptoms may vary, various clinical events may occur and their course of 
treatment may alter several times (Patterson and Treasure 1993; Jackson 1993).
Morbidity and Mortality o f CHD
CHD is often misperceived as simply an inevitable consequence of old age, but in fact, it 
claims the lives of a considerable number of people in their prime, especially from certain 
ethnic groups which have a predisposition to CHD (McKeigue 1992). This disease is a 
major cause of mortality and morbidity in the UK, and its management is expensive. 
Although since the early 1970’s the death rate from CHD has slowly declined, it remains 
one of the highest death rates in the world (Beaglehole 1990; Sans et al 1997). In 1997, 
CHD accounted for about 123,000 deaths in the UK, representing 22% of the annual 
mortality from all causes (NHS 1997c).
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The Health Survey for England reported a prevalence of CHD of 7.1% for men and 4.6% 
for women overall which increased with age to 23.4% in men and 18.4% in women over 
75 years. These figures referred to those who had confirmed diagnoses of angina or a 
heart attack (Erens and Primatesta 1999). However, there is a substantial reservoir of 
undiagnosed heart disease, including an estimated 75% of people with mild angina who 
fail to seek medical advice. Although they incur no immediate medical costs, the risk of a 
future myocardial infarction is increased to 3-4 times the average. There is no national 
data on the incidence of CHD. General practice statistics provide estimates, but they 
underestimate the true extent, as they do not account for sudden deaths, deaths before 
discharge of patients admitted directly to hospital and cases, which are unrecognised 
(Langham et al 1993).
Although there has been a decline in the prevalence of CHD, demand for invasive 
treatment continues to rise (Weintraub et al 1990; Hubner et al 1990). Furthermore, the 
incidence of myocardial infarction has dropped but demand for prescriptions for CHD has 
increased (NHS 1994a). If these trends persist, calls for treatment for CHD will impose an 
ever increasing demand on purchasing budgets. Gunnel and Smith (1994) estimate that, in 
a typical district of about 500,000 people, there will be at least 1,275 acute myocardial 
infarctions and 5,700 patients clinically presenting with angina per annum. Of these, 8- 
13% will be referred to a cardiologist by their GP, and between 600-900 will be 
considered as potentially suitable for invasive treatment.
It has been estimated that in 1991 at least £917 million was attributable to the costs of 
NHS treatment for CHD. This consisted of costs for inpatient activity, GP consultations, 
drugs and dispensing (OHE 1992). CHD also impinges on purchasing budgets for 
prevention, and it is estimated that £10 million per annum has been attributed to this 
aspect of health care (Langham et al 1993). CHD accounts for high social costs, which are 
difficult to quantify. These relate to quality of life impairment, unemployment, premature 
retirement, the costs associated with absence from work due to sickness. In 1990/1991, 53 
million working days were lost in Britain due to CHD amounting to 10.5% of all the days 
lost to sickness. The government provided £463 million in invalidity benefit for 47.3 
million of these lost working days. Furthermore, it was estimated that the working days 
lost to CHD cost over £3 billion in lost production (Rayner 1993; HEA 1993).
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Given the scale of CHD, it has consistently formed one of the key priority areas targeted 
by the Government’s long term strategy to improve the nation’s health (NHS 1991b, 
1994a, 1999).
5.3.3 Role o f CC
CC plays a vital role in the management of heart disease but, in a broader context, it is 
only one of a number of diagnostic tests, investigations and treatments used in 
mainstream clinical practice.
As a Diagnostic Tool
Patients may present clinically complaining about chest pain which may or may not be 
angina. Furthermore, if  angina is confirmed, CHD may not necessarily be the underlying 
cause. In forming a diagnosis, it is important to consider other causes of chest pain which 
resemble angina. Differential diagnoses include heart-bum or hyperventilation. A 
clinician seeks to define anginal pain by enquiring about its location, duration, intensity 
and the factors which precipitate and relieve it. There are different types of angina, and 
the most characteristic symptom of stable angina is retrosternal chest pain, which is 
precipitated by exertion and relieved by rest (de Bono and Hopkins 1993). However, pain 
may instead be experienced in other parts of the body such as the face (Swanton 1998).
Preliminary tests for patients with suspected angina include checks of their blood 
pressure, blood cholesterol levels and medical history (Jackson 1991). Clinical 
investigations are more specialised. They have two primary roles: to confirm a diagnosis 
and to stratify risk. Various techniques can be used to examine the structure and 
performance of a living heart, but no single diagnostic method can produce a complete 
picture. The standard chest X-ray only shows the basic size, shape and orientation of the 
heart. For further detail, more sophisticated methods are required to enhance the clarity of 
the images and obtain detailed information about the function of the heart. In addition to 
the CC procedure, the methods used in mainstream clinical practice comprise 
electrocardiogram (ECG) recordings, echocardiograms and radionuclide tests.
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An ECG is a recording of the voltage changes produced by the action of the heart muscle. 
It may show evidence of previous myocardial infarctions. The ECG is an important and 
widely used diagnostic tool, with the advantage of being non-invasive. However, it can 
give false positive results, especially in women (de Bono and Hopkins 1993), so further 
tests may be necessary.
The echocardiogram scan uses sound wave echoes reflected from different parts of the 
heart, to provide images of the heart structure and its movement. It has the advantages of 
being non-invasive and the equipment is relatively inexpensive. Although the image 
quality is relatively poor, with technological developments, it is improving. Its principal 
use is for assessment of the performance of the heart valves and the function of the left 
ventricle, the main pumping chamber of the heart. Left ventricular function is an 
important risk stratification variable when invasive treatment is being considered.
Radionuclide tests involve the injection of a small, harmless quantity of radioactive 
substance into the blood. A gamma camera is used to view the size and pumping function 
of the heart, and to identify areas of the myocardium which are short of blood. 
Radionuclide scans have the benefits of being non-invasive and are more reliable than 
ECG monitoring (de Bono 1999).
As a Treatment Procedure
CC also has a role in the treatment of heart disease. Heart disease is currently incurable, 
but there are various strategies for its clinical management and the prevention of further 
cardiac events. These include changes in lifestyle to control risk factors, and various drugs 
which may increase the blood supply to the heart, reduce the amount of work the heart has 
to do or unblock an occluded coronary artery. §5.3.1 described how CC is used to carry 
out angioplasty procedures. In addition to coronary angioplasty procedures, clinically 
invasive strategies for heart disease include catheter procedures for congenital heart 
disease and valve disease, surgical replacement of defective valves, surgical correction of 
congenital defects and coronary bypass surgery. Coronary bypass surgery involves the 
construction of a bypass channel around a narrowing in a coronary artery, using a section 
of a vein or artery.
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Its Future Role in the Management o f Heart Disease
CC has played and continues to play an essential role in both the investigation and 
treatment of heart disease. Although its use is primarily for patients with suspected heart 
disease, some normal results will be expected, as some CC investigations are only 
intended to resolve diagnostic uncertainty (King and Talley 1989). Coronary angiography 
remains the ‘gold standard’ for cardiac investigation and has thus assisted in the 
development of non-invasive methods such as echocardiography and radionuclide tests. 
As a consequence, many patients can be successfully diagnosed and treated without 
invasive investigation, which is both risky and expensive.
For some conditions, the advent of new and refined technologies, such as more 
sophisticated echocardiograms or magnetic resonance imaging may reduce the need for 
coronary angiography in the future (Manning et al 1993). Currently, in the treatment of 
CHD, diagnostic CC is essential when planning invasive treatment, that is, coronary 
angioplasty or coronary bypass surgery (de Bono and Hopkins 1993; Swanton 1998; 
Patterson and Treasure 1993). The image of the coronary anatomy, given by the coronary 
angiogram, indicates which section of the artery should be targeted. It is also used to 
evaluate the success of the intervention in restoring the blood flow. In the future, it is 
expected that the development of interventional CC will impact upon the use of cardiac 
surgery, as the design of sophisticated catheter-based treatments will enable some patient 
groups to avoid the need for surgery.
5.4 RESEARCH METHODS
5.4.1 Data Collection
Collaborative work was conducted between late June 1997 and August 1999. See 
Appendix C for details about site visits, meetings and data acquired from the 
collaborative centres.
Observation work was conducted at the catheter laboratories at the three hospitals. This 
occurred in June and August 1997 at Heartwick and Veinbridge Hospitals, after 
Heartwick’s laboratory had reopened after closing for repairs. Observation work was 
carried out at Ribsley General, during the second period that district services were in
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place, in March 1998. These site visits provided an insight into the complexities 
associated with the delivery of CC services and opportunities to elicit data during 
informal discussions with both the medical and support staff. Observation work also took 
place at another hospital.
Interviews provided opportunities to build a rapport with the collaborators, collect data, 
obtain further insight into the problem and obtain feedback on analysis. Guidance was 
also given on background reading for the research. The form of the interviews varied. 
Patton (1980) differentiates between four types of interview, based upon the degree of 
structure, as determined by the interviewer. The interviews for this project were a 
combination of two of these types: the interview guide approach and the more structured, 
standardised, open-ended interview. In the former, the topics are determined in advance, 
but flexibility is given to the interviewer to decide upon the sequence of the topics and 
wording of the questions. In the latter, both the sequence and wording of the questions are 
fixed, but the questions are phrased in an open-ended format. To facilitate the process of 
recording these meetings, some of the interviews were tape-recorded with the permission 
of the interviewees. These interviews were transcribed within 24 hours of the interview. A 
considerable amount of informal communication also took place via the telephone.
Although replies were sought to a series of predetermined questions, the discussion was 
not constrained by these questions. A question would often lead to a useful new line of 
enquiry, and further questions would emerge. Sometimes, especially in the early stages, 
feedback was also sought on a preliminary hypothesis about the causal mechanisms 
underlying the effects of the service shift. This hypothesis, which was based upon insights 
from the literature, was presented as text to the interviewee to read. At a later stage, 
questions were based upon graphs of data supplied by the collaborative centres and an 
informal conceptual model. These were also presented on paper. Presenting the graphs 
proved very fruitful, as this enabled the collaborators to reflect upon, and sometimes 
revise, their assumptions about the trends represented in the graphs. A learning process 
thus emerged. A conceptual model was presented as a summary of the insights obtained 
from the literature, the various interviews, data analysis and observational work. The 
conceptual model was presented to the consultant cardiologists at the three collaborative 
centres and the behavioural implications of the structure were described. Their views on
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this model were sought. All three found the model acceptable subject to certain 
amendments, which were incorporated into the model.
In seeking the cardiologists’ views of the conceptual model, the aim was to form a 
consensus about the general mechanisms underlying the effects of the shift in the balance 
of care, using a Delphi-like process (Linstone and Turoff 1975). Whilst the effects at 
Ribsley General and Veinbridge General differed, the underlying mechanisms should be 
the same (the different effects would arise from the different relative strengths of these 
mechanisms). It was not considered necessary to check the conceptual model with the 
other collaborators because the associated sections of model structure, such as cost 
constraints, were relatively easy to represent. Although GP referral behaviour is 
represented in the conceptual model, due to time constraints, the research design could 
not extend to include interviews with GPs. Insights about how to represent GP referral 
behaviour, in the structure of the model, were thus derived from the literature and the 
experiences of the collaborators.
Numerical data was derived from various databases. Written sources of data comprised 
hospital reports, annual reports of purchasing authorities, and brochures and other 
documentation of suppliers of CC services, in addition to the literature.
The use of several data sources follows classic research design and is known as 
triangulation. Triangulation is based on the assumption that a single source alone may 
produce undetected errors, which may lead to erroneous conclusions. The background to 
the shift in CC services is first presented in Chapter 6. The case studies findings are then 
reported, with the triangulation of evidence in Chapter 7. The case study evidence 
demonstrates a potential role for SD to investigate further.
5.4.2 UseofSD
A retrospective analysis of the shift in CC services was carried out by considering how 
improvements could have been made. The two policy questions that were stated in §5.2 
were thus recast as follows:
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How did shifts in CC services help and hinder the provision of NHS cardiac 
services over time?
How could NHS purchasers and providers have effectively intervened to alleviate 
pressure on the system?
In investigating the primary and secondary effects of the shift in CC services, we can 
speculate about the dynamic implications of the underlying mechanisms. However, our 
cognitive limitations prevent us from fully understanding the inherent complexity 
involved. These limitations may be overcome with the aid of an SD simulation model.
The Modelling Processes
In §4.2.2, the basic processes of simulation modelling were described in general terms. 
More specifically, the first phase of an SD simulation study is referred to as the process of 
conceptualisation. The problem or issue of interest is defined. Its context and 
characteristics are described, and the central questions to be addressed are clarified. For 
problems and issues that have a history, historical reference modes are constructed to 
produce an unambiguous descriptions of the problematic behaviour in graphical terms. 
Further reference modes may reflect more desirable behaviour and observed policy 
behaviour if different policies have been tried in the past. Ideally, these graphs are 
produced from numerical data, and hypothetical graphs, based upon verbal descriptions of 
the system, may be used when numerical data is unavailable. Both real and hypothetical 
reference modes were employed in this study with the emphasis on the latter for the 
Veinbridge General case.
SD can also be applied to problems and issues that do not have a historical precedent. For 
example, in planning for a particular service shift for which there is no previous history, 
SD can provide a useful planning tool in helping to anticipate the effect of this policy 
change. However, in the absence of historical reference modes, it is essential to have clear 
a priori expectations about the possible dynamic effects of interventions (Mass, 1991). 
Based upon these expectations, reference modes may be derived.
Also as part of the conceptualisation process, an informal conceptual model is constructed 
to present the basic mechanisms that are understood to generate the system behaviour. A
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causal hypothesis is presented and the purpose of the model is stated. The former is a 
verbal statement describing the relationship between the behaviour and feedback 
structure. The latter concerns: the intended audience for this study; the policy levers of 
interest that need to be represented in the model; and, the desired level of implementation 
or use of the model. The level of implementation of the model could range from raising 
awareness to a one-time adoption of a set of policy recommendations, and to the adoption 
of the model as an ongoing policy analysis tool.
The second phase of an SD simulation study involves the conversion of the informal 
conceptual model into a formal simulation model. This is referred to as the formulation 
phase. It is followed by an experimental phase, which aims to provide insight into the 
base case behaviour and, by conducting policy analyses, obtain insight into how more 
desirable behaviour may be achieved. In practice, the different modelling phases are 
iterative. As stated in Chapter 4 and illustrated in Figure 4.1, a process of model testing 
and refinement is embedded within the SD approach. This produces iterations as models 
are constructed gradually and undergo a series of revisions. The model output is analysed 
for sources of insight into the relationship between behaviour and structure and the 
existence of model errors. The model structure is refined and analyses are rerun on the 
revised model.
In describing the model of the shift in CC services and its use, it is necessary to organise 
the chapters sequentially. Unfortunately, this will inevitably obscure the underlying 
iterative nature of the SD approach. The simulation model and its use is presented over 
three chapters (Chapters 9, 10 and 11). In the first of these chapters, the final version of 
the simulation model is described and the procedures that were applied to validate/gain 
confidence in this model are described. This was based on a series of established tests. 
The second chapter presents the simulations which were carried out on the model in order 
to understand the existing use of district services at the case study centres - the base case 
analyses. The third chapter describes the simulations that provided insight into the effects 
of alternative policies - the policy analyses.
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Use of Data
To calibrate the simulation model, parameters were derived from both numerical data, 
provided by the collaborative centres, and expert estimates in cases where numerical data 
was unavailable. For Veinbridge General, the little numerical data that was available had 
a number of omissions and inconsistencies and some of the expert estimates proved to be 
unreliable as they led to further inconsistencies. However, most of the descriptions of the 
system seemed reliable. There was no reason to believe that Veinbridge General was 
atypical and these descriptions were consistent with those found elsewhere.
In spite of the data problems, for several reasons, it was important to consider Veinbridge 
General in addition to Ribsley General. Studying Veinbridge General provided an 
opportunity to develop a model that accommodated uses and experiences of district 
services beyond those that applied to Ribsley General e.g. involving phase 2 development 
and a permanent rather than temporary service. It also enabled an examination of the 
effects of more ‘aggressive’ referral behaviour; considering more aggressive referral 
behaviour at Ribsley General would not have constituted a plausible departure from the 
base case assumptions. Finally, Veinbridge General would be the more interesting case to 
system dynamicists as the mechanisms underlying the system behaviour had a greater 
emphasis on endogenous factors.
It would have been infeasible to overcome the data problems with the Veinbridge General 
case study by collecting more reliable data directly from the patient records, even if 
patient confidentiality problems could have been overcome, due to the time constraints. 
Instead, by making some reasonable assumptions, the useful data was employed as an aid 
to the estimation of other parameters that produced behaviour that was consistent with the 
descriptions of the Veinbridge General experience. This approach was also successfully 
adopted with the Ribsley General case to estimate several OP parameters.
Use o f the Simulation Model
Sensitivity analysis was applied to test the effects of uncertainties in parameter values, 
such as GP referral parameters. Sensitivity analysis was also used to generate insight into 
the structure-behaviour linkages in both the base case and policy analyses (Tank-Nielsen
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1980). There are three different types of model sensitivity: numerical, behavioural and 
policy sensitivity (Richardson and Pugh 1980). All quantitative models will exhibit 
numerical sensitivity by their very nature so this is not a source of concern. This is in 
contrast to cases of behavioural sensitivity. It occurs when the basic pattern or trend of the 
model output changes in response to a model parameter or structural change.
The behaviour of SD models tends to be insensitive to parameter changes due to the 
effects of: loop dominance (the parameter change may not apply to the dominant loop); 
shifts in loop dominance (it may only apply to the dominant loop for a short period); and, 
system compensation (other loops may intensify or weaken to compensate). If the model 
behaviour is sensitive to a structural change, then the appropriate structure for the base 
case analysis is that which produces the behaviour exhibited by the real system. Policy 
sensitivity is the greatest potential concern as policy conclusions should be robust to 
reasonable changes in the model. If policy sensitivity is found to be due to a model 
artefact, the model must be reformulated. If policy sensitivity exists and the model 
structure is considered to be appropriate and consistent with the real system, efforts 
should be directed at improving the accuracy of the model’s parameters. Given that the 
real system could exhibit the same sensitivity, it is also advisable to develop policy 
recommendations that rely on different parameters.
In addition to sensitivity analysis, partial-model testing was employed in the use of the 
simulation model. Partial-model testing is a SD technique that can be used for several 
purposes: to provide insight into how the model operates; improve the model structure; 
and, improve the parameter estimation (Homer 1983; Morecroft 1983, 1985). It involves 
disabling, or switching off, parts of the model so that the analysis can focus on an isolated 
sub-model.
The policy experiments reflected changes to the forces that drive activity, changes to 
demand patterns and capacity constraints, and the assumed effects of the use of new 
clinical guidelines to prioritise demand. In considering the issue of the appropriateness of 
demand, the possible impact of a clinical guideline was represented in the simulation 
model by considering a reduction in the assumed response to the increased access. For 
example, rather than assuming that demand could increase by as much as x% in response 
to a reduction in waiting times, it was assumed that the increase would be constrained to
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(x-y)%. Expert estimates were obtained for ‘x’ and ‘y* from the consultant cardiologists 
and made various assumptions about the potential effects of the use of clinical guidelines 
by GPs. An audit was not carried out on the individual patient data in order to establish 
the appropriateness of decisions about individual patients. Such an analysis would have 
been extremely time consuming and would have required specialised skills. For the 
purposes of this study, the use of expert estimates and sensitivity analysis sufficed.
5.4.3 Evaluating the Model-Based Experiments
Chapter 2 described how there have been increasing calls made for greater evaluation 
within health care. In Chapter 3, this health care trend was discussed with specific 
reference to shifts in the balance of care. Several different aspects of service quality were 
introduced in §2.4. This section identifies the aspects that were considered and the key 
performance measures that were used in evaluating the results of the model-based 
experiments. It also describes how these measures were evaluated. In carrying out the 
experiments, an attempt was made to provide a balanced evaluation of the system. The 
aspects of service quality that were relevant were considered to varying degrees.
Selecting Appropriate Performance Measures
Equity was not evaluated, as this aspect of service quality was not relevant to this 
research. Only a single patient population was considered for each case study i.e. those 
referred for an elective CC investigation from a given DGH. Equity would have been 
relevant if the availability of district CC services for different patient populations had 
been considered.
Several service quality variables were considered implicitly but they were not measured. 
It was assumed that the local purchasers regarded a district CC service as relevant to the 
local population’s needs, otherwise they would not have supported its introduction. 
Providing a local CC service obviously improved the geographical accessibility of CC 
services to the local population. Geographical accessibility could be measured by the 
average journey time spent by patients and/or district-based CC operators. Such a measure 
did not feature in the model as it was irrelevant to its purpose. However, considered in 
calculating the relative cost of a district-based CC investigation and tertiary-based CC
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investigation, was the need for a certain proportion of patients to require an inpatient stay 
at the tertiary centre which could be avoided if they underwent a district-based CC 
investigation. This proportion thus reflected the degree of geographical inaccessibility. It 
was assumed that the shift in CC services only occurred on the basis that it did not 
compromise clinical effectiveness and that it had proven to be cost-effective. This was 
confirmed by the interviews. The responses to patient questionnaires at the collaborative 
centres provided evidence of high patient satisfaction with the district service. It was 
assumed that this implied that the new service was responsive to patient needs. These 
questionnaires and their replies were not studied as part of the research. Instead, the 
model implicitly assumed that high patient satisfaction and patient responsiveness formed 
factors in the support for the shift in CC services. Introducing district CC services 
obviously increased the scope o f facilities for clinical investigation at the district hospital. 
In the model, this was indicated by the number of patients undergoing district CC 
investigation.
Financial accessibility was represented in the model but did not form a key evaluation 
variable. The same applied to the skill base. It was assumed that the quality of the skill 
base was not compromised by the shift in CC services, otherwise the service shift would 
not have been permitted to take place. Instead, it was reported that improvements were 
made to the quality of the skill base; the rate at which junior CC operators gained skills 
during the presence of district CC services was increased as more patients were 
investigated (with the increased capacity). The model reflected the underlying 
mechanisms involved in the gain of CC skills.
One key evaluation variable for the experiments comprised the resource usage which 
connects with efficiency. Two further key variables were the average waiting time and the 
waiting list length. Each represents different aspects of pressure on the system associated 
with access times. The former represents the delay to undergo investigation (or treatment) 
and as stated in §2.5.2, this is a key performance indicator from the perspective of the 
patient. The latter represents the need for investigation (or treatment) and represents a 
further important performance indicator from the perspective of those responsible for 
funding and delivering services. A fourth key evaluation variable, the referral rate, was 
considered for two reasons. Firstly, because this variable represented a key determinant of
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the other three. Secondly, because it was the stimulation of referrals that provided the 
motivation for the investigation of the use of the SD method.
By concentrating on resource usage, waiting times, waiting lists and referral rates, both 
the supply and demand for CC investigations were addressed, in addition to the interplay 
between supply and demand variables. These four evaluation variables were considered 
across the cardiac referral chain with respect to both the cardiology OP services at the 
district hospital and delivery of elective CC investigations. By considering both OP and 
elective CC services, both the localised and broader consequences of the shift in CC 
services were addressed.
Introducing a Pressure Summary Index
SD models can generate both tabulated and graphical output for each evaluation variable. 
In SD modelling, to facilitate comparisons with the base case, base case graphs are often 
superimposed on the test (experiment) graphs so that changes in behaviour modes, 
amplitudes, phase changes and so on, can be viewed. In considering a single evaluation 
variable, sometimes it is clear whether or not the test conditions have produced an 
improvement to the system behaviour (see Figure 5.3(a) and (b)). However, on other 
occasions, it is not clearly apparent overall as there may be trade-offs involved between 
short-term and longer-term effects (see Figure 5.3(c)).
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Figure 5.3. Comparing Base Case Graphs with Test Graphs 
(AvWT is a generic pressure variable)
I propose that measuring the area between the two graphs could help to summarise the 
differences in graphical output. The area quantifies the degree to which improvements 
have been made and can help to summarise the overall impact o f short-term and longer- 
term effects (Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4 Quantifying Differences Between the Base Case Graphs and Test Graphs
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The areas under the graphs o f the referral rate and activity rate represent the cumulative 
referrals and activity respectively. The areas under the waiting list and average waiting 
time graphs could be interpreted as proxy measures for the pressure imposed on the 
system over time. Note that this represents a summary of, over a given time period, the 
instances when pressure affected behaviour. It does not represent the effect o f pressure on 
behaviour. The latter is represented in the model by various factors including the waiting 
time effect.
In this study, areas for the graphs o f activity rates, average time spent on the waiting list, 
the waiting list length, and referral rate for both elective CC investigations and OP 
appointments were measured. For the waiting times and waiting lists, the measure was 
modified (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5 Adding a Tolerance Level
Measuring the area between the two graphs illustrated in Figure 5.5(a) reflects the implicit 
assumption that all levels o f the waiting time (or waiting list) would be unacceptable. 
However, this is not necessarily true, as a certain level would be tolerated. Subsequently, 
a more refined measure would be based on areas under the graph and above a tolerance 
level, as illustrated in Figure 5.5(b). The tolerance levels were specified by the waiting 
time and waiting list goals.
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F ig u re  5 .6  P itfa lls  o f  F o cu sin g  on  a  S ing le  M easu re
I propose that this area-related measure can provide a good summary index to evaluate 
changes in pressure on a system. However, in some cases (see Figure 5.6), it can be 
misleading if  used alone. Therefore, in this study, several measures were employed.
5.4.4 Drawing Insights from the SD Study
Insights will be drawn from the SD study by deriving policy implications from the results 
of the model-based experiments and assessing the usefulness o f SD with reference to the 
CC study. The case study findings will then be used to challenge the research hypothesis. 
This will produce a revised statement about the causal mechanisms o f the effects of the
AvW T
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service shift and the usefulness of SD. Generalisations will then be drawn from the 
findings of the research. This will consider both the dynamics of service shifts and the 
conclusions regarding the usefulness of SD as a planning and evaluation tool for studying 
the dynamics of service shifts. Finally, reflecting upon the study, some recommendations 
for future research directions will be specified.
5.5 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to clarify the research design to probe further into the 
usefulness of the SD method.
A case study research strategy was presented, based upon the shift in CC services from 
the established tertiary level to the secondary (or district) level for investigations on low 
risk patients. Three case study centres were introduced. It was stated that access to data 
was provided on condition that all parties involved would not be publicly identified. For 
this reason, pseudonyms were assigned. The case study centres were composed of two 
DGHs (‘Ribsley General’ and ‘Veinbridge General’), which offered contrasting histories 
of the shift in CC services, in addition to their main tertiary referral centre (‘Heartwick 
Hospital’). An outline of the health professionals who acted as collaborators for this study 
was provided. The main collaborators were: consultant cardiologists; hospital managers; 
purchasers (commissioners) of health services; and, a manager from the company 
(‘Cardiocare’) that supplied CC facilities and consumables to the two DGHs.
The CC procedure was described and it was explained how it is used to diagnose and treat 
heart disease. This provided background and insight into the issues involved in deciding 
who should undergo this procedure and where it might be safely undertaken.
The research methods were outlined by describing how data was acquired and analysed, 
and how insights will be drawn from the SD study. Regarding the analysis of data, 
following on from the general description of simulation modelling in Chapter 4, the 
phases of SD simulation modelling were described in further detail. Four key performance 
measures which were used to evaluate the model-based experiments were identified: 
resource usage; average waiting times; length of the waiting lists; and, referral rates. A
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new index was proposed to summarise the pressure over time associated with an 
excessive waiting list and average waiting time.
The literature on the shift in CC services is reviewed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SHIFT IN CARDIAC CATHETERISATION SERVICES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the case of the shift in CC services in the NHS was introduced as 
a focus for further study. The purpose of this chapter is to present the review of the 
literature on the shift in CC services. This provided some background and motivation for 
the case studies. It included the evidence that was expected to arise from the case studies 
in support of the research hypothesis. This information also placed the shift in CC 
services to the case study centres in context with the general evolution of district CC 
services. The case study experiences of CC services will form the focus of the next 
chapter.
In this chapter, the traditional cardiac referral chain is introduced (§6.2). Following on 
from the general discussion about the motivation underlying the shift in the balance of 
care in the NHS in §2.5.3, four main factors motivating the development of district CC 
services are considered (§6.3). The provision of district services is then discussed (§6.4) 
in terms of the practicalities involved (§6.4.1) and the future prospects for this trend 
(§6.4.1). Again, following on from the general discussion, two key concerns about the 
possible consequences of the shift in CC services are highlighted. The first concern is that 
improving access will stimulate further demand (§6.5). Evidence of demand being 
stimulated is provided (§6.5.1), and the mechanisms by which this may occur are 
examined (§6.5.2). The second concern is that increasing access will lead to an increase in 
the rate of inappropriate use of CC (§6.6). The factors involved in defining the 
appropriateness of CC are considered (§6.6.1), before presenting the review of the 
available literature on appropriateness of CC (§6.6.2). The use of clinical guidelines to 
promote the appropriate use of CC is also discussed (§6.6.3). The final section provides a 
summary of the chapter (§6.7).
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6.2 THE TRADITIONAL REFERRAL CHAIN
The referral chain was introduced in general terms in §2.3.2. Cardiac services are 
provided within both the community (primary level) and hospital sectors (secondary and 
tertiary levels). The health professionals located within the community include ambulance 
and first aid workers, but those who primarily deal with patients with heart disease are the 
GPs. They have important roles in disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and 
rehabilitation. However, for some patients, their expertise and the facilities available to 
them are inadequate. These patients are subsequently referred to a hospital for an OP 
appointment so that they may be investigated further by a specialist, either a general 
physician or cardiologist. If surgery is necessary, the patient will be subsequently referred 
to a cardiac surgeon. Therefore, the GP acts both as a gatekeeper to elective hospital 
services and as an agent to patients. Patients may also enter the hospital sector via the 
A&E department as an emergency arrival. This arrival may have been arranged by their 
GP or the patient may be a self-referral.
Regarding hospital services for heart disease, the traditional role of the DGH is in the 
diagnosis and management of heart disease using non-invasive methods. Tertiary centres 
offer more specialised investigations and treatments such as coronary angioplasty and 
coronary bypass surgery. As CC is invasive, the established place for this service has been 
the tertiary level. Depending on their geographical location and other factors, patients may 
be referred directly to a tertiary centre or via a secondary centre. For example, in the 
Thames Regions, the majority of referrals to tertiary centres are by secondary centre 
cardiologists (LIG 1993).
6.3 MOTIVATION FOR DISTRICT SERVICES
In recent years, facilities have been developed to conduct low risk procedures outside the 
established tertiary level, at some DGHs. The complexity of different types of CC 
procedures were described in §5.3.1. The cases which have been shifted to the district 
level are CC investigations on low risk patients. Low risk patients comprise primarily 
uncomplicated elective referrals from outpatients and also inpatients whose condition has 
stabilised (BCS 1997). The latter group are derived from those who enter the system as
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emergency admissions. In practice, patients are only catheterised on an inpatient basis in 
DGHs with established CC facilities.
Although district services confer a range of benefits, the change in policy has been driven 
by four main factors (Stewart et al 1990; BCS 1994a 1994b 1997; Foale 1998). Firstly, 
the desire to address shortfalls in tertiary facilities. Secondly, the increased availability of 
district-based cardiologists who are trained CC operators. Thirdly, the increasing pressure 
to improve local services. Finally, the demonstrated cost-effectiveness and safety of 
conducting routine diagnostic CC without on-site surgical backup.
6.3.1 Addressing Shortfalls in Tertiary Facilities
There is a widespread concern about the inadequate provision of cardiac services and long 
waiting lists for both routine and urgent elective cases (Black et al 1996; BCS 1997). The 
limiting factor for elective CC activity is often an insufficient provision of beds for the 
post-procedural recovery period as beds are being ‘blocked’ by emergency admissions. 
Therefore, tertiary centres are under pressure to meet emergency and urgent needs without 
compromising routine elective care.
Tertiary centres are also called upon to carry out more interventional work including 
coronary angioplasty and coronary bypass surgery to support various targets including the 
standards set by the Government’s National Service Framework on CHD (BCS 1994a, 
1994c; Black et al 1996; Swanton 1999; NHS 2000a). These are driven by the national 
priority to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with heart disease and the desire to 
close the discrepancy between UK intervention rates and those of other industrialised 
countries. These treatments require capacity increases for the procedures themselves and 
also for diagnostic CC to plan these procedures. The ratio of investigations to 
interventions is 2:1 for patients with CHD and approximately 1:1 for patients with valve 
disorders and adult patients with congenital defects (BCS 1994a).
District CC facilities may be used to support a shift in activity away from the tertiary 
centre or to expand overall activity or both as was illustrated in Figure 3.1 in §3.3. These 
facilities may be provided temporarily or on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Shifts 
in CC activity may be required to release tertiary capacity for more complex cases such as
113
emergency care or treatment procedures. Alternatively they may be required to 
temporarily substitute for a tertiary catheter laboratory which has been closed due to 
repairs or contamination (BCS 1994d). Additional capacity may be provided to achieve a 
desired reduction in waiting times or to support a long-term expansion of services.
6.3.2 A vailability o f  Necessary Skills
The evolution of district services has been supported and motivated by the emergence of a 
new generation of district consultant cardiologists who are fully trained CC operators and 
now have the responsibility of training junior staff (Hall et al 1995). In the absence of a 
district facility, district consultant cardiologists who administer CC (typically elective 
cases) have to conduct CC sessions at a tertiary centre to maintain their skills. Their junior 
staff will also rely upon sessions at the tertiary level to gain and maintain experience in 
CC.
6.3.3 Pressure to Improve Local Services
The development of district services has also been driven by the desire to improve local 
services. A local CC service has several advantages. It can reduce the undesirable 
fragmentation of specialist care between the tertiary and secondary levels, thus enabling 
some patients to be fully managed at their local district hospital. Low risk patients can 
undergo CC in familiar surroundings, close to home. The close proximity of services can 
also reduce the need for patients to remain in hospital overnight as CC is increasingly 
being carried out on a day-case basis (Christie et al 1985; Clark et al 1992; BCS 1994b; 
de Bono 1999; BCS/BCIS 2000). District services also present opportunities for support 
staff at DGHs to acquire new skills. In addition, by making DGHs more specialised, this 
facilitates the introduction of new technologies and thus reinforces the specialisation at 
the district level. This is appreciated by both the staff and their patients. Developing CC 
facilities at a DGH may also enable the host trust to generate income from further NHS 
purchasing contracts and private patients, and to offer sessions to visiting cardiologists 
from neighbouring districts (BCS 1997).
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6.3.4 Cost-effectiveness and Safety Issues
Cost-effectiveness considerations have obviously been important factors in the debate 
about the appropriateness of having district CC services (Mills 1990; Gunnell et al 1995). 
In §3.4.1, it was mentioned that Scott (1996) recommended that, in a cost-effectiveness 
analysis of a service shift, the appropriate measures of the benefits should be process 
measures, such as waiting times and convenience, rather than mortality and morbidity 
measures. For the shift in CC services, both sets of measures should be considered. The 
latter set concern the key issue of the safety of shifting CC services to the district level.
The issue of cost-effectiveness has been frequently discussed with respect to the shift in 
CC services, but no economic evaluations have appeared in the literature. The debate has 
mainly focused on safety issues. The concern has been about removing CC services from 
the protective environment of the tertiary centre where surgery can be promptly given if 
necessary. The British Cardiac Society are satisfied that diagnostic CC can be safely 
undertaken at the district level on low risk patients. Consequently, they have endorsed the 
development of district services for these patients subject to the availability of adequate 
skills and facilities (BCS 1994a, 1997). Evidence continues to confirm the safety of 
district based services (e.g. Smith et al 1999; Papaconstantinou et al 1999).
There has been a similar debate about conducting interventional CC (coronary 
angioplasty) without surgical backup at DGHs. The current consensus is that this is not 
recommended although there are a few DGHs that have departed from this 
recommendation (BCIS 1992; de Bono and Hopkins 1993; BCS/BCIS 2000). As 
described in §5.3.1, interventional CC is more complicated than CC investigations and, 
therefore, carries more risk. A recent study has concluded that backup continues to be 
necessary in spite of the availability of stents that have reduced the need for urgent 
coronary bypass surgery (Shubrooks et al 2001).
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6.4 PROVISION OF DISTRICT SERVICES
6,4.1 Practicalities Involved
There are a number of practicalities involved in the provision of district services. District 
services may be supplied by hiring a mobile catheter laboratory, which is shared with 
other district hospitals and is driven to the hospital only for prearranged visits. 
Alternatively, a hospital may hire a relocatable catheter laboratory, which remains on site 
or construct integrated CC facilities within the hospital. Mobile units may be used in 
cases where district services are only required on a short-term temporary basis, or 
temporarily as part of a long-term strategy during the period of construction of an 
integrated facility. Temporary district services may be necessary to provide additional 
capacity or to temporarily substitute for a laboratory which has closed.
Mobiles may also be used as a long-term arrangement in instances where the construction 
of an integrated facility would not be cost-effective. Integrated CC facilities have been 
reported to cost in the region of £1 million to install and further costs are incurred to staff, 
run and maintain the unit with regular upgrades. With both mobiles and integrated 
laboratories, the costs of overheads are absorbed into the procedural costs. With an 
integrated laboratory, the procedural cost declines as the patient volume increases whereas 
the procedural cost with mobiles may be fixed. Consequently, at low patient volumes, the 
mobiles offer lower procedural costs with the situation reversed at higher patient volumes. 
A DGH then has to process a large number of patients for an integrated catheter 
laboratory to become a viable option (Cardinal Medical 1995). This may be achieved by 
sharing the facilities with cardiologists from neighbouring DGHs.
The process of introducing mobile CC facilities to a DGH involves several steps and 
subsequently involves several delays (Cardiovision 1995). Although there may be 
significant clinical interest in developing a district service and an adequate provision of 
medical skills, a service cannot be developed without financial backing. A business case 
has to be presented to the local purchaser. To organise the hire of a mobile unit, 
depending on the desired level of activity and the regulations at the time, tender 
documents may also have to be drawn up. Arranging the contract to provide mobile 
services will have to go out to tender. At the time of the research, the two companies that 
held the UK market were Cardiovision and Cardinal Medical. A suitable site for the
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mobile has to be identified and prepared, if one does not already exist. Factors involved in 
site preparation include the development of a level base which can withstand the 
considerable weight of the mobile unit and an electricity panel which connects the mobile 
to the electricity supply of the host hospital. Staff scheduling and other arrangements also 
have to be made to ensure that staff are available and that day beds are provided for the 
post-procedural recovery period. The construction of an integrated facility will involve the 
use of a mobile to present a feasibility study and the submission of a further business case.
Mobiles are accompanied by fully trained support staff - a nurse, a radiographer and a 
cardiac technician. A relocatable catheter unit may be supported by staff from the host 
hospital or from the suppliers. Suppliers of mobile services also offer a range of support 
services including training for support staff at the host hospital. This is useful in preparing 
for the use of an integrated CC facility. In addition to the cardiology department, several 
other departments of the host hospital will be involved in the establishment and running 
of mobile services. These include the hospital management to co-ordinate the service, the 
estates department to prepare the site, security staff and hotel services to provide porters 
and cleaning. It is essential that a visiting mobile unit has exclusive use of a porter so that 
patients can be promptly transferred between the ward and mobile unit.
6.4.2 Future Prospects
In developing guidelines for a long-term strategy for the location of CC services, the 
British Cardiac Society Council considered the following four options (BCS 1994a):
Option 1 - No district CC services and no district cardiologists undertaking CC.
Option 2 - No district CC services but district cardiologists with appropriate skills to be offered 
sessions at tertiary centres to conduct (primarily elective) diagnostic CC.
Option 3 - Some district hospitals, particularly those geographically remote from tertiary centres, 
to develop CC services in conjunction with neighbouring districts to ensure that facilities are used 
efficiently.
Option 4 - Tertiary centres to concentrate on emergency cases, interventional work and 
investigations for their local population only, and for elective invasive investigations at the 
district level to become the norm.
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An extensive range of factors formed the basis of their deliberations. These included 
various issues of safety, workload, access, efficiency, research and training. For each 
factor, the Council considered the case in favour of a regional tertiary provision, and the 
case in favour of a local district provision (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Tertiary Verses District Provision of CC
For a Regional Tertiary Provision For a Local District Provision
Safety Issues
Patient Safety
Exposure to Radiation
Immediate surgical cover an advantage.
May be higher if tertiary cardiologists 
undertake only interventional cases.
Increased safety through reduced 
delay.
Radiation burden will be shared by 
more cardiologists.
Patient Activity
Emergency Work
Angioplasty Referrals
Surgical Referrals 
Waiting Time
Centres must remain robust to cope with 
emergency referrals.
Ability to fast track patients and avoid 
second procedure.
Dependant on contracts
District hospitals without surgical 
cover should not investigate 
emergency patients.
Frees lab space at tertiary centre for 
more coronary angioplasty 
procedures.
Rate may increase so that current 
unmet need is brought to light.
Probably reduced by providing more 
new facilities.
Efficiency & Costs
Efficiency
Cost per Case
Maximise use of expensive equipment. 
Reduced by increasing throughput
Maximise use of expensive 
equipment.
Lower capital charges and overheads
Research & Review
Research
Audit
Reduced workload might hinder 
research.
More easily organised if on one site.
Tertiary centres provide a better forum 
for planning and discussing cases 
and protocols.
Routine diagnostic work of limited 
value.
Would need to join national 
confidential enquiry on 
complications. District 
cardiologists should keep close 
links with the centre.
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Training & Skills
Training Loss of cases for investigations may Some districts will have registrars
hinder training of registrars. rotating through higher
Devolution to district may force all cardiology training.
cardiologists inappropriately to
develop invasive skills.
Skills Sufficient activity to maintain skills. Avoids wasting district hospital 
skills
Other Factors
Travel Time Reduced for patients and
cardiologists. Most patients do 
not live near a tertiary centre.
Doctor Satisfaction Increased through ability to see 
patients through whole course of 
illness.
(Source: BCS 1994a)
The Council rejected the first option on the basis that skills would be wasted but they 
supported the second and third options subject to certain criteria. These criteria are: the 
development of local services is within the context of a overall strategic plan for 
cardiology services agreed by providers and purchasers; staff are adequately trained; 
district activity is audited; the quality of medical images equals that of a tertiary centre; 
close links are maintained with the tertiary centres; and, that there is sufficient throughput 
to ensure cost efficiency and to maintain local skills. There is a strong positive correlation 
between outcome and throughput (Luft et al 1990; LIG 1993, McGrath et al 2000). A 
British Cardiac Society Working Group (BCS 1997) have recommended that there should 
be at least two operators in each district laboratory, carrying out a minimum of 500 cases 
per annum and that the throughput of each laboratory which is dedicated to cardiac work 
should be 1500-2000 cases per annum (minimum of 4 cases per session). The British 
Cardiac Society Council also accepted that over the course of time, district CC services 
would develop and converge towards the fourth option. The use of mobile catheter 
laboratories will play an important role in this process.
The development of district CC services has a number of important benefits to the 
delivery of specialist cardiac services. However, this initiative may prove to be counter­
productive in the long-term as increasing access to CC may lead to the stimulation of
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further demand and thus impose increasing pressure on the system. Furthermore, 
increasing access could also lead to inappropriate use of CC services. However, demand 
may also be stimulated by reducing access to CC. The concerns of stimulated demand and 
inappropriate use are discussed in §6.5 and §6.6 respectively.
6.5 STIMULATION OF LATENT DEMAND
6.5.1 Evidence o f Stimulated Demand
There is various evidence in the literature to suggest that shifts in CC services may 
stimulate demand. This supports the proposal that exploring this service innovation with 
SD could be useful.
Marked variations exist between the rates of CC and cardiac treatments, across different 
regions and within regions, despite apparent similarities in selection criteria (Gray et al 
1990; Henderson et al 1995). However, a consistent finding is that where facilities are 
available, the preference of patients and doctors is for an increasingly interventionalist 
approach (de Bono and Hopkins 1993; Every et al 1993; BCS 1994a). The stimulation of 
demand by the introduction of CC facilities is also suggested in research in the US. This 
research has shown that the availability of CC services can influence the choice of 
hospital (Hodgkin 1996). Furthermore, there is the evidence that, for health services in 
general, referral rates rise in response to increasing access to services (e.g. Buttery and 
Snaith 1979, 1980; Roland and Morris 1988; Worthington 1991; Pope 1992; Newton et al 
1995; Hamblin et al 1997; The Economist 1998; Goddard and Tavakoli 1998; Hamblin et 
al 1998a; Earwicker and Whynes 1998).
Stimulated demand is desirable if it constitutes the identification of new high risk 
patients. However, this latent demand may also include low priority or inappropriate 
cases. This will impose increasing pressure on purchasers and providers in their attempts 
to fund emergency care and to meet their waiting time targets. Eventually, these targets 
may become unsustainable.
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6.5.2 Mechanisms of Demand Stimulation
The mechanisms underlying the stimulation of demand for health care are extremely 
complex, primarily involving dynamic complexity, but also elements of detail and 
organisational complexity (these different types of complexity were described in §4.2.1). 
Also associated with the stimulation of demand is the suppression of demand. It would be 
unrealistic for a single research project to attempt to consider all these issues. In this 
section, some insight is provided into the complexity involved, and the elements that were 
excluded from the analysis are identified.
Demand fo r  a CC Investigation
Changing access to a CC investigation may result in changes in demand for this service: 
the stimulation of demand may arise from improvements in access and the suppression of 
demand may be associated with reductions in access. Referrals for a CC investigation are 
a fraction of the patients passing through inpatients (the source of emergency referrals for 
CC and a minor source of elective referrals) and outpatients (the main source of elective 
referrals). Therefore, changes in demand for a CC investigation will result from changes 
in the OP and inpatient activity rates or changes in the referral fraction.
Regarding increases in the inpatient and OP activity rates, it is important to distinguish 
between demand for these services (referral rates) and the delivery of these services 
(activity rates). Increases in demand will only translate to increases in activity if that 
demand is met. Given that demand for OP services is categorised as elective, it will not 
immediately result in demand for a CC investigation. The rate at which demand is met 
will be determined by forces that drive activity, typically the waiting time goal. By 
contrast, increases in demand for inpatient care (for admission as an emergency case) will 
be met immediately. This may subsequently contribute to further demand for an 
emergency CC investigation. Further demand for an elective CC investigation may be 
generated by emergency admissions who subsequently stabilise to become new referrals 
for a CC investigation i.e. those who were not already on the CC waiting list.
The CC investigation referral fraction is a sum of the elective and emergency referral 
fractions. If the development of district facilities leads to an increase in overall capacity,
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and therefore a reduction in waiting times, cardiologists may decrease their referral 
threshold (and thus increase their elective referral fraction) in response to this 
improvement in access. Cardiologists may also decrease their referral threshold in 
response to pressure by patients and GPs. An increase in the referral fraction could also 
arise from a change in the case mix of those undergoing assessment.
Access to a CC investigation does not only influence demand for this service. In fact, 
changing access to this service may cause demand to be stimulated, or suppressed, for 
several other services: OP appointments, inpatient services; private sector care and 
invasive treatments.
Demand fo r  OP Appointments
Demand may be stimulated for OP appointments, where patients are screened for CC. 
Referrals for OP appointments are divided into new referrals and follow-up referrals. The 
former are referrals by GPs and the latter are referrals by cardiologists. Cardiologists use 
follow-up appointments to review patients’ progress. In discussing the stimulation of 
demand for health care, the literature focuses on GP behaviour. It is, perhaps, assumed 
that the numbers of follow-up referrals are driven by clinical factors alone.
Patient expectations are rising and this is being fuelled by initiatives such as the Patient’s  
Charter (NHS 1991a, 1996a). Developing district services results in both patients and the 
local GPs becoming more knowledgeable about CC and its benefits. The natural tendency 
for GPs lacking in knowledge of CC, typically for those in areas remote from CC 
facilities, is to focus on the risks associated with this procedure. The potential response to 
increases in knowledge about CC is an increase in referrals for OP appointments.
Demand fo r  Inpatient Services and Private Care
Reductions in access to CC may affect demand for inpatient services as patients on the 
waiting list may deteriorate and thus stimulate the levels of emergency admissions. 
Reducing access to NHS CC services may also cause more patients to seek care privately. 
Demand for health care in the private sector lies beyond the scope of this research.
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Demand for Invasive Treatments
The development of district CC services also imposes pressure by stimulating demand for 
invasive treatments. It has been reported that the development of district CC services has 
increased the need for coronary angioplasty and coronary bypass surgery procedures (LIG 
1993; Black et al 1996).
The development of district services is considered to be the most powerful influence on 
the future need for coronary angioplasty and coronary bypass surgery:
“Information from the focus groups and British Cardiac Society indicates that where [district 
cardiac catheterisation services have developed] the result is a twofold increase in the 
requirement for tertiary cardiac treatment” (LIG 1993, p. 18).
A proportion of patients who undergo CC will be subsequently referred on for invasive 
treatments. The development of district services may increase the requirement for 
invasive treatments in two different ways: by increasing the referral rate for CC or by 
increasing the CC activity rate. Increasing CC referral rates will bring more patients into 
the part of the cardiac referral chain where invasive treatments might be considered 
(potential demand for invasive treatments). Increasing CC activity rates makes the 
existing patients within this part of the referral chain pass along more quickly (expressed 
demand for invasive treatments). The investigation of the stimulation of expressed 
demand for invasive treatments was restricted to that which arose from elective CC 
investigations only.
The 'Aggressiveness ’ o f Referral Behaviour
The sensitivity to changes in waiting times and patient pressure will vary between the 
individual cardiologist and will depend upon their circumstances.
In general, patients screened for a medical procedure may be categorised as: those for 
which a referral is clearly inappropriate; those for which a referral is clinically indicated; 
or, those in the ‘grey area’ for which the appropriate course of action is uncertain. In the 
case of CC investigations, the ‘grey area’ arises from the fact that non-invasive tests are 
unreliable as described in §5.3.3. Therefore, unless it is clearly inappropriate to refer a
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particular patient or it is clearly indicated, they will fall in the ‘grey area’. §6.6.2 provides 
examples o f patients that fall into the first two groups.
‘Aggressiveness’ is a term that is often used to describe the degree o f enthusiasm, 
confidence or interest in the use o f a medical procedure. Where there is uncertainty about 
the appropriateness o f a referral, an ‘aggressive’ clinician will be more inclined to refer, 
as illustrated in Figure 6.1. The most ‘aggressive’ clinician might typically refer all 
patients in the ‘grey area’, so the influence of the expected waiting time will be zero. For 
a less ‘aggressive’ clinician, there is more scope to alter their referral threshold according 
to factors such as the expected waiting time.
More ‘Aggressive’
Referral Behaviour ““ pr ReferralInappropriate
Referral
Indicated
Less ‘Aggressive’ M ro  
Referral Behaviour ^ ReferralInappropriate
‘Grey Area’ Referral /
Ind icated
□ Not referred (w .r.l normal referral fraction) 
Referred (w.r.t. normal referral fraction)
Figure 6.1 Variation in ‘Aggressiveness’ o f Referral Behaviour 
(The relative sizes o f  the three regions, which are shown to be o f  similar size, should not be regarded as 
descriptive as the purpose is merely to illustrate the contrasting referral behaviour)
Changes in Referrals
Figure 6.2 illustrates the possible changes in referral links, within the NHS, resulting from 
the increasing access to CC services at a DGH with CC services.
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PRIMARY LEVEL SECONDARY LEVEL TERTIARY LEVEL
A District General Hospital 
With CC Services
Tertiary CentresGPs
Other District General Hospitals
More Referrals
Fewer Referrals
Figure 6.2 Potential Changes in Referrals
Developing CC services reduces the need to refer to the tertiary level (see referral link 1). 
Increases in demand for OP appointments at the given DGH may be within existing links 
with GPs (link 2). Alternatively, increases in demand may involve the creation of new 
links (demand switching from links 3 to 2, or from links 4 to 2) with GPs deciding to refer 
to the given DGH, rather than other hospitals. Therefore, demand could be shifted back 
from the tertiary level to the given DGH both directly (reductions in referrals along link 1) 
and indirectly via changes in GP referral links (reductions in referrals along links 3 and 4). 
The cardiologists at the given DGH will only have direct control over the former. The 
extent to which changes in referral links will occur will depend upon geographical factors 
and other factors, such as the price of services. As GP referral behaviour was not 
considered in detail, the issue of possible changes in GP referral links were not 
considered. However, this is a fruitful area for further research.
Therefore, changing access to CC can produce changes in demand for a CC investigation 
and other services along the referral chain. This creates several feedback effects and thus 
supports the research hypothesis about the potential usefulness o f an SD analysis of the 
shift in CC services.
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6.6 APPROPRIATENESS OF CC
Concern has been raised that stimulating demand may increase the levels of inappropriate 
demand (Gunnell and Harvey 1996). Therefore, the appropriateness of the use of CC is an 
important factor to consider in evaluating the development of district services.
How the appropriateness of a medical procedure is defined is considered, before assessing 
the available evidence about what is considered to constitute the appropriate use of CC. 
How clinical guidelines may be employed, to reduce the rate of inappropriate use, is also 
described.
6.6.1 Defining the Appropriateness o f a Medical Procedure
Definitions o f Appropriateness
One definition of a medical procedure being appropriate is that the benefit from 
undertaking the procedure is greater than the risks inherent in the procedure (Chassin et al 
1986). A broader definition of the appropriateness of a procedure would consider its 
necessity, timing, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness (Coulter 1998). It is necessary to 
consider both the appropriateness of doing a procedure and the corresponding desire to 
reduce overuse, and the appropriateness of not doing a procedure and the corresponding 
desire to reduce underuse. Discussions of the appropriateness tend to focus on the former 
only. The implications of overuse of a procedure is that some patients are being subjected 
to an intervention which is potentially more harmful than it is beneficial, and resources 
are being wasted. However, underuse is as important because a patient’s condition could 
deteriorate by not undergoing the treatment that they need.
Difficulties in Defining Appropriateness
Clearly defining the appropriateness of CC is difficult. In the case of diagnostic CC, for 
some patients the extent of coronary disease can only be confirmed by viewing the 
coronary angiogram. Therefore, the appropriateness cannot be fully established in advance 
of the patient actually undergoing CC.
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Subsequent Variation in Clinical Practice
Due to the inherent clinical uncertainties involved, the appropriateness of CC can only be 
clearly established for selected patient groups or ideal conditions (Brook 1994). The 
available evidence is reviewed in §6.6.2. When making decisions about patients, for 
which evidence is not available, what is considered to be appropriate is determined by the 
judgement of the individual clinician. However clinical attitudes towards CC varies.
Variation in clinical attitudes is particularly apparent between clinicians in the US and 
those in the UK. It is well accepted that the former are the more ‘aggressive’ (Aaron and 
Schwartz 1984). Brook et al (1988) found significant differences between the attitudes of 
two panels of experts, one from the US and the other from the UK. In establishing 
appropriateness criteria for CC investigations, they found that the UK panel placed greater 
emphasis on the importance of symptoms and the degree of medical treatment, compared 
with the US panel. These differences were reflected in statistically significant differences 
in their appropriateness ratings of two groups of patients who had undergone CC 
investigations in the US. The disparity between US and UK attitudes is also reflected in 
the wide differences in utilisation rates in spite of similarities in prevalence (Brook et al 
1988; Ham 1990; Black et al 1996).
Variation in attitudes about what is considered to constitute appropriate use has 
contributed to the considerable variation in utilisation rates which have been observed 
(Brook et al 1988; Gray et al 1990; Graboys et al 1992; Bernstein et al 1993; Henderson 
et al 1995; Gunnell and Harvey 1996; Selby et al 1996). Furthermore, studies which have 
measured the appropriateness of CC investigations have found significant levels of its 
inappropriate and equivocal use. Equivocal use refers to a procedure for which the 
potential benefit equals the potential harm. In a study of the Trent Region in the UK, of 
320 patients over the age of 25 who underwent CC investigations for CHD, 21% were 
considered to be inappropriately investigated and 30% equivocal (Gray et al 1990). 
Murphy (1995) mentions several reasons for actual clinical use deviating from what might 
be considered to be appropriate. These include uncertainty, the fear of litigation, patient 
pressures and reimbursement issues.
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6.6.2 Evidence Available to Define the Appropriate Use o f CC
CC Investigations
Diagnostic methods are evaluated relative to a ‘bench mark’ diagnosis, which may be 
obtained via a biopsy, autopsy, surgical inspection or another method that marks the ‘gold 
standard’ (Altman 1993). Several basic statistical measures are used to focus on how 
sensitive and specific the method is in identifying abnormality and on its ability to predict 
abnormality. A diagnostic method’s sensitivity is the proportion of abnormal cases which 
are correctly identified. Its specificity is the proportion of normal cases that are correctly 
identified by the method. The method’s (positive) predictive value is the proportion of 
cases declared by the method as abnormal that are correctly diagnosed. Unlike the 
previous two measures, this measure provides an indication of the usefulness of the 
method in practice given that the true diagnosis will not be available.
CC investigations are presented as the ‘gold standard’ diagnostic method for CHD 
(Charles and Marshall 1989; Jackson 1991; Manning et al 1993; Swanton 1998). 
Subsequently, the appropriateness of CC investigations is reflected by diagnostic value of 
alternative methods. Weaknesses of alternative methods strengthen the argument for the 
appropriateness of CC investigations.
A CC investigation would never be conducted on all patients who presented with chest 
pain. Some referrals are made to hospitals simply to provide reassurance to the patient or 
advice to the GP on how to clinically manage the patient (Roland and Coulter 1992). With 
some patients who are investigated further, adequate and safer alternative means of 
diagnosis are available, as discussed in §5.3.3. One such example would be a patient who 
only experienced chronic stable angina upon moderate exertion, did not require maximum 
medical therapy and had produced a negative ECG stress test i.e. ECG test under exertion 
(Brook et al 1988).
At the other extreme, it is also universally acknowledged that all patients considered for 
coronary bypass surgery or coronary angioplasty should undergo a CC investigation first 
(de Bono and Hopkins 1993; Patterson and Treasure 1993; Swanton 1998). Another 
example of a patient for which a CC investigation is clearly indicated is one who has
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experienced chronic stable angina upon mild exertion, was on maximum medical therapy 
and had produced a positive ECG stress test (Brook et al 1988).
6.6.3 Promoting Appropriate Use With Clinical Guidelines
Clinical guidelines provide a means upon which to apply the best available evidence, 
reduce inappropriate referrals for, and use of, health care technologies and thus reduce the 
undesirable variations in medical practice. They can also present a basis upon which to 
maximise the potential benefits from the limited NHS resources available and thus are of 
interest to purchasers (Delamothe 1993). However, unless guidelines are developed, 
disseminated and implemented appropriately, they may fail to be effective. Guidance for 
purchasers has been produced so that they may verify the scientific validity and ensure the 
successful implementation of clinical guidelines (Grimshaw and Russell 1993a, 1993b, 
1993c).
Appropriateness ratings are based upon the severity of symptoms, ECG test performance 
and the adequacy of medical treatment. They can provide a useful basis for clinical 
guidelines by producing a priority scoring system (Brook 1994; de Bono 1999). However, 
they possess certain limitations. For example, as stated in §6.6.1, in the case of diagnostic 
CC, for some patients the extent of coronary disease can only be confirmed by viewing 
the coronary angiogram. Therefore, the appropriateness cannot be fully established in 
advance of the patient actually undergoing CC. This was illustrated by the Trent audit of 
Gray et al (1990). 30% of patients in which diagnostic CC was deemed inappropriate 
(without using the information from the catheterisation investigation) did in fact require 
bypass surgery. However appropriateness ratings present the most reasonable method 
available upon which to develop clinical guidelines about who should be investigated 
first, especially in the context of pressures from resource constraints and excessive 
waiting lists.
Various guidelines have been issued on the appropriate timing and use of CC 
investigations (ACC/AHA 1991; BCS/RCP 1993; BCS 1994c; de Bono 1999).
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6.7 SUMMARY
This chapter presented the review of the literature on the shift in diagnostic CC services 
from the established tertiary level to the district level for low risk patients. Four factors 
motivating the development of district services were discussed. The first factor is the need 
to address shortfalls in tertiary capacity. Given the availability of skilled CC operators at 
DGHs, the second factor is the desire to utilise these skills. Further factors are the 
pressure to improve local services and the demonstrated cost-effectiveness and safety of 
conducting district CC investigations without surgical backup facilities for low risk 
patients. The practicalities involved and the future prospects for the provision of district 
services were discussed in the context of either the shared use of mobile catheter 
laboratories or the shared use of integrated catheter laboratories. The stimulation of 
demand and inappropriate use were discussed as potential undesirable consequences of 
the shift in CC services. Clinical guidelines were considered as a useful means to reduce 
the rate of inappropriate referrals for, and use of, CC.
Having outlined background on the shift in CC services, and presented evidence from the 
literature of this demand being stimulated by this service innovation, the next chapter 
presents the evidence from the case study centres.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CASE STUDY EXPERIENCES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter provided some background from the literature regarding the shift of 
CC services, from the established tertiary level to the district level. Evidence of this 
service shift generating further demand was presented, thus supporting the hypothesis that 
an SD analysis could potentially be useful.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the experiences of district CC services at the 
case study centres and to highlight corroborative evidence of the service shift stimulating 
further demand. A tertiary perspective is first considered by describing the shift in CC 
services from Heartwick Hospital (§7.2). The shift in CC services to Ribsley General is 
then described (§7.3), thus providing a district perspective. The degree of use of district 
services (§7.3.1) is considered, before discussing the impact of the service on the delivery 
of CC investigations for Ribsley General patients (§7.3.2-§7.3.3). Evidence is presented 
of the district service stimulating latent demand for cardiac services (§7.3.4). The issues 
of the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of district services are discussed (§7.3.5), before 
reporting on the views, regarding district services, of different health professionals 
associated with Ribsley General (§7.3.6). The case of the shift in CC services to 
Veinbridge General is then considered (§7.4). Having presented evidence of the 
stimulation of demand, the appropriateness of demand is discussed (§7.5). The chapter is 
summarised in the final section (§7.6).
Numerical data supplied by the collaborative centres is used, albeit with some limitations, 
to illustrate the effects of the introduction of district services, including the existence of 
secondary effects. Appendix C contains further details about the collaborative work 
including the site visits, interviews, and data obtained.
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7.2 SHIFT IN CC SERVICES FROM HEARTWICK HOSPITAL
Following the theme of Ham et aVs hub and spoke model (1998), a strategic view on the 
development of district CC is taken by first considering district services in relation to the 
tertiary centre, Heartwick Hospital (the main referral centre for both Ribsley General and 
Veinbridge General). This is consistent with the view of the Business Manager at 
Cardiocare, the company which supplied the mobile catheter laboratory to Ribsley 
General and Veinbridge General.
This section considers the CC activity conducted at Heartwick Hospital, and the CC 
workload which was shifted to its referring DGHs, Veinbridge General and Ribsley 
General. As explained in §5.2.3, the district services were initially introduced to 
compensate for the temporary closure of one of Heartwick’s two catheter laboratories, for 
repairs, from May 1996 to March 1997. It was also understood from conversations with 
staff at Heartwick Hospital that they also partially compensated for the capacity loss by 
working overtime in their other catheter laboratory. After the CC service at Heartwick 
Hospital was restored to full capacity, the district service was withdrawn from Ribsley 
General but the service at Veinbridge General remained. The district service was 
temporarily reinstated to Ribsley General for several sessions between February 1998 to 
May 1998. The sessions in April and May compensated for further construction work to 
Heartwick Hospital’s catheterisation facilities.
Heartwick Hospital was responsible for the district site preparation costs and also the 
running costs for the period in 1996/1997 when the district services were compensating 
for the loss of its capacity. Veinbridge General took over the responsibility for their 
district service in April 1997. Consequently, during their second period of construction 
work in 1998, Heartwick Hospital only paid for the running costs for the district service at 
Ribsley General.
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Figure 7.1 Impact o f District Services on Overall CC Activity 
(NHS only. Sources: Heartwick Hospital, Veinbridge General and Cardiocare)
Quarterly CC activity data was provided from April 1995 to Dec 1997 and is shown in 
Figure 7.1. This illustrates the temporary reduction in tertiary-based activity, and how 
district services both compensated for the loss of tertiary capacity at Heartwick Hospital 
and supported an increase in the overall CC activity levels. Tertiary activity refers to all 
the diagnostic CC procedures conducted, with or without treatment procedures, for both 
emergency and elective cases. These data derive from direct referrals by GPs and referrals 
from DGHs. District activity is elective and involves diagnostic procedures only, as was 
stated in §6.3.
Interviews and observation work began in June 1997. Information about the use and 
views o f district services were obtained from various health professionals at Heartwick 
Hospital, including consultant cardiologists, support staff and the cardiac business 
manager. It was evident that the senior health care professionals at Heartwick Hospital 
were strong advocates o f having district services. The use o f the district facilities enabled 
Heartwick Hospital to carry out essential repairs on its catheter laboratories, without 
having to compromise on the quality o f patient care in terms o f safety and waiting times. 
Shifting low risk cases towards the district level also enabled Heartwick to direct its 
tertiary expertise towards more complex cases, that is, emergencies, high risk electives 
and treatment procedures.
133
Ideally, isolating the activity that relates to patients from Ribsley General and, Veinbridge 
General separately, would illustrate the changes in activity at these individual hospitals. It 
is these patients who could, if eligible, be directly held back at the district level and not 
GP referrals which are made directly to the tertiary centre. Unfortunately, these data could 
only be provided for Ribsley General. To derive comparable data for Veinbridge General, 
several approximations were made.
7.3 SHIFT IN CC SERVICES TO RIBSLEY GENERAL
In this section, different aspects of the shift in CC services to Ribsley General are 
explored based upon several data sources including a very useful database at Ribsley 
General. It contained various data on each patient on the CC waiting list, including their 
waiting list joining date and removal date, and the outcome of their CC investigation. A 
small proportion of patient records (just over 9%) were excluded because their data was 
incomplete. Using the remaining data, various time series were produced.
7.3.1 Degree o f  Use o f  District Services
Prior to the introduction of district services, and during the subsequent periods of the 
absence of district services at Ribsley General, cardiologists based at Ribsley General 
conducted CC sessions at Heartwick Hospital. They only conducted investigations, not 
treatments. In §6.4.2, four options (or degrees) of the use of district services were 
described. As a reminder, Option 2 involves no district services but skilled district 
cardiologists being offered sessions at tertiary centres to conduct CC. Option 3 represents 
the use of district services to a higher degree with some DGHs developing CC services in 
conjunction with neighbouring districts to ensure that facilities are used efficiently. Since 
June 1996, the cardiologists at Ribsley General have switched back and forth between 
Option 2 and the interface between Options 2 and 3 using a mobile catheter laboratory. 
The Ribsley CC service could not be described as reflecting Option 3, given the 
temporary nature of the district service.
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7.3.2 CC Activity Profiles
For the period under study, all patients from Ribsley General who underwent elective CC, 
either did so either at Ribsley General or Heartwick Hospital. The 5% of referrals to other 
tertiary centres, as shown in Figure 5.1, related to non-CC procedures.
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Figure 7.2 Temporary Expansion Followed by a Shift o f Elective CC for Ribsley General Patients
(NHS only. Source: Ribsley General)
Figure 7.2 illustrates the levels o f CC investigations for Ribsley General patients. All 
activity is elective (unlike Figure 7.1). Tertiary activity refers to patients who were 
assigned for CC by Ribsley General cardiologists and underwent an elective CC 
investigation at the tertiary level. Some of these patients will also have undergone 
interventional catheterisation (coronary angioplasty) at the same time. District activity 
refers to low risk patients who were held back by the district cardiologists to undergo a 
CC investigation at Ribsley General.
Figure 7.2 shows that there was a temporary expansion followed by a shift o f the elective 
workload of CC investigations. Prior to the closure o f Heartwick Hospital’s catheter 
laboratory in May 1996, there was an increase in tertiary activity. This activity increase, 
which was partially funded by a Waiting List Initiative, was intended to reduce the size of 
the waiting list and average waiting times and the for Ribsley General patients (the graphs 
for these two variables are shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, respectively). The sudden drop 
in activity in May 1996 and June 1996 was attributed to the combined effect o f the loss of
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tertiary capacity and the delay in establishing the district service. Between July 1996 and 
March 1997, the district service sustained the increase in activity.
After the district service was withdrawn in March 1997, the level of activity dropped 
because the waiting times and waiting list had been reduced to a more manageable level. 
The district service at Ribsley General was reinstated in February 1998 following further 
reductions in access to elective CC services. Several sessions in February and March 1998 
were provided using further Waiting List Initiative funding. Heartwick Hospital funded 
several additional CC sessions in April and May 1998, while Heartwick’s second catheter 
laboratory was closed to undergo construction work.
It was stated earlier that the capacity for elective catheterisation on Ribsley General 
patients was first expanded at the tertiary level and when this workload was shifted to the 
district level, there was sufficient capacity at Ribsley General to sustain the increase in 
activity. In fact, the consultant cardiologist at Ribsley General explained that capacity 
constraints at the tertiary level did not necessary apply to the district level. For a patient to 
undergo catheterisation, they need to be allocated a slot in a catheter laboratory session, 
and a ward bed for the post-procedural recovery period. In practice, the availability of 
beds is the deciding factor. To expand capacity for Ribsley General elective patients at 
Heartwick Hospital, special arrangements had to be made because, during the regular 
sessions at Heartwick Hospital, only 4 elective Ribsley patients could be catheterised. In 
theory, Ribsley General patients had access to further beds but in practice, these were 
filled by emergency cases. By contrast, with a district CC service, emergency cases were 
transferred out to Heartwick Hospital, so Ribsley General could concentrate on elective 
care with more than double the capacity which was usually available at Heartwick 
Hospital.
Note that black blocks are used in subsequent figures to indicate the duration of district 
services.
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7.3.3 Access to a CC Investigation
Figure 7.3 illustrates the size o f the waiting list for Ribsley General patients. It illustrates 
how the increase in activity led to a dramatic reduction in the size of the waiting list. The 
graph also shows how the waiting list ‘bounced back’ after the additional capacity was 
withdrawn, requiring further increases in activity. This was not desired. Instead, the desire 
was for the waiting list to remain at a low level.
Month
Figure 7.3 Waiting List for Ribsley General Patients for CC Investigation 
(NHS only. Source: Ribsley General)
Figure 7.3 was constructed using an expert estimate. The consultant cardiologist at 
Ribsley General provided an estimate of the initial waiting list size, and using the 
individual patient data, the number of monthly waiting list additions and removals for the 
period April 1995 to April 1998 were calculated. Using the expert estimate, for the size of 
the waiting list in April 1995, the subsequent changes in the length o f the waiting list 
were deduced.
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Figure 7.4 Average Time Spent on the CC Investigation Waiting List for Ribsley General Patients
(NHS only. Source: Ribsley General)
The waiting time trend for CC for patients assigned for an elective CC investigation by 
Ribsley General cardiologists is shown in Figure 7.4. It illustrates the benefits o f the 
capacity increases with a dramatic reduction in the average waiting time. To construct this 
figure, for each month, the average waiting time was calculated by averaging over all the 
patients on the waiting list. Note that average waiting time is calculated for patients on the 
waiting list rather than for patients leaving the waiting list, as the former measure 
provides a better representation o f the pressure imposed on the system. If the waiting list 
removal rate were to become zero, assuming there were still patients on the waiting list, 
pressure on the system would rise. However, in these circumstances, the latter measure 
would not be calculated which would be a poor representation o f the real world. The 
collaborators were happy with this choice of waiting time measure.
7.3.4 Evidence o f Stimulated Demand
There was evidence o f demand for cardiac services being stimulated by the introduction 
and use o f CC services at Ribsley General. The issue o f the appropriateness of demand is 
considered in §7.5.
§6.5.2 discussed how changes in access to CC could influence the levels o f demand for 
various cardiac services. This study focused on changes in demand for OP appointments,
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elective CC services and invasive treatments. At Ribsley General, no evidence of demand 
being stimulated or suppressed for OP appointments was found. However, there was 
evidence o f the stimulation and suppression of demand for elective CC services, and the 
stimulation o f demand for invasive treatments.
Referrals for OP appointments are composed o f new referrals (referrals by GPs) and 
follow-up referrals (referrals by cardiologists). It is clear from the numbers of new 
referrals, as displayed in Figure 7.5, that the district service at Ribsley General did not 
stimulate an increase in GP referral rates to Ribsley General. The variation appears to be 
random. Perhaps the knowledge that the district service was only temporary, and the 
subsequent lack o f marketing o f the service, served to stem the potential demand. Data on 
follow-up referrals was not available.
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Figure 7.5 New Referrals for a Cardiology OP Appointment at Ribsley General 
(NHS only. Source: Ribsley General)
Demand for an elective CC investigation, for Ribsley General patients, is shown in Figure
7.6 (see Additions). This figure shows changes in both the number o f additions and 
removals to the CC NHS waiting list for Ribsley General patients. The removals are 
composed o f elective activity only (as shown in Figure 7.2). Other waiting list removals, 
such as deaths, were removed from the data because the date o f removal was not 
recorded. Although there is some random variation, there is also a trend in that the 
additions dropped when the system was under pressure and rose when this pressure was
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alleviated. The size o f the waiting list and the average waiting time, as shown in Figure
7.3 and Figure 7.4 respectively, may be used as proxies for pressure on the system. Figure
7.6 thus indicates that demand for elective CC was both stimulated and suppressed at 
Ribsley General. The consultant cardiologist immediately saw the trend when shown 
Figure 7.6 and he then proceeded to provide explanations for this trend.
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Figure 7.6 Additions and Removals onto the Ribsley General CC Investigation Waiting List 
(NHS only. Source: Ribsley General)
§6.5.2 stated that the referrals for an elective CC investigation are primarily composed of 
patients who have been referred onto the waiting list from an OP appointment, plus a few 
other new referrals o f patients who were referred as inpatients. ‘New’ refers to the fact 
that they were not previously on the waiting list. The consultant at Ribsley General stated 
that the levels of cardiology OP activity were constant. It was not possible to illustrate this 
with data. Although access was given to OP activity data, due to the duplication of 
records and inconsistency in the way in which the data was recorded, it was impossible to 
extract any useful information for the purposes o f this study. The numbers o f new 
referrals from inpatients were negligible. Assuming that the case mix o f the patients 
undergoing assessment as inpatients and outpatients remained constant, it can be 
concluded that the variation in the number o f additions to the CC waiting list was solely 
due to changes in other factors that altered the OP to CC referral fraction.
The consultant cardiologist admitted to altering demand for CC by adjusting his referral 
threshold. He said that this was partially in response to changes in the average waiting
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time for CC. Whilst reductions in the average waiting time would stimulate his referral 
fraction, increases in the average waiting times would suppress some demand. However, 
an excessive waiting time would not induce him to suppress all his low priority demand. 
He believed that for some of these cases, it is better to place them on the waiting list 
sooner rather than later. In three month’s time, he would review their condition and 
possibly remove them from the waiting list. However, if in three month’s time he decided 
to keep them on the waiting list, they would have the advantage of being three months 
ahead in the ‘queue’.
A second factor that was reported to increase the OP to CC referral fraction was increases 
in pressure by patients and GPs. The consultant at Ribsley General stated that pressure 
had risen because patients and GPs had become more knowledgeable about CC. They 
had learnt about CC through the new service at Ribsley General being reported in the 
local newspaper. In addition to this raised awareness, he believed that patients had gained 
knowledge about the service and its benefits through ‘word of mouth’ via family and 
friends.
He also believed that the OP to CC referral fraction was influenced by the level of skills 
of the doctors who selected patients for CC. He believed that highly skilled CC operators 
are able to identify a greater number of patients in need of CC than operators-in-training 
and non-operators. The operator-in-training at Ribsley General also agreed that his 
referral rate had increased as he gained experience and confidence in conducting CC 
procedures. The consultant cardiologist suggested that conceptualising the referral 
fraction as a simple monotonic increasing function of experience may not necessarily 
reflect the referral behaviour of all CC operators-in-training. It was possible that some 
junior operators might be over-confident and over-refer at first, and subsequently raise the 
referral threshold, as they became more experienced. Moreover, he believed that the 
pattern of referral behaviour might depend on the learning environment; some 
environments are more conservative than others. As junior operators at Ribsley General 
trained over a 12 month period, and were then replaced by a new trainee, the skills effect 
on demand varied periodically. The level of skills (and consequently the skills effect on 
demand) also depended upon the activity rate. Increases in activity increased the learning 
opportunities and thus accelerated the gain in skills.
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This skills effect was also mentioned during an interview with a hospital manager from 
another hospital, outside the study centres. This was an interesting finding as it did not 
appear to be documented in the literature. As I highlighted in §3.3, Hamblin et al (1998a, 
1998b) referred to a different skills effect on demand, more specifically, how GPs, by 
taking on new responsibilities associated with shifts in services across the 
secondary/primary interface could stimulate demand. Adopting the new responsibilities 
led them to gain “clinical intelligence” and thus identify more patients in need of 
treatment. This referred to a different skills effect on demand as it involved the 
development o f new skills rather than the variation and acceleration o f existing skills. It 
also referred to the effect of increased knowledge (“clinical intelligence”) on demand 
associated with the gain in skills rather than the associated gain in confidence.
Demand was also stimulated for invasive treatments. Referrals for invasive treatments are 
a fraction o f those undergoing CC investigations. Therefore, an increase in referrals for 
invasive treatments can arise from an increase in those undergoing CC, or result from an 
increase in the invasive treatment referral fraction. Increases in the elective CC 
investigation rate were shown in Figure 7.2. During this period, o f the patients who had 
undergone an elective investigation, there was no trend in the invasive treatment referral 
fraction as shown in Figure 7.7.
Month
Figure 7.7 Invasive Treatment Referral Fraction for Ribsley General Patients 
(NHS only. Following elective catheterisation only. Dotted line indicates the average o f  50% which is 10% 
for coronary angioplasty and 40% for bypass surgery. Source: Ribsley General)
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7.3.5 Cost-Effectiveness and Efficiency Issues
Although at Ribsley General the issues of the cost-effectiveness and efficiency were 
certainly considered with the introduction and withdrawal of district services, the data 
available for this study was of very poor quality.
It was reported that the introduction of the district service did not compromise patient 
outcomes. Therefore, safety should not be an issue in deciding whether to continue with a 
district service. In March 1997, when the district service was due to close, following the 
re-opening of Heartwick Hospital’s catheter laboratory, a manager at Ribsley General 
wrote to the local purchaser to attempt to persuade them to support a continuation of the 
district service at Ribsley General. Whilst Heartwick Hospital would charge £450 per 
patient catheterised as a day case, and £675 per patient catheterised on an inpatient basis, 
it was stated that Ribsley General would charge a flat rate of £521 per patient. A 
breakdown of these figures was not provided. Given the close proximity of the district 
service to their homes, patients could avoid the need for an overnight stay which might be 
necessary after catheterisation at Heartwick Hospital which is located at an inconvenient 
distance from their homes. The consultant at Ribsley General estimated that at least 1 in 3 
patients, who were eligible to undergo catheterisation at the district level, would require 
an inpatient stay after catheterisation at Heartwick. Therefore, the weighted average cost 
for a tertiary investigation was £525 per patient, assuming 1 in 3 patients required an 
inpatient day, compared with £521 per patient with a district service. Obviously, for 
assumptions about higher proportions requiring an inpatient stay, the cost differential 
would increase. For 1 in 2 patients, the weighted average cost for an investigation at the 
tertiary level would be £562.50 per patient, and for 2 in 3 patients the weighted cost 
would be £600 per patient.
However, it should be noted that, although, there might exist a procedural cost saving in 
undergoing CC investigation at the district level, this only applied to patients undergoing 
investigation only. If a patient investigated at the district level required an interventional 
CC, they would have to undergo a second procedure at the tertiary level. If that patient 
had been investigated at the tertiary level, they would have undergone treatment at the 
same time, and therefore only have incurred the costs, and been exposed to the risks, 
associated with one procedure. On average, about 10% of Ribsley patients were referred
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on for interventional CC, following an elective CC investigation. Given that this was a 
sizeable proportion, there seemed to be some appeal in having CC conducted solely at the 
tertiary level. Based upon the March 1997 figures, a tertiary-based service would be more 
efficient (on a cost/case basis) unless it required a large proportion of patients to undergo 
their investigation as an inpatient. See Appendix E, E4a for further details. However, 
what also needs to be considered that, assuming that there were no complications, 90% of 
patients did not need to be investigated at the tertiary level.
As was stated previously, those at Ribsley General failed to persuade the local purchaser 
to support a continuation of the district service.
7.3.6 Views o f  District Services
The consultant cardiologist and hospital manager at Ribsley General were in support of 
the district service and were keen to continue the service. They welcomed the ability to 
overcome capacity limitations associated with the tertiary service, and thus reduce the 
waiting list and waiting times for CC investigations. They also appreciated the 
opportunity to improve the local services and to provide continuity of care within the 
DGH, and the various other benefits as listed in Table 6.1. The local service saved the 
consultant cardiologist the inconvenience of having to travel to the tertiary centre to 
conduct CC sessions. However, he did admit to feeling rather isolated working at the 
DGH, given that he was the only consultant CC operator based at Ribsley General.
Although there was ongoing pressure to establish a long-term district service at Ribsley 
General, the local purchaser has maintained steady resistance. Both the contract manager 
and the public health consultant at the local health authority expressed the view that they 
were not keen on the district service. They were concerned about the costs and safety 
aspects. Whilst there had been no adverse incidents, they felt more comfortable, in 
principle, with CC investigations being conducted at the tertiary centre, where there were 
surgical backup facilities. They also emphasised the importance of concentrating patient 
activity at the tertiary level in order to maintain skills and to facilitate audit. The British 
Cardiac Society Council had taken all these factors into account when drawing up their 
positive recommendations for the development of district CC services (see §6.4.2). The 
Ribsley General service was certainly operating within the recommended practice.
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However, it would seem that the development of long-term CC services would not have 
an easy passage into Ribsley General.
7.4 SHIFT IN CC SERVICES TO VEINBRIDGE GENERAL
This section explores different aspects of the shift in CC services to Veinbridge General. 
The experiences of district services at Veinbridge General provided an interesting contrast 
to those at Ribsley General.
7.4.1 Degree o f  Use o f  District Services
Prior to the introduction of district services at Veinbridge General, the cardiologists at 
Veinbridge General who performed CC procedures (CC operators), held sessions at 
Heartwick Hospital. The consultant cardiologist based at Veinbridge General also 
conducted interventional CC at Heartwick Hospital. Let us return to the four degrees of 
district services, which were introduced in §6.4.2. The operators based at Veinbridge 
General may be described as having operated within Option 2 prior to the introduction of 
district services, then on the interface between Options 2 and 3 from May 1996 until the 
opening of the integrated laboratory at Veinbridge General in February 1998, and 
thereafter, within Option 3. A mobile catheter laboratory was also used at Veinbridge 
General. The mobile was used during the eleven month period of the closure of the 
catheter laboratory at Heartwick Hospital and for ten months beyond this period until its 
integrated catheter laboratory opened. The opening of the integrated laboratory prompted 
a further shift in workload towards catheterising slightly higher risk patients at the district 
level.
7.4.2 CCA ctivity Profiles
It is understood that all Veinbridge General patients who underwent an elective CC 
investigation between April 1995 and December 1997, did so either at Veinbridge 
General or Heartwick Hospital. Although it was stated that 10% of referrals were made 
from Veinbridge General to other tertiary centres (see Figure 5.1), it is assumed that these 
referred to other patient referrals.
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As stated in §5.2.3, district services were introduced to Veinbridge General in May 1996. 
Initially, district services were provided to compensate for the temporary loss of catheter 
laboratory capacity at Heartwick Hospital, from May 1996 to March 1997. This presented 
opportunities to provide local CC services at Veinbridge General and a feasibility study 
for the development o f a permanent district service.
The use o f the district service at Veinbridge General enabled work to be shifted out of the 
tertiary level and led to an overall increase in elective activity as shown in Figure 7.8. The 
district service at Veinbridge General thus illustrated a permanent shift and expansion of 
activity. By contrast, the district service at Ribsley General was involved in a temporary 
expansion followed by a shift. As data on elective CC investigations for Veinbridge 
General patients only was not available, this graph was derived by making some 
estimates.
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Figure 7.8 Shift and Expansion o f Elective CC for Veinbridge General Patients 
(NHS only. Sources: Heartwick Hospital, Veinbridge General and Cardiocare)
The number o f elective CC procedures, of patients referred from Veinbridge General, 
which were carried out at Heartwick General were estimated. From Heartwick Hospital’s 
database, quarterly data was extracted for patients registered with GPs in the district 
where Veinbridge General is located (the host district) and the surrounding districts. Of 
these patients, those from the host district form the majority. They will primarily comprise 
referrals from Veinbridge General, but may also include a few referrals from other district
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hospitals and direct referrals by GPs. Simple average monthly rates were calculated in 
order to present these tertiary data on the same graph as the monthly district data (as with 
the Ribsley General case).
It can be seen from Figure 7.8 that, unlike the Ribsley General case, the increase in overall 
activity was sustained by an increase in demand for CC.
Data were not available for delays experienced by Veinbridge General patients, for a CC 
investigation. The consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge General reported that the average 
waiting time for a CC investigation was under control as sufficient funding had been 
available to expand the capacity, as illustrated in Figure 7.8. He prioritised his patients on 
his CC waiting list into three categories, routine, soon and urgent. His target waiting times 
were: more than 12 weeks for routine cases; 6 to 12 weeks for those classified as 
requiring catheterisation soon; and, 4 to 6 weeks for urgent cases.
7,4,3 Evidence o f Stimulated Demand
As with Ribsley General, there was evidence of the district service stimulating demand at 
Veinbridge General. Changes in demand for OP appointments, elective CC services and 
invasive treatments were investigated. At Veinbridge General, evidence was found of 
demand being stimulated for OP appointments, elective CC services and invasive 
treatments. The issue of the appropriateness of demand is considered in §7.5.
Unlike the case of Ribsley General, the view of the consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge 
General was that the district CC service had stimulated demand for OP appointments. 
This was demonstrated by an increase in the number of new cardiology OP referrals to 
Veinbridge General, as shown in Figure 7.9. This increase may be due to either increases 
in the GP consultation rate or increases in the GP referral fraction. The interviews 
suggested that either of these factors could have increased but that the case mix of the 
patient population had not altered.
The consultant at Veinbridge General stated that the increase in referrals for new OP 
appointments had presented a new problem of increased waiting times for patients on the 
OP waiting list. This was an unintended and undesirable side effect of the introduction of
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district services. He had subsequently attempted to alleviate pressure on the system by 
reducing the number o f follow-up appointments.
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Figure 7.9 New Referrals for a Cardiology OP Appointment at Veinbridge General 
(NHS only. The black block indicates the duration of district services. The change in the trend is 
highlighted by a 12-point centred moving average through the series. Source: Veinbridge General)
It was reported by the consultant cardiologist and the hospital manager at Veinbridge 
General that the OP rate had increased in response to the increase in demand. Given the 
comments o f the consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge General, the increase in the OP rate 
was obviously insufficient to meet demand. The OP waiting list and average waiting time 
was rising because the number of referrals for OP appointments had exceeded the activity 
rates. OP activity data was provided and although they reflected a steady rise, they were 
rejected as unreliable due to the presence of a number o f inconsistencies.
Given that a permanent CC service had been introduced to Veinbridge General, involving 
a large financial investment, it was necessary to have sufficient demand to sustain the 
service. The main source o f demand for an elective CC investigation is patients assessed 
as OP services. Emphasis had been placed on marketing the district service. Marketing the 
district service was explicitly discussed in the business case which presented the argument 
for the construction o f the integrated catheter laboratory at Veinbridge General. This was 
in contrast with the relatively low marketing strategy at Ribsley General. Demand for the 
Veinbridge service was also generated from within the private sector. Therefore,
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stimulating an increase in OP referrals was intentional, but the large extent to which 
demand was stimulated was unexpected and undesirable.
Data on the number of referrals for an elective CC investigation was not available. 
However, the reports that the OP rate rose suggested that these referrals had increased. As 
was stated in §6.5.2, the referral rate for an elective CC investigation is a fraction of the 
OP rate plus the referral rate of new electives from inpatients. The numbers of new 
referrals from inpatients were negligible. Therefore, the stimulation of demand for OP 
appointments had produced further demand for an elective CC investigation.
There was also evidence that there was an increase in the OP to CC referral fraction (a 
reduction in the referral threshold) from the interview with the consultant cardiologist. He 
stated that the fraction of patients seen at an OP appointment who were referred on for a 
CC investigation increased following pressure from patients and GPs. However, he 
declared that waiting times did not influence his referral decisions. The consultant 
cardiologist at Heartwick Hospital also stated that waiting times did not influence his 
referral decisions. These statements are, perhaps, unsurprising given that both 
cardiologists are enthusiastic CC operators in conducting both investigations and 
interventions, and adopting the latest techniques, such as coronary stenting. They could be 
described as ‘aggressive’ operators as discussed in §6.5.2. Given the ‘aggressive’ referral 
environment at Veinbridge General, the skills effect on demand could potentially lead to 
periods of over-referrals by juniors. The consultant cardiologist agreed with this but he 
also stated that the skills effect on demand would not play a role as he reviewed all 
referral decisions and thus corrected any tendency by juniors to over-refer or under-refer.
Demand was also stimulated for invasive treatments. The increase in the elective CC rate 
resulted in an increase in the referral rate for invasive treatments. The variation in the 
fraction of Veinbridge General patients who were selected for invasive treatments 
following elective investigation, is shown in Figure 7.10. Decisions for some patients 
were subject to review and, as the final decisions were not recorded, the actual referral 
fractions are not known. As with the case of Ribsley General, there did not appear to be 
any discernible trend. However, this conclusion can only be tentative, given the lack of 
data.
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 Referrals for Invasive Treatments (Incl Reviews)
 Referrals for Invasive Treatments (Excl Reviews)
Figure 7.10 Invasive Treatment Referral Fraction for Veinbridge General Patients 
(NHS only. Following elective investigation only. Data for the period September 1996 to March 1997 was 
lost. On average, between 11% and 17% of referrals were for coronary angioplasty and between 29% and 
32% were referred for bypass surgery. Source: Veinbridge General)
7.4.4 Cost-Effectiveness and Efficiency Issues
The consultant cardiologist stated that the service would not have continued had it not 
been possible to demonstrate that the service was cost-effective. However, it was very 
difficult to qualify this with data.
As with the case o f Ribsley General, the district service at Veinbridge General 
demonstrated that CC investigations could be safely carried out at the district level. In 
fact, the consultant cardiologist was so confident in its safety that, following the opening
of the integrated catheter laboratory, he lowered the threshold for district investigation to
include slightly more complex cases.
There was very little cost data available. Veinbridge General assumed responsibility for 
the contract for CC investigations in March 1997 when Heartwick’s catheter laboratory 
re-opened. Charges to purchasers were made on a cost per case basis. The consultant 
cardiologist at Veinbridge General stated that his hospital matched Heartwick Hospital’s 
prices for CC investigations and the service ‘broke even’. As for patients referred from
Ribsley General, Heartwick Hospital charged £450 per patient catheterised as a day case 
and £675 per patient catheterised on an inpatient basis.
The points that were raised about costs in §7.3.5 with regard to the Ribsley General 
district service, also apply to the service at Veinbridge General. With a district service at 
Veinbridge General, costs were reduced due to the ability to catheterise more patients on a 
day case basis. Also mentioned in §7.3.5, were the costs incurred by a certain proportion 
of patients investigated at the district level who, requiring an interventional CC, have to 
undergo a second procedure at the tertiary level. If that patient had been investigated at 
the tertiary level, they would have undergone treatment at the same time, and therefore 
only have incurred the costs, and been exposed to the risks, associated with one 
procedure. On average, somewhere between 11% to 17% of Veinbridge patients are 
referred on for interventional CC, following an elective CC investigation. As with the 
Ribsley General case, given that this is a sizeable proportion, there seems to be some 
appeal in having CC conducted solely at the tertiary level. Based upon these assumptions 
and the March 1997 figures, a district service would be more efficient (on a cost/case 
basis) if it avoided a high proportion of patients undergoing their investigation as an 
inpatient. Increasing the interventional CC proportion cancelled out this potential 
advantage. See Appendix E, E4b for further details. However, it is also necessary to 
consider that, assuming there were no complications, over 80% of patients did not need to 
be investigated at the tertiary level.
The situation altered in favour of the district service when the integrated laboratory 
opened. With the mobile-based service (which was in place in March 1997), the cost/case 
was fixed but, as stated in §6.4.1, with an integrated laboratory, the cost/case declined as 
the volume of activity increased. Therefore, at sufficiently high volumes of activity, the 
district service would be more efficient. Allowing cardiologists from neighbouring 
districts to use the laboratory would boost the volume of activity. When drawing up the 
business case for an integrated laboratory at Veinbridge General, the intention to ensure 
that the service was efficient was clearly stated.
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7.4.5 Views o f District Services
The consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge General was a strong advocate of district CC 
services. He grasped the opportunity presented by the temporary closure of the catheter 
laboratory at Heartwick Hospital to promote the development of CC services at 
Veinbridge General. He appreciated all the benefits of district services, described in Table 
6.1, and mentioned further benefits, including the ability to provide a more 
comprehensive service to the local GPs.
In the previous section, it was mentioned that the consultant cardiologist believed that the 
district service had stimulated further demand from GPs and that this is indicated by the 
higher referrals for new OP appointments. However, the hospital manager at Veinbridge 
suggested that the increase in GP referral rates could not be totally attributed to the 
introduction of the district service because an increase in referral rates had been observed 
across various specialities.
The local health authority, in the Veinbridge General area, believed that the district CC 
service was highly regarded by the local GPs, and that this was reflected in their referral 
rates. The purchasers appreciated the benefits of having a district CC service, but they 
also expressed concerns about the increased pressure imposed by the expansion of CC 
services. Moreover, they stated that their public health officials were concerned about 
safety issues, even though patient safety had not been compromised and that the district 
service at Veinbridge General was operating within the recommended practice of the 
British Cardiac Society Council.
7.5 APPROPRIATENESS OF DEMAND
§6.5 discussed how the development of district services could stimulate further demand 
for cardiac services, and §6.6 addressed the issue of the appropriateness of this stimulated 
demand. In both the Ribsley General and Veinbridge General cases, evidence of the 
stimulation of demand was found. In this section, the issue of the appropriateness of 
demand is considered, in particular the appropriateness of the stimulated demand. 
Definitions of appropriateness were provided in §6.6.1.
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As was stated in §5.4.2, it was not possible to audit individual patient records to establish 
the degree to which referrals for cardiac services were appropriate. Instead, the related 
issue of changes in the referral thresholds were considered to some extent. §7.3.4 reported 
upon increases and reductions in the referral threshold for an elective CC investigation for 
Ribsley General patients. §7.4.3, reported upon reductions in the referral thresholds for an 
OP appointment and an elective CC investigation for Veinbridge General patients. 
However, the implications for appropriateness are difficult to establish. If the tendency is 
to over-refer, then a reduction in the referral threshold will result in a higher number of 
inappropriate decisions (in terms of over-use). However, if  tendency is to under-refer, 
then a reduction in referral threshold will result in a lower number of inappropriate 
decisions (in terms of under-use). In this study, it is only possible to make relative, not 
absolute, assessments.
In defining the appropriateness of a procedure in §6.6.1,1 considered the requirement for 
a medical procedure to be timely and according to need. Delays are inevitable, given the 
scarcity of resources. In fact, some level of delay to CC is desirable; a patient’s condition 
can improve and they can thus avoid the risks of undergoing catheterisation. However, 
delays are considered inappropriate when they become excessive.
The consultant cardiologist at Ribsley General prioritised the patients on the CC waiting 
list into two categories, routine elective and urgent elective, and attempted to catheterise 
patients in order of clinical priority. However, if the waiting time approached the 
Patient’s Charter maximum of 12 months, it was necessary to distort clinical priority. 
This practice has been reported in the literature (CSAG 1993, 1996). Figure 7.4 presented 
the average waiting times for Ribsley General, which were for some periods excessive. It 
is perhaps difficult to appreciate this, given that averages are plotted and that they fall far 
short of the 12 month maximum. However, it is possible to deduce relative pressures from 
the shape of the graph. For example, waiting times obviously presented a greater problem 
in September 1995 compared with March 1997. Moreover, it can be deduced that the 
scale of this problem was significant, given that efforts were made to bring the waiting 
time down dramatically, and further interventions were made when the average waiting 
time rose again.
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The consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge General also prioritised his patients on his CC 
waiting list. He prioritised into three categories, routine, soon and urgent.
Numerical data on waiting lists and waiting times for invasive treatments were not 
available. The consultant cardiologist at Heartwick Hospital stated that the average 
waiting times for coronary angioplasty were low, at 1 to 2 months, but the delays for 
bypass surgery were excessive, at approximately 1 year. The delay for a patient requiring 
invasive elective treatment may involve: a delay to be seen in an OP appointment; a delay 
to undergo catheterisation; and, a delay to undergo treatment. Reducing the waiting time 
to catheterisation will obviously be beneficial in reducing the overall delay.
In discussing the appropriateness of cardiac services, it is important to consider the 
sizeable number of undiagnosed patients with significant CHD, which was highlighted in 
§5.3.2. Concerns are frequently expressed by cardiologists and cardiac surgeons about the 
need to ‘tap into’ this pool of unmet need. Therefore, there is a natural tendency to take 
advantage of increased access to diagnostic facilities and thus reduce the referral 
threshold. However, there has to be a balance. During discussions of appropriateness, the 
consultant at Ribsley General expressed concerns about another service shift, open-access 
ECG testing. These have ‘opened the flood gates’ of inappropriate demand from GPs.
The consultant at Ribsley General accepted that some demand for CC could be postponed. 
He knew of some hospitals that used guidelines and protocols to suppress low priority 
demand. He expressed a preference for the former because they are more flexible.
The appropriateness of demand was not explored with the consultant cardiologist at 
Veinbridge General. However a comment can be made. Unlike the Ribsley General case, 
Veinbridge General was under pressure from the increase in referrals from GPs for OP 
appointments. The fact that Veinbridge General had responded by increasing the OP rate 
could suggest that this increase in demand was considered appropriate. On the other hand, 
the appropriateness could be questioned if these increases in activity were associated with 
waiting time targets distorting clinical priorities.
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7.6 SUMMARY
This chapter described the experiences of district CC services at the case study centres. 
Whilst the two DGHs presented two contrasting histories of the use of district services, 
evidence was presented from both cases that the shift in CC services was not a simple 
service shift but involved the stimulation and suppression of demand for services. Three 
feedback mechanisms by which demand was stimulated were identified. These involved 
responses to: changes in waiting times; the increased knowledge of GPs and patients; and, 
changes in the skills of doctors who select patients for CC. The third feedback mechanism 
has not been described in the literature.
Understanding the interactions of these feedback mechanisms, their long-term 
implications, and the impact of changes to supply and demand variables is non-trivial. 
They involve dynamic complexity. As discussed in Chapter 4, dynamic complexity is the 
focus of SD. Therefore, there was potential for an SD analysis of the shift in CC services, 
based upon the case studies. Chapter 8 describes the conceptualisation process of the SD 
study.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCEPTUALISATION IN SYSTEM DYNAMICS TERMS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 7, the case study experiences of district CC services were described, and the 
potential for an SD analysis was demonstrated. This chapter presents the first phase of the 
SD study, the conceptualisation phase, which followed well established guidelines 
(Randers 1980, Richardson and Pugh 1981, Sterman 2000).
As stated in §5.4.2, to embark upon conceptualisation, it is necessary to describe the 
context and characteristics of the central focus of the study verbally. The central focus 
was the effects of the shift in CC services in the NHS. Its context and characteristics have 
been described in previous chapters. The key policy questions were stated in §5.4.2.
The following sections explain how the conceptualisation process was completed. By 
producing reference modes, the central focus was described in graphical terms (§8.2). 
Reference modes corresponding with several simple uses of district services were 
constructed (§8.2.1) before those for the more complicated cases of Ribsley General and 
Veinbridge General (§8.2.2 and §8.2.3 respectively). A conceptual model was produced to 
convey the basic mechanisms (or structure) which were understood to be responsible for 
the system behaviour (§8.3). Both the model structure (§8.3.1) and the process by which 
the model was constructed (§8.3.2) are discussed. The causal hypothesis, which was 
encapsulated in the research hypothesis (see §5.2) also formed part of the 
conceptualisation process by describing the assumed relationship between the behaviour 
and structure (§8.4). Finally, the intended purpose of the model was clarified (§8.5.). The 
chapter is summarised in the final section (§8.6).
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8.2 DERIVATION OF THE REFERENCE MODES
Chapter 7 described the history of the shift in CC services to Ribsley General and 
Veinbridge General. In SD, for problems and issues that have a history, historical 
reference modes are constructed to present an unambiguous graphical description of the 
problematic behaviour. An SD study could have two further sets of reference modes 
(Richardson and Pugh 1981). A second set could define more desirable behaviour. In 
cases where different policies have been used in the past, a third set of reference modes 
would be produced showing observed policy behaviour. Reference modes provide a key 
focus for the study. They indicate what factors are of interest, and therefore what should 
be included in the model. They have an important role in testing the simulation model. It 
is essential that the simulation model can qualitatively replicate the historical reference 
modes. The reference modes also provide a target for the policy analysis process by giving 
a graphical description of more desirable behaviour. Ideally, reference modes are 
constructed using numerical data. However, such data are not always available. 
Hypothetical reference modes may be drawn to substitute for, or supplement, the modes 
that are based on the available numerical data.
8.2.1 Representing the Effects o f  Different Uses o f  District Services
Different uses of district services may be defined in terms of the duration of the district 
service and its impact on the CC investigation rate. Complicated uses of district services 
were employed at Ribsley General and Veinbridge General involving several shifts and 
expansions in activity. Figure 8.1 illustrates some simple uses that follow on from the 
discussion in §6.3.1, supporting: a temporary expansion in activity by augmenting the 
tertiary-based service; a temporary shift in workload away from the tertiary level; a 
permanent shift away from the tertiary level; and, a permanent shift and expansion in 
activity.
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Defining reference modes for the above simple examples provided a focus for the 
construction o f a general model of the shift in CC services. For this study, the intention 
was to construct a general model of the shift in the balance o f CC services, and to 
calibrate it to the cases o f Ribsley General and Veinbridge General.
Figures 8.2 to 8.4 and 8.6 illustrate the basic principle o f the use o f reference modes. Only 
a selected number o f variables are shown. In order to focus on the basic trends, it is 
assumed that there is no random variation in the monthly referral rates and activity rates. 
For simplicity, only waiting list removals that constitute patient activity are considered; 
all other waiting list removals such as deaths on the waiting list are ignored. Furthermore, 
the delays in establishing the district service are omitted. The focus is on patients who are 
screened for CC at the DGH of interest. How spare tertiary capacity, released by the shift 
in activity to the district level, is used remains an open question. The time frame for the 
effects o f the development o f district services to propagate is estimated to be a few years.
Figure 8.2 shows the modes o f desirable behaviour implicit in each use o f district services 
represented in Figure 8.1. The modes refer to the elective CC investigation referral rate, 
total investigation rate, district-based and tertiary-based investigation rates and average 
CC investigation waiting time. The graphs for the elective referral rate and investigation 
rate are superimposed, so that changes in the waiting list and average waiting time may be 
deduced. Also shown is the degree of pressure imposed by patients and GPs to refer and
Temporary
Shift
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Shift
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Shift & Expansion
Tertiary
Activity
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District
Activity
Tertiary
Activity
Shift\& Expand
District
Activity
Figure 8.1 Simple Uses of District Services
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Figure 8.2 Simple Uses of District Services: Desired Behaviour Modes
the overall monthly cost rate for CC services. The latter reflects the costs o f having 
district services. Start-up costs refer to the initial costs incurred to set up the district 
service, such as the costs o f preparing the site for the mobile catheter laboratory and hire 
costs for the electricity panel.
The figure shows expansions in activity (Temporary Expansion and Permanent Shift & 
Expansion) producing a desired reduction in the average waiting time (5th graphs). By 
contrast, shifts in workload alone (Temporary Shift and Permanent Shift) involve the use 
of district services (2nd graphs) to ensure that reductions in tertiary-based activity (3rd 
graphs) do not lead to increases in the average waiting time. In three cases, the reference
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modes reflect the desire that the elective referral rate (1st graphs) and pressure to refer (4th 
graphs) remain constant so that changes in the average waiting time would be attributed to 
changes in the investigation rate alone. The exception is the case of the permanent shift 
and expansion. To support the permanent increase in activity levels, it is assumed that 
referral rate (1st graph) would rise so that the waiting list would not be drained 
completely. Therefore, an increase in the pressure to refer (4th graph) would be welcomed.
The system behaviour will be considerably different to that desired, if  excessive levels of 
latent demand are stimulated by the district service and insufficient capacity, either in 
terms o f funding or expertise, is available to maintain the desired waiting time. The 
expected problem behaviour shown in Figure 8.3 corresponds with the permanent shift 
and expansion policy. This reflects the assumption that there is insufficient capacity for 
elective CC investigations. The stimulation of demand could also lead to capacity 
shortages with OP services. Although OP services are not represented, they would follow 
the same principles.
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Figure 8.3 Expected Problem Behaviour With Insufficient Funding
8.2.2 Ribsley General Reference Modes
District services at Ribsley General supported temporary expansions and shifts in CC 
services on two occasions. The district service was initially used to sustain and expand 
upon a temporary increase in activity that had originally begun at the tertiary level, in 
order to bring the average waiting time down to a more reasonable level. After the district 
service was withdrawn, the average waiting time rose again. This was reversed when the
1 6 0
district service was reintroduced to produce a further increase in activity. The shifts in 
workload were intended to both compensate for the temporary closure o f tertiary facilities 
and release tertiary resources for other uses, both o f which would have been reflected in 
reductions in tertiary-based CC investigation rates.
Just considering the first expansion and shift in CC services and assuming the second did 
not take place, the above description could be represented by the reference modes shown 
in Figure 8.4 (applying the same simplifying assumptions as those above). These 
reference modes also extend to OP services.
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Figure 8.4 Reference Modes Associated with a Temporary Expansion Followed by a Shift Policy
The problem of excessive waiting times for a CC investigation (5th graph: Problem 
Behaviour) arises from the tendency for referrals for a CC investigation to exceed the 
available capacity (1st graph: Problem Behaviour) so that capacity increases are repeatedly 
called upon. Even when additional capacity is available by the use o f the district facility, 
the benefits are cancelled out to some extent by the district service stimulating further 
demand for CC (1st graph: Problem Behaviour). A small temporary increase in the OP 
waiting time might be tolerated (4th graph: Desired Behaviour) as demand would only be 
stimulated temporarily and there would be some slack in the system to bring the waiting 
time back down to the desired level. Therefore, only the stimulation of demand for CC 
services would constitute a problem.
It was assumed that there was a desire for temporary increases in CC activity (1st graph: 
Desired Behaviour) to solve the problem of the excessive waiting time and that, when the
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• • t i l  •target average waiting time had been achieved, it was maintained (5 graph: Desired 
Behaviour). Implicit in this desire was the assumption that after the district service has 
been withdrawn, the elective referral rate will not exceed the elective investigation rate 
(1st graph: Desired Behaviour). Furthermore, ideally, an improvement from the problem 
behaviour will be achieved without the need for additional resources (6 graph: Desired 
Behaviour).
Let us consider the removal of all the simplifying assumptions that applied to Figures 8.2 
to 8.4 and add the second shift and expansion in CC services. Historical reference modes 
of the problem behaviour for the Ribsley General case were constructed from the graphs 
that were introduced in Chapter 7 for the CC services, and these were supplemented with 
simple hypothetical modes for the OP services (see Figure 8.5). The modes for the OP 
services present an ideal situation with no OP capacity shortages. However, small 
temporary increases in the waiting time and waiting list could also be considered to reflect 
no OP capacity shortages as these increases would not cause concern.
Note that, these reference modes differentiate between the average time spent on the 
waiting list (waiting time for existing waiting list patients) and the average estimated 
waiting time for new patients joining the waiting list (waiting time for new waiting list 
patients). Furthermore, as stated in §5.4.3, the length of the waiting list was also 
considered in addition to the average waiting time because both reflect different aspects of 
access times. The latter represents the delay to a health service, whilst the former 
represents the expressed need for that service. Therefore, more desirable behaviour would 
involve both the waiting list and waiting time goals being achieved, ideally, without 
increasing resource levels, and demand being reduced to more manageable levels.
These reference modes refer to the period May 1995 to March 1998. A longer time scale 
was considered for the model-based experiments. A simulation model that can reproduce 
problematic behaviour over one particular time frame may then be employed to predict 
future trends and thus extend the time scale. Obviously, this will be subject to certain 
assumptions about the future. The model’s ability to replicate the historical reference 
modes is demonstrated in Chapter 9 (see §9.4.2). The time scale for the problem reference 
modes was extended as part of the base case analysis which is presented in Chapter 10 (in 
§ 10.2 .1).
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Figure 8.5 Historical Reference Modes for Ribsley General 
(Real data for the CC investigation variables and hypothetical data for the OP variables. The real data has 
been smoothed with a centred 2-point moving average)
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8.2.3 Veinbridge General Reference Modes
District services at Veinbridge General supported permanent shifts and expansions of CC 
services. These shifts and expansions were not intended to reduce the average waiting 
time for a CC investigation. Instead, as part o f a long term strategy, they were intended to 
increase the availability o f CC services. Firstly, by shifting the routine workload to the 
district level, tertiary resources could be released for more complex cases. This was 
particularly important during the temporary closure o f the tertiary facilities for essential 
repair work. Secondly, by increasing the overall capacity, more routine investigations 
could be carried out.
First considering the shifts and expansion that occurred when the service first opened (and 
applying the same simplifying assumptions that referred to Figures 8.2 to 8.4), the 
reference modes might look something like those in Figure 8.6.
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Figure 8.6 Reference Modes Associated with a Permanent Shift and Expansion Policy
The shift and expansion in elective CC capacity would be desired to support an increase 
in referrals for routine CC investigations (1st graph: Desired Behaviour) without 
compromising the average waiting time (4th graph: Desired Behaviour). This increase in 
referrals could reflect the investigation o f more patients already in the system (selection of 
more ‘grey area’ cases) as soon as the additional capacity was available. A further 
increase in referrals could reflect an increase in new patients coming into the system (due 
to the increase in OP referrals, stimulated by the introduction o f district services). The OP 
rate would have to rise to bring more patients forward for a CC investigation and also
164
ensure that the OP waiting times were not compromised (6th graph: Desired Behaviour). 
However, if the level of stimulated demand for OP appointments exceeded the available 
capacity (6th graph: Problem Behaviour) then the average OP waiting time would rise (7th
tVigraph: Problem Behaviour). Although the CC waiting time goal would be maintained (4 
graph: Problem Behaviour) as desired (4th graph: Desired Behaviour), the CC 
investigation waiting list would exhibit increases (5th graph: Problem Behaviour). This 
would be due to periods where the elective CC investigation rate lagged behind the 
elective CC referral rate (1st graph: Problem Behaviour). The base case analysis revealed a 
further cause (see §10.3.3).
A hospital consultant might not consider the increased waiting list to constitute a problem 
as the desired waiting time would have been maintained. However, someone who would 
be more concerned about costs, typically a hospital manager or purchaser, might disagree. 
It is the increase in the waiting list that requires the elective CC investigation rate to rise 
in order to maintain the desired waiting time. A further rise in the investigation rate, to 
exceed the referral rate, would be necessary to bring the waiting list back down. 
Therefore, an increase in the CC investigation waiting list could be viewed as another 
symptom of the problem behaviour and the maintenance of the waiting list goal would 
reflect another aspect of desired behaviour (5th graph: Desired Behaviour).
Let us now consider the removal of the simplifying assumptions and add the second shift 
and expansion in CC capacity. The available numerical data was deemed inadequate for 
the purpose of constructing reference modes of the Veinbridge General case. 
Subsequently, hypothetical data was used.
Figure 8.7 shows the historical reference modes for the Veinbridge General case. These 
graphs represent the period April 1995 to August 1999 and are based upon descriptions of 
the behaviour of the system, by the Veinbridge General collaborators. As with the case of 
Ribsley General, after demonstrating the model’s ability to replicate the historical 
reference modes (see §9.4.2), the time scale for the problem reference modes was 
extended (see §10.3.1).
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Figure 8.7 Assumed Historical Reference Modes for Veinbridge General
As with the case o f Ribsley General, meeting the desired waiting times and waiting list 
lengths, ideally, without increasing resource levels and controlling demand to more 
manageable levels, would constitute more desirable behaviour.
8.3 CONSTRUCTION OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The stimulation o f demand led to CC capacity shortages for Ribsley General patients and, 
OP capacity shortages and increases in the CC investigation waiting list for Veinbridge 
General patients. Although the effects o f the shift in CC services at the two case study
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centres differed, there existed a common structure underlying these effects. In SD, a 
conceptual model in the form of a causal-loop diagram (also known as an influence 
diagram) is often used to present the basic feedback structure that is understood to 
underlie the problematic behaviour. The conceptual model formed the basis of the 
simulation model which was used to replicate the different effects (model outputs) for the 
two case studies by specifying two different sets of model parameters (model inputs).
A preliminary causal loop diagram was constructed portraying the generation of referrals 
for elective CC investigations at the district level and the delivery of elective CC 
investigations at both the tertiary and district levels. As the focus was on the use of 
district services, the model only considered elective investigations. To explicitly add 
emergency investigations would have cluttered the model with unnecessary detail. This 
preliminary model was based upon the insights from: the literature; observational work 
conducted at the collaborative centres; interviews with collaborators about their 
experiences of district services; and, analysis of various data supplied by the 
collaborators. Revisions were made in response to comments made by collaborators. The 
resulting conceptual model is presented in §8.3.1. The actual process of its development is 
described in §8.3.2.
8.3.1 The Basic Feedback Structure
Figure 8.8 shows the revised causal loop diagram. It is composed of four balancing 
information feedback loops (labelled ‘B’) and four reinforcing information feedback 
loops (labelled ‘R’). In §4.3.3, the basic structure of an information feedback loop was 
described, simple illustrations of balancing and reinforcing loops were provided, and the 
labels ‘s’and ‘o’ were explained. The eight mini replicas of the model on the left hand 
side, indicate where the individual loops lie.
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Figure 8.8 The Conceptual Model: Seeking a Desired Waiting Time 
(2 lines - Delay)
Loop B1 represents the balancing process which ensures that for patients referred for an 
elective CC investigation from a given DGH, the tertiary-based elective CC investigation 
rate is adjusted to its desired level, provided sufficient capacity is available. The desired 
investigation rate is determined by an implicit waiting time goal for new patients joining 
the waiting list. For example, if there were 60 patients on the waiting list and it was 
desired to investigate a new patient just joining the waiting list in 3 month’s time, then the 
desired activity rate would be 20 patients per month (for simplicity, all deaths and other 
waiting list removals are ignored).
The variable “Avg Waiting Time for CC Inv” represents the average estimated waiting 
time for new patients joining the waiting list. The average time spent on the waiting list 
(waiting time for existing patients on the waiting list) is not shown although it is 
represented in the simulation model. When the system is in equilibrium, the average 
waiting time for new patients joining the waiting list will equal the average waiting time 
for existing patients on the waiting list.
It should also be noted that the consideration of maximum waiting times (rather than 
average waiting times), such as those which are specified in a contractual agreement or 
the Patient’s Charter, is not beyond the capability of a SD analysis. However, average 
waiting times were easier to model and, therefore, presented a good starting point.
Loop B2 depicts the development of CC services at the DGH to compensate for shortfalls 
in tertiary activity. It thus introduces a further balancing process. The shift in CC activity 
is only relevant to the patients who are eligible. The overall capacity to deliver elective 
CC investigations is determined by both physical and funding constraints. Shortfalls in 
tertiary capacity may be triggered by a capacity loss due to the tertiary catheter laboratory 
undergoing repairs, or other construction work, or a desire to reallocate capacity to more 
complex cases. Shortfalls may also be triggered by a reduction in the desired waiting time. 
Delays may occur in both perceiving a shortfall in activity, with respect to the desired 
level, and in producing a service at the district level. The co-ordination between capacity 
adjustments at the district and tertiary levels is based on the assumption that there are 
close links between the tertiary centre and its referring DGH. This is consistent with the 
British Cardiac Society guidelines on district services (BCS 1994a, 1997).
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The balancing loops B3 and B4, and reinforcing loops R l, R2, R3 and R4 all relate to 
side-effects of the new service development which may affect the demand for elective 
CC.
The balancing loop B3 represents elective CC investigation referral rates adjusting 
according to changes in the perceived waiting times for a CC investigation. The 
development of district services may result in increases in overall (district + tertiary) 
capacity for elective CC investigation. Capacity influences patient throughput, which in 
turn affects the average waiting time for a CC investigation. The cardiologists, who 
evaluate and screen patients for CC, may respond to shorter waiting times by increasing 
their referral rates. Excessively high waiting times may induce cardiologists to suppress 
demand. Therefore, the first demand inducement process, which has been discussed 
(relating to the waiting time effect on demand), is represented by loop B3.
Feedback loops R l and R2 collectively represent the second demand inducement process 
which has been discussed (concerning the knowledge effects on demand). These loops act 
to reinforce the growth in demand and elective CC activity rate. Opening a service facility 
at the local DGH will lead to patients and GPs becoming more knowledgeable about CC, 
especially those from the host district. Loop Rl represents increasing knowledge about 
CC resulting in increased demand for cardiology OP appointments where patients are 
screened for a CC investigation. Higher levels of cardiology OP activity will subsequently 
arise assuming that the desired cardiology OP waiting time is to be maintained. This 
balancing process, labelled B4, is similar to that represented by loop B l. Loop R2 depicts 
the impact of increased knowledge about CC on the fraction of patients assessed at an OP 
appointment who are referred on for an elective CC investigation. Increasing knowledge 
leads to patients and GPs imposing greater pressure on cardiologists to recommend a CC 
investigation. A higher proportion of patients may also be encouraged to accept their 
cardiologists’ recommendation for a CC investigation. It is typical for some patients to 
refuse to be catheterised due to anxiety about the procedure and its associated risks. Some 
of this small patient group may be persuaded to undergo a CC investigation, especially 
given the opportunity to have it carried out at their local hospital, in familiar surroundings 
and remain within the care of their local cardiologist.
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The third demand inducement process discussed earlier (concerning the skills effect on 
demand) is represented by feedback loops R3 and R4. These feedback loops represent the 
processes which reinforce increases in the elective CC investigation demand and activity 
levels. Increasing the number of CC investigations carried out by district-based CC 
operators, most typically achieved by the use of a district facility, will increase the number 
of learning experiences for district-based CC operators in training. This will accelerate 
their gain in expertise in identifying patients who could benefit from being catheterised. 
Increasing their exposure and involvement in CC investigations will also increase their 
confidence levels. Both these effects may result in higher numbers of referrals. If the 
desired waiting time is to be maintained, then these increases in demand will reinforce the 
growth in district-based activity and demands for increases in tertiary-based activity.
The conceptual model also depicts the effect of other factors on referrals such as the 
development of a permanent district facility (this factor would be endogenised in a more 
sophisticated model).
Let us briefly return to the balancing feedback process represented by loop Bl. An 
alternative goal which may drive the desired activity rate is a desired waiting list length 
rather than a desired waiting time. For this policy, the desired activity rate equals the 
perceived referral rate (to maintain the existing waiting list size) plus an adjustment (to 
address any discrepancies between the desired and actual waiting list size). The 
corresponding causal loop diagram is shown in Figure 8.9. Compared with Figure 8.8, the 
differences are the way in which the desired activity rate is calculated (see variable “Des 
Elective CC Inv Rate”), and the introduction of further feedback processes (these are not 
highlighted). The policy that the cardiologists used was that which sought the desired 
waiting time (represented in Figure 8.8). However, preliminary simulation analysis 
suggested that there were some advantages to seeking a desired waiting list length 
(represented in Figure 8.9). The analysis of this issue is presented in Chapter 11.
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8.3.2 Conceptual Model Development
The initial causal loop diagram was refined by seeking feedback from a consultant 
cardiologist from each of the three collaborative centres, Ribsley General, Veinbridge 
General and Heartwick Hospital. The model was revised to incorporate the responses 
given at each stage.
The broad aim of these meetings was to convey the focus of the study (and model) and 
present the model in a comprehensible form so that their views of the model could be 
elicited. First, the key policy questions (see §8.1) were stated to indicate the focus of the 
study. To explain how these policy questions would be addressed, a brief overview of the 
processes of SD modelling was given. The importance of checking each stage for errors 
and promoting a degree of model ‘ownership’ was emphasised and these meetings were 
presented as part of this process.
It was also explained that, although the model would be calibrated to the experiences of 
the two DGH case studies, the aim was to produce a general model of the feedback 
mechanisms involved in the evolution of district CC services. This point was made to 
avoid the potential pitfall that the cardiologists would be ‘blinkered’ by their personal 
experiences. Stock and flow diagrams were introduced, and the differences between them 
and causal loop diagrams were explained. A stock and flow diagram, depicting the basic 
patient flows represented in the model, was then presented to introduce the basic SD 
concepts of stocks and flows. Reference was made to the bath tub analogy which is 
commonly used in SD. The stock is compared to the water level in the bath tub and the 
flows are compared to the flow of water from the taps into the bath (in-flow) and out of 
the bath via the plug hole (out-flow).
The stock and flow diagram was also used to describe the level of aggregation of the 
model, representing an overview of the system and not emphasising individual patient 
events. The entire causal loop diagram was not introduced immediately. Instead, it was 
introduced in stages to avoid confusing the cardiologists as they were unfamiliar with 
these diagrams, and also to avoid producing cognitive overload (Sterman 2000). A series 
of partial causal loop diagrams were shown, starting with a single loop, then adding a 
further loop and so on. The rationale for each feedback loop was given. During the course
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of the meeting, references were made to the graphs, which were shown in Chapter 7, and 
to comments that arose during previous meetings. Several amendments were subsequently 
made to the conceptual model to incorporate the comments obtained from the 
cardiologists. These involved conceptual changes, the addition of further structure and the 
aggregation of the preliminary model. These three types of amendments are discussed in 
the remainder of this section.
Conceptual changes related to two issues. The first concerned the concept “Patient & GP 
Knowledge of CC”. This was originally referred to as “Convenience of CC Services”. The 
consultant at Ribsley General insisted upon this change. He stated that high patient 
expectations and patient pressure were important factors in determining the levels of 
referral rates, but that changes in knowledge rather than convenience was the key issue. 
Furthermore, he stated that this also applied to GPs. The consultant at Veinbridge General 
endorsed this change in concept. The second conceptual issue concerned the use of the 
term “CC Operator” which was originally labelled “CC Practitioner”. The consultant at 
Heartwick Hospital requested that the term “Practitioners” be re-labelled to the more 
recognised term “Operators”. Having recognisable terms is important in promoting a 
sense of model ownership.
There were two main additions o f further structure. The first related to the method of 
entry into the system. Generally patients who are eligible to undergo district investigation 
(low risk patients) are derived from the OP route. This was originally understood to be the 
exclusive method of entry into the system. However, the consultant at Veinbridge General 
stated that, as the service is established at his hospital, he is also able to catheterise 
inpatients whose condition has stabilised. The consultant at Ribsley General said that, if 
he had a regular district service in place, he would also catheterise stable inpatients at 
Ribsley General. Therefore, low risk patients are also derived from the inpatient, 
emergency admission route. This second group of patients was thus incorporated into the 
analysis. However, this is not shown in the conceptual model because it does not relate to 
the main feedback structure.
The second addition of further structure involved the inclusion of the link between 
“Patient & GP Pressure” and “OP Waiting List”. The consultant at Ribsley General 
argued that patient and GP knowledge about CC has also impacted on the demand for OP
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appointments at hospitals with established CC services. The consultant at Veinbridge 
General endorsed this view. This link had originally been omitted because it was under 
review. This was because the hospital manager at Veinbridge General had suggested that, 
perhaps, the increase in demand was due to other factors. She had observed that increases 
in demand had applied across various specialities. When this issue was raised with the 
consultant cardiologist at Veinbridge General, he acknowledged that other factors were 
involved and that it was difficult to separate the two. Therefore, the link was added to the 
model.
The level o f aggregation of the model was also revised. The initial conceptual model 
focused on patients who were eligible to undergo investigation at the district level - low 
risk patients. These form a subgroup of those who undergo CC electively. In contrast, 
high risk electives cannot undergo investigation at the district level but they also need to 
be considered as their utilisation of tertiary resources impacts upon the availability of 
resources for low risk patients. Low risk and high risk elective patients could be 
considered either separately or together. Adopting the latter approach is the most sensible 
strategy because an aggregated model is smaller and therefore easier to manage and 
understand. If necessary, a disaggregated model could be produced at a later stage.
8.4 THE CAUSAL HYPOTHESIS
It was discussed how the development of district CC services may solve some problems, 
but also create others. These problems include excessive treatment delays, pressures 
imposed by high expectations, contractual obligations and cost constraints, bed ‘blocking’ 
and the undesirable fragmentation of specialist patient care. Furthermore, these problems 
are inter-linked and evolve over time. Consequently, there are no straightforward answers 
to the two policy questions that were presented in §5.4.2.
Associated with the first question is a causal hypothesis. This is a verbal statement of the 
assumed relationship between the reference behaviour modes, which were presented in 
§8.2, and the underlying structure which was summarised by the causal loop diagram in 
Figure 8.8. This causal hypothesis formed the part of the research hypothesis that 
encapsulated the theories about the effect of the shift in CC services (see §5.2.2).
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These theories were based upon a review of the health policy and medical literature which 
documented the influence of various factors on referral rates. At this point, the study had 
already generated new insights into the stimulation of demand via the interviews and 
preliminary modelling. The causal hypothesis could thus have been revised to incorporate 
these new insights. However, this would only have been based upon a static analysis and 
it is well known in SD that there is a danger of making erroneous inferences about 
dynamic behaviour from static analyses. By exploring the feedback mechanisms with the 
simulation model, it was possible to test the causal hypothesis and refine the 
understanding of the relationship between the system structure and behaviour.
8.5 CLARIFICATION OF THE MODEL PURPOSE
The model purpose outlines the broad aims for the study, the target audience, the policy 
levers of interest and the desired outcomes. In formulating a formal simulation model 
from the informal conceptual model, a well-defined purpose is essential. It provides a 
clear focus on what should be included and what should be excluded from the simulation 
model (Richardson and Pugh 1981). Without it, the model may become cluttered with 
unnecessary detail thus undermining the ability to seek useful policy insight.
The two policy questions provided a focus for the model purpose. Several aims for the 
study were established in order to address these questions, and test the causal hypothesis. 
The first aim was to offer a framework in which to investigate the effects of the 
development of district CC on the delivery of cardiac services within the NHS. The 
second aim was to study the sensitivity of different aspects of service delivery to changes 
in referral patterns, waiting time goals and capacity constraints. The third aim was to 
calibrate the model to the experiences of district services at Ribsley General and 
Veinbridge General. Further aims were to evaluate the current district policy and potential 
refinements to this initiative using a balanced set of performance measures, and to test 
whether aiming for improvements in a single performance measure and/or short-term 
goals could only give an illusion of progress. The final aim was to assist in identifying 
leverage points, where policy makers can intervene effectively to improve the delivery of 
services.
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The target audience for this study was primarily NHS purchasers and providers of cardiac 
services at the strategic level of decision making, given the strategic nature of SD. This 
would involve senior managers of purchasing authorities and hospitals, and hospital 
consultants. The broad audience for the study also encompassed other interested groups, 
such as the managers of companies involved in the development of district services and 
health services researchers. The policies of interest included different uses of district 
services. Other policies related to attempts to suppress the levels of low priority demand 
and changes in the desired waiting times. A further policy involved employing the 
available information about the system differently to consider seeking a desired waiting 
list length rather than a desired waiting time goal. The associated structural change was 
illustrated in Figure 8.9. Finally, the desired outcomes from the development of the model 
were a combination of increased awareness, improved general understanding, and the 
eventual adoption of a set of policy recommendations.
8.6 SUMMARY
This chapter described the conceptualisation phase of the shift in CC services SD study. 
Reference modes were constructed to represent the problematic and desired behaviours 
for several simple uses of district services and the two case studies, which reflect more 
complicated uses. The structure which was understood to be responsible for the 
problematic behaviour was presented with a simple conceptual model. This encapsulated 
the basic processes of adjustment in activity and referral rates which underlay the primary 
and secondary effects of the evolution of district services. The process by which 
collaborative input was incorporated into this simple model was also discussed. The 
purpose of the model was clarified. Several broad study aims were established. NHS 
purchasers and providers were declared as the key audience for the study. A number of 
policies that were planned to form model-based experiments were highlighted including 
changes to capacity constraints, demand management stategies and changes to the forces 
that drive activity rates. The intended final outcome was established as a combination of 
several general policy lessons and specific policy recommendations.
The next phase of the SD study involved the conversion of the informal conceptual model 
into a more formal computer simulation model. This will be described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9
THE SHIFT IN CARDIAC CATHETERISATION 
SERVICES SIMULATION MODEL
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 8 presented a conceptual model that depicted the basic mechanisms that were 
understood to generate the primary and secondary effects of the shift in CC services (this 
model is reproduced in Appendix D in Dl). The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate 
how this informal conceptual model was developed into a formal simulation model, and 
describe the procedures that were applied to gain confidence in this model.
First, an overview of the simulation model is provided (§9.2), before describing it in 
further detail (§9.3). This section focuses on the model representation of: adjustments in 
activity (§9.3.1); stimulation and suppression of demand (§9.3.2); waiting time 
calculations (§9.3.3); gain and loss of CC operator skills (§9.3.4); and, generation of costs 
(§9.3.5). The rationale underlying the model structure and parameter values is discussed 
in a separate section (§9.3.6). The next section outlines the procedures by which 
confidence was gained in the model (§9.4). Using well-established SD tests, both the 
model’s structure (§9.4.1) and its behaviour (§9.4.2) were subjected to close scrutiny. The 
chapter is summarised in the final section (§9.5).
This chapter does not focus on every single model equation, as the aim is to explain the 
overall structure and to highlight the important equations. Appendix E contains further 
details about the simulation model including two fully documented listings of the model 
equations - one parameterised to the Ribsley General case and the other to the Veinbridge 
General case. A glossary of modelling terms is provided in Appendix B. Note that all 
references to OP services refer to cardiology OP services.
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9.2 M ODEL OVERVIEW
The simulation model was constructed using the STELLA RESEARCH software v. 5.1.1 
(High Performance Systems 1997). With this software, the model may be viewed at 
varying levels o f detail, as illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Level 1: Sector Diagram
Level 2 :  Stock & Flow Diagram increasing
Detail
Level 3: Model Equations J
Figure 9.1 The Simulation Model: Three Levels o f  Detail
The sector diagram shows the model divided into several modules or sectors that group 
together functionally related portions of model structure. As the conceptual model was 
converted into stock and flow terms, 5 distinct sectors emerged, as shown in Figure 9.2: 
Waiting Times; Loss & Gain of District CC Operator Skills (this is referred to as the 
Skills Sector); Referrals for OP Appts & Elective CC Investigations (the Referrals 
Sector); Delivery o f Elective CC Investigations (the Delivery Sector); and, Costs.
Within the Referrals Sector, referrals for OP appointments, OP activity, and referrals for 
elective CC investigations from both the outpatient and inpatient routes are modelled. The 
waiting time, skills and knowledge effects on referrals for CC investigations and OP 
appointments are also represented within this sector. The Delivery Sector contains the 
structure that generates the elective CC investigation rates at both the tertiary and district 
levels, in addition to the preparation, introduction and withdrawal of the district facility. 
This sector connects with the Referrals Sector via patient flows and information links to 
provide inputs for the knowledge effects on referrals.
Waiting times are calculated in a separate sector, labelled Waiting Times. This comprises 
waiting time calculations for OP appointments and CC investigations. This sector 
connects with the Referrals Sector to provide inputs for the waiting time effect on 
demand. The turnover o f junior district CC operators and the associated aggregate loss 
and gain in skills at the district hospital are modelled within the Skills Sector.
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Loss & Gain of District CC Operator S k i l ly /
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At Tertiary Level
At District Level
Loss & Gain in Skills
Turnover of Junior District Operators
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Delivery o f Elective CC Investigations V
OP Referrals and Activity
Referrals fo r  Elective CC Investigations from 
Inpatient & Outpatients
Referrals for OP Appts & Elective CC Investigations V
Figure 9.2 The Main Sectors 
(Arrows depict connections between the different sectors. The dark arrow indicates a physical flow, in this 
case, a flow o f patients, and the light arrows represent information flows)
The Delivery Sector connects with the Skills Sector to provide learning experiences upon 
which junior district CC operators gain skills. The Skills Sector connects with the 
Referrals Sector to provide inputs for the skills effect on demand. The sector labelled 
Costs generates patient activity costs, district preparation costs and district running costs 
for the duration o f the simulation. It also checks for the affordability o f district services 
and patient activity. Consequently, this sector connects with the Referrals Sector and 
Delivery Sector by only permitting activity when it is affordable.
The model also contains four further functional sectors for the model-based experiments. 
One sector, Mass Balance Checks, contains the structure required to check that the flows 
of skills and patients are conserved (see §9.4.2). Another sector, Parameters for 
Experiments, contains various switches and other variables that act as controls for the 
experiments. A number of additional measures for evaluating the simulation runs are 
calculated in the sector, Parameters fo r  Evaluating Experiments. Finally, the model 
output is presented in graphical and tabular form in the sector Graphs & Tables.
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Figure 9.3 provides a glimpse at the corresponding stock and flow diagram (the 5 main 
sectors only) which is the model viewed from the next level of detail. The STELLA 
software provides the ability to zoom in and out from this diagram. The figure shows how 
it appears from a distance such that the variable names are not visible. It illustrates the 
considerably higher level of detail compared to the sector diagram by highlighting the 
numerous model components and connections that lie within the 5 main sectors. The 
relatively high degree of detail complexity also demonstrates the greater rigour required 
with stock and flow diagrams, compared to conceptual models.
Note that all the feedback loops and connections between the sectors are not apparent, as 
some links have been superficially broken by ‘ghosting’ variables. Ghosting involves 
making copies of variables. This can serve several purposes. In this model, ghosts were 
used to uncross some links and shorten others to avoid the stock and flow diagram 
resembling a bowl of spaghetti! In addition, using ghosts, a sector was created 
(Parameters for Experiments) to collect together all the controls for the experiments. This 
avoided the inconvenience of repeatedly having to navigate around the model searching 
for parameters.
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Figure 9.3 Stock and Flow Diagram
Waiting Times Sector Skills Sector Costs Sector
To complete the simulation model overview, the key patient flows represented in the 
model are considered. These are shown in Figure 9.4.
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where:
oa
OOPWLRR
□  4=
NRRIPtoCC
o
Figure 9.4 Key Patient Flows
KEY:
Stock / Level
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CCWL CC investigation waiting list length [pats]
CCWLRR CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
NRRIPtoCC New referral rate from inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
OOPWLRR Other OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
OPWL OP waiting list length [pats]
RROP Rate o f  referrals for an OP appointment [pats/mth]
RROPWLtoCC Rate o f referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
The patient referral chain represents patient pathways through the processes o f care as 
described in §2.3.3. Referring to the referrals between the primary/secondary/tertiary 
levels (described in §2.3.2), in the simulation model, only the relevant sections of the 
cardiac referral chain are represented. These are those which concern referrals for and the 
delivery o f elective CC investigations and the responses to the availability o f district 
services. For the purpose o f this study, the relevant flows o f patients across the 
primary/secondary interface are represented explicitly and the patient flows across the 
secondary/tertiary interface are represented implicitly.
The key patient flows span across the Referral and Delivery Sectors. Two stocks, also 
known in SD as levels, represent the waiting list for OP appointments (OPWL) and the 
waiting list for CC investigations (CCWL). Several flows, also known as rates, regulate 
the flows o f patients to and from the stocks. The white arrowheads indicate the direction 
of flow. The rates are specified as biflows, rather than uniflows, in order to check that the 
model is functioning correctly (to check that levels do not become negative).
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The OP waiting list is increased by a single flow representing referrals for OP 
appointments (RROP) aggregating new and follow-up referrals, and it is reduced by two 
separate flows. One represents referrals for elective CC investigations from the OP 
waiting list (RROPWLtoCC) and the other depicts all other removals from the OP waiting 
list including deaths on the waiting list (OOPWLRR). The destination of the latter flow is 
not of interest so it is directed to beyond the boundary of the model.
The waiting list for a CC investigation is increased by two flows of patients. In addition to 
the referrals from the OP waiting list (RROPWLtoCC), there are new referrals for elective 
investigations from inpatients (NRRIPtoCC). “New” refers to patients that are not already 
known to the cardiologists. Therefore, this excludes patients who were previously waiting 
on the OP waiting list and had deteriorated, undergone hospital admission, restabilised 
and were subsequently referred on for an elective investigation; they would already be 
accounted for (within RROPWLtoCC). Also excluded is the potential outflow of patients 
already on the CC investigation waiting list who have deteriorated, become hospital 
admissions and then restabilised. As they would remain classified as in need of an elective 
investigation, they would already be accounted for (within CCWL). Although new 
referrals for elective investigations from inpatients need to be considered to ensure that 
the flows of patients are conserved, the source of these patients is not of interest with 
regard to the purpose of the study. Their source, therefore, lies beyond the boundary of the 
model. Finally, the CC investigation waiting list is reduced by the waiting list removal 
rate (CCWLRR). This comprises both removals which constitute elective patient activity 
and those which do not, such as deaths on the waiting list and patients who deteriorated 
whilst waiting for their investigation and were subsequently reclassified as emergency 
cases.
9.3 MODEL DETAIL
In this section, the stock and flow structure is explored in greater detail by presenting a 
selected number of small stock and flow sub-structures. Fuller stock and flow sub­
structures are given in Appendix E where all the main feedback processes, as depicted in 
the conceptual model, are highlighted. The key to the symbols used is given in Figure 9.5.
184
L_J Stock / Level
-------► Connector / Information Link
— 1> Material Flow
3* Flow / Rateo Non-Graphical Converter / Auxiliary or Constanto Graphical Converter / Table FunctionQ Model Boundary
G Ghosts
Figure 9.5 Symbols Used in Stock and Flow Diagrams
Note that, regarding the model formulation, a number o f gross discontinuities are 
produced by the specification of ‘IF... THEN... ELSE’ statements in the model equations. 
Such statements are inconsistent with aggregated behaviour which is the typical focus of 
SD. However, they were appropriate in this study in order to model single hospitals and 
the behaviour o f individuals.
9.3.1 Representing Adjustments in Activity
The process o f changes in the OP activity rate (depicted as loop B4 in the conceptual 
model) is represented in the Referrals Sector (see Figure 9.6).
RROPWLtoCC
IPWL CumOPRROP
DesTOP
AvkROP
DesCiPRWL*
PreOPWLRR
AvPreOPWLRR
CapOP
DesOPWLAT OPWLRRDesOPWL
DesOPR*
AvWLRT
where:
UCapOP*
Av
Cap
Des
OA
Average
Capacity
Desired
Overall affordability
SwPADr
DesOPRWT* OPR OP rate
RR.. Referral rate
..RR Removal rate
T Time
WL Waiting list
 ^  Relates to the drive to meet waiting time goal
— ^  Relates to the drive to meet waiting list goal
* Equation/function is provided in the text of this sub-section
Figure 9.6 Adjustments in OP Activity Rate (OPR)
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The feedback loop appears broken because a ghost (for DesOPRWT) has been introduced 
to avoid overlapping links. In modelling the adjustment in the OP activity rate (OPR), two 
feedback process are represented as the adjustment in the OP activity rate could be driven 
by the desire to meet a waiting time goal (DesTOP) or a desired waiting list size 
(DesOPWL). The latter relates to a policy experiment. In fact, the model contains several 
variables and structures that are intended for policy experiments; these components were 
dormant when simulating the base case behaviours. The goal that drives the desired OP 
activity rate is selected via the use o f a switch (SwPADr). The formulations are as 
follows:
DesOPR = SwPADr*DesOPRWL+ (l-SwPADr)*DesOPRWT 
DesOPRWL = MAX(MIN(AvRROP+(OPWL-DesOPWL)/DesOPWLAT- 
AvPreOPWLRR,OPWL/AvWLRT+AvRROP),0)
DesOPRWT = IF(DesTOP=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((OPWL/DesTOP)-AvPreOPWLRR)
where:
AvPreOPWLRR Average pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
AvRROP Average rate o f referrals for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
AvWLRT Average waiting list removal time [mths].
DesOPWL Desired OP waiting list length [pats].
DesOPWLAT Desired OP waiting list adjustment time [mths].
DesOPR Desired OP rate [pats/mth].
DesOPRWL Desired OP rate driven by the waiting list goal [pats/mth].
DesOPRWT Desired OP rate driven by the waiting time goal [pats/mth].
DesTOP Desired waiting time for an OP appointment [mths].
OPWL OP waiting list length [pats].
SwPADr Switch for patient activity driver [-].
It was assumed that when determining the desired OP activity rate, allowances are made 
for the existence o f other waiting list removals (PreOPWLR); otherwise more activity 
than is actually required would be sought. This rate is averaged (APreOPWLR) because 
as it is instantaneous, as such, it cannot be observed. Considering the calculation for the 
activity rate desired to meet the waiting time goal (DesOPRWT), a desired waiting time 
(DesTOP) o f zero would call for an infinitely large activity rate. For the model to 
accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation to proceed (i.e. avoid a division
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by zero), an IF statement is used involving the assignment o f a very large number to the 
desired activity rate.
In seeking a waiting list goal (DesOPWL), the desired activity rate (DesOPRWL) is 
composed of: (1) the average number of patients joining the waiting list (in order to 
maintain the waiting list at its existing level); plus (2) any additional adjustment required 
to meet the desired waiting list size, and, minus (3) any other removals from the waiting 
list (otherwise, more activity may be carried out than is necessary). However, there are 
two situations which place bounds on the actual values that the desired activity can take. 
The first situation is where there are insufficient patients available to meet the calculated 
desired activity rate. In this case, the actual activity rate will be derived from the existing 
waiting list and new patients joining the waiting list. This is formulated using the M IN () 
function. The second situation is when the calculated desired activity rate works out as 
being negative. For this, the actual desired activity rate will be zero. This is represented by 
the use o f the M A X () function.
Associated with the adjustment in OP activity is a financial constraint that would suspend 
all OP activity if  it were exceeded. This constraint is located in the Costs Sector and it 
connects with the Referrals Sector via a ghosted variable, overall affordability (OA). If 
this financial constraint is exceeded, the OP capacity (CapOP) becomes zero. The OP rate 
(OPR) is calculated by multiplying the combined capacity o f doctors (CapOP) by the 
capacity utilisation fraction (UCapOP).
Utilisation of 
OP Capacity j
Desired OP Rate 
OP Capacity
Figure 9.7 Basic Form of Utilisation o f OP Capacity (UCapOP)
This function (its basic form is shown in Figure 9.7) reflects how the capacity utilisation 
increases as the demand for OP appointments (DesOPR) rises relative to the capacity 
available (CapOP), but it can never exceed 1. Furthermore, it reflects how demand can be 
accommodated when it lies sufficiently below the capacity but as the limits on supply are
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approached, it becomes more difficult to actually deliver the full capacity due to 
practicalities such as staff scheduling problems.
The same basic structure as for the OP activity is used to represent the adjustment in the 
tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate (TCCInvR, as shown in Figure 9.8).
CumCC
RRCC
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RROPWLtoCC / \ CCWLRR
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•CapTCC
DesCCWLATDesCCInvRWL
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AvRRCC
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Av 
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OPR OP rate
RR.. Referral rate
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T Time
TCC Tertiary-based elective CC
Average
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OCCWLRR
DesTCC
CCWL
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 p. Relates to the drive to meet waiting time goal
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Figure 9.8 Adjustment in Tertiary-Based CC Investigation Rate (TCCInvR)
Unlike the OP case, the structure includes the facility to reduce the waiting time and 
waiting list goals (DesTCC and DesCCWL respectively) when a district service is 
available (Figure 9.9). This would represent the desire to exploit the opportunity o f the 
capacity increases associated with the availability o f a district service. As an adjustment in 
the goal would not be instantaneous, the smoothed availability o f the district CC facility 
(SDCCFA) is considered.
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DesCCWL
DCCFA
SRDCCFA
DCCFAST
SDCCFA
DesTCC
where:
DCC District-based CC
FA Facility availability
s Smoothing
T Time
WL Waiting list
Figure 9.9 Adjustment in Waiting List and Waiting Times Goals
The formulation for the desired district-based CC investigation rate (DesDCCInvR) is 
more complicated (Figure 9.10).
CapTCC
TCCInvRNEQCC TCapAEDCC
STTCapUNEDCC
UCapTCCNEDCC,
DesCCInvR DesDCCInvR*
FEDCC PcvdTCapAEDCC1
DesNECCInvR CapSEDCC’
DCCFA
where:
DesECCInvR*
Cap Capacity
CapA Capacity availability
CapS Capacity shortfall
CCInvR CC investigation rate 
DCC District-based CC
Des Desired
E Eligible
NE Not eligible
TCC Tertiary-based CC
* Equation is provided in the text of this sub-section
Figure 9.10 Desired District-Based CC Investigation Rate (DesDCCInvR)
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A desire for district-based activity will arise from a capacity shortfall at the tertiary level 
during times that a district service is available. In general, a capacity shortfall is the 
desired activity level minus the maximum activity that it is perceived to be able to do. 
However, that is not what is being considered in the context of a shift in CC services to 
the district level. The shortfall of interest is that which is eligible to be shifted to the 
district level - only that which constitutes low risk elective cases. Furthermore, high risk 
elective cases (those not eligible to be investigated at the district level) will take 
precedence over the low risk cases in using the available capacity at the tertiary level. It 
was assumed that the delay to perceive changes in the available capacity for eligible 
patients will be shorter than usual in cases when these changes are anticipated. This 
produces the following formulation:
DesDCCInvR = CapSEDCC*DCCFA 
CapSEDCC = DesECCInvR - PcvdTCapAEDCC 
DesECCInvR = DesCCInvR*FEDCC
PcvdTCapAEDCC = SMTH1 (TCapAEDCC,STTCapUNEDCC) 
TCapAEDCC = IF (FEDCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE (CapTCC-TCCInvRNEDCC)
where:
CapSEDCC
CapTCC
DesCCInvR
DesDCCInvR
DesECCInvR
DCCFA
FEDCC
PcvdTCapAEDCC
STTCapUNEDCC
TCapAEDCC
TCCInvRNEDCC
Capacity shortfall (at tertiary level) with respect to patients who are eligible to 
undergo district-based CC investigation [pats/mth]
Capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [pats/mth]
Desired elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth]
Desired district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth]
Desired eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth]
District CC facility availability [-]
Fraction of CC investigation waiting list that are eligible for district-based 
investigation [-]
Perceived tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those 
eligible to undergo district-based CC [pats/mth]
Smoothing time of tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity use by 
patients not eligible to undergo a district-based CC [mths].
Tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to 
undergo district-based CC [pats/mth]
Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate of those not eligible to undergo 
district-based CC [pats/mth]
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CDesDCCF
where:
Cap Capacity
CapS Capacity shortfall
CCInvR CC investigation rate
CF Completed fraction
DCC(P) District CC facility (preparation)
Des Desired
E Eligible
Phi Phase 1
ST Start time
T Time
* Equation is provided in the text
o f this sub-section
PhlDCCPP
TDCCFA
CapSEDCS* 
FSuppDCC 
G
MinDCCInvR
CFPhlDCCP
69 FSuppDCC
A Des DCC F
TADesDCCF
llDCCP
PhlDCCPD
DCCFA
1DCCPP
TCapLT
STPhlDCCP
Figure 9.11 Development of District-Based CC Facility
In the model, a desire for a district CC facility (DesDCCF) is formulated as either being 
anticipated (ADesDCCF) corresponding with a planned closure o f a tertiary facility in the 
future, or current (CDesDCCF) corresponding to an existing capacity shortfall (as shown 
in Figure 9.11). After a delay to carry out the necessary arrangements such as negotiations 
with suppliers o f mobile cath labs (PhlDCCPD), a desire for a district facility initiates the 
preparation o f a phase 1 district facility, provided that the preparation for such a facility 
has not already begun. The model retains the phase 1 preparation start time 
(STPhlDCCP) and uses this time to initialise the development o f a phase 2 facility, if 
planned, after a specified delay. The model thus reflects the assumption that phases 1 and 
2 would be co-ordinated within a programme o f development. The preparation o f a phase 
2 facility, which only applies to the Veinbridge case, is implicitly represented in the Costs 
Sector. The model reflects the assumption that a district facility will be available 
(DCCFA=1) once 95% of the phase 1 preparation has been completed 
(CFPhlDCCP>=0.95) and there exists a current desire for a district CC facility 
(CDesDCCF=l) and staff are available (PCapDCC>0).
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9.3.2 Representing Stimulation and Suppression of Demand
NEfTWTCC
EffCapLCC'
RefTnewCC’
FOPtoCC>
EffWTCC
SuppEflWTCC EffSkCC
FEDOp,
iDSCC
SwR2
EffSkECC
EftSkOJCC*
AvSkJDOp
DCCInvR
The model depicts a number o f factors that determine the fraction o f patients assessed at 
an OP appointment who are then referred on for an elective CC investigation (FOPtoCC, 
as shown in Figure 9.12).
EffOFCC*
RefFOPtoCC
AvTnewCCWLe&r
SwR2
where:
DOp District-based CC operator
EDOp Expert district-based CC operator
Eff Effect
JDOp Junior district-based CC operator
K Knowledge
OF Other factors
Sk Skills
SuppEfT Suppressed effect
TR Time ratio
WT Waiting time
* Equation/function is provided in 
the text o f  this sub-section
EfTKCCTDCCS
EfiSkUJCC* SwOC
PDDCCInvR
Figure 9.12 OP to CC Referral Fraction (FOPtoCC)
Figure 9.13 shows the basic form of the base case functions for these factors. For the 
waiting time effect, a non-linear function (NEffWTCC, Figure 9.13a) of the ratio 
(TRnewCCWL) o f the average waiting time (AvTnewCCWLe&r) and a reference waiting 
time (RefTnewCCWL) quantifies the demand multiplier. The reference waiting time is 
that which would neither stimulate nor suppress demand.
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(a) Waiting Time Effect (b) Knowledge Effects
1
 ^ Waiting Time
Ratio
Pcvd District-Based 
CC Inv. Rate
(c) Underconfident Skills Effect (d) Overconfident Skills Effect
11
Avg Skills Per Junior Avg Skills Per Junior
District Operator District Operator
(e) Effect o f Sudden Capacity Loss (f) Effect o f  Other Factors
Time Time
Figure 9.13 Base Case Referral Multipliers 
(Continuous Line - Ribsley General; Dashed Line - Veinbridge General;
Values above 1 - Stimulation o f demand; Values below 1 - Suppression o f demand)
For the knowledge effect, a non-linear function (NEffKCC, Figure 9.13b) o f the perceived 
district-based CC investigation rate (PcvdDCCInvR) quantifies the demand multiplier. 
The reduced effects on demand due to the use o f new referral guidelines are modelled 
with two other non-linear functions (SuppEffWTCC and SuppEffKCC). Another function 
models an increased knowledge effect on demand which was used as part o f the 
sensitivity analysis (IncrEffKCC). It was assumed that the effects on demand will vary 
according to the duration o f the district service and the referral tradition at the host 
hospital. Therefore, further functions represent the assumed effects that would be 
generated by a permanent district service at Ribsley General (EffKCCPDCCS) and a 
temporary district service at Veinbridge General (EffKCCTDCCS). See model listings for 
further details. Switches are employed to select the relevant functions for the simulation 
runs.
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In modelling the effect of skills on demand for CC investigations (EffSkCC), three 
categories of staff were assumed to make referrals for CC investigations: expert CC 
operators; junior trainee CC operators; and, others who would be non-CC operators. The 
effect of skills on demand is a weighted average considering the skills multipliers and 
proportions of patient decisions made by these three categories of staff. The parameters 
reflect the assumption that expert operators will identify more patients in need and thus 
refer more patients than non-CC operators. Allowances are made for the case of no trainee 
CC operators. Furthermore, the inclusion of two non-linear functions of the average skills 
per junior district CC operator (AvSkJDOp) reflect different referral patterns as trainee 
operators climb up the learning curve. More specifically one involves a period of under­
confidence (EffSkUJCC, Figure 9.13c) and another also involves a period of over­
confidence (EffSkOJCC, Figure 9.13d). The former function is used to represent the 
typical referral behaviour of junior CC operators at Ribsley General and the latter is used 
to represent that at Veinbridge General. It should be noted that for the case of Veinbridge 
General, the expert CC operator makes the final decision about referrals for CC 
investigations (FEDOp=l) so this part of the model structure is inactive. However, this 
function (EffSkOJCC) is included in the model so that generalisations may be considered 
to other hospitals and service shifts. In other cases, this function might have an impact.
Also represented in the model, in addition to the waiting time (EffWTCC), skills 
(EffSkCC) and knowledge (EffKCC) effects on referrals, are an effect of significant 
capacity losses on referrals (EffCapLCC, base case function is shown in Figure 9.13e) and 
an effect of other factors (EffOFCC, Figure 9.13f). It was assumed that a significant loss 
of capacity will result in a reduction in referrals as a 'knee jerk' reaction. For the purpose 
of the policy runs, several functions are included to correspond with different 
combinations of capacity losses. An example of another factor which might influence the 
referral threshold is the introduction of a permanent district service, especially with an 
integrated cath lab. This might encourage the referral threshold to drop so that slightly 
higher risk cases (and also more 'grey area' cases) would be investigated at the district 
level. For simplicity, this effect is modelled exogenously. For the case of Ribsley 
General, given that district services were only temporary, this is set to the default value of 
1 (indicating a zero effect). In the Veinbridge General model, it is represented as a non­
linear smoothed step function where the changes correspond with the introduction of
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district services and opening of the integrated lab. This factor would be represented 
endogenously in a more sophisticated model to connect with these events.
It was assumed that these five factors act as multipliers on a reference referral fraction 
(RefFOPtoCC) which is the referral fraction that was assumed to exist during periods 
where: there was no district service; normal capacity levels existed at the tertiary level; all 
district screeners were fully skilled; and, there was neither stimulation nor suppression of 
demand due to the waiting time or knowledge effects. This would correspond with a 
situation for which GPs' and patients' knowledge of CC relied totally on that derived from 
tertiary activity and the waiting time was at a level so that it neither stimulated nor 
suppressed demand. The formulation chosen for the referral fraction (FOPtoCC) reflects 
the assumption that the 'knee jerk' reaction to the capacity losses dominates over the 
effects of waiting times, knowledge and other factors on referrals for an elective CC 
investigation. This avoids double counting, which is a quantification problem that is 
discussed by Coyle (1996). The referral rate calculation is as follows:
FOPtoCC = RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
(IF(EffCapLCC<l) THEN EffCapLCC ELSE (EffCapLCC*EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffOFCC))
where:
EffCapLCC Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for CC investigation [-]
EffKCC Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for CC investigation [-]
EffOFCC Effect of other factors on referrals for CC investigation [-]
EffSkCC Effect of CC operator skills on referrals for CC investigation [-]
EffWTCC Effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for CC investigation [-]
FOPtoCC Fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an
elective investigation [-]
RefOPtoCC Reference fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on
for an elective investigation [-]
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RefRROP
OPWL
RROP
EffKOP
where:
Eff Effect 
Knowledge 
Referral rate 
Waiting list
Function is provided in the text of this sub-section
SwR
RR..
WLIncrESfXOP
EffKQPTDGCS
SuppEflKOP
SwRl
PcvdDCCInvR
Figure 9.14 Stimulation o f Demand for an OP Appointment
To represent the stimulation of demand for OP services (Figure 9.14), a non-linear 
function (NEffKOP, also shown by Figure 9.13b) o f the perceived district-based CC rate 
(PcvdDCCInvR) quantifies the demand multiplier. The reduced effect on demand due to 
the use o f new referral guidelines is modelled with another non-linear function 
(SuppEffKOP). Further functions model the response associated with the use o f a 
permanent district service at Ribsley General (EffKOPPDCCS) and a temporary district 
service at Veinbridge General (EffKOPTDCCS). The same logic that applied to the 
magnitudes o f the knowledge effects on demand for CC investigations applies to these 
functions. Switches are employed to select the relevant function for the simulation runs.
9.3.3 Representing Waiting Times
The Waiting Times Sector (Figure 9.15) comprises waiting time calculations for OP 
appointments and CC investigations, considering both the average time spent on these 
waiting lists and average time estimated for new patients joining these waiting lists.
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DepRSumJTOPWLAccRSumJTOPWL
SumJTOP1 G ' OPWLRR
CTime OPWL
RROP
AvOPWLRR
AvTonOPWL*
AvTnewOPWL*
SumJTCCWL
DepRSumJTCCWLAccRSumJTCCW]
CCWLRR
CCWL
RRCC
CTime
AvTon*
AvCCWLRRe
AvTnewCCWLe&r AvTnewCCWLe
where:
AvCCWLRRe&r
AccR Accumulation rate
AvTnew Avg est. waiting time for new (waiting list patients)
AvTon Avg time spent on (waiting list)
DepR Departure rate
e Evaluation
e&r Evaluation and response
RR.. Referral rate
..RR Removal rate
SumJT Sum o f (waiting list) join times
WL Waiting list
* Equation/function is provided in the text o f  this sub-section
Figure 9.15 Waiting Times Sector
In modelling the average time spent on these waiting lists (AvTonOPWL and 
AvTonCCWL), co-flow (co-incident flow or rate-to-rate) formulations represent the 
accumulation and depletion o f the sum of waiting list join times which occur in parallel 
with referrals onto and removals from the waiting lists. In SD, co-flow formulations are 
employed to represent a process that runs in parallel with some primary process or to 
track an attribute associated with a flow. Allowances are made for the extreme case o f a 
waiting list being empty, in which case the average time spent on that waiting list would 
be zero.
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The model reflects how the average estimated waiting times for new patients joining the 
waiting lists (AvTnewOPWL, AvTnewCCWLe and AvTnewCCWLe&r) are calculated 
by considering the size of the waiting lists and the average waiting list removal rates at the 
time of entry onto the waiting list. The waiting list removal rates have to be averaged 
because they are instantaneous rates and as such are unobservable. Allowances are made 
for the extreme case of a zero average waiting list removal rate (all activity suspended and 
no other waiting list removals); the estimated waiting time would be infinity because, at 
that point, the removal of a new patient joining the waiting list would not be anticipated. 
A very large waiting time is thus specified to accommodate this extreme case and also 
enable the simulation to proceed (to avoid a division by zero). The model calculates two 
average estimated waiting times for new patients joining the CC investigation waiting list. 
One is used as a summary performance measure to evaluate pressure on the system 
(AvTnewCCWLe) and for this the averaging period for the waiting list removal rate was 
assumed to be one month. The second measure (AvTnewCCWLe&r) is used to model the 
evaluation of pressure on the system and response to that pressure which is used to 
calculate the waiting time effect on demand for CC investigations. For this, the waiting 
list removal rate is averaged over a longer period of 3 months.
The OP waiting time calculations are as follows (the CC investigation waiting time 
calculations have similar formulations):
AvTonOPWL = IF (OPWLoO) THEN (CTime-(SumJTOPWL/OPWL) ELSE 0 
AvTnewOPWL = IF (AvOPWLRRoO) THEN 999 ELSE (OPWL/AvOPWLRR)
where:
o  Signifies “not equal to”
AvOPWLRR Average OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
AvTnewOPWL Average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths]
AvTonOPWL Average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
Ctime Current time [mths]
OPWL OP waiting list length [pats]
SumJTOPWL Sum of join times for patients on OP waiting list [pat.mths]
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9.3.4 Representing the Gain and Loss of Skills
It is essential to model the gain and loss of CC operator skills as the level o f skill and 
confidence o f junior CC operators may influence their referral rates for an elective CC 
investigation. Obviously, this is an intangible variable but the SD methodology does 
allow efforts to be made to incorporate such variables into the analysis.
The skills effect on demand is a function of the average skills per junior operator 
(AvSkJDOp), which is calculated in the Skills Sector (Figure 9.16).
TCCInvR
' DCCInvR
JDOp
DCCFA
LFJDOp
LEJDOp’
AggJDOpSki
FTCCbyDOp AggJDOpSk
JDOpSkGR' JDOpSkLR
JDOpSkGRRec
LPP*
JDOpSkGRExp'-—%
AvSkJDi
Max Ski
AvSkNJDOp
JDOpRecR
JDOpRecD SwTOpP
where:
Agg
DCC
DepR
FTCC
GR
GRExp
GRRec
(J)DOp
LE
LF
LPP
Figure 9.16 Skills Sector
Aggregate 
District CC 
Departure rate
Fraction o f tertiary-based elective CC inv. 
Gain rate
Gain rate via experience 
Gain rate via recruitment 
(Junior) district-based CC operator 
Learning experiences 
Learning fraction 
Learning per patient
JDOpTT
LR Loss rate
NJDOp New junior district-based CC operator
RecD Recruitment delay
RecR Recruitment rate
Sk Skill
TOpP Trainee (district) operator programme
TT Training time
* Equation/function is provided in the text
o f this sub-section
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This sector uses a co-flow formulation to model the loss and gain of CC skills of the 
junior district CC operators associated with their turnover and the gain in experience of 
new trainees. New CC operator trainees periodically join the district hospital to gain skills 
and then leave at the end of their training period to be replaced by new trainee operators.
The basic structure is composed of two stocks. One represents the number of junior 
operators (JDOp). This stock is increased by the recruitment of juniors (JDOpRecR) and 
reduced by the departure of juniors (JDOpDepR). Departures follow recruitment after a 
fixed training period (JDOpTT) and recruitment delay (JDOpRecD). The second stock 
represents the aggregate junior district CC operator trainee skills (AggJDOpSk). This 
stock is increased by the gain of skills (JDOpSkGR) and reduced by the loss of skills 
(JDOpSkLR). The gain in skills is the sum of skills gained via recruitment 
(JDOpSkGRRec) and skills generated with experience (JDOpSGRExp). The former 
depends upon the average skill per new recruit (AvSkNJDOp - a value of zero reflects all 
new recruits arriving as complete novices). The latter depends upon the number of 
learning experiences to which the trainee operators are exposed (LEJDOp) and the 
learning per experience i.e learning per patient (LPP). The number of learning experiences 
depends upon the levels of district and tertiary activity of patients referred from the 
district hospital for an elective CC investigation and the degree of involvement of the 
district operators, both trainees and experts, as shown in the following formulation:
LEJDOp = (DCCInvR+TCCInvR*FTCCbyDOp)*LFJDOp 
where:
DCCInvR District-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth]
FTCCbyDOp Fraction of tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district-based 
CC operator [-]
LEJDOp Learning experiences for junior district-based CC operators [pats/mth]
LFJDOp (Patient activity) learning fraction of junior district-based CC operators [-]
TCCInvR Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth]
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The fraction of tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district-based CC
operator (FTCCbyDOp) depends upon several factors (see Figure 9.17).
Elective CC Investigations on 
Patients from a Given District Hospital
Eligible to be 
Carried Out at 
District Level
Not Eligible to 
be Carried Out at 
District Level
Low Risk 
(90%)
High Risk, 
( 10%)
Without a District Service In Place:
Investigated at 
Tertiary Level
Investigated at 
Tertiary Level
95% Carried Out by 
District Cardiologists
With a District Service In Place:
Investigated at 
District Level
Investigated at 
Tertiary Level
100% Carried Out by 
District Cardiologists
0% Carried Out by District Cardiologists (If They Only Do Investigations) 
95% Carried Out by District Cardiologists (If They Also Do Treatments)
Figure 9.17 District Operator Fractions o f Elective CC Investigations
The fraction will be lower if  a district service is in place, as district-based cardiologists 
would not wish to spend time travelling to the tertiary centre unnecessarily. Furthermore, 
with a district service in place, a district-based cardiologist who only does interventional 
procedures may decide to abdicate responsibility for investigating high risk cases to 
tertiary-based cardiologists as these cases might be more likely to require synchronous 
investigation and treatment. A further factor to consider is allowances for absences due to 
sickness and holidays. It was estimated that overall 5% of the workload would be
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reallocated to tertiary-based CC operators due to these absences. Therefore the following 
formulation was used:
f  IF (DCCFAOO) THEN 0 ELSE 0.95 (Ribsley General)
FTCCbyDOp =  <
V IF (DCCFAOO) THEN 0. 95 ELSE 0.95 (Veinbridge General)
where:
DCCFA District CC facility availability [-]
FTCCbyDOp Fraction o f  tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district- 
based CC operator [-]
The learning fraction o f junior district-based CC operators (LFJDOp), specified by an 
expert estimate, reflects their degree of exposure to cases directly by actually carrying out 
CC investigations or indirectly by attending case review meetings and informal 
discussions about patients.
The learning per patient (LPP) is specified in the model by a non-linear function of the 
average skills per junior district-based CC operator (AvSkJDOp) as a proportion of the 
maximum skills per CC operator (MaxSkOp). This function is shown in Figure 9.18.
Learning 
Per Patient
0.5
Avg Skills Per Junior District CC Operator
Max Skills Per Junior District CC Operator 
Figure 9.18 Basic Form o f Learning Per Patient (LPP)
This function was constructed from estimates, provided by the consultant cardiologist, 
about the typical trainee CC operator’s learning curve. Zero skill units was set to represent 
a complete novice CC operator and 100 skill units was set to represent a fully skilled CC 
operator. Within these two limits, expert estimates provided the number o f skill units that 
they would expert junior trainee operators to accumulate after being involved in n patients 
where n ranged from 0 to 100 (Table 9.1).
202
Table 9.1 Estimated Gain in CC Operator Skills
Total Procedures Skill Gained
0 0
10 20
30 60
50 80
70 90
100 100
The expert estimates indicated that trainee operators first acquire skills at a fixed rate and 
then the rate of gain of skill tapers off as they become more expert. This occurs because 
gaining further skill would then require the junior operator to encounter more complex 
cases which would not arise as often as the more routine cases which led to their initial 
gain in skill. A continuous approximation of the rate of learning per patient was derived 
from this table and the input to this function was standardised by dividing the average 
skill per junior operator by the maximum skill per operator.
9.3.5 Representing Costs
Within the Costs Sector (Figure 9.19), four stocks are specified to track the cumulative 
district facility running costs (CumDCCRC), district site and facility preparation costs 
(CumDCCPC), OP activity costs (CumOPAC), and elective CC investigation costs 
(CumCCAC). These four costs are also aggregated to calculate the cumulative overall 
costs (CumC). A fifth stock will be discussed later.
Starting at the top of the sector with the cumulative district CC service running costs 
(CumDCCRC), the running cost rate (DCCRCR) involves a very simple formulation. 
Running costs of a specified amount each month (MDCCRCR) are associated with the 
monthly district CC investigation rate (DCCR).
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where: PhlDCCPC
AC Activity costs
AL Affordability limit
AvC Average cost
CCCR CC procedures cost rate
CR Cost rate
Cum Cumulative
DCC District CC facility
FSupp Financial support
M Monthly
OA Overall affordability
OP Outpatients
PC Preparation costs
PD Preparation delay
PR Preparation rate
Phi Phase 1
Ph2 Phase 2
PP Preparation period
RC Running costs
ST Starting time
TDCCSFA Time district CC service 
first affordable
AvCTCCT/
DR AvTFurthC
AvCTCCx
TCCInvR
CCCRATL
AvCDCCr>o
\[g  ; DCCInvR
CumCCACATL
Figure 9.19 Costs Sector
Moving down the sector to the cumulative district site and facility preparation costs 
(CumDCCPC), the district site and facility preparation cost rate (DCCPCR) is the sum of 
the monthly costs o f phase 1 preparation (PhlDCCPMCR) and phase 2 preparation 
(PH2DCCPMCR), if  relevant. Once phase 1 preparation has commenced (modelled in the 
Delivery Sector and connects with the Costs Sector via the phase 1 preparation rate, 
PhlDCCPR), the total phase 1 preparation costs (PhlDCCPC) are spread evenly over a 
specified preparation period (PhlDCCPT). Provided there is financial support for a phase
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2 service (FSuppPh2=l), phase 2 preparation takes place commencing at a specified time 
after the preparation of phase 1 (Ph2DCCPD). The total phase 2 preparation costs 
(Ph2DCCPC) are spread evenly over a specified preparation period (Ph2DCCPT). 
Obviously, financial support is also necessary for a phase 1 district service 
(FSuppDCC=l). This link is also specified in the Delivery Sector and connects with the 
Costs sector via the phase 1 preparation rate (PhlDCCPR).
Moving on to the cumulative patient activity costs (CumOPAC and CumCCAC), the OP 
cost rate (OPCR) is calculated as the OP activity rate (OPAC) multiplied by the average 
cost of an OP appointment (AvCOP). In formulating the elective CC activity cost rate 
(CCCR), allowances are made for patients who are investigated at the district level and 
are found to require treatment and therefore need to undergo a further CC procedure. The 
cost and timing of the second procedure (AvCFCC) will differ from that of a district- 
based investigation (AvCDCC). The cost of the second procedure is discounted using an 
illustrative discount rate (DR). Allowances are also made for the opportunity for patients 
investigated at the tertiary level to undergo synchronous investigation and treatment. The 
cost of a synchronous procedure (AvCTCCT) was assumed to equal the cost of a 
treatment procedure, which would be more expensive than a tertiary-based investigation 
only (AvCTCCI).
A fifth stock facilitates a cost comparison between the presence and absence of a district 
service under ideal conditions. This is achieved by considering the cumulative CC costs 
(CumCCACATL) if all the elective CC activity were carried out at the tertiary level 
(CCCRATL), assuming it were possible to provide the same levels of capacity.
The Costs Sector also calculates two key financial variables that determine whether or not 
patient activity and district services are deemed affordable and are thus permitted to take 
place. The first, an overall affordability factor (OA) situated at the top of the sector, 
relates to the total cumulative costs (CumC). Provided these costs remain within a 
specified limit (CumCAL), activity will be permitted to continue. Links representing this 
financial constraint on activity appear in the Referral Sector and Delivery Sector. This 
financial constraint also links with the second key financial variable which is the financial 
support for the district service (FSuppDCC). Support is only given on certain conditions. 
The total phase 1 preparation costs, monthly running costs and cumulative running costs
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have to lie within their respective affordability limits (PhlDCCPCAL, MDCCRCRAL 
and CumDCCRCAL respectively) and the cost of a district-based CC investigation 
(AvCDCC) must not exceed that of a tertiary-based investigation (AvCTCCI).
9.3.6 Sources and Use o f Knowledge Underlying Model Structure and Parameters
The structure of the conceptual model (reproduced in D1 in Appendix D) reflected the 
collaborators’ composite mental map of the basic mechanisms underlying changes in 
demand in response to the shift in CC services. As I stated in Chapter 5, interviewing GPs 
was not possible due to the time constraints for the research. Therefore, this model 
included some assumptions that were made by the collaborators about GP referral 
behaviour. The structure that reflected activity rates being driven by waiting list goals 
(reproduced in D3 in Appendix D) represented a policy experiment.
In translating these structures into the more rigorous stock and flow terms, various links 
were disaggregated and further structure was added. The new structure arose from: the 
collaborators’ descriptions of how the system worked; assumptions about the appropriate 
representation of certain policy changes; and, the application of some basic common 
sense. For example, in constructing the basic patient flows, it was clear that deaths on the 
waiting lists and other waiting list removals had to be accounted for. Furthermore, the 
different sources of referrals for a CC investigation had to be made explicit, considering 
both the inpatient and outpatient routes. The development of the district facility, its 
inherent delays and associated costs also had to be explicitly represented in the model 
structure.
For the policy analysis, often the same sets of parameter changes were made repeatedly, 
as the model underwent revisions and different policies were combined. Rather than 
repeatedly changing the parameters of certain variables (typically non-linear functions), 
different functions were added to the model accompanied by switches so that the 
appropriate functions could be selected for each simulation run. This involved the 
functions that specified the CC capacities, the effects of sudden capacity losses on 
referrals (the number and timings of the sudden capacity losses varied), and the 
knowledge effects on demand.
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The justification underlying the model parameters varied. Various parameters arose from 
numerical data provided by the collaborative centres. This included all the affordability 
limits (except those where a very large number was specified to indicate no effective 
limit), CC capacities, CC operator staffing levels, the average procedural costs and, for 
the Ribsley General case, the initial value of the average time spent on the CC 
investigation waiting list.
Other parameters were based upon expert estimates. They included the various response 
times, the reference OP to CC referral fraction for the Ribsley General case, junior CC 
operator training period and recruitment delays, district facility preparation times, the 
non-linear functions for the waiting time and knowledge effects on demand and the 
passage up the CC operator learning curve (from which the function ‘Learning Per 
Patient’ was derived), and the initial CC investigation waiting list length for the Ribsley 
General case.
In several cases where numerical data did not exist, parameter values were derived from 
simple calculations. This involved working backwards along the referral chain from the 
actual activity rates and following descriptions that parts of the system was in equilibrium 
and the desired waiting time goals were maintained. This referred to the reference OP rate 
and initial length of the OP waiting list for the Ribsley General case. The calibration of 
several parameters for the Veinbridge General case resulted from the descriptions of 
equilibrium and the assumption that the cardiologists there referred 50% more patients 
than those at Ribsley General for an elective CC investigation. The latter assumption was 
made because the expert estimate proved to be unreliable. This assumption reflected the 
fact that cardiologists at Veinbridge General referred more ‘aggressively’ and it produced 
a calculated OP rate of similar magnitude to that of the Ribsley General case (the OP rate 
could not be verified but served for the purpose of the model). These parameters included 
the initial length of the OP waiting list, the OP capacity level, the reference OP to CC 
referral fraction and reference OP referral rate. Note that the data shown in Figure 7.9 
could not be used to specify the final variable, as the data was incomplete by only 
referring to new OP referrals.
A number of parameter values were derived from simulation runs. For example, the 
model was run for an initialization period to produce the starting values of the sum of the
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waiting list join times (to set the starting values of the average time spent on the waiting 
lists) and the initial value of the current simulation time (which included the initialization 
period). Further examples involved the use of sensitivity analysis and partial model 
testing. The former was used to derive the appropriate magnitude of the effect of ‘other’ 
factors on demand to produce the reported capacity utilisation rates for the Veinbridge 
General case. The latter involved the magnitude of the effect of significant capacity losses 
on demand for the Ribsley General case.
The policy variables reflected the possible effects of various policy changes (reflecting 
interventions that could have been made) and their specified values were for illustrative 
purposes only. This included alternative functions for the waiting time, knowledge, effect 
of sudden capacity losses and ‘other’ effects on demand, OP and CC capacities and the 
affordability limits of various costs relating to the district service.
The limitations that the model assumptions imposed on the study are discussed in §12.2.3. 
Further details about the justification underlying the model structure and its parameters 
may be found in the model documentation.
9.4 TESTING THE MODEL
It is essential that the model is rigorously tested in order to gain confidence in the insights 
and recommendations that emerge from its use. Sensitivity analysis and partial-model 
testing play important roles in testing SD models in addition to a series of formal tests. 
These tests provide an indication of the appropriate time to stop refining the model. The 
formal process of model testing is often referred to as model validation. Validation, in the 
sense of confirmation, can never be absolute (Popper, 1959); a model cannot be proved to 
be right, it can only fail to be proved to be wrong. In simulation modelling, a pragmatic 
approach is adopted to establish confidence in whether the model is sufficiently accurate 
for its intended purpose (Forrester 1961; Richardson and Pugh 1981; Neelamkavil 1987; 
Pidd 1998; Coyle and Exelby 2000).
As stated in §4.2.2. and §5.4.2, the process of building confidence in a model is an on­
going, iterative process that is embedded in the SD approach. It does not rely upon a 
single test or performance measure. Confidence in the model develops as the number of
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tests it withstands increases. Furthermore, the model has to be acceptable to both the 
modeller and the target audience (Forrester and Senge 1980; Richardson and Pugh 1981; 
Barlas 1996). The model was constructed and tested with synthetic parameters initially in 
order to provide some illustrative model output to present to the collaborators. This was 
deemed very useful as they had not been exposed to SD modelling before. This also 
facilitated the discussion of the face validity of the model structure and the process of 
calibrating the model.
There are a number of established tests for SD models and these can be classified in 
several different ways. Forrester and Senge (1980) differentiated between tests of the 
model structure, those that focus on the simulated behaviour, and those that consider the 
policy implications that emerge from the use of the model. In making clear connections 
with the importance of the model purpose in the process of validation, Richardson and 
Pugh (1981) subdivided both the model structure and behaviour tests into two groups. 
The first group are those that consider the model’s suitability for its purpose. The second 
group are those that evaluate the model’s consistency with reality by comparing the 
model’s structure and behaviour with the available information about the real system. 
Richardson and Pugh also argued that beyond suitability and consistency are two other 
important issues. These are the effectiveness of the model in achieving the purpose of the 
study and the utility (usefulness) of the model and the outputs of the modelling process. 
This overlaps to some extent with Forrester and Senge’s tests of the policy implications.
Another classification of SD model tests was presented by Barlas (1996). He referred to 
model structure tests as direct structure tests. He also subdivided behaviour tests into 
structure-oriented behaviour tests and behaviour pattern tests. The former set evaluates 
the model structure indirectly by applying particular behaviour tests on the simulated 
behaviour patterns. The latter consider the ability of the model to reproduce the reference 
modes. The various model tests follow a logical sequence. Direct structure tests precede 
structure-oriented behaviour tests and these are followed by behaviour pattern tests.
SD has been criticised for the absence of statistical significance testing in model 
validation. These tests assume the availability of past time series for all input variables 
which is rare in SD. Furthermore, system dynamicists argue that the use of statistical
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significance testing in SD model validation is inappropriate for various philosophical and 
technical reasons. For further discussions on this topic, see Barlas (1996).
Time and cost constraints may prevent all the available tests being carried out. However, 
there exists a core (or minimum) set as highlighted by Forrester and Senge (1980). Table
9.2 lists the tests that were applied during the course of the model development. These 
included all the core tests. The tests are arranged within the Richardson and Pugh (1981) 
framework.
Table 9.2 Tests Applied to Build Confidence in System Dynamics Model
Model Structure Model Behaviour
Suitability for 
Model Purpose
Dimensional consistency test* 
Extreme conditions in equations test* 
Boundary adequacy for structure test*
Structural (in)sensitivity test* 
Parameter (in)sensitivity test*
Consistency 
With Reality
Face validity of structure test* 
Parameter verification test*
Replication of reference modes test* 
Surprise behaviour test*
Extreme conditions test (including 
conservation of mass)
Utility and 
Effectiveness
Appropriateness for audience test Generation of insights test* 
Counter-intuitive behaviour test 
Family-member test
(Sources: Forrester and Senge 1980; Richardson and Pugh 1981; Coyle 1996. *Core tests)
The tests are briefly described in the following two sub-sections. For further details, see 
Forrester and Senge (1980), Richardson and Pugh (1981) and Coyle (1996).
9.4.1 Tests o f  Model Structure
To evaluate the suitability of the model structure, the model was required to pass three 
core tests. The first test considered the dimensional consistency of the model equations. 
The dimensions on both sides of all the model equations should balance. Furthermore, all 
parameters should have meaningful interpretations in the real world; ‘fiddle factors’, 
designed to make equations balance, should not be employed. In this way, the 
dimensional consistency test is carried out in conjunction with another test, the parameter 
verification test.
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The second test on the suitability of the model structure ensured that the equations made 
sense when subjected to extreme conditions even if they seemed unlikely. This test can 
highlight the need to include non-linear functions in order to incorporate saturation effects 
into the model. For example, the non-linear formulation of the learning per patient 
function (LPP) saturated the gain in junior district CC operator skills as the average skills 
per operator (AvSkJDOp) approached and reached the maximum level of skills 
(MaxSkOp).
For the third test of suitability of model structure, the model boundary was checked to 
ensure that it contained all the necessary variables and feedback structure to address the 
purpose of the study. In addition to the variables that formed the feedback structure, the 
boundary was required to include many additional variables such as those for testing the 
model and evaluating the policy experiments.
Two further core structural tests evaluated the model’s consistency with reality. With 
these tests verification was sought into both the model’s basic structure and its parameter 
values. Both need to be recognisable to those who are familiar with the real world system. 
As described in §8.3.2, some face validity issues were addressed in the development of 
the conceptual model which formed the basis of early versions of the simulation model. In 
verifying the model structure it is also essential that resource flows obey physical laws 
such as the conservation of mass; matter should neither be created (‘free lunches’) nor 
destroyed (leakages). For example, patients who, waiting for an OP appointment, 
deteriorated and were referred on for an elective CC investigation following a hospital 
admission (RROPWLtoIPtoCC) would not be accounted for in new elective CC 
investigation referrals from inpatients (NRRIPtoCC). Therefore the omission of the 
former would constitute a leakage from the flow of patients to the OP waiting list (RROP) 
and then from the OP waiting list to elective CC investigations (RROPWLtoCC). 
Parameter values must not be contrived but conceptually sound. Furthermore, their 
numerical values should be derived from reliable information sources. If hard data is not 
available, expert estimates are required.
Finally, to contribute to the model structure’s utility and effectiveness, it was important to 
ensure that the level of detail of the model was appropriate for the target audience. This 
concerned issues of the model’s size, its degree of complexity and level of aggregation.
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Careful balances had to be maintained in deciding upon the appropriate level of model 
detail. A high level of model detail might impress some audiences. However, excessive 
model detail may inhibit the ability of both the target audience and modeller to understand 
the model and its analyses. For example, explicitly representing the delivery of emergency 
CC investigations and differentiating between priorities of elective cases would clutter the 
model with unnecessary detail.
9.4.2 Tests o f  Model Behaviour
It is recommended that before testing the simulated (model) behaviour, a clear set of a 
priori expectations should be established. This will provide a suitable basis upon which to 
address any unanticipated behaviour. All instances of unanticipated behaviour should be 
questioned and resolved. Furthermore, hypotheses about their causes should be 
thoroughly tested. It is important to note that unanticipated model behaviour may not 
necessarily indicate a failure of the model. Instead, it may suggest the discovery of a 
useful policy insight (Mass 1991).
In considering the suitability of the simulated behaviour for the model purpose, the 
sensitivity of the model’s structure and parameters to reasonable changes was tested. For 
these two core tests, it was considered whether reasonable changes in parameter values or 
alternative model formulations altered the modes of behaviour and, more critically, 
altered the policy conclusions. Parameter sensitivity may be overcome by justifying the 
use of an exact parameter value, although parameter insensitivity is more desirable. 
However, a model that displays policy sensitivity is deemed unsuitable for policy analysis.
The consistency of the simulated behaviour with reality was tested with three tests, two of 
which were core tests. For one test, it was necessary to demonstrate the ability of the 
model to replicate the historical reference modes. This represented a core test. For both 
the Ribsley General and Veinbridge General cases, there was a good qualitative fit 
between the simulated problem behaviour and historical reference modes.
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Figure 9.20 Historical Fit for Ribsley General: CC Variables
(Thick lines indicate real data which have been smoothed with a 2 point-centred 
moving average and thin lines indicate simulated data)
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The historical reference modes for the Ribsley General case were introduced in §8.2.2. 
The historical fit is shown in Figure 9.20 and Table 9.3 provides several summary 
measures described by Sterman (1984).
Table 9.3 Statistics of the Historical Fit for Ribsley General
Variable MAPE Bias Unequal
Variation
Unequal
Covariation
R2 N
Figure 9.20(a) 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.94 0.24 35
Figure 9.20(b) 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.87 0.80 35
Figure 9.20(c) 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.80 0.96 35
Figure 9.20(d) 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.91 35
Figure 9.20(e) 0.18 0.60 0.09 0.31 0.88 35
Figure 9.20(f) 0.26 0.34 0.01 0.65 0.48 35
Figure 9.20(g) 0.13 0.68 0.01 0.31 0.93 35
(May 1995 to March 1998. Bias, unequal variation and unequal covariation refer to Theil’s statistics.
The failure to sum to unity is due to rounding errors.)
As stated in §7.3, the real data for Ribsley General excludes the patients who, over the 
three year period, had incomplete data. This involved 60 patients including 52 patients 
who did not undergo their CC investigation but left the waiting list for another reason i.e. 
other waiting list removals. By contrast, the simulated data includes other waiting list 
removals. Therefore, the historical fit graphs are not strictly comparing like with like. It 
would be inappropriate to define simulated variables with these other waiting list 
removals deducted for the analysis of the historical fit, as this would produce 
inconsistencies between the underlying dynamics of the real and simulated data. In other 
words, what happens tomorrow and on subsequent days is a consequence of what 
happened today so if the events of today are changed (i.e. changes to the starting values 
and so on) then this will also alter the events of tomorrow and thereafter.
Recall that the emphasis in SD is on reproducing data patterns, not individual data points. 
The former concerns the underlying trends, periods, frequencies, phase lags, amplitudes 
and so on, whilst the latter concerns isolated events. Given the purpose of the model, it 
was considered that it replicated the historical CC behaviour modes well.
Referring to Table 9.3, the bias (overestimates) in the average time spent on the CC 
investigation waiting list (AvTonCCWL, see Figure 9.20(e)) is due to two factors. The
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first factor is the early underestimation of the referral rate (RRCC, Figure 9.20(a)). Fewer 
patients are considered to contribute an individual waiting time of zero (as they have just 
joined the waiting list) so higher average waiting times result. The second factor is the 
underestimates of the tertiary-based CC investigation rate (TCCInvR, Figure 9.20(d)). 
Estimating fewer waiting list removals produces higher waiting times. The bias 
(underestimates) in the CC investigation waiting list (CCWL, Figure 9.20(g)) is due to the 
net effect of these two factors where the former dominates over the latter.
The estimates of the tertiary-based CC investigation rate (TCCInvR) result from the 
estimates of the tertiary capacity. As stated in the model documentation, the tertiary 
capacity (see PCapTCCB) is based upon an approximation of the historical activity data 
and the reports that the system operated at full capacity. The historical data were 
smoothed and then divided between five different situations and, for each situation, 
averages were taken to derive five different capacity levels. Corresponding to increasing 
levels of capacity, these situations were: (1) with a major reduction in capacity e.g. during 
a major closure of tertiary facilities, (2) with a moderate reduction in capacity e.g. during 
a moderate closure of tertiary facilities, (3) during the first month of a major closure of 
tertiary facilities, (4) normal capacity levels (5) elevated capacity levels. For the early 
period, the model reflects the reports of normal capacity levels (situation 4) followed by 
elevated capacity levels (situation 5) which were achieved using Waiting List Initiative 
funding. It is possible that a closer fit could have been achieved if more numerical data 
had been available for reported situations where ‘normal capacity’ levels applied.
Figure 9.17 demonstrates that there was also a good fit between the simulated and 
hypothetical behaviour for the OP variables. It would not be appropriate to summarise the 
degree of fit with the summary measures that were used above, given that the historical 
reference modes were constructed with hypothetical data. Both the simulated average time 
spent on the OP waiting list and waiting list length exhibit small, temporary increases. As 
stated in §8.2.2, this behaviour is not inconsistent with the description that there were no 
OP capacity shortages. The actual sizes of the simulated increases in the OP waiting list 
and average waiting time arose from the model assumptions about changes in GP referral 
patterns in response to the introduction of district services (knowledge effects on 
demand). These assumptions reflected the description that the knowledge effect on 
demand was marginal.
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Figure 9.21 Historical Fit for Ribsley General: OP Variables
Historical Fit fo r the Case o f Veinbridge General
The historical reference modes for the Veinbridge General case were introduced in §8.2.3. 
Recall that these were generated using hypothetical data as real data was not available. As 
shown in Figure 9.22, there was a good qualitative fit with the simulated behaviour.
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Figure 9.22 Historical Fit for Veinbridge General
In Figures 9.20-9.22, the simulated output is reported at monthly intervals to be consistent 
with the frequency o f the real data. However, it should be noted that SD estimates real 
world phenomena approximately continuously (in this case, calculating at small intervals 
o f DT=0.125 months) and not at discrete intervals. Therefore, reporting simulated data at 
discrete monthly intervals can obscure the simulated effects o f delays in the system. For 
example, for the Veinbridge General case, the simulation output exhibits a brief delay in 
shifting the workload to the district level due to the perception delay in responding to the 
shortfall in capacity following the closure of the tertiary catheter laboratory.
Other Tests o f Model Behaviour
Another core test targeted unexpected model behaviour. On occasion, during the course of 
the simulations, the model exhibited unexpected behaviour. The underlying mechanisms
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were closely considered to establish whether this indicated the presence of flaws in the 
model, or whether the mechanisms were consistent with the real system and therefore, 
correct. For instance, if a limited overall budget were imposed, so small that it was 
consumed before the district site had been completed, in the real world district site 
preparation would cease. Even if funds had been set aside to prepare a site, there would be 
no funding to use it so the preparation costs would be a waste of money. However, the 
simulated site preparation did not cease under these circumstances thus indicating the 
need for the creation of links between the district site preparation rate (DCCPR) and the 
overall affordability (OA).
To conduct the third test of the consistency of the simulated behaviour, the model was 
subjected to extreme conditions and extreme policies. Policy statements are expressed 
within the rate equations. The model was required to behave reasonably under such 
changes i.e. as the real system would be expected to behave under these circumstances, 
even those which have not been observed in the real system. As part of this test a mass- 
balance (conservation of matter) test was carried out by simulation, as opposed to by 
direct inspection which had formed part of a previous test (face validity of model 
structure). The unintentional creation of mass can result in negative stocks. Mass balance 
tests are particularly indicated in cases where flows bifurcate and merge such as the 
patient flows in this model. However, negative stocks can also occur in single source-sink 
flows. Therefore, mass balance tests were applied to both the patient flows (involving a 
bifurcation and a merger) and the flow of junior district CC operator skills (a single 
source-sink). The tests involved setting an extreme condition, formed by a single large 
PULSE, as the main input to the flows whilst setting the other inputs to zero. All relevant 
stocks were plotted to ensure that they remained non-negative. To also check that matter 
had not been destroyed calculations were carried out to the patient and skills flows which 
are in general terms:
CHECKSUM l t = LSTOCKo + EINFLOWS DURING t - ^OUTFLOWS DURING t - ESTOCK, 
CHECKSUMS = ESTOCKo + EINFLOWS DURING t - EOUTFLOWS DURING t - EMAX(STOCKt, 0)
In many circumstances, if these functions remain zero at all times (making allowances for 
the floating point accuracy of the simulation calculations) this will indicate that the flows 
have been conserved. Dangerfield and Fang (2002) discuss some situations where this 
will not happen, none of which applied to this model. CHECKSUM2 (by including the
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MAX function) is the more robust as a negative value of a stock could produce cancelling 
out and calculate CHECKSUM 1 as zero thus erroneously suggesting that matter had been 
conserved.
For example:
STOCKo = 10
EINFLOWS DURING T = 20
EOUTFLOWS DURING T = 40 (i.e. matter has been created)
STOCKt = STOCKo+EINFLOWS DURING T-EOUTFLOWS DURING T = 10+20-40 = -10 
CHECKSUM1t = 10+20-40-(-10) = 0 (i.e. suggests that matter has been conserved)
CHECKSUM2t = 10+20+40-0 = -10 (i.e. highlights that matter has not been conserved)
Three tests evaluated the utility and effectiveness of the model. The first test considered 
the ability of the model and modelling process to generate useful policy insights. This is a 
core test because the inability of a model to generate compelling evidence to support 
policy makers would render it useless. The degree of utility of the policy insights is 
discussed in Chapter 12.
The second test focused on counter-intuitive behaviour exhibited by the model. Counter­
intuitive behaviour is that which, without the aid of the model, is considered to contradict 
intuition but, with the aid of the model, is regarded as having clear implications for the 
real system. Using the model it was possible to understand fully the basic mechanisms 
responsible for some counterintuitive behaviour patterns experienced by the CC waiting 
list. For example, the waiting list ‘bouncing back’ i.e. reducing and then lengthening 
again after an increase in CC capacity.
The final test in this category was the family member test. This involved the ability of the 
model to represent a general theory of a family (or class) of problems. Key questions were 
how the shift in CC services differed from other family members (shifts in other services), 
and how the model would exhibit the characteristic behaviour of each family member 
when policies were altered in accordance with their known decision making rules. The 
results of this test are also discussed in Chapter 12.
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9.5 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the simulation model and outline the 
procedures by which confidence was gained in this model. After providing a brief 
overview, the model was discussed in further detail. The model comprised structure 
representing the referrals and delivery of OP appointments and elective CC investigations, 
the associated waiting times, costs and financial constraints. The key equations were 
explained and these were accompanied by the relevent stock and flow sub-structures. The 
rationale underlying the model structure and parameters was given before describing the 
series of well-established SD tests that were applied. These assessed both the model’s 
structure and its behaviour.
The next two chapters demonstrate how the simulation model formed an experimental 
tool with which insight was provided into: (a) understanding the base case behaviours for 
the two case studies and (b) designing ways in which the behaviour of the system could 
have been improved.
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CHAPTER 10
BASE CASE ANALYSES
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 9 introduced the simulation model and described the process by which 
confidence in this model was gained. The purpose of this chapter is to present the base 
case analyses which were generated by the use of the model. Note that for both case 
studies, the problem behaviour is referred to as the base case behaviour. The base case 
analysis for the case of Ribsley General is described first. Using the simulation model, the 
time scale for the problem reference modes was extended (§10.2). Several assumptions 
underlying this simulation run are highlighted (§10.2.1). The insights into the base case 
behaviour that were generated by the model are described (§10.2.2) with references made 
to the underlying causal structure (§10.2.3). This chapter also explains how the 
understanding of the causes of the base case behaviour was tested and explored further via 
sensitivity analysis (§10.2.4). In the next section (§10.3), the Veinbridge General base 
case analysis is presented. The chapter is summarised in the final section (§10.4).
The causal structure, which was first presented in Chapter 8, is reproduced in Appendix D 
(see D l) and is accompanied by a diagram which depicts the potential interactions 
between the different feedback loops (see D2). The difference between potential and 
actual interactions between two loops is that the latter rely upon both loops being active at 
the same time. As described in Chapter 5, the results of the experiments were evaluated 
on the basis of changes to the waiting list lengths, average waiting times, resource use and 
referral rates. The indices proposed in §5.4.3 were used to summarise, for a given time 
period, the instances when pressure was imposed by excessive waiting lists and waiting 
times. A selection of graphs and performance measures are presented. Further results and 
other details including the changes that were made to carry out the experiments may be 
found in Appendix E.
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Note that demand increases are often referred to as raising pressure on the system. This 
description may be considered to have negative connotations. However, cardiologists 
often welcome increased referrals for their services as this may lead to the identification 
of further patients at high risk from cardiac events. As discussed previously, some patients 
with significant CHD do not display major symptoms. Therefore, it is important to ensure 
that they are brought into the health care system. The intention for this research was to 
contribute to the debate and not impose value judgements.
10.2 RIBSLEY GENERAL ANALYSIS
10.2.1 Simulating the Base Case Behaviour 
(Exp R0)
In §8.2.2, the historical reference modes for the Ribsley General case were presented and 
in §9.4.2, it was demonstrated that the simulation model replicated these reference modes 
well. These reference modes were constructed using the available numerical data, and 
related to the period April 1995 to April 1998. As district services were introduced to 
Ribsley General in June 1996, these data only reflected the effects of district services over 
23 months beyond its introduction. In order to consider the effects of policy changes over 
a longer time scale, the model was used to extrapolate over 17 months beyond April 1998 
to the end of September 1999. The model thus produced base case behaviour over a 
period of AVi years (54 months) from April 1995 to September 1999 inclusive. The 
extrapolations were based upon three assumptions.
The first assumption was that no further district services were provided to Ribsley 
General between its withdrawal at the end of May 1998 (t=37 where t indicates the 
simulation time) and October 1999 (t=54). The second assumption was that following 
May 1998, tertiary capacity levels for elective CC investigations for Ribsley General 
patients returned to levels which were consistent with previous periods where there were 
no facility closures and tertiary capacity levels were normal. “Normal” means that no 
additional funding, such as Waiting List Initiative funding, was available. Whilst it was 
not possible to collect further numerical data, contact with the Ribsley General consultant 
cardiologist continued until August 1999, so it was possible to collect further mental data.
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By that time no further use o f the district service had been reported and none was planned 
in the immediate future. The same applied to tertiary-based capacity increases. The final 
assumption related to all the new junior CC operators who were recruited to Ribsley 
General after May 1998. It was assumed that they continued the established conservative 
referral tradition at Ribsley General. More specifically, they displayed under-confidence 
in their referral behaviour initially, and gradually increased their referral rate as they 
gained experience and confidence as CC operators. There was no reason to believe that 
the referral tradition at Ribsley General would have changed.
Given the persistent capacity shortages at Ribsley General, it was expected that temporary 
improvements in capacity would occur at some time in the future. However, information 
about their timing and extent was not available. Therefore, in generating base case 
behaviour for Ribsley General, it was deemed inappropriate to extrapolate too far into the 
future. This was in contrast with the case o f Veinbridge General, where there was more 
certainty about the future use o f CC services (see §10.3.1).
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Figure 10.1 Ribsley General Base Case Behaviour 
(Month 0 is April 1995 and Month 54 is October 1999. Figures are based upon simulated data that are 
reported at intervals o f  DT i.e. 0.125 months, unlike those in Chapter 9 that presented monthly data.)
Figure 10.1 shows the base case behaviour for the OP and CC investigation waiting lists, 
average waiting times, referral rates and waiting list removal rates. Following these
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assumptions, the number of waiting list joiners consistently exceeded the number of 
waiting list removals so the length of the waiting list and the average time spent on the 
waiting list rose. This was consistent with the behaviour that followed after the district 
service was withdrawn the first time at the end of March 1997 (t=23). It will be noted that 
the OP waiting list removal rate is very high relative to the referral rate for a CC 
investigation as only a small fraction are referred on for further investigation.
10.2.2 Basic Causes o f  the Base Case Behaviour 
(Exps R1-R6)
April 1995 to end o f April 1996 (t=0 to t=13): No district service
Between April 1995 and October 1995 (t=0 to t=6) the simulation indicated that the CC 
investigation waiting list rose from 88 patients to 114 patients (30% increase) and the 
average time spent on the waiting list rose from 2.4 months to just over 4.5 months (88% 
increase). These changes, which imposed significant pressure on the system, resulted from 
insufficient capacity. As the average waiting time was so high, demand was suppressed to 
the maximum extent, i.e. to saturation point. The tertiary level operated at full capacity 
delivering elective CC investigations because the average waiting time list far exceeded 
its desired level of 3 months. Due to financial constraints, the patients at Ribsley General 
had to rely solely on the tertiary level for the delivery of CC investigations.
Between October 1995 and April 1996 (t=6 to t=12), there was a considerable increase in 
the elective CC capacity at the tertiary level (approximately 84% on average), which was 
achieved by an injection of further funding. This capacity increase was a key factor that 
drove the observed decline in the CC investigation waiting list and average waiting time 
for new patients joining the waiting list. Because the latter, although falling, remained 
high, the waiting time effect facilitated the decline by continuing to suppress demand. As 
the average time spent on the waiting list is averaged over all the patients on the waiting 
list, it responded more slowly to the changes in the rate of waiting list removals. 
Therefore, a further period of increase was observed before its decline. The elective CC 
investigation service at the tertiary level continued to operate at full capacity. By the end 
of April 1996 (t=13), the waiting list was down to 72 patients and the average time spent 
on the waiting list stood at just over 4.5 months. Without the excessive waiting times
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suppressing demand, the waiting list would have only dropped to 77 patients and the 
average time spent on the waiting list would have stood at nearly 4.7 months.
In anticipation of the planned closure of tertiary facilities in May 1996 (t=13), 
preparations were carried out to provide a district-based CC service at Ribsley General. 
As it was estimated that preparations would take 3 months, they needed to commence in 
February 1996 (t=10) to have a district service in place in time to ensure that CC services 
were not adversely affected by the closure of tertiary facilities. However, there was a 
delay of one month before preparations were underway. This delay represented a 
combination of factors, in particular, the inertia from the local purchaser who was very 
sceptical about the value of district services. Therefore, one month’s disruption of elective 
CC services for Ribsley General patients was inevitable.
May 1996 to end o f Mar 1997 (t=13 to t=24): District service present
In May 1996 (t=13), the significant drop in capacity, due to the closure of the tertiary 
facilities and the delay in introducing the district service, caused increases in the waiting 
list and average waiting time for new patients joining the waiting list. The impact of the 
capacity loss was diminished, but only to a limited extent, by the ‘knee jerk’ reduction in 
referrals which occurred as a response. A district service was introduced for 10 months 
between June 1996 and March 1997 (t=14 to t=23). By offering a service solely devoted 
to routine elective care, it was possible to provide elective capacity levels which exceeded 
those which had been offered previously at the tertiary level. This contributed to further 
reductions in the waiting list and waiting times. Another factor that drove down the 
waiting time and waiting list was the reduction in the desired waiting time as efforts were 
made to make the most of the district service whilst it was available. By the end of March 
1997 (t=24) when the district service was withdrawn, the waiting list was down to 35 
patients and the average time spent on the waiting list was down to 1.7 months. Therefore, 
by compensating for the tertiary facility closures and offering further capacity, the district 
service had contributed to over 50% reductions in the waiting list and average waiting 
time over a 10 month period.
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The district service often operated at full capacity. However, the simulation indicated that 
prior to its withdrawal, the capacity utilisation dropped because the average waiting time 
for new patients joining the waiting list had been reduced to a suitably low level.
The district service stimulated demand for cardiac services. The reduction in the average 
waiting time for a CC investigation stimulated further demand for that service. In addition 
to the waiting time effect, there was a knowledge effect on demand. As knowledge spread 
about the existence of a CC service at the local hospital, patients and GPs became more 
interested in CC and knowledgeable about its benefits, and thus more demanding. 
Therefore, to some extent, the stimulation of demand for CC investigations undermined 
the efforts to reduce pressure on CC services during the period that the district service was 
present. For example, when the district service was withdrawn at the end of March 1997 
(t=24), the simulation showed that 4 of the 35 patients on the CC investigation waiting list 
(11%) could be attributed to the stimulation of demand due to the combined waiting time 
and knowledge effects.
The increase in knowledge about CC also led to higher demand for OP appointments. The 
simulation indicated that the demand for OP appointments was first stimulated just under 
2 months later than that for CC investigations. This was due to the perception delay and 
the assumption that higher levels of district activity were required to persuade GPs to 
increase their referral rates. There was insufficient slack in the system to maintain the 
waiting time goal and the average time spent on the waiting list rose from 1.15 months to 
1.18 months (nearly 3% increase). The OP waiting list rose from 424 patients to 442 
patients (4% increase). However, the increase in demand was only temporary, after which 
the OP waiting list and waiting times returned to their desired levels and equilibrium was 
re-established. Demand was stimulated for just under 10 months in total and it led to 65 
additional OP appointments being carried out. This contributed to 10 further referrals for 
an elective CC investigation.
The variation in referrals due to the annual recruitment of new trainee CC operators (who 
under-referred during their periods of under-confidence) periodically alleviated pressure 
on the system. The impact of this skills effect was evident on the CC investigation waiting 
list. For example, if  the junior CC operator training programme had been withdrawn and 
the junior who was recruited in October 1994 had remained at Ribsley after completing
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their training, the waiting list would have been 2 patients higher (6% increase) at the end 
of March 1997 (t=24). Furthermore, the differential would have increased as time 
progressed to 16 patients (16% increase) at the end of September 1999 (t=54).
The duration for which junior CC operators alleviated pressure on the system by under- 
referring was influenced by the activity rates which in turn determined their rate of gain in 
skills. For example, the simulation indicated that the junior trainee operator recruited in 
1996 took approximately 5 months to gain sufficient skills and confidence to saturate the 
skills effect on demand. By contrast, the junior trainee recruited in 1998 experienced 
lower patient activity rates to gain skills and thus took nearly twice as long.
April 1997 to January 1998 (t=24 to t=33): No district service
Following the withdrawal of the district service at the end of March 1997 (t=24), the 
capacity for CC investigations dropped sharply and the waiting list and waiting times rose 
in spite of the ‘knee jerk’ reduction in referrals which followed as a response. The 
capacity loss was the predominant factor responsible for the increases in the waiting list 
and waiting times. Another factor which reinforced these increases was the knowledge 
effect on demand which, although declining, still remained after the ‘knee jerk’ reaction 
in referrals had passed. The simulation indicated that nearly 5 months elapsed before the 
demand for OP appointments returned to their normal levels. The waiting time effect led 
to demand being suppressed as waiting times rose. However, there was a 6 month delay 
before the skills effect could provide additional relief in terms of reduced pressure on the 
system. This was because by April 1997 (t=24), the existing trainee operator had gained 
sufficient skills to saturate the skills effect on demand for CC investigations to its highest 
level. His departure and the arrival of a new novice trainee (and associated drop in 
referrals) was not due to take place until October 1997 (t=30).
February 1998 to May 1998 (t-34 to t=37): District service reinstated
By the time the district service was reinstated in February 1998 (t=34), the reduction in 
the CC investigation waiting list had been almost completely obliterated by rising to 69 
patients. Meanwhile, the average time spent on this waiting list had risen to just over 3.5 
months.
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The additional capacity provided by the district service reversed the increases in the 
waiting list and waiting times. This was facilitated by the waiting time effect as demand 
was suppressed, although the degree of demand suppression reduced with the decline in 
waiting times. The district service was in place for an insufficient period for GPs and 
patients to perceive its existence and respond to this knowledge. Consequently, there was 
no further stimulation of demand for OP services during this period. The skills effect 
imposed increasing pressure on the system as the existing trainee CC operator who was 
recruited in October 1997 gained confidence. When the district service was withdrawn at 
the end of May 1998 (t=38), the CC investigation waiting list had been reduced to 41 
patients and the average time spent on this waiting list had been reduced to 2.8 months. 
Therefore, four further months of the district service had contributed to a 41% reduction 
in the waiting list and 20% reduction in the average time spent on the waiting list.
June 1998 to October 1999 (t=38 to t=54): No district service
Based upon the assumptions outlined in the previous section, the simulation indicated that 
from June 1998 (t=38) onwards to October 1999 (t=54), the tertiary service operated at 
full capacity. However, this was insufficient to control the increase in the CC 
investigation waiting list and waiting times. Instead, both exhibited consistent growth 
over this period. As the average waiting time rose, the waiting time effect caused demand 
to be suppressed thus alleviating pressure on the system but only to a limited extent. The 
growth in the waiting list and waiting times was also slowed to a small extent by the 
associated increase in other waiting list removals. The simulation indicated that by 
October 1999 (t=54), whilst the OP end of the referral chain had returned to equilibrium, 
the CC investigation waiting list had more than doubled to 98 patients and the average 
time spent on the waiting list had increased over 1.5 times to 4.3 months. The return of 
CC capacity shortages was confirmed by the Risbley General consultant cardiologist 
during contacts that followed the collection of numerical data.
Generation o f Costs Over Time
The reductions in the waiting lists and waiting times have to be traded-off against the 
various costs associated with having a district service. The introduction and use of district
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services incurred costs to prepare the site in advance of the introduction of the service 
(approximately £30,000), in addition to the costs of running the service (approximately 
£50/mth). Furthermore, there was the penalty associated with a district service, where 
synchronous investigation and treatment was not possible adhering to the under current 
guidelines. This inevitably required some patients to undergo a second CC procedure. 
Assuming that only one third of patients required inpatient treatment and one half had 
coronary stents inserted, conducting the same level of activity at the tertiary level, if 
possible, would have led to approximately a 2% saving in activity costs. This would have 
amounted to £12,957 over the 14 months that the district service was in place (average 
£925/mth). Higher stent fractions would have generated higher costs but slightly lower 
cost savings.
10.2.3 Emphasising the Structure-Behaviour Linkages
System dynamicists focus on the information feedback structure of a system. They seek to 
understand how it influences the behaviour of the system (the behaviour-structure 
linkage) and they thus develop endogenously-based insights. Reactions to exogenous 
events are studied but system behaviour that is purely generated exogenously is not 
interesting to system dynamicists.
This section highlights the structure-behaviour linkages underlying the base case 
behaviour. It should be noted that the viewpoint for this study was to examine the 
consequences of the shifts in CC services and the feedback effects that they engendered. 
Therefore, capacity changes were modelled exogenously. If the aim had been to consider 
the policy decisions to introduce a district service, capacity changes would have been 
modelled endogenously (see §12.9).
In the main feedback structure, which is reproduced in Appendix D (see Dl), loop B1 
represents the balancing process underlying attempts to meet the CC investigation waiting 
time goal with adjustments to the tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate. As stated 
in the previous section, the tertiary-based CC service for Ribsley General patients was 
pushed to operate at full capacity so loop B1 was dormant. Therefore, during these 
periods, changes in the tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate were driven 
exogenously by capacity changes and adjustments to the waiting time goal.
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Loop B2 represents the process which controls adjustments in the CC investigation rate at 
the district level. It was also stated that the district service often operated at full capacity. 
During these periods, changes in the CC investigation rate at the district level were driven 
exogenously by changes to the capacity and waiting time goal. When the service was not 
operating at full capacity, changes in the CC investigation rates were driven 
endogenously.
When the CC investigation services were operating at full capacity, this rendered inactive 
other endogenous processes which shared the causal links between the capacity utilisation 
and activity rates. This affected all the four reinforcing processes. The tertiary service 
operating at full capacity affected the process driving the gain in district-based junior CC 
operator skills at the tertiary level (loop R4). The district service operating at full capacity 
affected the processes underlying changes to the knowledge effects on demand for OP 
appointments (loop R l) and CC investigations (loop R2) and, the gain in district-based 
junior CC operator skills at the district level (loop R3). Operating at full capacity meant 
that changes in the skills for district-based junior CC operators and knowledge effects 
were driven exogenously by subsequent further increases in capacity and adjustments in 
the waiting time goal.
Endogenous processes also featured and two of these generated further demand that 
forced the capacity utilisation to remain high. These processes thus formed further 
exogenous inputs to the processes of activity adjustment (loops B1 and B2), knowledge 
gain (loops R l and R2) and skills gain (loops R3 and R4). They involved the balancing 
loop B3, which controls adjustments in the waiting time effect on demand for CC 
investigations. A second process involved the balancing loop B4, which controls attempts 
to meet the implicit OP waiting time goal with adjustments to the OP rate in response to 
increases in the referral rate. Increases in OP activity produce further referrals for a CC 
investigation. However, the analysis showed that the significance of the increases in 
demand from the waiting time effect (loop B3) was greater than that associated with the 
increases in OP activity (loop B4). Another endogenous process was the balancing 
process that generated other removals from the CC investigation waiting list (shown in 
the stock and flow diagrams as loop B. See El in Appendix E). This process alleviated
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pressure on the system to some extent by slowing down the rate of increase in the CC 
investigation waiting list and thus reduced the pressure to increase activity rates.
Therefore, the basic trend exhibited by the CC investigation waiting list was mainly as a 
result of exogenous factors. Firstly, the shortfalls and increases in elective CC capacities 
at both the tertiary and district levels. Secondly, the reduction in the desired waiting time 
for a CC investigation. Thirdly, the action of several endogenous processes which 
generated further demand for CC services. Moreover the endogenous processes interacted 
with one another thus generating further pressure on the system. For example, with the 
use of a district service and the associated capacity increases, the subsequent increases in 
referrals for CC investigations in response to reductions in the average waiting time drove 
the district activity to rise in attempts to meet the desired waiting time (interactions 
between loops B2 and B3). This generated a higher number of learning experiences for 
junior CC operators and thus reinforced the gain in CC operator skills (interactions 
between loops B2 and R3). Whilst several mechanisms existed which alleviated pressure 
on the system, only capacity increases were effective in helping to meet the desired 
waiting time.
The basic trend exhibited by the OP waiting list was generated endogenously by the 
process of adjustment in the OP rate towards achieving the waiting time goal (loop B4). 
The various factors that drove increases in the district CC investigation rates and thus 
generated further demand for OP appointments also provided exogenous inputs to 
increases in the OP waiting list (and various interactions).
Understanding the links between the behaviour and the underlying structure provided 
insight into how more desirable behaviour could have been achieved. Note that if a 
feedback loop is active, then it may be described as being intensified by increasing the 
size of its variables. Alternatively, it may be described as being activated by increasing 
the size of its variables if the loop was previously dormant.
The base case analysis suggested that three approaches could have been taken to alleviate 
pressure on the system: clarifying demand; meeting demand or controlling demand. 
Increasing the rate of other removals (intensifying loop B) by reviewing the waiting list 
more frequently would have clarified those who did and did not require an investigation.
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This would have slowed down the rate of gain in the CC investigation waiting list and 
average time spent on the waiting list but this would not have produced significant 
improvements. Moreover, the improvements would have been numerical but not 
behavioural. Further capacity increases would obviously have alleviated pressure on the 
system by intensifying and activating the processes of adjustment in activity (loops B1 
and B2). This would have proved costly and it might have stimulated further demand due 
to the knowledge and waiting time effects on demand. A more affordable intervention 
might have been to use new referral guidelines to prioritise demand. This intervention 
would have diminished the knowledge effects (loops R l and R2) and waiting time effects 
(loop B3) on demand. It also would have reduced the calls for more activity directly and 
indirectly by weakening the interactions between different processes (e.g. between R3 and 
B3).
10.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis plays an essential role in SD in testing the robustness of the 
conclusions drawn from the model-based analyses (Tank-Nielsen 1980; Richardson and 
Pugh 1981). Sensitivity analysis was thus applied to evaluate the robustness of the base 
case behaviour to various assumptions. The understanding of the causes of the base case 
behaviour, as discussed in the preceding section, suggested several areas where sensitivity 
analysis could be directed.
This section reports upon the results of making alterations to: the availability of district 
services; availability of elective CC capacity; CC investigation waiting time goal; waiting 
time effect on demand; knowledge effects on demand; skills effect on demand; and, 
exogenous demand for an OP appointment.
Limiting the Availability o f District Services (Exps R7 & R8)
It was stated that elective CC capacity increases were key factors in reversing the upward 
trends exhibited by the average CC investigation waiting time and waiting list in the base 
case behaviour. The importance of capacity was illustrated by comparing the base case 
with two alternative scenarios which resulted in significant changes in terms of fewer 
peaks and troughs. The first scenario involved the absence of a district service. This
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experiment isolated the effects o f the tertiary capacity losses. In the second scenario, the 
use of the district service was restricted to a single occasion. This experiment, with the 
previous experiment, illustrated the importance o f the district service in providing 
additional capacity.
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Figure 10.2 Limiting the Availability o f District Services: CC Investigation Waiting List
Figure 10.2 illustrates how these changes led to large increases in the CC investigation 
waiting list. This figure also shows how the significance o f the other removals from the 
CC investigation waiting list increased according to the size o f the waiting list such that 
the sustained increase in the waiting list eventually curtailed its growth. Consequently 
whilst, at the end o f May 1998 (t=38) when the district service was withdrawn, the 
waiting list was 152 patients lower than it would have been without a district service, at 
the end of September 1999 (t=54), the waiting list differential was reduced to 108 
patients. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis demonstrated that capacity increases were 
crucial in controlling the waiting time and waiting list but that their importance 
diminished as the waiting list increased.
Limiting the Availability o f Elective Capacity: A Winter Crisis (Exp R9)
The base case reflected the assumption that between the closures o f the tertiary facilities, 
the tertiary elective capacity returned to normal levels. The model was used to consider a 
departure from this assumption. The model simulated a winter crisis over a 3 month 
period prior to the 1998 closure of tertiary facilities (from t=32 to t=35). It was assumed 
that a crisis would affect cardiac services by causing elective CC investigations to be 
cancelled as beds (needed for the post-operative recovery period) and other resources
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would be reallocated to higher priority cases. This crisis was represented in the model by 
a 75% reduction in tertiary elective capacity and the cancellation o f the district service in 
February 1998 (t=34). Rather than cancelling all elective activity, allowances were made 
for higher risk cases to be investigated. Furthermore, given the cancelled activity, there 
would be insufficient patients to justify the hire o f the mobile catheter laboratory.
The available capacity was insufficient for the system to cope during the crisis. For 
example, it caused the average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list to peak at 
4.5 months, representing a 25% increase on the base case (Figure 10.3).
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Figure 10.3 Effects o f a Winter Crisis: Average Time Spent on the CC Investigation Waiting List
Furthermore, the effects on the crisis were still apparent, albeit diminishing, long after the 
crisis had passed. For example, the final waiting time (t=54) was 0.5 months higher (11% 
higher) than the base case.
Maintaining a Constant CC Investigation Waiting Time Goal (Exp R10)
In addition to the available capacity for elective CC investigations, the waiting time goal 
was a key exogenous factor in determining the behaviour o f the system. Its assumed 
reduction, when the district service was present, contributed to increases in the CC 
investigation rate and the degree o f demand that was stimulated. The model was used to 
test the effects o f maintaining a constant waiting time goal.
Keeping the desired waiting time constant produced effects that were inconsistent with 
those that were reported by the cardiologists in the interviews and the effects that were
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reflected in the numerical data (shown in §7.3). The elective CC investigation rate was 
reduced as fewer calls were made to utilise the available capacity. Consequently, higher 
levels of the CC investigation waiting list and waiting times prevailed. For example, the 
minimum average time spent on the waiting list was 2.4 months as opposed to 1.7 months 
for the base case (42% higher). A consequence of higher waiting times was that no 
stimulated demand was associated with the waiting time effect. The knowledge effects on 
demand for CC investigations and OP appointments were delayed and reduced in 
magnitude. Lower increases in the OP waiting list and waiting times resulted. Compared 
to the base case, pressure on the system at the CC investigation end of the referral chain 
was higher whilst less pressure was exerted at the OP end of the referral chain. For 
example, the pressure imposed by excessive CC investigation waiting times increased by 
over 30% overall whilst that for OP appointments was reduced by 60%. “Pressure” refers 
to the index that was introduced in §5.4.3 to summarise the instances when there was an 
excessive waiting list (or average time spent on the waiting list) relative to its desired 
level.
The district service only briefly operated at full capacity. Therefore, maintaining a 
constant waiting time goal altered the mechanism underlying changes in district CC rates, 
knowledge about CC and skills gain from a combination of exogenous factors and 
endogenous processes (loops B2, Rl and R3 respectively) towards endogenous processes 
only. However, the mode of behaviour did not change and it was still to a large degree 
driven by the changes in capacity for CC services.
Altering the Waiting Time Effect on Demand (Exps R l l  & R12)
In the base case, the waiting time effect on demand for CC investigations alleviated 
pressure on the system to some extent by suppressing demand when the expected waiting 
time was high. When the waiting time was low, demand was stimulated, thus increasing 
pressure on the system and undermining attempts to reduce the waiting time. To examine 
the sensitivity of the base case to alterations to the waiting time effect on demand, the 
response time to changes in the average waiting time was doubled and halved. This served 
to accelerate and decelerate the process underlying the effect of the waiting time on 
referrals (loop B3).
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The effects were minor indicating numerical but not behavioural sensitivity. If the 
capacity had remained constant (apart from the initial increase which caused the average 
waiting time to drop), reducing the response time would be expected to generate greater 
pressure whilst increasing the response time would be expected to reduce pressure. 
However, this did not occur in the Ribsley General case as the capacity changed over 
time. Extending the response delay delayed changes in the waiting time effect in both 
adjusting from and returning to normal. Compared to the base case, the net effect was a 
4.3% increase in the period of stimulated demand for an elective CC investigation whilst 
shortening the delay reduced this period by just over 2%.
Altering the Knowledge Effects on Demand (Exps R13-R15)
In the base case, demand was increased by the consequences of increased knowledge of 
GPs and patients about CC investigations, thus imposing further pressure on the system. 
Cardiologists were able to make general comments about the effects on demand for both 
CC investigations and OP appointments. However, they could only provide the necessary 
estimates to construct the non-linear function for the former. Consequently, sensitivity 
analysis played an essential role in addressing the uncertainties about the latter. This 
involved changes to the delay for GPs and patients to perceive changes in the availability 
of district services, and changes to the extent to which increased knowledge could 
stimulate demand. The first change altered the speed at which changes in knowledge 
affected demand for CC investigations whilst the second change altered the intensity of 
this feedback process (loop R2).
To consider the possibility that the perception delay may have been underestimated or 
overestimated, the model was rerun with a longer and shorter perception delay. The 
system was behaviourally sensitive to changes in this perception delay. This was in 
contrast to the effect of changes to the time for cardiologists to respond to changes in the 
waiting time. Reducing the GP and patient perception delay produced a change in the 
mode of behaviour. More demand was stimulated as the response arose earlier than the 
base case and spanned over a longer period. The mode of behaviour changed as demand 
was stimulated twice in contrast to the base case behaviour where the second district 
service was in place for an insufficient length of time for it to prompt a change in demand 
from GPs and patients. Consequently, the time for which the average time spent on the
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OP waiting list exceeded its desired level increased by over 55% (from 12.6 months to 
19.6 months). Meanwhile, the overall pressure from an excessive delay for an OP 
appointment increased by 33%. Increasing the average waiting time for an OP 
appointment prompted increases in OP activity which pushed more patients along the 
referral chain. This amounted to 3 additional referrals for an elective CC investigation. 
Increasing the perception delay reduced the amount of stimulated demand and the period 
for which the average waiting time was excessive was reduced by 3 months (22%). 
Pressure from an excessive delay for an OP appointment was reduced by 40%.
Although the sensitivity analysis unveiled a sensitive parameter it could not be concluded 
that the estimates used for the base case were inappropriate because stimulated demand 
for OP appointments was not observed twice. However, the fact that changes in this 
parameter could alter the mode of behaviour was interesting from a policy perspective. 
Changes in this parameter were considered again in the policy analysis (see Chapter 11).
For the base case, it was assumed that as the district service was not heavily marketed, the 
maximum knowledge effect on demand for OP appointments would be low. To examine 
the effect of a higher degree of stimulation (reflecting the effects of a more aggressive 
marketing effort), the magnitude of the knowledge effect on demand for an OP 
appointment was altered. The behaviour was less sensitive to this particular parameter 
change. It was numerically sensitive, obviously, but the basic mode of behaviour was 
unchanged. As expected, the district service stimulated a higher level of demand for OP 
appointments. For example, pressure from an excessive delay for an OP appointment was 
almost doubled.
Altering the Skills Effect on Demand (Exps R16-R19)
Sensitivity analysis focused on the processes underlying the skills effect on demand by 
altering their intensity and polarity (loops R3 and R4).
In the base case, associated with the annual replacement o f experienced junior CC 
operators with novices were reductions in the referral rates for CC investigations which 
were followed by increased referrals as these trainees gained experience and confidence. 
This was how the referral behaviour of junior CC operator trainees at Ribsley General was
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described during the interviews. The length of time for which pressure was alleviated was 
determined by the rate at which these trainees gained CC skills. This was influenced by 
the number of learning experiences, which varied according to the number of tertiary- 
based investigations carried out by district operators, and the fraction of investigations 
from which the junior district operators learned. Reductions and increases in the latter by 
a modest 20% were considered thus altering the intensity of the effect of skills on 
demand. Reducing the learning fraction prolonged the periods during which novice CC 
operators lacked confidence and under-referred patients for CC, slowed their ascent up the 
Teaming curve’, and delayed their approach to the saturation point. This alleviated 2.5% 
of the pressure from an excessive delay for a CC investigation. Increasing the learning 
fraction shortened the periods of underconfidence and produced 2.3% increase in the 
pressure. Although the changes from the base case parameter were symmetric, the results 
were asymmetric due to the non-linear nature of the Teaming curve’. The increase in the 
learning fraction was considered further as part of the policy analysis (see Chapter 11).
Exploring the effects of a different referral tradition at Ribsley General illustrated how the 
assumptions about the referral tradition affected the behaviour of the system. The base 
case involved inexperienced CC operators reflecting under-confidence in their referral 
patterns. As previously stated, this was consistent with a conservative attitude towards the 
use of CC investigations. The model was used to explore the effects of the presence of 
inexperienced operators who initially under-referred as with the base case, but prior to 
gaining sufficient confidence to refer the same proportion as expert operators, became 
over-confident and thus over-referred. This behaviour might be consistent with a more 
‘aggressive’ attitude towards the use of CC investigations. This introduced a change of 
polarity of the process underlying the effect of skills on referrals (loops R3 and R4). Over­
confidence in referral behaviour increased referral rates for CC investigations and thus 
increased the pressure on CC services. This raised the utilisation of the district service, 
when it was in place, and after it was withdrawn it led to increasingly higher levels of the 
CC investigation waiting list. For example, this produced 1 additional patient on the 
waiting list after the withdrawal of the district service at the end of March 1997 (t=24) 
and 9 additional patients at the end of September 1999 (t=54). The higher district CC 
investigation rates induced further demand for OP appointments. Therefore, a 
consequence of overconfidence in referral behaviour was slightly increased pressure on 
OP services.
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Another experiment considered how delaying the recruitment of trainee CC operators by a 
month would affect the role of the skills effect in alleviating pressure on the system. It 
was assumed that this would not affect the levels of OP activity i.e. for the intervening 
period the trainee OP workload would be divided evenly between the expert CC operators 
and non-operators. This did not alter the mode of behaviour of the system but in 
understanding the effect on CC services, several factors need to be taken into account. 
Effectively, the turnover of junior operators (and associated drop in referrals) was less 
frequent, once every 13 weeks rather than once every 12 weeks. Potentially, this resulted 
in increased pressure on CC services. However, during the recruitment delay, rather than 
having all the junior patient workload assessed by a novice junior operator, a fraction of 
these patients were assessed by an expert (who would refer more patients than novice 
operators). Therefore, there was a periodic partial drop in referrals (prior to the arrival of 
the new trainees) as opposed to a complete drop. This contributed to increased pressure 
on CC services.
A further factor to consider was changes in the rate of gain of skills. Altering the timing 
of the arrival of the new trainees altered the timing of their initial training with respect to 
the elective CC capacity increases (which offered increases in learning experiences for 
these trainees). For example, in the base case, the new trainee who arrived in October 
1996 (t=18) had the benefit of 5 month’s-worth of the greater volume of learning 
experiences (associated with the capacity increases with the district service in place). 
With a recruitment delay of one month, the new trainee arrived two months later and 
therefore only had 3 month’s benefit so his rate of gain of skills was lower. Therefore, for 
this period, there was reduced pressure on the system. However, the situation was 
reversed with the next trainee. This new trainee arrived just before the period of increased 
activity rates and thus benefit from a higher gain in skills. For this period, there was 
increased pressure on the system. The simulation showed that the net effect of all these 
changes was slightly higher pressure on CC services (about 5% increase in pressure 
exerted by both an excessive waiting list and an excessive average waiting time).
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Increase in Exogenous Demand for an OP Appointment (Exps R20a-R20c)
In the base case, the reference level of demand for an OP appointment (level for which 
knowledge about CC was only based on tertiary-based activity i.e. no knowledge effect on 
demand) was set at a level that produced behaviour that was consistent with that reported 
in the system (stability in OP services). The ability o f the district service to alleviate 
pressure on the system very much depended on the level o f demand for cardiac services. 
Sensitivity analysis also focused on considering how changes to the exogenous level of 
demand for OP appointments would potentially alter the ability o f the system to cope. 
Several examples o f exogenous increases in demand for OP appointments were examined. 
The results o f three increases (1%, 4% and 7%) are presented in Figure 10.4. They were 
introduced in April 1999 (t=48) to ensure that these effects were not masked by the effects 
of the district service and the time scale was extended to allow sufficient time for the 
effects o f this change to be observed.
1: B ase  C ase  2: W ith  1% In c rea se  3: W ith  4 %  In c re a se  4 : W ith  7 %  In c rea se
1 .3 0 1
•30Os
l .O ffo.oo 30 .00 6 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 120.00
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Figure 10.4 Exogenous Increase in Demand for OP: Average Time Spent on the OP Waiting List
A small increase in exogenous referrals (e.g. 1%) only slightly increased the average 
waiting time spent on the OP waiting list. The initial decrease was due to the increase in 
referrals temporarily destabilising the system such that, initially, there was a higher 
number o f waiting list joiners (who each contributed a zero waiting time to the average) 
than removals. Moderate increases (2% to 6%) raised the average waiting time to above 
its desired level but there was sufficient OP capacity for the system to re-stabilise by 
raising the utilisation o f OP capacity. However, for increases in demand o f 7% or more, 
the OP capacity was insufficient to re-stabilise the system in the short-term. The OP 
waiting list and average waiting time exhibited a continuous rise. Equilibrium was only be
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re-established when the other waiting list removals had risen to balance the OP waiting 
list removals with the OP referral rate.
The increases in OP activity pushed further patients along the referral chain, so that 
demand for CC investigations increased but this did not produce changes in the mode of 
behaviour of CC services. Therefore, to conclude, low exogenous increases in demand for 
OP appointments led to a limited increase in pressure at the OP end of the referral chain 
but it did not significantly undermine the ability of the district service to alleviate pressure 
further along the referral chain. Higher exogenous increases in demand for OP 
appointments produced a sustained increase in pressure at the OP end of the referral 
chain. To some extent, the increase in demand for a CC investigation was constrained by 
the OP capacity so that pressure was held back to accumulate at the OP end. However, a 
few further referrals for a CC investigation arose by two mechanisms. Firstly, increasing 
the rate of referrals for an OP appointment led to the OP capacity being reached more 
quickly; further referrals for a CC investigation resulted as the OP rate would be pushed 
to full capacity for a longer period. Secondly, a higher OP waiting list contributed to 
higher numbers of referrals for an elective CC investigation from the inpatient route. 
Increases in the exogenous demand for OP services were considered further in the policy 
analysis (see Chapter 11).
To conclude, the sensitivity analysis demonstrated robustness in the understanding of the 
causes of the base case behaviour as described in §10.2.2. It also revealed some useful 
policy insights which will be considered again in the next chapter.
10.3 VEINBRIDGE GENERAL ANALYSIS
10.3.1 Simulating the Base Case Behaviour 
(Exp VO)
Problem reference modes for the Veinbridge General case were presented in §8.2.3. They 
referred to the period April 1995 to August 1999. Having demonstrated that the 
simulation model was able to replicate these reference modes well (see §9.4.2), the model 
was then used to project beyond August 1999 to April 2001. This was based upon the 
assumptions that the capacities for OP and elective CC investigation services remained
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constant and that there were no further shifts in CC workload to the district level. The 
model thus produced a base case behaviour over a six-year period from April 1995 to 
April 2001 (see Figure 10.5).
1 (Continuous Line) : Referral Rate for an OP Appointment (patients/mth)
2 (Dashed Line) : OP Waiting List (patients)
3 (Thick Line) OP Waiting List Removal Rate (patients/mth)
Months
((Continuous Line) : Referral Rate for a CC Investigation (patients/mth)
2 (Dashed Line) : CC Investigation Waiting List (patients)
3 (Thick Line) : CC Investigation Waiting List Removal Rate (patients/mth)
0.00 18.00 36.00 54.00 72.00
1 (Continuous Line) : Average Time Spent on the OP Waiting List (mths) 1 (Continuous Line): Average Time Spent on the CC Investigation Waiting List (mths)
2 (Dashed Line) Average Waiting Time for New Patients Joining the OP Waiting List (mths) 2 (Dashed Line) : Average Waiting Time for New Patients Joining the CC Investigation Waiting List (mths)
36.00
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Figure 10.5 Veinbridge General Base Case Behaviour 
(Month 0 is April 1995 and Month 72 is April 2001. Figures are based upon simulated data that are 
reported at intervals o f  DT i.e. 0.125 months, unlike those in Chapter 9 that presented monthly data.)
10.3.2 Basic Causes o f the Base Case Behaviour
(Exps VI-V3)
April 1995 to April 1996 (t=0 to t=12): No district service
Prior to the introduction o f district CC services, the system was stable at Veinbridge 
General. The CC investigation and OP waiting lists were estimated at 128 patients and 
338 patients respectively, and the average time spent on these waiting lists was estimated 
at 3.5 months and 0.92 months respectively (each maintaining their desired levels). 
Furthermore, there was sufficient capacity to meet demand for both OP and elective CC 
investigation services. In fact, there was some slack in the system as neither service 
operated at full capacity. The OP service only utilised 85% o f its capacity whilst the CC 
investigation service operated at 90% capacity. The stability in the system was also due to
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the absence of cyclic variation in demand for CC investigations associated with the skills 
effect, in contrast with the case of referrals from Ribsley General.
At both Ribsley General and Veinbridge General, a desire for a district service predated 
the closure of the tertiary facilities in May 1996 (t=13). In both cases, prior to this event, 
district services could not be offered due to financial constraints. For Ribsley General 
patients, the desire for a district service arose from the prevailing shortfall in elective CC 
capacity. Therefore, the desire was clearly apparent. The situation for Veinbridge General 
patients was quite different. CC capacity shortages did not exist and district services were 
desired to develop cardiac services at Veinbridge General. Therefore, this desire was not 
apparent. To be apparent, the tertiary-based elective CC capacity would have to be 
reduced (thus producing a capacity shortfall).
In anticipation of the planned closure of tertiary facilities in May 1996 (t=13) and with 
funding available for a district service, preparations were carried out at Veinbridge 
General to provide a district-based CC service. They were estimated to last 2 months. 
Unlike the case of Ribsley General, support for the service was such that preparations 
commenced in time for them to be completed in the same month that the tertiary facility 
was due to close. Therefore, access to CC investigations for Veinbridge General patients 
was not disrupted by the closure of the tertiary facilities.
May 1996 to Jan 1998 (t=13 to t=33): Phase 1 district service present
A phase 1 (mobile-based) district service opened in May 1996 (t=13) as part of a 
programme to develop a permanent phase 2 (integrated lab-based) service at Veinbridge 
General. The model, estimating the dynamics of the system approximately continuously 
(calculating at small intervals of DT) exhibited a brief delay in shifting the workload to 
the district level. This was due to the perception delay in responding to the shortfall in 
capacity following the closure of the tertiary laboratory. However, essentially, the model 
reflected that CC services for Veinbridge General patients were not adversely affected by 
the closure of tertiary facilities. The district service also supported an expansion in 
elective CC capacity for Veinbridge General patients. This expansion did not lead to 
reductions in the average waiting time for a CC investigation because demand for CC
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services was already satisfied within the normal capacity levels. Instead, it was intended 
to support increases in referrals.
There were several mechanisms underlying the referral rate increases. Initially, there was 
a reduction in the referral threshold towards including more ‘grey area’ cases. The district 
service provided more capacity and, therefore, more flexibility to investigate ‘grey area’ 
cases. In contrast, although there were no capacity shortages with the tertiary only-based 
service, the capacity utilisation was still high and its priority was to investigate patients 
for which CC procedures were clinically indicated. The simulation indicated that after a 
delay of nearly 4 months, the referral threshold began to drop further due to the increasing 
pressure from GPs and patients to refer as they became more knowledgeable about CC 
(the knowledge effect on CC demand). This effect reached saturation point, stimulating 
demand to the full extent, but this did not compromise the average waiting time for a CC 
investigation because there was sufficient capacity to cope with the increased pressure. In 
fact, this increased demand would have been encouraged by the district service being 
heavily marketed; given the plans to develop a permanent district service, it was 
important that there was sufficient demand to sustain the service.
The increase in knowledge about CC also led to increased referrals for an OP 
appointment. This prompted higher OP rates, as efforts were made to maintain the desired 
OP waiting time, and 921 (22% of the total) further elective referrals for a CC 
investigation were produced. This led to increased pressure on the CC services which was 
in contrast with the case of Ribsley General where the effect of the small temporary 
increase in OP activity rates on demand for CC services was marginal. The differences 
were due to the fact that the increases were higher and they were sustained. The OP 
activity rate was higher at Veinbridge General and a greater proportion of cases were 
referred on for a CC investigation as the referral behaviour was typically more 
‘aggressive’. The pressure on OP services was sustained because the district service, 
which generated the pressure, was permanent.
Although the desired waiting time for a CC investigation was maintained, the length of 
the waiting list exhibited increases. This was due to the delays between the adjustments in 
activity rate in response to the referral rate increases and the fact that efforts were made to 
meet the desired waiting time and not a desired waiting list length. The simulation
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indicated a rise in the CC investigation waiting list from 128 patients to 203 patients (59% 
increase) between the period of May 1996 (t=13) to the end of January 1998 (t=34). 
Furthermore, an increase of 53 patients could be attributed to the knowledge effects on 
CC demand and OP demand.
When the tertiary facility reopened in April 1997 (t=24), the CC workload was not shifted 
back to the tertiary level because sufficient funding was committed towards developing a 
permanent district service. Furthermore, the tertiary capacity for Veinbridge General 
patients was not restored to its previous levels because the capacity that had previously 
been devoted to routine investigations was reallocated to other uses. The tertiary capacity 
that remained available for Veinbridge General patients was fully utilised by high risk 
elective patients.
The stimulation of demand for OP services led to severe OP capacity shortages. As there 
was little spare capacity for OP services and no opportunity for expansion, the system was 
unable to cope with the demand which, the simulation indicated, was stimulated to the 
maximum extent (subject to the assumptions about GP referral behaviour). Given the 
assumption that demand could have increased by as much as 20%, by the time the 
integrated laboratory opened in February 1998 (t=34), the OP waiting list rose by 49% 
from 338 patients to 505 patients. In addition, the average time spent on the OP waiting 
list rose by 23% from 0.92 months to 1.13 months. To a large extent, the OP capacity 
constraints held back demand for CC investigations so that CC capacity shortages did not 
arise.
February 1998 to April 2001 (t=34 to t=72): Phase 2 district service present
The integrated catheter laboratory, which opened in February 1998 (t=34), provided 
opportunities for further expansion in CC capacity and prompted further reductions in the 
referral threshold. Not only were more ‘grey area’ cases referred for CC investigation, but 
slightly higher risk cases were shifted to the district level, i.e. more patients were 
considered eligible for district-based investigation. Given the reduced need for tertiary 
services by elective cases from Veinbridge General, further tertiary capacity was 
reallocated to other uses. As with the earlier reduction in the referral threshold, this 
prompted an increased CC investigation rate by the doctors working at a greater tempo so
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that the desired waiting time for CC investigation was maintained. However, whilst the 
referral rate exceeded the waiting list removal rate, the waiting list rose further. The 
simulation indicated a 12% rise in the CC investigation waiting list from 203 patients to 
227 patients between February 1998 (t=34) and July 1998 (t=39). No more demand was 
associated with the knowledge effects as these were already saturated.
The OP waiting list and waiting times continued to escalate. By April 2001 (t=72), in the 
simulation, the length of the OP waiting list almost doubled from the pre-district service 
level to 651 patients and the average time spent on the OP waiting list increased by over 
50% to just under 1.5 months. The OP waiting list and waiting times began to plateau. 
This occurred because the rate of other waiting list removals from the OP waiting list rose 
and eventually caused the number of waiting list removals to balance the number referrals 
onto the waiting list.
Generation o f Costs Over Time
The preparation costs for the mobile service and integrated laboratory were quoted at 
approximately £6,500 and £1 million respectively and the district running cost rate was 
approximately £50/mth. There was a penalty associated with the district service as with 
the case of Ribsley General. As synchronous investigation and treatment was not 
permitted within current guidelines, some patients had to undergo a second procedure at 
the tertiary level. Applying the same assumptions for the case of Ribsley General (see 
§10.2.2), the same level of activity carried out the tertiary level would have produced a 
9% reduction in activity costs. This would have amounted to £266,231 over the 59 
months that the district service was in place (average £4,512/mth).
10.3.3 Emphasising the Structure-Behaviour Linkages
Of the 8 main feedback processes that were presented in the conceptual model (see D1 in 
Appendix D), only 5 influenced the base case behaviour exhibited by the Veinbridge 
General case. The waiting time feedback loop (B3, which controlled the waiting time 
effect on demand) remained dormant because the referrals for an elective CC 
investigation were not influenced by the average waiting time. The 2 skills loops (which
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controlled the skills effect on demand) were rendered inactive by the expert CC operator 
making all the final decisions about referrals for a CC investigation.
Prior to the introduction of district CC services to Veinbridge General, the 5 remaining 
feedback loops were dormant as the system was stable. Neither the OP service nor the 
elective CC service operated at full capacity. This indicated that there was some scope for 
the activation of the feedback processes to raise the tertiary-based elective CC and OP 
activity levels (loops B1 and B4 respectively), if desired.
The drop in the tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate, associated with the closure 
of the tertiary lab, produced a shift in elective CC investigations to the district level (loop 
B2) and pushed the remaining tertiary-based service to operate at full capacity (loop Bl). 
The latter process was only briefly active as the tertiary-based utilisation was driven up to 
100% instantaneously. These processes acted to ensure that the desired waiting time was 
maintained. The adjustment in district activity was also prompted by a change in an 
exogenous factor, namely the reduction in the referral threshold as the consultant 
cardiologist took advantage of the district service to investigate more borderline cases. In 
fact, this factor (EffOFCC) would be formulated endogenously in a more sophisticated 
model as its adjustment is linked to the development of the district service through its 
different phases. The development of the district services led to increased knowledge 
about CC among patients and GPs and this stimulated demand for both OP appointments 
and CC investigations (loops Rl and R2 respectively). These knowledge effects were 
driven to saturation point and, from then on, the underlying processes remained dormant.
The adjustments in the district and tertiary investigation rates were made quickly as they 
were controlled by cardiologists who were familiar with the capacity changes at the 
tertiary and district levels as and when they occurred. This was in contrast with the 
stimulation of demand for CC investigations and OP appointments that arose from 
increased knowledge about CC (loops Rl and R2). The activation of these processes was 
lagged by the perception delay of GPs and patients. As they were based in the community, 
a period elapsed before they became aware of the service reconfigurations within the 
hospital sector.
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By the time demand was stimulated by GPs and patients, the tertiary service had already 
been driven to operate at full (albeit reduced) capacity. Therefore, the process underlying 
the knowledge effect on demand for elective CC investigations (loop R2) did not 
reinforce the adjustments in tertiary-based CC investigation rates (loop B l) as they were 
not active at the same time. By contrast, the former process interacted with the adjustment 
in district-based investigation rates (loop B2); more district activity generated more 
knowledge about CC which stimulated demand and thus led to calls for more activity in 
order to maintain the desired waiting time.
The processes underlying the knowledge effect on demand for CC (loop R2) and 
adjustments in district activity (loop B2) also interacted with the processes underlying the 
knowledge effect on demand for OP services (loop R l) and adjustments in OP activity 
(loop B4). More district activity generated further demand for an OP appointment which 
led to calls for more OP activity to maintain the desired waiting time. Associated with 
increases in OP activity were further referrals for CC investigations which contributed to 
calls for more district activity. When the knowledge effects reached saturation point and 
the OP service was driven to operate at full capacity, these calls for further district activity 
ceased.
The OP waiting list and average time spent on the OP waiting list exhibited steady 
increases due to the lack of OP capacity. These variables displayed asymptotic growth due 
to the action of a balancing process which controlled other waiting list removals. This 
process (labelled loop B in the stock and flow diagrams. See El in Appendix E) was 
driven by changes to the length of the OP waiting list. It only represented a minor 
feedback process whilst other processes were active, but as the saturation points were 
reached, a shift in loop dominance occurred such that this loop became dominant. The 
action of this loop caused the OP waiting list removals to rise towards the level of the 
waiting list referrals. This loop would become dormant when these two levels balanced 
and a new equilibrium would be achieved. The simulation indicated that this would not 
occur within the time scale considered.
Another endogenous process (represented in the stock and flow diagrams but not 
highlighted) was also driven by increases in the OP waiting list - the deterioration of 
waiting list patients who were admitted to hospital, subsequently restabilised and were
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then referred on for an elective CC investigation. The effects of this feedback loop, which 
contributed to reductions in the OP waiting list and increases in the CC investigation 
waiting list, were minor.
As the district service was not operating at full capacity, there was scope for further 
increases in the district investigation rates. This occurred when the integrated laboratory 
opened at Veinbridge General and the consultant cardiologist took advantage of the 
opportunity presented by the new facility to offer a CC investigation to more borderline 
cases. This prompted the district activity rate to increase (loop B2) in order to maintain 
the desired waiting time goal.
In contrast with the case of Ribsley General, exogenous factors played a minor role in 
producing the basic trend exhibited by the CC investigation waiting list at Veinbridge 
General. Several endogenous processes interacted to generate further pressure on the 
system (loops R l, R2, R3 and B2). Exogenous factors which also played parts were the 
increase in district CC capacity and the effect of other factors on referrals for an elective 
CC investigation (but a more sophisticated formulation would have represented the latter 
factor endogenously). The mechanisms that were responsible for the OP trends in the 
Veinbridge General case provided a further contrast to the Ribsley General experiences as 
different endogenous processes were responsible for the observed behaviour. At 
Veinbridge General, the process of adjustment in OP activity (loop B4) only acted briefly 
to increase the OP activity rate to full capacity. Thereafter, this process was rendered 
inactive whilst the emphasis shifted to the process of adjustment in the number of other 
waiting list removals (loop B in the stock and flow diagram. See El in Appendix E).
The base case analysis suggested that efforts to control demand or meet demand would 
have produced more desirable system behaviour for the Veinbridge General case. Directly 
weakening the process whereby demand was stimulated for OP services (loop R l) would 
have achieved the former and the latter would have been achieved by intensifying the 
process underlying increases in OP activity rates (loop B4).
deducing stimulated demand for CC services would have led to fewer calls to increase the 
district activity which would in turn, have generated less stimulated demand for OP 
services. If this could have been achieved, CC resources could have been diverted to OP
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services. However, this would not have been acceptable. Furthermore, controlling the 
knowledge about the district service, by reducing the marketing of the district service 
(decelerating or weakening the process underlying the knowledge effect on demand), 
would not have been acceptable. This would have interfered with the efforts to produce 
sufficient demand for the service. A more acceptable approach to diminishing the 
stimulation of demand for OP services (loop R l) would have been to reduce the pressure 
to refer via the use of new referral guidelines. This would have limited the impact of the 
knowledge about the district service. Capacity increases would have enabled increases in 
the OP activity rates (loop B4). However, this intervention would have formed a less 
preferable approach, compared to the use of new referral guidelines, given the additional 
costs involved.
Another aspect of the undesirable behaviour was the rise in the CC investigation waiting 
list. It was the increases in the waiting list, produced by the increase in demand for an 
elective CC investigation that required the elective CC investigation rate to rise to 
maintain the desired waiting time (loops Bl and B2). Capacity increases would have 
failed to control the length of the waiting list. This is because the current decision rule 
was to adjust the investigation rate to meet a desired waiting time and not a desired 
waiting list length. To eliminate or reduce the increases in the waiting list, it would have 
been necessary to modify the process underlying adjustments in the investigation rate 
towards aiming to maintain a desired waiting list size rather than a desired waiting time. 
Doing so would have also controlled the average waiting time. This would have involved 
using the available information about the system in a different way and introducing 
further feedback effects. This suggestion is consistent with Wolstenholme’s (1999a) 
experience in his community care study where changes to flow (or rate) variables had 
greater leverage than changes to stock variables (e.g. capacities).
10.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis was applied to explore the robustness of the base case behaviour to 
various model assumptions. As with the case of Ribsley General, the understanding of the 
causes of the base case behaviour provided pointers towards suitable areas for the use of 
sensitivity analysis. For the Veinbridge General case, the following issues were explored:
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the availability of district services; availability of elective CC capacity; CC investigation 
waiting time goal; knowledge effects on demand; and, skills effect on demand.
Note that variations in the assumptions about the elective CC capacities were not explored 
as part of the sensitivity analysis although there were doubts about the reliability of the 
data provided as mentioned in §9.3.1. Experimenting with other capacity levels would 
have been pointless as those specified were appropriate for the purpose of this study.
Limiting the Availability o f District Services (Exps V4-V7)
Four scenarios clarified the role played by district services in the OP capacity shortages 
and the rise in the CC investigation waiting list. These involved: the absence of district 
services at Veinbridge General; the temporary use of district services to compensate for 
the tertiary facilities closures in 1996/1997 and 1998 only; the temporary use of district 
services to support an expanded tertiary service (50% expansion); and, further district 
sessions in addition to those in 1996/1997 and 1998 thus producing a periodic district 
service. The additional district based capacities were set to provide the same levels as 
those during the 1996/1997 period. It was assumed that a temporary district service at 
Veinbridge General would have produced less stimulated demand due to the knowledge 
effects, compared to the base case (which involved a permanent district service). The 
district service would not have been promoted as much and less interest would have been 
generated. This is consistent with the differences in base case assumptions between 
Ribsley General and Veinbridge General.
Only the expanded tertiary service provided a permanent expansion in CC services whilst 
the temporary and periodic district services only provided short-term expansions. It was 
assumed that a temporary expansion in CC services at Veinbridge General would only 
have led the consultant cardiologist to temporarily reduce his referral threshold to 
investigate more ‘grey area’ cases. Furthermore, it was assumed that the service would 
have to have been in place for a reasonable period to prompt this change in referrals and 
therefore would only have been associated with the 1996/1997 tertiary facility closure.
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Figure 10.6 presents changes in the two waiting lists for the different scenarios. By 
limiting the use o f district services, less demand was stimulated which altered both the OP 
and CC behaviour modes. The absence o f a district service maintained the stability at the 
OP end of the referral chain whilst the other three scenarios only destabilised the OP 
system temporarily. The absence o f a district service produced sharp increases in the CC 
investigation waiting list during the loss of tertiary capacity. However, when the tertiary 
facilities reopened, by pushing the system to operate at full capacity, the CC service 
gradually ‘recovered’ so that by April 2001 (t=72), the waiting list returned to the pre­
district service levels (46% lower than the base case).
The other three scenarios also altered the asymptotic growth in the CC investigation 
waiting list to a rise and fall. For these, the fall in the waiting list was attributed to the 
decline in patient pressure following the withdrawal o f the district service. With the 
temporary and periodic district services, the waiting list returned to its desired level. After 
the 1996/1997 sessions, when the service was reintroduced periodically, it was in place 
for an insufficient length o f time to stimulate significant levels o f demand. The CC 
waiting list only rose to 197 patients (16% lower than the base case) and the pressure 
imposed by an excessive waiting list was reduced by over 70%. The 1996/1997 district 
sessions stimulated demand and, after the district service (and the overall capacity 
increases it provided) was withdrawn, there was a delay before demand returned to the 
pre-district service levels.
Expanding the tertiary service led to the CC investigation waiting list stabilising at 192 
patients which was 18% lower than that associated with the base case but in excess of the
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desired level. The waiting list did not fall further due to the assumption that the 
cardiologists would stimulate demand to justify the increased tertiary-based capacity. The 
experiment involved a 50% increase in tertiary-based capacity. Sensitivity analysis 
showed that, to maintain the same level of capacity utilisation as that prior to the 
expansion in services, the cardiologists would have to stimulate twice as much demand as 
that associated with the introduction of the integrated catheter laboratory (in the base 
case). Demand would also have to be stimulated earlier, compared to the base case, given 
the different timing of the increase in tertiary-based capacity and opening of the integrated 
catheter laboratory. Therefore, for the case of Veinbridge General, limiting the district 
service did not control the stimulated demand for CC services, it only altered its 
underlying mechanisms.
Limiting the Availability o f Elective Capacity: A Winter Crisis (Exp V8)
The model was used to demonstrate how a winter crisis might impact upon the delivery of 
services. A crisis was introduced during the 3 month period just before the 1998 closure 
of tertiary facilities (t=32 to t=35). Dramatic reductions in elective capacity were 
considered - 50% at the tertiary level and 75% at the district level. Compared to the case 
of Ribsley General, it was expected that there would be fewer tertiary-based cancellations 
with the Veinbridge case as this would refer to higher risk electives only.
The effects of the crisis were apparent for some time after it had passed, and were 
diminished to some extent by the assumed ‘knee jerk’ reaction (reduction in referrals) to 
the capacity loss. The CC investigation waiting list dropped temporarily but there was 
insufficient capacity for the system to maintain the desired waiting time. The average time 
spent on the waiting list peaked at 4.9 months (39% higher than desired) and 9 months 
elapsed before it returned to the desired level. The experiment also showed that the 
duration of the drop in district activity was too short to alter the knowledge effects on 
demand. Therefore, the (endogeously generated) demand for an OP appointment was 
unaffected by the crisis.
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Adjusting the CC Investigation Waiting Time Goal (Exp V9)
It was assumed that, for the Veinbridge General case, the desired waiting time for a CC 
investigation was not reduced when the district service was present. Unlike the case of 
Ribsley General, at Veinbridge General CC capacity shortages did not exist (the desired 
waiting time was maintained). Furthermore, as the district service was permanent, there 
was no need to ‘squeeze’ as much as possible out o f the service in a short space o f time. 
The impact of altering this assumption was considered. Seeking a reduced waiting time 
stimulated certain feedback processes. Higher levels o f district activity were produced and 
this stimulated further demand for OP services overall as the saturation point was reached 
earlier and higher waiting times and waiting list sizes resulted.
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Figure 10.7 shows the effects on the length of the CC investigation waiting list. The figure 
shows that the increases in the waiting list, reflected in the base case, were eliminated and 
a final list length o f 117 patients was produced which was 11 patients lower than the pre­
district service level and 50% lower that the final list length within the base case 
behaviour.
Altering the Knowledge Effects on Demand (Exps V10-V12)
In the base case, demand was stimulated by the consequences o f increased knowledge 
about CC investigations and this led to increased pressure on the system. As with the case 
of Ribsley General, assumptions were made about these knowledge effects on demand 
based upon information derived from the interviews. The experimental design did not
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extend to interviewing GPs and patients although the experiences of cardiologists and 
numerical data clearly showed that these effects existed (see §7.4.3). Sensitivity analysis 
was applied to address the uncertainties in these assumptions. Again, changes to the delay 
for GPs and patients to perceive changes in the availability of district services and 
changes to the extent to which increased knowledge could stimulate demand for OP 
appointments were considered. The perception delay was increased and reduced and the 
extent was increased. These changes altered the speed and intensity of the processes 
underlying the knowledge effect on demand (loops Rl and R2).
Unlike the case of Ribsley General, these changes only produced numerical changes and 
the modes of behaviour remained unaltered. Reducing the perception delay led to pressure 
on CC services to occur sooner and this was reflected in the CC waiting list rising sooner. 
The situation was reversed when the perception delay was extended. The changes were 
asymmetric due to the nonlinear nature of the knowledge effect on demand; the increases 
in pressure were generally greater than the reductions in pressure. For example, reducing 
the perception delay by 50% led to a 2.5% increase in the pressure exerted by an 
excessive CC waiting list whilst reducing the perception delay by 50% produced a lower 
decrease of 2.3%. Reducing the perception delay also led to OP capacity shortages to 
occur sooner and the OP capacity shortages were delayed when the perception delay was 
extended. The differences with the base case diminished as time elapsed due to the effect 
of other waiting list removals slowing down the growth in the OP waiting list and average 
time spent on the OP waiting list. The higher the OP waiting list, the quicker the time it 
took for that list and its constituent waiting time to plateau. Changes in the perception 
delay were also considered as part of the policy analysis (see Chapter 11).
The extent of the knowledge effect on demand for an OP appointment was doubled. As 
expected, this led to increased pressure on both OP and CC services. The average time 
spent on the OP waiting list reached the February 1998 levels (when the integrated lab 
opened) about 11 months earlier.
It was not possible to draw conclusions about the accuracy of the estimates used for the 
base case. However, these assumptions merely added to a number of other assumptions 
that had been made and which together produced behaviour modes which were consistent
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with those described by the collaborators. Therefore, it was concluded that, for the 
purpose of this study, the estimates were appropriate.
Introducing a Skills Effect on Demand (Exp VI3)
The base case reflected the fact that the expert CC operator made all the final decisions 
about referrals for an elective CC investigation. Therefore, the skills effect on demand 
was absent. It was stated previously that this absence contributed to the stability of the CC 
waiting list and waiting times. To examine to what extent this was the case, a scenario 
was considered whereby a skills effect was present. This involved the expert delegating 
responsibility for making final decisions to both the junior operator and the other doctor 
who screened patients for a CC investigation. It was assumed that a third of decisions 
were each made by the expert, junior and the other doctor at Veinbridge General, who 
was another consultant cardiologist. The model had to be reinitialised to make allowances 
for the reduced skills effect on demand (from a value of 1 in the base case to 0.72). 
Introducing a skills effect led to periodic drops in the CC investigation waiting list. This 
resulted in a minimum waiting list of 118 patients (10 patients lower than the base case) 
and just over a 2% drop in the overall pressure from an excessive waiting list.
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis supported the description of the basic causes of the 
base case behaviour. Furthermore, it revealed some useful insights which later formed the 
basis of some policy experiments. These will be addressed in the next chapter.
10.4 SUMMARY
This chapter presented the base case analyses for the two case studies. The basic causes of 
the contrasting problematic behaviours were explained with reference to the underlying 
feedback structure. The Ribsley General case had persistent capacity shortages at the CC 
investigation end of the referral chain which were alleviated by capacity increases. For the 
Veinbridge General case, the introduction of district services had stimulated demand to 
the extent to generate OP capacity shortages and rises in the CC investigation waiting list. 
The Ribsley problematic behaviour was mainly explained by exogenous factors and 
endogenous processes that acted exogenously. By contrast, the emphasis for the 
Veinbridge behaviour was on endogenous processes. Sensitivity analysis was applied to
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demonstrate the robustness of the explanations of the basic causes and explore the base 
case further.
The base case analyses provided insight into how more desirable behaviour could have 
been achieved. For the Ribsley General case, the analysis suggested parameter changes to 
diminish the intensity of the mechanisms underlying the increase in the CC investigation 
waiting list and waiting times. Whilst parameter changes could also have alleviated the 
undesirable behaviour for Veinbridge General, the analysis also suggested the potential 
for a structural change. These issues will be explored further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 11
MODEL-BASED POLICY ANALYSES
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 10 presented the base case analyses for the two case studies. For each case, the 
problematic behaviour was explained with reference to the underlying feedback structure. 
This led to some suggestions into how more desirable behaviour could have been 
achieved. Further suggestions for improvement arose from the sensitivity analyses which 
were carried out to probe further into the base case behaviours. In this chapter, these 
suggestions are followed up with a series of model-based policy experiments (policy 
analyses). Their effects and causes are explained. Note that the resulting policy 
recommendations and policy lessons, and the operationalisation of the policy 
recommendations will be discussed in Chapter 12.
For both case studies, problems had arisen from the imbalance between supply and 
demand. In the case of Ribsley General, these problems predated the introduction of 
district services whilst the introduction of the district service was the cause of the 
problems in the case of Veinbridge General. The policy alternatives that were considered 
involved two basic strategies: aiming to meet demand and aiming to control demand. The 
former involved modifications to the supply of services and the goals that drive the 
patient activity rates whilst the latter involved alterations to the demand for services. It 
should be noted that the aim of this study was not to investigate all possible policy 
interventions and combinations of interventions. In order to illustrate the potential 
benefits of applying the SD approach, only a selected number of interventions were 
investigated.
As discussed in Chapter 4, an SD simulation model can provide a flexible framework in 
which to design robust policies by exploring the likely effects of a variety of different 
policy alternatives. Policy interventions in the real system may be represented in the
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model by changes to the model’s parameters and/or its structure. Both types of 
interventions were considered in this study. A model parameter that is found to be 
sensitive may suggest a policy leverage point. This is the term given to a point where a 
change produces more desirable system behaviour. Structural changes involve changes to 
the form and number of model equations. They include the introduction of new feedback 
structure, which represents new ways of manipulating the available information in the real 
system. System dynamicists place great importance on structural changes. This is because 
the structure of a feedback system tends to be the strongest single determinant of its 
behaviour, whilst the behaviour tends to be insensitive to most parameter changes (as 
described in §5.4.2).
The Ribsley General policy experiments are described first. Parameter changes are 
considered as policy alternatives (§11.2). This comprises an investigation into elective CC 
capacity changes (§11.2.1), the use of demand management strategies (§11.2.2), changes 
to the CC operator skills base (§11.2.3), and OP capacity changes (§11.2.4). The next 
section (§11.3) is devoted to structural changes as policy alternatives. The structural 
changes that arise from parameter changes are highlighted (§11.3.1) before considering 
the effect of changes to the activity targets (§11.3.2-11.3.4). The case of Veinbridge 
General is then considered. The different circumstances of Veinbridge General are 
reflected in a different set of policy experiments. One section is devoted to parameter 
changes (§11.4) and another (§11.5) focuses on structural changes. In the final section 
(§11.6), the chapter is summarised.
As described in Chapter 5, the results of the experiments were evaluated on the basis of 
changes to the waiting list lengths, average waiting times, resource usage and referral 
rates. The indices proposed in §5.4.3 were used to summarise, for a given time period, the 
instances when pressure was imposed by excessive waiting lists and waiting times. In 
explaining the results of the experiments, references are frequently made to the basic 
mechanisms. These are reproduced in Appendix D. Note that whilst this chapter contains 
only a sample of the results, further results and other details about the experiments may be 
found in Appendix E.
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11.2 RIBSLEY GENERAL ANALYSIS: PARAMETER CHANGES
For the case of Ribsley General, a number of suggestions for parameter changes arose 
from the base case analysis. These involved: changes to the capacity for elective CC 
investigations; use of demand management strategies; changes to the CC operator skills 
base; and, increases to the capacity for OP appointments.
11.2.1 Altering the Capacity for Elective CC Investigations
The problems in the case of Ribsley General involved unacceptable delays to undergo an 
elective CC investigation. In §10.2.4,1 demonstrated the impact of the temporary losses 
of tertiary-based elective CC capacity and the importance of the use of the district service 
in compensating for these capacity losses and providing additional capacity. In this 
section, this analysis continues by presenting the results of several other experiments 
based upon capacity changes.
Reconfiguring the Base Case Capacity Increases (Exps R21-R23)
Before considering the effect of capacity increases, a different configuration of the base 
case capacity increases (a resource neutral scenario) was investigated. The aim of this 
experiment was to test whether or not fewer capacity changes could provide greater 
stability on the performance and thus generate less pressure on the system. The base case 
involved the provision of district services for 14 months, in total, over two periods 
between June 1996 and May 1998 inclusive (t=14 to t=37), and produced significant 
increases in capacity. For this policy experiment, the total capacity increases were 
averaged and spread over the 24 months, to represent a constant provision of district 
services for this period, and less dramatic capacity changes - a semi-permanent, reduced 
district service. The simulated effects on the average times spent waiting are shown in 
Figure 11.1.
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Figure 11.1 Some Effects o f a Semi-Permanent Reduced District Service
Compared to the base case, this experiment produced numerical changes and phase shifts 
but it did not alter the basic modes of behaviour for OP services or CC services. Greater 
pressure was produced at the OP end of the referral chain, as demand was stimulated for a 
longer period. Demand was still stimulated to the maximum extent despite the reduced 
district-based investigation rate but the stimulated demand rose and fell from the 
maximum extent more slowly (due to the reduced district-based activity and the drop in 
activity when the tertiary facility reopened). Consequently, the average time spent on the 
OP waiting list exceeded its desired level for approximately 8 further months and 55 
additional referrals for an OP appointment were produced. Furthermore, this led to 50 
further OP appointments.
There was greater stability at the CC end of the referral chain and the utilisation o f the 
district facility rose but the waiting list only dropped to 50 patients (over 40% higher than 
the base case). As with the OP end o f the referral chain, demand for elective CC 
investigations was still stimulated to the maximum extent and the stimulated demand rose 
and fell from the maximum extent more slowly. Demand was stimulated by low waiting 
times to a lower degree but for a longer period. The lower activity rates led to CC operator 
skills and confidence being gained more slowly so the stimulation o f demand due to the 
skills effect was delayed. The net effect on elective CC services was the average time 
spent on this waiting list exceeding its desired level for approximately 10 further months 
and 35 additional referrals arising, prompting a total o f 19 more elective CC 
investigations to be carried out. The overall costs generated over the 54 months (the 
duration o f the simulation run) rose by nearly £22,000 (nearly 1% increase).
262
Therefore, by reconfiguring the base case CC capacity changes over a longer period, 
whilst the monthy cost rate was lower, by generating costs over a longer period, greater 
costs were incurred in total. Furthermore, greater pressure was imposed on the system 
overall as more demand was stimulated. New referral guidelines could be used to ensure 
that the additional resources were used to deal with existing demand and not new demand 
(reflecting “joined-up thinking”). Whilst strict referral guidelines eliminated the increases 
in the OP waiting list and average waiting time (see §11.2.2. for definitions), only modest 
guidelines were required to produce improvements in the CC behaviour whilst the district 
service was in place i.e. a persistent downward trend.
Increasing Capacity (Exps R24-R32)
As the problems in the case of Ribsley General involved unacceptable delays to undergo 
an elective CC investigation, an obvious approach to improving the behaviour would be 
to increase the capacity. Experiments were carried out to examine the effects of three 
different ways of achieving capacity increases.
In the first experiment, a permanent district service was modelled by indefinitely 
maintaining the capacity levels that corresponded with the previous experiment. It was 
assumed that continuing the base case district levels would not have been affordable so 
this more modest scenario was considered. It was also assumed that a permanent district 
service would produce greater patient and GP pressure to refer than a temporary or semi­
permanent service as more effort would be devoted to promoting the service and greater 
interest would be generated. Therefore, different knowledge functions were specified. The 
knowledge functions represented the combined effect of pressure from GPs and patients 
and the response to that pressure. A change in the response would depend upon the 
referral behaviour of the cardiologist and a cardiologist at Ribsley General, following the 
established conservative referral tradition, would only be expected to produce a moderate 
response. Therefore, for this experiment (involving a permanent district service), the 
maximum values of the knowledge functions were higher than the base case (which 
involved a temporary district service and therefore would be assumed to generate lower 
pressure to refer) but lower than those for Veinbridge General (which involved a 
permanent district service and assuming a similar degree of pressure but a more 
‘aggressive’ response). It was also assumed that permanent capacity increases would not
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prompt a reduction in the waiting time and waiting list goals as, unlike the base case, 
there would not be the need to ‘squeeze as much out o f the system’ and as quickly as 
possible. This assumption also applied to the next experiment.
For the second experiment, an expanded tertiary-based service was assumed with the 
district service only used to cover facility closures. The same total capacity levels as the 
previous experiment were provided in order to compare directly capacity increases at the 
tertiary and district levels.
In the third experiment, further temporary district sessions were added to the base case 
assumptions to produce a periodic district service. This provided approximately 8% lower 
capacity levels overall compared with the previous two experiments. It was assumed that 
providing the same capacity levels overall would have been unrealistic as this would have 
involved exceptionally high levels of district capacity. The effects on the CC investigation 
and OP waiting lists are shown in Figure 11.2.
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Figure 11.2 Some Effects o f Increased Elective CC Capacity 
(The OP waiting list graphs for 1 and 4 are the same)
Effects on OP Behaviour
Expanding the tertiary service did not alter the OP modes o f behaviour. However, 
compared to the base case, less demand was stimulated as the level o f district activity was 
lower. For example, the waiting list only rose to 437 patients (5 patients lower than the 
base case). Introducing further district sessions also did not alter the OP behaviour modes. 
Furthermore, this change did not stimulate any further pressure from GPs and patients to 
refer as, for each session, the district service was in place for an insufficient length o f time
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to prompt a change in their behaviour. By contrast, a permanent district service stimulated 
further demand, and to such an extent that the OP variables exhibited steep asymptotic 
growth towards new equilibrium values. By October 1999 (t=54) both the OP waiting list 
and average time spent on the OP waiting list were over twice their base case value. These 
effects were alleviated to some extent by the use of new referral guidelines but only strict 
guidelines eliminated these problems.
Effects on CC Behaviour
All three experiments produced alterations in the CC behaviour modes from the base case. 
In the short-term and medium-term, the permanent district service and expanded tertiary 
service experiments exhibited a higher average waiting time and waiting list but the 
behaviour of these variables was more stable, albeit oscillatory. The oscillations were 
generated by the skills effect. Although the total capacity increases were equal, the 
permanent district service produced higher waiting list and waiting times relative to the 
base case due to the district service stimulating more demand. This also caused the OP 
activity rates to rise and thus push more patients along the referral chain. Furthermore, it 
caused more patients to deteriorate on the OP waiting list which then contributed to 
further referrals for an elective CC investigation. The OP activity rate was pushed to full 
capacity and the deterioration of patients rose with the rise in the OP waiting list. 
Moreover, as time progressed, this caused an increase in the differential between the CC 
waiting list and waiting times associated with the permanent district service and those 
associated with the expanded tertiary service.
Expanding the tertiary service stimulated demand for CC investigations due to the waiting 
time effect, but as there were no further knowledge effects on demand this was 
approximately one third of that which arose with the permanent district service. Given the 
assumed expectations on CC services, both experiments significantly reduced the pressure 
imposed by excessive waiting times compared to the base case. However, the permanent 
district service produced a marked increase in the pressure exerted by an excessive 
waiting list length.
Adding further district sessions on a temporary basis produced more marked oscillatory 
behaviour, compared to the other experiments as periodic capacity changes were added to
265
the skills effect. This also resulted in phase differences in the average waiting time and 
waiting list compared to other experiments as the timing of the capacity increases differed 
to that of the changes in skills. Pressure on the CC service was reduced by the capacity 
increases provided by the district service and the ‘knee jerk’ reactions (reduction in 
referrals) prompted by the withdrawals of the district service. Compared to the base case, 
the pressure from an excessive waiting list and an excessive average waiting time for a 
CC investigation were reduced by about 11% and 2% respectively. These reductions 
would have increased over time. Whilst the average waiting time was generally lower 
than that associated with the permanent district service, greater pressure was imposed as it 
was assumed that the expectations would be higher. This was because it was assumed that 
if a district service was temporary, a lower average waiting time would be desired during 
periods that the district service was present as efforts would be made to squeeze as much 
out the system as quickly as possible.
Introducing new referral guidelines reduced the pressure on CC services to some extent 
but this did not produce significant changes in the CC behaviour modes.
To summarise, these experiments demonstrated that some ways of increasing capacity 
were more effective in alleviating pressure than others. Furthermore, the differences were 
not simply determined by the size of the capacity increase, but also the action of feedback 
effects and other changes prompted by the approach to increasing capacity.
Linking Structure to Behaviour
Exogenous factors played a large role in influencing the base case behaviour for Ribsley 
General. However, endogenous processes rather than exogenous factors tend to be the 
more powerful determinants of behaviour. These processes can reinforce or control 
behaviour; they are self-sustaining mechanisms whereas exogenous factors need to be 
repeatedly altered. Therefore, activating endogenous processes that control undesirable 
behaviour could provide a powerful means to improving the mode of behaviour of the 
system. However, activating endogenous processes that reinforce undesirable behaviour 
would be unhelpful.
266
Referring to the basic mechanisms in Appendix D, introducing a semi-permanent reduced 
district service did not alter the mode of behaviour nor the basic mechanisms that were 
responsible for that behaviour. Capacity changes (exogenous factors) continued to play a 
key role in reducing the CC investigation waiting list and waiting times (by influencing 
the causal links along loops Bl and B2). The tertiary service still operated at full capacity, 
so loop Bl remained inactive. Although the district service was prolonged, as it operated 
at full capacity for the whole period, adjustments in the levels of district-based activity 
were driven completely by exogenous factors. Although the district activity was reduced, 
the knowledge effects on demand were still pushed to operate at maximum intensity. A 
consequence of prolonging the stimulation of demand for OP appointments was an 
extended action of the process underlying adjustments in the OP activity rate (loop B4). 
The intensity of the processes underlying the waiting time effect on demand (loop B3) 
was diminished, but active for a longer period. In addition, the intensity of the links 
associated with the process of the gain in the skills effect on demand (loops R3 and R4) 
was also diminished, as the CC investigation rate was lower.
Adding further district sessions altered the mode of behaviour relative to the base case but 
did not alter the basic mechanisms that were responsible for the behaviour. Again, 
capacity changes (exogenous factors) continued to play a key role in reducing the CC 
investigation waiting list and waiting times (by influencing the causal links along loops 
Bl and B2). Adding more capacity merely extended that role.
The role played by capacity changes in reducing the CC investigation waiting list and 
waiting times was also extended with the permanent district service. The knowledge 
effects on demand were increased by the higher response associated with a permanent 
service. Changing the capacity levels altered the rate at which skills stimulated demand; 
compared to the base case, demand was stimulated more slowly when the district service 
was first introduced (as the investigation rate was lower) but subsequently stimulated 
demand more quickly (as the investigation rate was higher). Both the knowledge and 
skills effects (loops R l , R2, R3 and R4) continued to be generated by exogenous factors 
whilst the basic mechanism underlying the waiting time effect (loop B3) changed. In the 
base case, the rise in the average waiting time drove the waiting time effect to saturation 
point. With a permanent district service, the rise and fall in the average waiting time 
meant that the waiting time effect was not saturated (and subsequently generated by
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exogenous factors). Therefore, it continued to be generated endogenously. Furthermore, 
as the average waiting time persisted above its desired level, demand was only 
suppressed, and not stimulated, by waiting times.
The basic mechanisms underlying the OP behaviour also changed. The emphasis 
underlying changes in the OP waiting list and waiting times switched from endogenous 
processes to exogenous factors as the stimulated demand forced the system to operate at 
full capacity. The ability to control the rise in the OP waiting list and waiting times was 
thus removed and these variables exhibited sharp increases in the absence of sufficient OP 
capacity. This behaviour was only curtailed by the action of the endogenous process 
underlying the rate of other waiting list removals, which increased with the rise in the 
waiting list.
Expanding the tertiary service led to the utilisation of tertiary-based capacity dropping 
below 100% whilst in the base case, the tertiary-based service operated at full capacity. 
This altered the mechanisms underlying the adjustment in tertiary-based activity and 
changes in skills effect from being generated by exogenous factors to endogenous 
processes (activated loops Bl and R4). Consequently, the CC investigation waiting list 
and waiting times were controlled without the need for further capacity changes. The 
utilisation of district-based capacity also dropped so that it only reached 100% for a brief 
period. This altered the mechanisms underlying the adjustment in district-based activity 
and changes in the knowledge effects on demand and skills effect from exogenous factors 
to endogenous processes. The capacity utilisation actually dropped to 85% and it was 
assumed that this level would be sufficiently high not to warrant the further stimulation of 
demand to justify the capacity increases. Rather than operating at full capacity, having 
some slack in the system would possibly be welcomed in the case of an unexpected rise in 
demand.
In all cases, introducing new referral guidelines diminished the intensity of the causal 
links around the feedback loops. Strict referral guidelines deactivated the causal links 
around the loops that controlled the waiting time effect (loop B3) and the knowledge 
effects on demand (loops Rl and R2).
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11.2.2 Using Demand Management Strategies
Further experiments investigated the use of demand management strategies representing 
efforts to control, rather than meet, demand. Depending upon the perspective taken, 
controlling demand could either mean reducing (or limiting) demand or supporting 
increases in demand if the aim was to identify more high risk cases. Identifying more high 
risk patients could be considered as a means to managing future demand and future costs 
by referring patients onto the necessary treatment before major problems arose.
Altering the GP and Patient Perception Delay (Exps R13 & R14)
Two of the experiments described within the sensitivity analysis in §10.2.4 may be 
regarded as demand management strategies. They involved altering the delay for GPs and 
patients to respond to changes in the availability of district services. As illustrated in 
§10.2.4, reducing the perception delay altered the mode of behaviour. This change 
accelerated the gain in knowledge about the district service and thus triggered the 
stimulation of demand for OP services on both occasions that the district service was in 
place. The demand was also stimulated earlier on the first occasion. This involved 29 
further referrals for an OP appointment but only 3 further referrals for an elective CC 
investigation. In the base case, demand for OP services was only stimulated on the first 
occasion. As this led to an increase in OP activity rates, further demand for CC 
investigations was also stimulated indirectly.
By contrast, increasing the perception delay acted to limit and delay the stimulated 
demand. This involved 22 fewer referrals for an OP appointment but only 2 fewer 
referrals for an elective CC investigation. Compared to the base case, slightly greater 
pressure was imposed on CC services by an excessive waiting list and average waiting 
time. The reason for this result, which is counter-intuitive, is that reducing the number of 
referrals meant that the system was not pushed as hard.
Use o f New Referral Guidelines (Exp R33 & R34)
Further ways of managing demand for services involve the use of referral guidelines 
specifying new referral criteria. I discussed referral guidelines in §6.6.3. The impact of the
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use of new guidelines was represented in two experiments by reductions in the levels of 
stimulated demand associated with the waiting time and knowledge effects on demand. 
The skills effect was not considered as this only suppressed demand. The 
operationalisation of referral guidelines is described in §12.3.4.
For the first experiment, it was assumed that all the stimulated demand was suppressed. 
This might be considered to reflect the implementation of very stringent rules about who 
should and who should not be referred for CC investigations and OP appointments; this is 
referred to as the use of strict new guidelines. This might be considered to reflect a very 
unrealistic policy intervention. However, this experiment still had value in illustrating the 
maximum possible effect that a referral guideline could have in managing stimulated 
demand. Some might consider this an ideal policy. Others might consider it less than 
ideal, given that some high risk patients might not satisfy the criteria for an investigation 
if very strict criteria were imposed. Therefore, these patients can only be diagnosed 
accurately by undergoing a CC investigation. As discussed before, given the unpredictable 
nature of heart disease, some patients with severe disease may only display minor cardiac 
symptoms. The second experiment reflected the assumption that half the stimulated 
demand was suppressed. This might be considered to reflect the use of less stringent 
referral guidelines; this is referred to as the use of modest new guidelines.
Returning to §6.5.2 can help to illustrate the effects of new guidelines. In this section, it 
was discussed how patients considered for a referral may be categorised into: those for 
which a referral would be clearly inappropriate; those for which a referral is clearly 
clinically indicated; or those in the ‘grey area’ for which the appropriate course of action 
is uncertain and therefore subject to debate. It was assumed that all patients for which a 
referral is clearly indicated will be referred and patients for which a referral is deemed 
inappropriate will definitely not be referred. Those in the ‘grey area’ might form further 
referrals depending on the degree of ‘aggressiveness’ of the cardiologist. It was also 
assumed that demand may be suppressed or stimulated around some normal referral 
fraction, determined by the referral tradition of the particular hospital.
Both the base case and the effects of new guidelines are illustrated in the context of a 
conservative referral tradition in Figure 11.3. The figure depicts the potential suppression 
and stimulation of the referral fraction around the normal referral fraction and the
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consideration o f the referral of some ‘grey area’ cases as being inappropriate. Additional 
referrals that are regarded as inappropriate only refer to the views o f cardiologists at the 
hospital o f interest based upon their general attitude to referrals and their interpretation of 
the clinical guidelines in place. A more aggressive referral tradition would be reflected by 
smaller numbers of additional referrals deemed as inappropriate and a lower extent of 
demand suppression (see Figure 11.6 for the figure corresponding to Veinbridge General, 
where a more ‘aggressive’ referral tradition applies).
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Figure 11.3 Constraining Demand: A Conservative Referral Tradition 
(The dark line indicates the normal referral fraction. The relative sizes o f the three regions should not be 
regarded as descriptive as the purpose is merely to illustrate the constraints on demand.)
It was assumed that the use of new referral guidelines would extend the proportion of 
inappropriate referrals for further investigation, thus restricting the degree o f demand
271
stimulation. However, allowances are made for the inevitable persistence of ‘grey area’ 
cases and variations in attitudes, as it would be unrealistic to assume that variations in 
referral behaviour could be eliminated by the introduction of new guidelines. For 
example, the new guidelines might state that a referral would be inappropriate for certain 
groups of patients and not strictly necessary for other groups. A conservative attitude to 
referrals would be reflected by the referral of fewer of the latter groups compared to a 
more aggressive attitude and consequently view a higher number of referrals as 
inappropriate.
These changes reduced the pressure on OP services and on elective CC services both 
directly and indirectly as the reduced demand to deliver OP appointments led to lower OP 
activity rates and thus produced fewer referrals for CC investigations. For example, the 
use of modest referral guidelines produced savings of nearly £3,200 in OP activity costs 
and nearly £4,900 in CC activity costs over the simulation (54 months).
Doubling the reductions in demand did not double the reductions in pressure from 
excessive waiting lists and waiting times or double the cost savings. This was due to the 
non-linear nature of the waiting time and knowledge effects on demand. In terms of 
qualitative changes, the effect on OP services was greater than that on elective CC 
services as, in the case of excessive waiting times and waiting list for OP services, it was 
possible to target the entire cause of the demand increases. Using strict referral guidelines 
altered the OP mode of behaviour from temporary instability to uninterrupted stability. 
The CC mode of behaviour was unchanged because the imbalance between the supply 
and demand, though reduced, persisted.
Introducing demand management strategies is analogous to controlling flow variables 
(more specifically, the referral rate). Some demand management strategies had a greater 
impact than others, given the extent of the capacity shortages at Ribsley General. 
However, they did not provide sufficient leverage to improve the CC behaviour, unlike 
the case of capacity changes (see §11.2.1). This was the opposite result to that of 
Wolstenholme’s study (1999a) which was mentioned at the end of §10.3.3. However, 
demand management strategies could still have played an important role by improving the 
leverage of capacity increases.
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Considering the basic feedback structure, demand management strategies diminished the 
intensity of the causal links and feedback processes that were responsible for the 
stimulation of demand, and diminished the intensity of the interactions between these 
processes. Increasing the GP and patient perception delay delayed the gain in knowledge 
about CC and the consequences of this gain in knowledge i.e. the stimulation of demand 
(loops Rl and R2) and adjustments in activity to address the demand increases (loops B l, 
B2 and B4). On the other hand, reducing the GP and patient knowledge perception delay 
intensified all these processes. The use of new guidelines to prioritise patients diminished 
the waiting time and knowledge effects on demand (loops B3 and R l and R2). This also 
reduced the need to increase the OP rate (loop B4) but it did not significantly reduce the 
need to increase the CC investigation rates (loops Bl and B2) nor significantly reduce the 
gain in CC skills (loops R3 and R4) as the imbalance between supply and demand 
persisted.
With demand management strategies in place, exogenous factors (capacity changes) 
continued to play a key role in influencing the CC investigation waiting list and waiting 
times. As a number of these strategies reduced demand, this role was reduced to some 
extent. The use of strict new referral guidelines altered the OP modes of behaviour by 
disabling the process underlying the knowledge effects on demand (loops Rl and R2). It 
also affected the basic mechanisms underlying the OP behaviour as suppressing all the 
stimulated demand removed the need for adjustments in the OP rate, therefore, this 
structure (loop B4) also remained dormant.
11.2.3 Altering the CC Operator Skills Base
(Exp R17)
The effect of accelerating the gain in CC skills on referrals for CC investigations was 
considered in §10.2.4 as part of the sensitivity analysis. This involved a 20% increase in 
the fraction of investigations from which the junior district operators learned. This 
parameter change may also be recast as a policy intervention intended to boost the 
identification of more high risk cases. In practice, this might involve an increase in the 
proportion of clinical cases that are discussed among juniors. There might be several 
factors motivating this intervention. Juniors would welcome the opportunity to gain skills 
more quickly whilst the consultants could delegate more of their cases more quickly. In
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this experiment, the periods during which novice CC operators lacked confidence and 
under-referred patients for CC was shortened, and thus accelerated their ascent up the 
‘learning curve’ towards the saturation point. This resulted in 7 additional referrals for an 
elective CC investigation.
Increasing the gain in CC skills reinforced the increase in referrals for CC investigations 
(loops R3 and R4). This resulted in a greater need to adjust CC activity rates in order to 
maintain the desired waiting time goal (intensifying the causal links along loops B1 and 
B2). The consequences of the increased activity rates were further stimulated demand due 
to the waiting time (loop B3) and knowledge effects (loops R1 and R2), and a greater 
need to adjust OP activity rates in order to maintain the OP desired waiting time goal 
(loop B4). However, the balance between the influences of exogenous factors and 
endogenous processes remained unchanged.
11.2.4 Increasing the OP Capacity
(Exps R35a- R35g)
The effects of increases in the exogenous level of demand for OP appointments were 
considered as part of the sensitivity analysis in §10.2.4. It was stated that whilst the 
system could cope with small increases in demand (1%), moderate increases (2% to 6%) 
raised the OP waiting list and waiting time to new levels above those desired. 
Furthermore, increases in excess of 6% resulted in a sustained increase in the waiting list 
and waiting times for a long period. Given that increases in the waiting list and waiting 
times resulted from an imbalance between supply and demand, as part of the policy 
analysis the effect of increasing the supply (i.e. OP capacity) under these scenarios was 
considered. Following the advice of the consultant at Ribsley General, the OP capacity 
was increased from 368 patients/month to 390 patients/month (6% increase).
Even with no exogenous demand increase (the base case assumption), the average waiting 
time was reduced as the demand on services was satisfied. In contrast to the case with 
normal capacity levels, the system could cope with small (1%) and moderate increases in 
demand (2% to 6%) by returning the waiting list and average waiting time to their desired 
levels. Increases between 7% and 12% raised the OP waiting list and waiting times to new 
levels whilst increases of 13% (rather than 7% under normal capacity levels) produced
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increases in the waiting list and waiting times for a long period. Equilibrium was only re­
established when the other waiting list removals rose to achieve a balance between the 
referral rate and waiting list removal rate.
Referring back to the feedback processes in the system, increasing the OP capacity levels 
served to intensify the adjustment in OP activity levels towards meeting the desired OP 
waiting time goal (loop B4). However, by contributing to a higher CC referral rate, this 
also increased the delivery of patients along the referral chain towards CC investigations 
and thus reinforced other feedback processes. The increase in OP capacity also led to a 
greater reliance on the adjustment in OP activity levels, rather than the consequences of 
the rise in other waiting list removals (this feedback process is labelled as loop B in El in 
Appendix E), to re-establish equilibrium.
11.3 RIBSLEY GENERAL ANALYSIS: STRUCTURAL CHANGES
11.3.1 Parameter Changes that Produce Structural Changes
Highlighted in the previous section were a number of parameter changes that weakened or 
intensified feedback loops. Some parameter changes had a more dramatic effect by 
completely disabling (or ‘switching off) structure within the system. These changes may 
also be regarded as producing structural changes. In the model, by setting parameter 
values to a particular value such as zero or unity, parts of equations, or whole equations 
are effectively cancelled out. For example, the use of strict new referral guidelines 
suppressed the stimulation of demand. This disabled the process whereby increased 
knowledge generated further demand for OP and CC services (loops R1 and R2). 
Furthermore, the process underlying increases in the OP rate, which would be required to 
meet the stimulated demand, also remained dormant (loop B4). Experiments were also 
carried out to investigate the effects of the more typical structural change in SD, involving 
the introduction of new feedback structure.
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11.3.2 Seeking Differen t A ctivity Targets 
(Exps R36-R52)
Experiments were carried to examine the effects of a change in the goal underlying 
adjustments in activity rates, from a desired waiting time to a desired waiting list size. 
The Veinbridge General base case analysis provided the motivation underlying this 
intervention and for the sake of completeness, it was also considered for the case of 
Ribsley General. The key structure for the decision to seek a desired waiting list is 
depicted in Appendix D in D3 and the basic equation for the desired activity rate is as 
follows:
Desired = Avg Referral + (Waiting List - Desired Waiting List) - Avg Other Waiting List.............(1)
Activity Rate Des. Waiting List Adj. Time Removal Rate
The simulation formulation and its rationale were described in §9.3.1. For the purpose of 
comparison, the basic equation for the decision to seek a desired waiting time (a base case 
assumption) is as follows:
Desired = Waiting List - Avg Other Waiting List............................................................. (2)
Activity Des. Waiting Time Removal Rate
It is important to differentiate between the factors that drive activity and those that are 
used to evaluate performance. Several targets may exist but the focus here is on the 
crucial factor or factors that drive activity. For one decision rule, the waiting time goal 
drives activity levels whilst for the other decision rule, the key factor is the desired 
waiting list size. In evaluating the ability to meet the desired goals, several factors were 
monitored including both the average waiting time and length of the waiting list as stated 
in §5.4.3. Following on from the calls in the literature for the waiting time to be the key 
concern (see §2.5.2) and not the waiting list, using the simulation model, it was possible 
to address the value of shifting the emphasis completely away from waiting lists.
It should be noted that increasing the activity rate in order to meet a waiting list goal will 
reduce the average waiting time. Conversely, increasing the activity rate in order to meet a 
waiting time goal may also achieve reductions in the length of the waiting list. Therefore,
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some overlap exists between the underlying motivation and the outcomes associated with 
the two rules. Using the simulation model, the extent of this overlap was revealed.
A series of experiments produced comparisons between the effects of seeking a desired 
waiting list and a desired waiting time. In order to isolate differences in the effects, it was 
necessary to ensure that these goals and the paths to these goals were consistent. This 
required some minor parameter changes. It was calculated that a CC investigation waiting 
list goal of 56 patients accompanied by desired waiting list adjustment times of 3 months 
was equivalent to a waiting time goal for a CC investigation of 3 months (see Appendix 
E, E5d for the calculations). These parameters departed from those specified by the 
Ribsley General consultant by setting a lower waiting list goal (56 patients, as opposed to 
60 patients) and a slower waiting list adjustment time towards its goal (3 months, as 
opposed to 2 months).
The first comparison involved the base case assumptions about supply and demand. 
Further comparisons probed further by altering these assumptions.
11.3.3 Effects o f  Seeking Different Activity Targets on OP Services
(Exps R36-R38)
Experiments showed that, when applying the base case assumptions about supply and 
demand, seeking a desired waiting list did not fundamentally alter the OP mode of 
behaviour. Seeking both activity targets led to the OP waiting list and average time spent 
on the OP waiting list returning to their respective targets. However seeking a desired 
waiting list overcompensated by temporarily causing the average time spent on the 
waiting list to be lower than its desired level.
Probing further with different demand scenarios, it became apparent that the outcomes 
were dependent upon the direction of change in demand and the ability to meet demand.
Altering Demand With Sufficient Capacity Available (Exps R41-R44)
When a small permanent increase in demand (0.5% increase) was introduced, as there was 
sufficient capacity for the system to cope, seeking a desired waiting list produced better
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results as shown in Figure 11.4(a). Note that although the quantitative differences in the 
OP waiting list are very small, the point to note is the significance o f the qualitative 
differences. By seeking a desired waiting list, both targets were met (overcompensating 
on the average time spent on the waiting list) whilst seeking a desired waiting time, the 
desired waiting list was not met. The situation was reversed when a small permanent 
decrease in demand (0.5% decrease) was introduced; seeking a desired waiting time 
produced the better results as shown in Figure 11.4(b). Table 11.1 provides a summary.
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Figure 11.4 Seeking Different Activity Targets with Sufficient Capacity to Cope with Changes in Demand 
((a) With 0.5% demand increase; (b) With 0.5% demand decrease. As described in Chapter 9, the desired 
OP waiting list length is 424 patients and the desired waiting time is just over 1.15 months (5 weeks 
converted to months). The initial differences are due to rounding errors. The simulation period is extended
in order to show the effects propagate.)
Table 11.1 Targets Met When Sufficient Capacity Available
Response to Increased Referrals 
Waiting List Waiting Time
Response to Decreased Referrals 
Waiting List Waiting Time
Seeking a Desired Waiting Time 
Seeking a Desired Waiting List
Target Not Met Target Met 
Target Met Target Met*
Target Met* 
Target Met
Target Met 
Target Not Met
(* Indicates overcompensation by producing value below desired level)
Given that there was sufficient capacity available, each decision rule met its respective 
target. However, seeking a desired waiting time when the referral rate increased 
produced a waiting list which was in excess o f its desired level. This result is not 
surprising as seeking a desired waiting time did not focus on maintaining the desired
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waiting list. Considering how the average waiting time is calculated (= waiting 
list/average waiting list removal rate), it can be seen that increasing activity levels (and 
therefore increasing the waiting list removal rate) to lower the waiting list to its desired 
level will also produce reductions in the average waiting time. However, striving to reach 
the desired waiting time will not necessarily address increases in the waiting list. In fact, a 
waiting time goal could be maintained if  increases in the waiting list were balanced by 
increases in the waiting list removals (i.e. waiting list/average waiting list removal rate 
remained constant). Therefore, a constant waiting time at its desired level could co-exist 
with an elevated or rising waiting list. This final point was highlighted by Hamblin et al 
(1998b).
Seeking a desired waiting time when the referral rate decreased produced a waiting list 
that was lower than its desired level i.e. overcompensated in meeting the waiting list 
target. This is not surprising as a constant waiting time at its desired level could co-exist 
with a reduced or decreasing waiting list, provided the waiting list is balanced by the 
waiting list removal rate.
Seeking a desired waiting list when the referral rate decreased produced an average 
waiting time which was in excess of its desired level. This occurred because to maintain 
the waiting list at its desired level, a reduced activity rate (and therefore reduced waiting 
list removal rate) was required to balance the reduced referral rate. Reducing the number 
of waiting list removals meant that the average waiting time rose. Similarly, to maintain 
the waiting list at its desired level when the referral rate increased, an increased activity 
rate (and commensurately increased waiting list removal rate) was required. Therefore, by 
seeking a desired waiting list, the average waiting time was reduced from its desired level 
and thus overcompensated in meeting the waiting time goal.
These experiments also showed the importance of monitoring both the waiting list and 
waiting times. In Figure 11.4(a), whilst seeking a desired waiting time controlled the 
average waiting time, this was only due to the activity rates rising (as reflected by the 
increased waiting list) to meet the increased demand. Therefore, maintaining the waiting 
time goal did not mean that the system was not under pressure.
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Increasing the Demand with Insufficient Capacity Available (Exps R45-R48)
In experiments where there was insufficient capacity to cope with the demand increase, 
the waiting time and waiting list goals were not maintained but rose to new equilibrium 
values as shown in Figure 11.5. However, by contrast with the earlier experiments 
involving increases in demand, seeking a desired waiting list did not produce a lower 
waiting list and average waiting time. A 7% increase in demand pushed the system to 
operate at full capacity and both decision rules led to the same equilibrium values 
although seeking a desired waiting list led to these values being reached more quickly as 
shown in Figure 11.5 (b). With a smaller increase in demand, 4%, the calls to increase 
activity were insufficient to push the system to operate at full capacity. In this case, higher 
equilibrium values were produced by seeking a desired waiting list as shown in Figure 
11.5 (a). These differences were due to the fact that seeking a desired waiting time led to 
greater calls for activity increases initially. By calling for more activity, more was 
delivered, therefore in the presence of capacity constraints, the discrepancy between the 
desired and actual activity rates was smaller. However, the activity target was never 
reached so the desired OP rate did not diminish but persisted in being higher than that 
called by seeking a desired waiting list.
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Figure 11.5 Seeking Different Activity Targets with Insufficient Capacity to Cope with Demand Increases 
((a) With 4% demand increase and system not pushed to operate at full capacity;
(b) With 7% demand increase and system pushed to operate at full capacity)
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Note that if the capacity shortages were such that the system was always pushed to 
operate at full capacity, then any differences between the desired activity rates would not 
have had any effect. In the experiments corresponding to Figure 11.5, there was initially 
spare capacity until the system was pushed to operate at full capacity.
It is possible to understand why seeking a desired waiting time in the context of demand 
increases led to greater calls for activity increases by re-examining the desired activity 
equations. These are basically as follows:
Seeking a desired waiting list:
Desired = Avg Referral + (Waiting List - Desired Waiting List) - Avg Other Waiting List (1)
Activity Rate Des. Waiting List Adj. Time Removal Rate
Seeking a desired waiting time:
Desired = Waiting List - Avg Other Waiting List............................................................ (2)
Activity Des. Waiting Time Removal Rate
In equation (1), as the referral rate is averaged, its impact will lag behind that on the 
waiting list.
To summarise: when there was sufficient capacity for the system to cope and demand 
increased, seeking a desired waiting list produced a lower waiting list and average waiting 
time compared to the outcomes of seeking a desired waiting time. The situation was 
reversed when demand was reduced. Waiting list and waiting time goals were met and in 
some cases the system overcompensated by producing lower levels than that desired. 
When there was insufficient capacity available and demand increased, in seeking both 
goals, neither the waiting list nor the waiting time goals were met. However, seeking a 
desired waiting time produced lower values or a slower ascent towards new equilibrium 
values in excess of those desired.
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11.3.4 Effects o f  Seeking Different Activity Targets on CC Services
(Exps R37, R38, R49-R52)
The experiments showed that, when applying the base case assumptions about supply and 
demand, seeking a desired waiting list did not alter the CC modes of behaviour. 
Furthermore, it produced higher pressure on elective CC services. For example, the 
pressure exerted by an excessive CC waiting list was 10% higher and that exerted by an 
excessive time spent on the CC waiting lists was 14% higher. This result was consistent 
with the OP analysis described in the previous section. This demonstrated that seeking a 
desired waiting time produced a lower waiting list and average waiting time when there 
was insufficient capacity to cope.
Several other experiments compared the two decision rules in circumstances that would 
increase the pressure imposed on the system. One experiment involved a reduction in 
supply for CC services associated with a winter crisis. As with the previous experiment, 
seeking a desired waiting list did not alter the mode of behaviour but produced lower 
pressure on OP services and higher pressure on elective CC services. A further 
experiment, which involved the removal of various factors including the skills, waiting 
time and knowledge effects, demonstrated that it was changes in demand rather than 
capacity losses that would reveal differences between the two decision rules.
In conclusion, there was certainly some overlap between seeking a desired waiting time 
and seeking a desired waiting list. However, seeking a desired waiting list was the more 
effective in coping with increases in demand that were within the resources available. 
When the referral rate led to the capacity constraints being approached, seeking a desired 
waiting time produced better results. Seeking a desired waiting list only matched the 
performance of that from seeking a desired waiting time in the long term in situations 
when the system was pushed to operate at full capacity. With reductions in demand, 
seeking a desired waiting time produced a lower waiting list and average waiting time. 
Finally, focusing on waiting times alone and not also the waiting list length could lead to 
misleading conclusions.
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11.4 VEINBRIDGE GENERAL ANALYSIS: PARAMETER CHANGES
For the Veinbridge General case, the problems and their underlying causes differed from 
those in the case of Ribsley General, so this called for a different set of parameter changes 
to be investigated as policy alternatives. The following changes are discussed: changes to 
the capacity for elective CC investigations; the use of demand management strategies; 
and, increases in the capacity for OP appointments. Unlike the case of Ribsley General, 
changes to the CC operator skills base were not investigated. These would modify the 
skills effect on demand for a CC investigation but as this effect was absent in the case of 
Veinbridge General, altering its influences would not affect the behaviour of the system.
11.4.1 Altering the Capacity for Elective CC Investigations
The key problems in the case of Veinbridge General arose from the permanent district 
service stimulating demand to the extent that unacceptable delays resulted for an OP 
appointment. Furthermore, although the desired waiting time for a CC investigation was 
maintained, significant increases in the CC investigation waiting list were observed. This 
influence was isolated in the base case analysis in §10.3.4 with two experiments which 
involved restricting the availability of district services. One experiment illustrated the 
importance of the district service in compensating for the tertiary facility closures. 
Another experiment demonstrated that less demand would have been stimulated had the 
district service been temporary. Some effects of these experiments were shown in Figure 
10 .6 .
Two further experiments described in §10.3.4 showed how alternative approaches to 
capacity expansions could have produced more desirable behaviour. Both limited the use 
of district services. One involved an expanded tertiary-based service with the district 
service compensating for tertiary facility closures. Some effects of these experiments were 
also shown in Figure 10.6. The second involved the addition of further temporary district 
sessions to the use of the district service compensating for tertiary facility closures. It 
might be considered that these two experiments could be recast as policy experiments. 
However, this would be in conflict with the commitment that had been made to introduce 
a permanent district service and construct an integrated CC facility at Veinbridge General.
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Therefore, whilst considering the restriction of district services had value in investigating 
the base case, it did not have value from a policy analysis perspective.
In fact, no changes to the capacity for elective CC investigations were considered suitable 
for the Veinbridge General policy analysis. Experimenting with expansions in district- 
based capacity was not considered useful. This was because in the base case, although the 
CC investigation waiting list rose, the desired waiting time goal, which drove the activity 
rate, was met without having to utilise a high level of district-based capacity. Tertiary- 
based capacity expansions in the context of the base case levels of district-based capacity 
were also not considered to have any potential as interesting policy alternatives. This was 
because the tertiary-based capacity levels adequately met the demand for high risk 
patients.
11.4.2 Using Demand Management Strategies
(Exps V10, V I1, V14&V15)
Alterations to the time for GPs and patients to perceive and respond to changes in the 
availability of district services, described within the base case sensitivity analysis in 
§10.3.4, may also be regarded as demand management strategies. It will be recalled that 
increasing the perception delay reduced demand for both OP and CC services because 
knowledge about the district CC service was obtained more slowly and the knowledge 
effects on demand thus accumulated less rapidly. Compared to the base case, 34 and 156 
fewer referrals were made for an elective CC investigation and an OP appointment 
respectively. Reducing the perception delay could possibly contribute to the management 
of future demand by accelerating the stimulation of demand which could lead to the 
identification of more patients at risk. Compared to the base case, 36 and 166 more 
referrals were made for an elective CC investigation and an OP appointment respectively. 
Changes from the base case arose when demand was stimulated and diminished over 
time. These changes were more rapid at the CC investigation end of the referral chain. 
Altering the perception delay did not alter the modes of behaviour apart from a minor 
change to the CC waiting list mode by the reduction in the perception delay. Although 
reducing the perception delay increased the level of stimulated demand, the knowledge 
effect on demand for an OP appointment was already saturated.
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The more obvious approach to managing demand is by targeting it directly with the use of 
new referral guidelines specifying referral criteria. The effect o f new guidelines on 
referrals is illustrated in Figure 11.6 (the basic features were explained with the 
corresponding diagram for the Ribsley General case, Figure 11.3).
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Figure 11.6 Constraining Demand: An 'Aggressive' Referral Tradition 
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regarded as descriptive as the purpose is merely to illustrate the constraints on demand.)
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Although the factors underlying the stimulation o f demand for the Veinbridge General 
case differed to those in the Ribsley General case, the same set o f new referral guidelines 
could be considered. However, their interpretation would vary given that guidelines could 
not eliminate a ‘grey area’ regarding the appropriateness o f referrals. As with the case of 
Ribsley General, in the experiments, the impact o f the use o f new guidelines was 
represented by changes in the level o f stimulated demand. For one experiment, which 
provided a benchmark, it was assumed that all the stimulated demand was suppressed 
(strict new guidelines), and for a second experiment, it was assumed that half the 
stimulated demand was suppressed (modest new guidelines). Significant savings were 
achieved with the use o f modest new guidelines with the OP and CC activity costs 
reducing by £144,640 and £551,144 respectively over the simulation (72 months). These 
figures were increased to £333,702 and £1,035,115 with the use o f strict new guidelines.
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Figure 11.7 Some Effects o f the Use of New Referral Guidelines
Figure 11.7 shows some examples where the use o f new guidelines altered the behaviour 
o f the system. Only the CC investigation waiting time goal was achieved in the base case. 
However, as all the causes o f the demand increases could be targeted with the use o f new 
referral guidelines, further goals could be achieved. The use o f strict new guidelines 
resulted in the CC investigation waiting list, OP waiting list and average OP waiting time 
also being maintained at their desired levels. The use o f modest new guidelines had a 
lower impact on the behaviour o f the system, causing the OP waiting time goal to be 
achieved. This was in contrast with the case o f Ribsley General where modest guidelines 
did not maintain the OP waiting time goal because there was insufficient slack in the 
system.
Therefore, it was possible to produce significant improvements in behaviour via the use of 
certain demand management strategies.
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Referring back to the feedback structure, introducing demand management strategies 
diminished the factors that were responsible for stimulating demand, both the exogenous 
variable (effect of other factors on referrals) and endogenous processes (loops R1 and 
R2). Altering the GP and patient perception delay adjusted the speed of these endogenous 
processes whilst the use of new referral guidelines reduced their intensity. Suppressing all 
the stimulated demand went further by disabling these processes completely. Adjusting 
the intensity and speed of individual processes also resulted in adjustments in the 
interactions between different processes. For example, reducing the effects of knowledge 
of CC on demand (diminishing the intensity of loops R1 and R2) reduced the need for 
increases in activity rates (diminished the intensity of loops B l, B2 and B4) which in turn 
reduced the gain in the effect of knowledge of CC on demand.
11.4.3 In creasing the OP Capacity
(Exp V I6)
Whilst several experiments dealt with capacity shortages by controlling demand, another 
experiment was based upon an obvious alternative approach, attempting to meet the 
demand by increasing capacity levels. Only increases to OP capacity were investigated. 
This extended the scope of the process of adjustment in the OP activity rate (loop B4) to 
the extent that its desired goal was reached. Activity rates were driven by waiting time 
goals. Therefore, as the desired waiting time for a CC investigation was maintained in the 
base case, increasing the elective CC capacity would not produce a lower waiting list.
In the base case, prior to the introduction of the district service, the waiting list and 
average waiting time were at their desired levels with the OP service operating at 85% 
capacity. After the district service was introduced, the referral rate for an OP appointment 
rose by 20%. This pushed the OP service to run at full capacity but this was insufficient to 
maintain the desired waiting time goal. In order to maintain the desired waiting time, it 
was not necessary to increase the capacity by 20%. In fact, a 10% increase was sufficient. 
With this higher capacity level, although there was some spare capacity (capacity 
utilisation was 93%), because the desired waiting time was maintained, further pressure to 
increase activity rates was not exerted. Consequently, the OP waiting list still rose above
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its desired level but to a considerably lower degree involving 245 fewer patients than the 
base case, as shown in Figure 11.8.
OP Waiting List Average Time Spent on OP Waiting List
2: With Increased OP CapacityI Base Can 
700.W
2: With Increased OP Capacity
0.0C i 1 1 1 1 -1 0.00 18.00 36.00 54.00 72.00
0.00 18.00 36.00 54.00 72.00
Months
Months
Figure 11.8 Some Effects of Increasing the OP Capacity
Furthermore, whilst pressure was decreased on the OP services in terms o f the reduced 
waiting lists and waiting times (albeit with increased costs), the increased OP activity rate 
resulted to higher pressure on CC services as more patients were pushed along the referral 
chain. The pressure from an excessive CC investigation waiting list rose by 2.4% but the 
increased flow o f patients did not alter the average waiting time.
Therefore, increasing the OP capacity only had a limited success in improving the 
behaviour o f the system.
11.5 VEINBRIDGE GENERAL ANALYSIS: STRUCTURAL CHANGES
11.5.1 Seeking Different A ctivity Targets
(Exp V I7)
As with the case o f Ribsley General, a number o f parameter-based policy interventions 
could be recast as structural changes as they disabled structure within the system. 
However, the main focus o f the investigation o f structural-based policy interventions 
involved the introduction o f the same new feedback structure that was investigated in the 
case of Ribsley General -  driving activity rates by seeking a desired waiting list length 
rather than a waiting time goal. This investigation was motivated by the Veinbridge 
General base case analysis (see §10.3.3). It was suggested that seeking a desired waiting 
list length would target the undesirable increases in the Veinbridge General CC 
investigation waiting list and at the same time, by raising activity rates, address increases
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in  the average waiting time. The basic structure for this new decision rule is shown in 
Appendix D in D3 and the rationale and formulation were presented in §9.3.1 and, in 
simpler terms, in §11.3.2. Unlike the case of Ribsley General, parameter changes to 
ensure that the goals o f the two decision rules and the paths to these goals were consistent 
were not necessary; consistent parameters already applied. The consistency arose during 
the calibration process from the derivation o f parameters (in the absence of hard data) 
based upon various assumptions including the system initially being in equilibrium (see 
Appendix E, E5d).
Comparisons were made between the effects o f seeking the two different activity targets 
under several different scenarios. The first comparison involved the base case 
assumptions about supply and demand (Figure 11.9). The insights were consistent with 
those obtained in the Ribsley General experiments, reported in §11.3.3, involving 
increases in referrals when there was sufficient capacity available. Both the elective CC 
investigation service and OP service for Veinbridge General patients had experienced 
increases in referrals. For the CC service, there was spare capacity and seeking a desired 
waiting list length ensured that this goal was maintained. Compared to the base case, 
nearly 95% of the pressure from an excessive waiting list was eliminated with the waiting 
list only rising to 148 patients (87 fewer patients). Seeking a desired waiting list also 
overcompensated by producing an average waiting time which was lower than that 
desired.
CC Investigation Waiting List
I : Seeking a Desired Waiting Time 2: Seeking a Desired Waiting List
I
'2
Months
Average Time Spent on CC Investigation Waiting List
1 Seeking a Desired Waiting Time 2: Seeking a Desired Waiting List
15
0.00 36.00 72.00
Figure 11.9 Some Effects o f Changing the Activity Target
For the OP service, there was insufficient capacity and the system was pushed to operate 
at full capacity. Both decision rules led to the same equilibrium waiting list and waiting 
time values although seeking a desired waiting list led to these values being reached more 
quickly. For example, the pressure from an excessive OP waiting list rose by nearly 2%.
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However, these reductions have to be traded-off against higher resource usage. For 
example, seeking a desired waiting list led to 149 further CC investigations being carried 
out over the 72 months and this generated £112,205 additional costs averaging £1,558 per 
month.
11.5.2 Seeking Different Activity Targets with Reduced Pressure on the System
Increased OP Capacity (Exps VI6, VI7 & VI8)
Another comparison involved increasing the OP capacity so that there was sufficient 
capacity for OP services to cope. This produced circumstances whereby seeking a desired 
waiting list also improved the OP behaviour by controlling the OP waiting list and 
average waiting time (see Figure 11.10).
OP Waiting List
I Bu c Cim  2 Seeking a Desired Waiimg l.u( 3 Increased OP Capacity 4 Both Interventions
Average Time Spent on OP Waiting List
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4
:
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F ig u re  11 .10 C o m p arin g  the D ec is io n  R u les w ith  In c re a se d  O P  C a p ac ity  
(F o r ru n s 1 an d  3, a d es ired  w a itin g  tim e w as sough t. R u n s  2 a re  the  d a sh e d  lines.)
Therefore, co-ordinating a change in the forces that drive activity with OP capacity 
increases eliminated both the undesirable behaviour to CC and OP services. Seeking a 
desired waiting list controlled the level o f the CC investigation waiting list, the capacity 
increases ensured that there was sufficient capacity to meet demand for OP services and 
thus controlled the rise in the OP waiting times, and the combination of the two 
interventions controlled the rise in the OP waiting list.
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Use o f New Referral Guidelines
(Exps VI4, V17, VI9 and references to R39 & R40)
Further comparisons involved suppressing some stimulated demand by using referral 
guidelines (controlling rather than meeting demand). This ensured that the benefits of 
seeking a desired waiting list were not offset by increased resource usage. Furthermore, 
the mode of behaviour improved since reducing demand to a manageable level ensured 
that both the waiting list and waiting time targets were maintained. Thus, as with the 
previous policy combination, there was synergy between the two interventions such that 
the CC investigation waiting list, OP waiting list and average waiting time for an OP 
appointment were controlled (see Figure 11.11).
OP Waiting List
!: Seeking » Desired Wailing List Modest New Referral Guide I ui
|  350 0( *
• l"'
36.00
Months
Average Time Spent on the OP Waiting List
I Base Case 2: Seeking a Desired Waiting List 3: With Modest New Referral Gaidcliaes 4 Both Interventions
I
§s
Figure 11.11 Seeking a Desired Waiting List Length and Using New Referral Guidelines 
(Normal capacity levels apply. Runs 2 are the dashed lines.)
This demonstrated that it was possible to produce significant improvements in both the 
OP and CC behaviours without capacity increases. Moreover, the improvements were 
slightly greater than those obtained with the previous experiment that did involve capacity 
increases.
Both the use o f the referral guideline and the change to the activity target were analogous 
to controlling rate variables (the referral rate and waiting list removal rate respectively). 
Therefore, this result was consistent with Wolstenholme’s (1999a) experience that 
changes to flows (e.g. referral rates) have greater leverage than changes to stocks (e.g. 
capacities), as shown in Figure 11.8 (Runs 2 - change in stock variable) and Figure 11.11 
(Runs 3 and 4 - change in flow variables).
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It should be noted that repeating this experiment for the case of Ribsley General did not 
produce the same outcome; the OP behaviour improved (the increase in the average OP 
waiting time was eliminated and there was a temporary drop in the OP waiting list below 
its desired level) but the CC behaviour was unchanged. Even using a strict clinical 
guideline failed to alter the CC behaviour mode. These results indicated that the combined 
policy could not improve the behaviour in situations where there were extreme capacity 
shortages.
11,5,3 Seeking Different Activity Targets with Increased Pressure on the System
(Exps V8 & V21)
Finally, the use of the two decision rules were compared when the pressure on the system 
was increased by introducing a winter crisis (modelled by a sharp drop in elective CC 
capacity over a 3 month period). The winter crisis caused a rise in the average waiting 
time for both decision rules. However, seeking a desired waiting list caused an increase in 
the waiting list whilst seeking a desired waiting time caused a decrease. The differences 
were due to different responses, not to the capacity loss, but to the ‘knee jerk’ reduction in 
referrals that were the assumed reactions to the sudden capacity loss. In seeking a desired 
waiting list, the reduction in referrals led directly to a reduction in the desired activity rate 
and this resulted in further increases in the CC investigation waiting list. By contrast, in 
seeking a desired waiting time, the referral rate reduction merely contributed to reductions 
in the waiting list.
11.6 SUMMARY
This chapter reported and explained the results of the policy experiments for the two case 
studies. Both parameter changes and structural changes were investigated, following up 
suggestions that arose from the base case analyses. Experiments represented efforts to 
address the capacity shortages by controlling demand and meeting demand.
During the course of the policy analyses (as with the base case analyses), for both case 
studies, the model demonstrated behavioural insensitivity to parameter changes on a 
number of occasions, as is typical with feedback systems. However, exceptions were 
made when the parameter changes involved capacity changes. This was not surprising,
292
given that the case studies had experienced extreme problems associated with under­
capacity. However, in the case of Veinbridge General, experiments demonstrated that it 
was possible to control both the delay to services (meet the desired waiting time) and need 
for services (meet the desired waiting list) without capacity increases. This was achieved 
by introducing a new referral guideline (a parameter change) to suppress demand and 
altering the activity target to seek a desired waiting list length (a structural change) for 
both the OP and elective CC services. The former change ensured that the conditions were 
suitable (there was sufficient capacity for the system to cope) for the latter to be effective 
in reversing the upward trend in the waiting list and waiting time in response to rises in 
demand. These same benefits did not apply to the case of elective CC services for Ribsley 
General patients as the capacity shortages were too great. However, experiments did 
provide insight into the effects of different approaches to capacity increases and the 
effects of a reconfiguration of the base case capacity increases.
The next chapter will conclude the research. As part of this process, a series of policy 
recommendations and policy lessons will be derived and generalisations will be drawn 
from the case studies.
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CHAPTER 12
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The aims of this chapter are to draw inferences from the SD study of the shift in CC 
services and, finally, conclude the thesis.
In the next section (§12.2), the policy implications of the results of the model-based 
experiments are derived before assessing the usefulness of SD in terms of its ability to 
contribute to the policy making process (§12.3-§12.5). As stated in Chapter 5, in §5.2.1, 
this assessment probes beyond the issue of modelling power (§12.3) alone to also 
consider the value of the policy insights generated by the SD analyses (§12.4) and the ease 
of use of SD (§12.5). The premises that were stated in the research hypothesis, regarding 
the causal mechanisms and usefulness of the SD methodology, are then revised (§12.6). 
Moving on from the case studies, the findings of the research are generalised (§12.7) 
considering both the insights into the dynamics of service shifts (§12.7.1) and the 
usefulness of SD (§12.7.2). To conclude the thesis, the research contributions are 
highlighted (§12.8), and some suggestions are made for further research (§12.9).
In this chapter, in discussing the effects of service shifts, references are made to the ‘fix 
that fails’ systems archetype (an example was given in §4.4.2). Systems archetypes are 
described by Senge as:
“certain patterns of structure [that] recur again and again” (Senge 1990, p.94).
They are used in SD to convey policy insights in simple terms. For examples, see 
Meadows (1982) and Senge (1990).
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Figure 12.1 ‘Fix That Fails’ Systems Archetype
The structure o f the ‘fix that fails’ systems archetype is shown in Figure 12.1. The 
structure depicts how a well-intentioned policy action, or ‘fix’, to solve a problem, is 
effective in the short-term (loop B). However, it has unintended long-term side effects 
which undermines the policy action and thus requires further actions i.e. more use o f the 
same ‘fix’ (loop R). Therefore, it is a short-term ‘fix th a t...’ in the long-term ‘...fails’. In 
the case o f the shift in CC services, the use o f a district facility to increase activity rates 
may be regarded as a solution to the problem of poor access to elective CC services. The 
stimulation o f demand for CC services represents a possible side effect that could 
undermine the efforts to improve access.
12.2 INTERPRETATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In Chapter 9, it was demonstrated that the simulation model could reproduce the base case 
behaviour for the two case studies. Chapter 10 described model-based experiments which 
were carried out to provide insight into this behaviour. Chapter 11 then presented the 
outcomes o f a series of policy experiments that involved departures from the base case 
from the time that district services were first introduced. Assuming that the simulation 
model provided a suitably accurate reflection o f the ‘real world’, with respect to the 
model purpose, these outcomes will portray those that would have occurred in the ‘real 
world’. With this degree o f confidence, a series o f policy lessons and recommendations 
can be derived from the base case and policy analyses.
Note that in interpreting the outcomes of the policy experiments, the aim is not to impose 
value judgements. Instead, an attempt is made to contribute to the debate by considering 
three agendas that prevail in the health services. The first is based upon the desire to
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control costs whilst working within a limited budget (a cost control agenda). The second 
is based upon the desire to improve health, irrespective of the costs involved (a health 
improvement agenda). A third agenda is driven by the desire to deliver services on the 
lowest cost/case basis (an efficiency improvement agenda).
Those pursuing a cost control agenda would want patient activity rates to remain within 
budget whilst meeting their contractual obligations regarding waiting time and waiting list 
targets. If the contracts only specified waiting time targets, the waiting list length would 
still be important. This is because, as stated previously, the size of the waiting list 
represents the need for activity; if the waiting list size doubled, then the number of 
waiting list removals (including activity) would also have to double in order to maintain 
the waiting time target. Those seeking health improvements would also be concerned 
about access, as treatment delays would cause distress to patients and possibly lead to 
their condition deteriorating. Furthermore, long waiting lists would raise concerns about 
unmet need. Seeking health improvements would also encapsulate several further desires. 
Firstly, the desire to identify more high-risk cases i.e. patients with advanced disease but 
only minor symptoms. Secondly, the desire to be able to utilise tertiary resources more 
effectively and thus devote those precious resources to the more complicated cases. 
Thirdly, the desire to meet higher treatment targets; increases in investigation rates are 
required to support increases in treatment rates. All these actions would be expected to 
produce reductions in morbidity and mortality and thus align with the aim to improve 
health. Those pursuing an efficiency improvement agenda would also want contractual 
obligations regarding waiting time and waiting list targets to be met. In addition they 
would want the use of district services to be restricted unless it provided investigations at 
a lower cost/case compared to that with a tertiary-based service.
It would be expected that conflicting views, about the value of stimulated demand, would 
prevail between those pursuing cost control and health improvement agendas. As 
explained in earlier chapters, stimulated demand could comprise low priority referrals and 
referrals which some might regard as inappropriate. On the other hand, it might also 
include those with major heart disease but minor symptoms. Adopting a cost control 
agenda, interventions that reduced stimulated demand might be preferable, as these would 
reduce the number of inappropriate referrals. These interventions would also be attractive 
as they would not involve increasing activity rates and activity costs i.e. resource neutral
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interventions and might even result in reduced activity costs. By contrast, interventions 
that met or encouraged stimulated demand might be favoured by those seeking a health 
improvement agenda. They would welcome these additional referrals as they could 
provide opportunities to identify further high risk patients and raise activity levels. From 
their perspective, it would be important that stimulated demand was met. Otherwise, the 
passage of high risk cases through the referral chain could be jeopardised by referrals of 
lower priority cases blocking the referral chain.
It could be argued that those following the health improvement agenda will have the 
upper hand given the Government’s recommendation in its National Service Framework 
document (NHS 2000a) for substantial increases in the provision of CC services. 
However, these recommendations are not easily implemented. Given that resources are 
limited, purchasers have to balance many demands including local priorities and needs for 
other patients, some of which may also have National Service Framework standards. As 
explained by one of the collaborators, whilst tackling heart disease may be high on the 
national health agenda, local priorities may be skewed towards different needs as dictated 
by the profile of the local population.
12.2.1 Ribsley General Case
The Basic Problems and Their Causes
Prior to the introduction of district services at Ribsley General, there were no access 
problems to OP services; the waiting list and average waiting time were maintained at 
their desired levels. However, this was not the case further down the referral chain as 
demand persistently outstripped the supply for an elective CC investigation. Pressure on 
elective CC services was alleviated by capacity increases, initially at the tertiary level and 
subsequently by providing a temporary district service.
Demand for CC services was stimulated by two mechanisms. Firstly, the increased 
availability of CC led to patients and GPs becoming more knowledgeable about the 
benefits of CC and thus more demanding for a referral for further investigation. Secondly, 
when the average waiting time for a CC investigation dropped, cardiologists took 
advantage of the CC capacity increases to catheterise more patients. There were also three
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mechanisms whereby demand was suppressed. Firstly, by cardiologists informally 
reducing the number of referrals when the waiting time for a CC investigation was high. 
Secondly, by the periodic reduction in referrals associated with the replacement of 
experienced junior CC operators by complete novices; novices initially under-referred and 
gradually reduced their referral threshold as they gained experience and confidence. 
Thirdly, by the ‘knee jerk’ reaction to drops in capacity. The net result was a frequent rise 
and fall in the referral rate. It should be noted that although the district service at Ribsley 
General stimulated demand for services, it could not be described as a ‘fix that fails’ to 
the access problems to elective CC services. This was because there was adequate 
capacity to cope with both the new and existing demand.
The increased patient knowledge about CC also stimulated demand for an OP 
appointment. Access to services was reduced but only temporarily and to a small extent, 
and was restored after the district service was withdrawn. Moreover, owing to the delay 
for GPs and patients to perceive changes in the availability of the district service, these 
changes in access only occurred when the district service was used for the extended 
period in 1996/1997.
How The Situation Could Have Been Improved
The imbalance between the supply and demand for CC services could have been 
addressed by intervening to meet, and/or control, demand. Table 12.1 summarises the 
results of a number of different interventions and highlights a selection of qualitative and 
quantitative changes from the base case. The table shows the degree of behavioural 
insensitivity to a number of interventions so that quantitative improvements were not 
necessarily accompanied by behavioural (qualitative) improvements. Regarding the 
resource use, changes in the cumulative costs are included in addition to activity rate 
changes as only the former reflects the extra costs associated with patients having to 
undergo a further CC procedure following a district-based investigation. More detailed 
results are listed in Appendix E in E5e.
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Table 12.1. Sum m arising the Changes from the Base Case for the Ribsley General Policy Experiments
Policy Intervention A Behaviour Mode A Waiting 
List
A Waiting 
Times
A Resource 
Use
A Referral 
Rates
OP c c OP CC OP CC OP CC Cum£ OP CC
Semi-perm reduced 
district service
+ + + + +* + +0.8% +* +
Semi-perm reduced 
district svce with
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wC WTbonly bonly
WLi 1 WT
------------- b- - +
+
- +
+
NoA
_*
+
+
+0.6%
+0.2%
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+
+*
-------------► -------------►
Perm district service / WLJ k WT - WL' WT
-------------b ------------ b
+ + + + + +6.4% + +
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a. modest guidelines
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b
> a
b
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-------------►
+ - + - +
_*
+
+
+5.8%
+1.7%
+
_ *
+
+
-----------------► -----------------►
300
A Referral 
Rates
A Waiting 
List
A Behaviour Mode A ResourceA Waiting 
Times
Policy Intervention
Use
Cum£ OP CCCC OP CCOP CC OPCCOP
1.7%Expanded tertiary 
service /
w t 'WL
Expanded tertiary 
service with /
a. modest guidelines
b. strict guidelines
WT'WLWTWL
bonlybonly
+ 1.5%
+ 1.3%
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b onlybonly
+0.7%
+0.3%
+ *+ * +0 .2%+ *+ *Deer GP and patient 
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wrWL
Policy Intervention A Behaviour Mode A Waiting 
List
A Waiting 
Times
A Resource 
Use
A Referral 
Rates
OP CC OP CC OP CC OP CC Cum£ OP CC
Incr GP and patient 
perception delay
+* + .* _* -0.2% .* -*
Use o f modest new 
referral guidelines
_* _* -0.3% _ *
Use o f  strict new 
referral guidelines
WL' WT'
------------ ► ------------ ►
_ * -0.6% _*
Incr learning fraction 
(for CC trainees)
+* + NoA + NoA +* +0.1% NoA +*
Incr OP capacity _* _* NoA NoA NoA NoA NoA
Seeking a des waiting 
list length f
WL' WT‘
------------ ► ------------ ►
+ + NoA -0.4% NoA _*
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Policy Intervention A Behaviour Mode A Waiting 
List
A Waiting 
Times
A Resource 
Use
A Referral 
Rates
OP CC OP CC OP CC OP CC Cum£ OP CC
S e e k in g  a  d e s  w a itin g wC 1 a WT' k
_b _
lis t le n g th  w ith  f b" ' a
a. m o d e s t g u id e lin es - + - + _* - -0 .7 % _* -
b. s tr ic t  g u id e lin e s ~ + + _* “ -1 .0 % _*
(A: C h a n g e ; / :  W ith  sam e to ta l c ap a c ity  in creases ; §: W ith  lo w er to ta l cap ac ity  in creases th an  / ;  f :  In v o lv ed  m in o r p a ram e te r ch an g es to  a llo w  v a lid  co m p ariso n s 
w ith  se e k in g  a d e s ired  w a itin g  tim e. C h an g es  a re  w .r.t. b a se  case  w ith  sam e m in o r p a ram e te r chan g es; M o d e st (new ) re fe rra l g u id e lin es : A ssu m ed  a  re d u c tio n  o f  
h a l f  s t im u la te d  d em an d ; S tr ic t (n ew ) re fe rra l g u id e lin es : A ssu m ed  a red u c tio n  o f  all s tim u la ted  dem an d ; B lan k s in A B eh av io u r M ode: N o  o r  o n ly  m in o r ch anges; 
A rro w s in A B e h av io u r M o d e : S lig h t u p w ard  o r  d o w n w ard  trends; -: R e d u c tio n  fro m  b a se  case ; +: In c rease  fro m  b a se  case ; N oA : N o  ch an g es 
i.e. 0 %  < | C h an g e  I <  0 .1 % ; *: S m all ch an g es  i.e. 0 .1 %  <  I C h an g e  I <  1%  o r 0 <  | C h an g e  | <  1; C um £: C u m u la tiv e  costs)
With the development of district services at Ribsley General, there was conflict between 
those pursuing a cost control agenda and those pursuing a health improvement agenda. 
The former, typically the purchasers, were sceptical about the benefits of having a district 
service and were concerned about the service stimulating demand and possibly leading to 
inappropriate referrals. The latter, typically the cardiologists who represented the interests 
of patients, were keen to have a district service to provide a local service. They also 
welcomed the opportunity to investigate and treat more patients and more promptly. 
There was also potential conflict between those pursuing health improvement and 
efficiency agendas. The district service was only more efficient than a tertiary-based 
service under certain circumstances.
These circumstances were explained in §7.3.5. It was stated that based upon the data 
provided, the district service provided investigations at a lower cost/case compared to 
tertiary-based investigations. However, taking into account the need for some patients to 
undergo further CC, a different story emerged. A district service would only have been 
attractive to those pursuing an efficiency improvement agenda if it had avoided a high 
proportion of patients undergoing their CC investigation as an inpatient. Otherwise a 
tertiary-based service would have been more efficient. If that were the case, from a 
efficiency improvement perspective, the desire would have been to restrict the district 
service and to achieve improvements in access to CC services via an expanded tertiary- 
based service if possible.
The Need for a “Joined-up ” Policy
Given the fundamental need to improve and maintain access to CC services, one policy 
lesson was clear from the analysis. The extent of the imbalance between the supply and 
demand was such that demand management strategies alone, even the use of the most 
stringent clinical guideline, could not have altered the undesirable rise in the CC waiting 
list and average waiting time. Frequent capacity increases were necessary. If the 
imbalance between the supply and demand had been smaller, then a demand management 
strategy could have offered greater and sustainable benefits. Therefore, it was not possible 
to achieve and maintain good access to services without the need for further capacity 
increases. However, a policy of tackling access problems directly with capacity increases 
would have to have been co-ordinated with efforts to ensure that the benefits of increasing
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supply were not cancelled out by stimulated demand. In other words, a “joined-up 
solution” to “joined-up problems” was required.
Increasing Capacity
An obvious approach to increasing capacity would have been to provide a permanent, 
rather than temporary, district service. The expectation would have been that a permanent 
service would have maintained the access targets permanently. However, from a cost 
control perspective, whilst providing a permanent district service could have controlled 
the average CC investigation waiting time, the benefits of increasing the supply would 
have been cancelled out by stimulated demand. The CC investigation waiting list would 
have exhibited a gradual rise thus indicating the need for further increases in the elective 
CC investigation rate in order to maintain the desired waiting time. In other words, the 
permanent use of district services would have been a ‘fix that fails’. Furthermore, the 
stimulated demand would have created a new problem, as capacity shortages would have 
arisen at the OP end of the referral chain. This would have then called for further 
resources in an attempt to control access to OP services. From a health improvement 
perspective, the reduction in the CC waiting times and increases in activity associated 
with a permanent district service would have been attractive, but these benefits would 
have been undermined by the loss in access to OP services.
By using new referral guidelines, it might have been possible to suppress demand and 
generate considerably lower costs. However, whilst the use of new moderate guidelines 
would have enabled the access to CC services to be maintained, strict new guidelines 
would have been necessary to eliminate the OP capacity shortages. The feasibility of 
introducing strict new guidelines would have been doubtful even in a conservative referral 
environment such as Ribsley General. Therefore, even with realistic safeguards in place to 
control demand, a permanent district service could not have led to significant 
improvements from either the cost control or health improvement perspective.
The access problems generated by a permanent district service suggests that a more 
effective approach to increasing supply would have been to limit the use of district 
services. In theory, this could have involved either expanding the tertiary-based service, 
and just using the district service to compensate for tertiary facility closures, or providing
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a periodic district service. Compared to a permanent district service, carrying out the same 
capacity increases at the tertiary level would have generated fewer costs because by 
lowering demand, the service would not have been pushed as far. Therefore, this option 
would have been closer to meeting the goals of those pursuing a cost control agenda. 
However, in practice, expanding the supply for elective services at the tertiary level would 
have been difficult whilst meeting the demands for more urgent cases. Expanding the 
supply at the district level would have been easier to achieve, as the service would have 
been solely devoted to elective care. Those pursuing a cost control agenda would have 
favoured a periodic district service over the same overall capacity increases translated into 
a permanent expansion at the tertiary level. This would apply because the former would 
have generated lower costs due to the ‘knee jerk’ reductions in referrals in reaction to the 
capacity losses.
The preference to those pursuing a health improvement agenda would have been less 
clear. The greater use of a district service would have provided more opportunities to 
devote tertiary resources to more complicated cases. It would also have led to the 
stimulation of more demand for an OP appointment. Bringing more patients forward for 
assessment could have led to the identification of further high risk patients and also 
supported higher activity targets. However, fewer referrals would have been made for CC 
services, as by introducing more capacity losses there would have been more ‘knee jerk’ 
reductions in referrals in reaction to these losses. Although it could be assumed that these 
reductions would have referred to lower risk patients, their assessment as lower risk 
patients would have been based on incomplete information i.e. without the benefit of an 
angiogram. It would have been possible that some high-risk cases who presented minor 
symptoms would have slipped though the net. Therefore, from a health improvement 
perspective, a periodic district service would have involved trade-offs. Nevertheless, it 
would be expected that those pursuing a health improvement agenda would have 
conceded that, on balance, a periodic district service would have been the only practical 
way to achieve improvements in access.
The Value o f Other Possible Interventions
Considering other possible interventions, it might be expected that increasing the delay 
for GPs and patients to perceive changes in the availability of district services would have
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led to reduced pressure on CC services by postponing and reducing the duration of 
stimulated demand. In fact, pressure on CC services would have increased. The 
explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that postponing the stimulated demand 
would have also eventually delayed the pressure to increase activity and thus missed the 
opportunity to make the most of the additional capacity whilst the district service was in 
place. The pressure on OP services would have been reduced but this reduction would 
have been insignificant, given that OP services at Ribsley General were not considered to 
have capacity shortages.
A reconfiguration, rather than expansion, in supply could have had some appeal. Given 
that temporary capacity increases had temporarily alleviated the CC capacity shortages for 
Ribsley General patients, it might be assumed that spreading out the district sessions over 
a longer period would have provided more sustainable benefits. The added appeal to those 
pursuing a cost control agenda would be that the costs of the capacity increases would 
have been distributed over a longer period. However, this intervention would have been a 
‘fix that fails’ as demand would have been stimulated over a longer period. This would 
have imposed greater pressure on both OP and CC services and would have led to the 
generation of higher costs overall. Improvements could have been obtained by co­
ordinating this policy with the use of new referral guidelines. Qualitatively, the outcome 
would have been a slower but longer descent in the waiting list and average waiting time. 
Therefore, there would have been a trade-off between short-term and medium-term 
effects. Furthermore, fewer ‘knee jerk’ reactions to capacity losses (sudden reductions in 
referrals) would have been associated with the greater stability, so that the overall 
pressure on the already hard-pressed CC service would have increased.
Those seeking health improvements might have appreciated increases in OP capacity. 
This would have reduced the extent of the increase in the OP waiting list and average 
waiting time due to the stimulated demand. The, albeit small, reduction in access would 
not have been eliminated, even with very large capacity increases, due to the inevitable 
delay in responding to the increases to the OP referral rate. Therefore, this intervention 
could not have produced qualitative improvements. Increasing OP capacity would not 
have been appealing to those pursing a cost control agenda. Given that the increases in the 
OP waiting list and average waiting time were not viewed as significant, intervening to 
reduce these increases would have been deemed an inappropriate use of resources.
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Given the lack of slack in the system, other interventions might simply have compounded 
the CC capacity shortages. If the circumstances had been different, these same 
interventions might have offered some benefits. For example, those seeking health 
improvements might have valued interventions that would have led to increases in the 
referrals. Bringing more patients forward would possibly have led to the identification of 
further high-risk cases. It would have also driven and supported activity increases and 
thus helped to meet higher activity targets. Accelerating the learning process of junior CC 
operators and reducing the delay for GPs and patients to perceive changes in access to 
district services could have produced increases in referrals for CC investigations. It would 
be expected that the stimulated demand generated by reducing the perception delay would 
have consisted of more low priority cases than that resulting from an accelerated learning 
process. Therefore, the former would have represented the preferable strategy.
These two interventions would have been less attractive to those pursuing a cost control 
agenda as increasing the referral rate would have driven increases in activity and thus 
placed further pressure on purchasing budgets. Although it could be argued by those 
pursuing a health improvement agenda that bringing more patients forward for assessment 
could lead to the identification of further high risk cases, this would not be guaranteed. 
Confirmation could only have been sought by looking at an angiogram, which would have 
been a rather expensive means to justifying higher costs. Purchasers could have argued 
that, in addition to cardiac services, there are many other demands on their budgets, a 
number of which would present a greater likelihood of clinical benefit.
12.2,2 Veinbridge General Case
The Basic Problems and Their Causes
Prior to the introduction of district services at Veinbridge General, there were no access 
problems to OP or CC services; the waiting list and average waiting time were maintained 
at their desired levels. There was a long-term strategy to expand CC services and the 
development of a permanent district service formed a key role in the implementation of 
this strategy.
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The district service stimulated demand via two mechanisms. Firstly, the increased 
availability of CC led to patients and GPs becoming more knowledgeable about the 
benefits of CC and thus more demanding for a referral for further investigation. This 
affected both CC and OP services. Secondly, cardiologists took advantage of the CC 
capacity increases to investigate more patients with CC. In fact, increased demand for CC 
services was encouraged, as it was necessary to support the expansion in services and thus 
justify the development of a permanent district CC service.
However, the attitude to the stimulated demand for OP services was quite different as the 
demand could not be met and thus caused significant rises in the waiting list and the delay 
for an OP appointment. The creation of OP access problems had not been anticipated in 
the development of the district CC service.
Another undesirable development was the rise in the CC investigation waiting list. 
Although there was adequate CC capacity to meet demand, the waiting list rose due to 
two factors: the inevitable delays between adjusting the activity in response to rises in the 
referral rate; and, the fact that effort had been devoted to maintaining the desired waiting 
time and not controlling the length of the waiting list. However, the district service at 
Veinbridge General could not be described as a ‘fix that fails’. Although demand was 
stimulated for CC services, the desire to expand CC services was satisfied.
How The Situation Could Have Been Improved
As with the case of Ribsley General, the access problems could have been addressed by 
intervening to meet, and/or control, demand. Table 12.2 summarises the results of a 
number of different interventions.
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Table 12.2 Summarising the Changes from the Base Case for the Veinbridge General Policy Experiments
S - • N
OP Base Case CC Base Case
WL- l WT i WL' ,-----  WT'
Policy Intervention A Behaviour Mode A Waiting 
Lists
A Waiting 
Times
A Resource 
Use
A Referral 
Rates
OP CC OP CC OP CC OP CC Cum£ OP CC
D e c re a se d  G P  an d  p a tie n t 
p e rc e p tio n  d e la y
+ + + N oA +* +* + 0 .6 % +* +*
In c re a se d  G P  a n d  p a tie n t 
p e rc e p tio n  d e la y
+* _* _* -0 .6 % _* _*
U se  o f  m o d e s t n ew  
re fe r ra l g u id e lin e s
W T ‘
------------►
+* -1 0 .2 %
U se  o f  s tr ic t  n e w  
re fe r ra l  g u id e lin e s
WL' L WT' WL'
k + -2 0 .1 %
Policy Intervention A Behaviour Mode A Waiting 
Lists
A Waiting 
Times
A Resource 
Use
A Referral 
Rates
OP CC OP CC OP CC OP C C Cum£ OP C C
In c re a se d  O P  c ap a c ity w t ' + N oA + +* + 1 .0 % N oA +*
S eek in g  a d e s ired  w a itin g  
lis t len g th
WL' k w t '
--------------- ►
+ + +* +* + + 1 .7 % +* + *
S eek in g  a d e s ired  w a itin g  
lis t len g th  w ith  in c r 
O P  cap ac ity
WL' w t ' WL' w t ' +* + + + 3 .1 % +* +
w r
S o u g h t a d e s ired  w a itin g  
lis t len g th  w ith
a. m o d e s t n ew  g u id e lin es
b. s tr ic t n e w  g u id e lin es
WL ' k a WT
b
WL "  WT'
b
- - - +*
+
- - -9 .3 %
-2 0 .1 %
-
-
b
a a
------------ ► ------------ ►
(A: C h an g e; M o d e s t n e w  re fe rra l g u id e lin es : A ssu m ed  a re d u c tio n  o f  h a lf  stim u la ted  dem an d ; S tric t n ew  re fe rra l g u id e lin es : A ssu m ed  a re d u c tio n  o f  a ll s tim u la ted  
d em an d ; B lan k s  in A B e h av io u r  M ode: N o  o r  o n ly  m in o r chan g es; -: R ed u c tio n  fro m  b a se  case ; +: In c rea se  fro m  b a se  case ; N oA : N o  ch an g es 
i.e . 0 %  <  | C h an g e  | <  0 .1 % ; *: O n ly  sm all ch an g es i.e. 0 .1 %  < I C h an g e  | <  1%  o r  0 <  | C h an g e  | <  1; C um £: C u m u la tiv e  co sts)
With the development of district services at Veinbridge General, compared to the case of 
Ribsley General, there was less conflict between those pursuing cost control and health 
improvement agendas. The development of the CC service at Veinbridge General was 
part of a long-term strategy to expand CC services. Therefore, the health improvement 
agenda was dominant to some extent whilst those pursuing a cost control agenda, 
typically the purchasers, were willing to fund this strategy. Nevertheless, at the same time, 
purchasers were concerned that the expansion of services had stimulated excessive levels 
of demand, beyond what they could afford.
Before the integrated catheter laboratory opened at Veinbridge General, the health 
improvement agenda possibly dominated the efficiency improvement agenda. As stated in 
§7.4.4, the district service provided CC investigations at the same cost as those at the 
tertiary level. Furthermore, as with the case of Ribsley General, taking into account the 
need for some patients to undergo further CC, a mobile-based district service at 
Veinbridge General was only more efficient than a tertiary-based service if  it avoided a 
large proportion of patients being catheterised as inpatients. Increasing the interventional 
CC proportion cancelled out this potential advantage.
The opening of the integrated laboratory at Veinbridge General provided the opportunity 
to improve the efficiency of the district service as the cost/case declined with the volume 
of patient activity. This eliminated any conflict there might have been between those 
pursuing the health improvement and efficiency improvement agendas.
The Need for a "Joined-up ” Policy
One policy lesson was clear from the Veinbridge General analysis. Whilst the long-term 
strategy to expand CC services relied upon increases in demand, the strategy would be 
undermined unless it was co-ordinated with controls to limit the stimulated demand. In 
other words, the strategy had to be based upon “joined-up thinking”. Demand for OP 
services would have to be controlled rather than met because a long-term commitment to 
increased funding for OP services would not be available. Purchasers had only agreed to 
support an increase in CC services, not pour in further funds to OP services aswell.
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Changing the Forces that Drive Activity
Even if it had been possible to increase the supply for OP services, this would have only 
eliminated the excessive delay for an OP appointment, not the excessive waiting list, thus 
achieving the same position as that for an elective CC investigation. This would have 
occurred because efforts would have been made to maintain the desired waiting time and 
not control the length of the waiting list. In general, seeking a desired waiting time will 
meet and maintain this goal provided there are sufficient resources available to respond to 
changes in the the waiting list length with the necessary changes in the waiting list 
removal rate.
However, maintaining the average waiting time at its desired level will not necessarily 
indicate that the waiting list goal is met. The length of the waiting list could, in fact, be 
elevated or rising above its desired level. Therefore, the desired waiting time would only 
be maintained due to the increases in the waiting list removal rate balancing increasing in 
the waiting list. With sufficient slack in the system, the waiting time and waiting list goals 
could be met by changing the forces that drive activity rates - seeking a desired waiting 
list length rather than a desired waiting time (see §11.3.3 for further details).
In the case of elective CC services for Veinbridge General patients, there was spare 
capacity, and introducing controls on demand would have produced some slack for OP 
services. Therefore, the OP and CC waiting list and waiting time goals could have been 
met by seeking a desired waiting list length. In fact, this policy would have 
overcompensated by producing an average waiting time that was lower than required. Of 
course, slack for OP services could also have arisen from removing the capacity constraint 
(meeting rather than controlling demand). However, as previously stated, this would not 
have been feasible.
Controlling Demand
Demand for OP services could have been reduced in two different ways. One approach 
would have been to delay the time for GPs and patients to perceive the introduction of 
district services. However, given the circumstances at Veinbridge General, this 
intervention would have only delayed the inevitable, so the improvements in access to OP 
services would have only been marginal. A more effective approach would have been to
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use new referral guidelines. Only the use of modest new guidelines would have been 
necessary to enable the benefits to be derived from seeking a desired waiting list length. 
The use of modest new guidelines alone would have led to some improvements but fewer 
than those derived from the combined policy. The use of strict new guidelines would have 
produced significant qualitative improvements. However, it would not have been feasible 
to introduce strict new guidelines for two reasons. Firstly, they would not have been 
accepted in such an ‘aggressive’ referral environment as Veinbridge General. Secondly, if 
they had applied to CC services, they would have suppressed the very demand that was 
necessary to meet the commitment to expand CC services and justify the development of 
a permanent district service at Veinbridge General.
Supporting the Expansion o f Services
Therefore, the implementation of the long-term strategy to expand CC services could have 
been improved by co-ordinating the shift in CC services with the use of new referral 
guidelines and changes to the forces that drive activity rates - a “joined-up” policy. This 
would have produced significant and sustainable improvements in behaviour that would 
have appealed both to those pursuing cost control and health improvement agendas. The 
effects of this policy would have been particularly attractive from a cost control 
perspective, as it would have led to improvements in access and reductions in costs. For 
those pursuing a health improvement perspective, there would have been trade-offs. They 
would have valued the improvements in access to OP services and reduction in the CC 
investigation waiting list but the reductions in referrals and activity would have been in 
conflict with the desires to meet higher activity targets and identify more high risk 
patients.
Changing the forces that drive activity and the use of new referral guidelines are 
analogous to changes in flow variables. The finding in the case of Veinbridge General that 
changing flow variables had more leverage than changing stock variables (capacity) 
echoes Wolstenholme’s (1999a) experience but for different reasons. Wolstenholme 
argued that adjustments in flow variables were better because they had longer lasting 
effects. In the case of CC services for Veinbridge General patients, the significance of the 
greater leverage was not a question of the duration of an improvement but its very 
existence. The adjustments in flow variables would have eliminated the increase in the 
CC waiting list whilst capacity increases would have had no effect.
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12.2.3 Robustness of the Model Assumptions
In §9.3.6,1 described how efforts were made to compensate for the lack of real data when 
constructing and calibrating the model. In many cases, as the purpose of the model was to 
explore qualitative changes and not produce point predictions, there was no need for 
absolute accuracy. However, the study was limited to some extent by the absence of direct 
input by GPs into the modelling process.
As stated in Chapter 10, the assumed magnitudes of the extent to which knowledge could 
stimulate demand and the delay for GPs and patients to perceive changes in the 
availability of district services served for the purpose of the model but it is possible that 
some feedback process may have been inadvertently omitted. For example, in addition to 
the effects of increased knowledge about CC, referrals for an OP appointment could have 
been influenced by GPs’ perceptions of the average waiting time (stimulating demand 
when the average waiting time was low and suppressing demand when the average 
waiting was high). This would reflect the need for a further balancing process in the 
model. However, the possible omission of a waiting time effect on demand for OP 
appointments did not affect the policy conclusions. Its presence would only have had a 
marginal effect on the Ribsley General base case behaviour as the changes in access to OP 
services were negligible. As for the Veinbridge General base case behaviour, whilst it is 
possible that high average waiting times could have suppressed demand, the knowledge 
effect on demand would have dominated so the problems with the excessive waiting list 
and waiting times would have still occurred.
12.3 MODELLING POWER OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS
12.3.1 A Necessary Condition For Usefulness
Having completed the SD study of the shift in CC services, it is possible to review the 
study to assess how useful SD was in terms of its ability to contribute to the policy 
making process. The demonstation of modelling power is a necessary condition for a 
method to offer a contribution to policy makers.
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As stated in §5.2.1, assessing the modelling power of SD involves considering the ability 
to both explain the effects of service shifts and inform purchasers about how they could 
improve the situation. Chapter 7 provided evidence of feedback effects associated with 
the shift in CC services to the two case study centres. This indicated that SD could be 
potentially useful; if feedback effects had been absent from the results of the shift in CC 
services, SD would have been irrelevant and of limited, if any, use in providing policy 
insight. The SD-based analyses of the shift in CC services demonstrated that SD did, 
indeed, provide policy insight. Chapter 10 described how the SD model was used to 
explain how the shifts in CC services helped and hindered the provision of cardiac 
services over time. Furthermore, Chapter 11 reported on the effects of a series of policy 
experiments and §12.2 outlined the policy implications of these experiments to explain 
how NHS purchasers and providers could have effectively intervened to alleviate pressure 
on the system.
As stated in §5.2.1, the extent of the modelling power of SD is assessed on the basis of 
the quality of the analysis, its significance and its completeness. These criteria are dealt 
with in turn.
12.3.2 The Quality o f  the Analysis
A lack of analytic rigour would undermine the results of an analysis and it could call into 
question its conclusions. Some criticise SD as lacking analytic rigour, for example, on the 
grounds of the poor use of statistical tests. These critics fail to recognise that, given the 
purpose of SD modelling, statistical analyses play only a minor role, unlike the case of 
econometrics. Many criticisms of SD are unwarranted and although there are examples of 
sloppy SD analysis, this simply reflects bad modelling, not an intrinsic weakness of the 
SD method.
This study was based upon good modelling practice. As stated in §8.1, the 
conceptualisation process followed established guidelines. In constructing the model, data 
was derived from a broad range of sources including the experiences and expert 
knowledge of various health professionals involved in the shift in CC services. The 
quality of the data obtained was checked for consistency. The study proceeded beyond 
static analysis, where erroneous inferences could have been made, to dynamic analysis
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where the power and flexibility of simulation modelling was exploited. The simulation 
model was subjected to a series of rigorous tests. Moreover, sensitivity analysis played a 
key role in both testing the model and generating insight into the behaviour-structure 
relationship. Therefore, it may be concluded that the study was of sound quality.
12.3.3 The Significance o f the Analysis
The significance of an analysis may be considered in terms of its focus and the amount of 
improvement derived from the analysis. Regarding the focus of the analysis, SD would 
have been of limited use if it had only been used to explain trivial issues. This was not the 
case in this study as SD was employed to tackle key policy issues including the access to 
services, the allocation of resources and the management of demand. Moreover, the 
analysis demonstrated the ability of SD to support health care policy makers engage in 
“joined-up thinking”.
In terms of improvements derived from the analysis, sustainable improvements are more 
significant than temporary improvements. Furthermore, greater significance is associated 
with qualitative changes (obtaining more desirable behaviour modes) rather than mere 
quantitative changes. In this study, the improvements were significant as sustainable 
improvements were achieved in the modes of behaviour. In the case of Ribsley General, 
insight was provided into how greater stability could have been obtained in the CC 
investigation waiting list and average waiting time that had both exhibited a tendency to 
rise. In the case of Veinbridge General, the analysis showed how the asymptotic growth in 
the waiting list for a CC investigation, the OP waiting list and average waiting time for an 
OP appointment could have been eliminated.
12.3.4 The Completeness o f  the Analysis
For the purpose of this thesis, the completeness of the analysis is assessed in terms of 
whether or not it provides the necessary detail to translate the policy recommendations 
that were generated into operational procedures. Moreover, all the policy changes that 
were discussed are considered, even those that did not form policy recommendations, as 
they could have been recommended if the circumstances had been different.
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For some policy changes that were discussed, operationalisation would easily follow on 
from the SD analysis. For others, operationalisation would not follow on automatically as 
the policy change would relate to the strategic level of decision making rather than the 
operational level. This would call for an analysis of the finer detail using some other 
method. As suggested in Chapter 4, DES could be applied to complement SD by 
addressing the micro issues that arise from the macro insights that are typically generated 
by SD analyses. Achieving capacity increases is one such example.
Achieving Capacity Increases
In the previous section, capacity increases to OP services, district-based CC services and 
tertiary-based CC services were discussed. These would have relied upon securing the 
availability of beds and staff, as well as additional funds to pay for the subsequent activity 
increases. Unfortunately, an SD analysis could not offer assistance on questions such as: 
How should the hospital bed provision be reconfigured to allow more beds to be allocated 
to cardiac services? What is the best staffing schedule to accommodate the addition of 
new duties without interfering with existing duties? Answers to these questions could be 
sought via a DES analysis. In this way, DES analyses could be applied sequentially to an 
SD analysis to complete the operationalisation of SD-based policy recommendations. 
DES could also be applied to improve the efficiency of resources. However, this would 
require the SD analysis to be repeated, as changes to the efficiency of resources would 
alter the capacity utilisation functions in the SD model (by narrowing the degree of 
curvature of the functions). This would produce quantitative changes to the output of the 
SD model, but it would not alter the behaviour modes. In considering the 
operationalisation of SD-based insights, only the sequential use of DES is relevant.
Operationalising increases in elective CC capacity at the tertiary level would be more 
challenging compared to increases at the district level. After all, the raison d’etre of a 
district service is often the inability to provide tertiary-based capacity expansions. Whilst, 
tertiary-based catheter lab capacity could be increased easily using a mobile lab, 
mobilising the necessary staff and beds would present far greater difficulty. Resources 
would typically be juggled between meeting targets for elective cases and satisfying 
demands from more urgent cases. As resources would already be stretched towards the 
limit, it would be expected that improvements using existing tertiary-based resources
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would be minor. Therefore, expanding the capacity of a tertiary-based service would rely 
heavily upon injecting new resources.
An extended district service would be easier to operationalise as the service would be 
exclusively devoted to elective care so that elective cases would not have to compete with 
more urgent cases for resources. To develop a periodic or semi-permanent district service, 
catheter lab capacity could be secured by booking further sessions with a mobile unit. To 
provide a permanent district service, the construction of an integrated catheter lab would 
not be essential as less costly options would be available, as described in §6.4.1, such as 
the regular use of a mobile lab.
As regards the other resources, again, DES analyses could be carried out to help secure 
the necessary beds and staff for the service. Specified changes in capacity for services 
would translate into specific changes in resources. For example, consider CC capacity 
increases at the district level. A specified increase in capacity would translate into specific 
levels of funds, bed-days, mobile catheter lab sessions, nursing staff, laboratory 
technicians, cardiologists and so on.
It should be noted that it was assumed that capacity increases would be driven by factors 
that could be mobilised relatively quickly, such as beds and staff, and not, for example, 
increasing staff numbers if it involved recruitment and training delays. This would relate 
to further structure, which would lie outside the boundary of the model.
Achieving Changes to the Perception Delays
Changes in the delay for GP and patients to perceive changes in the availability of the 
district facility could be achieved in several different ways. For example, a reduction in 
the delay could arise from improving the communication channels between the district 
hospital and general practice by sending out follow-up letters more promptly. Another 
way would be to raise the profile of the district service through the media. On the other 
hand, limiting the exchange of information between the district hospital and general 
practice, and not actively promoting the district service would achieve increases in the 
perception delay. The changes that were specified in the model were intended for 
illustrative purposes only. Unlike the case of capacity changes, it would be impossible to
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be specific about say, how many local newspaper features on the district service would be 
required to halve the perception delay.
Achieving Changes to the Learning Fraction
There are also several approaches to increasing the fraction of CC investigations from 
which the junior CC operator learns. For example, increasing the proportion of clinical 
cases that are discussed among juniors via longer and more frequent case review sessions. 
A DES analysis could be employed to assist in the design of a suitable timetable to ensure 
that sessions devoted to training and case review did not interfere with other duties. 
Another way would be to delegate the more complicated cases to juniors more quickly. 
The increase that was specified in the model was intended for illustrative purposes only. It 
would be impossible to establish the instances when a junior was actually learning and not 
daydreaming, or being exposed to a case that they had already heard about through some 
other source such as the internet or a private conversation.
Developing New Clinical Guidelines
The impact of the use of new referral guidelines was modelled by a reduction in the level 
of stimulated demand. It was assumed that stimulated demand would refer to referral 
decisions about ‘grey area’ patients, that is cases for which the appropriate course of 
action is unclear, neither clearly indicated nor clearly inappropriate. Reducing the 
stimulated demand involved extending the existing criteria of patients for which a referral 
was deemed inappropriate. Therefore, it included a sub group of ‘grey area’ patients, 
specifically, those who would be considered to be least likely to have advanced CHD. It 
was also assumed that the new guidelines would state that for another sub group of ‘grey 
area’ patients, a referral was not strictly necessary. This would allow for variations in 
referral practice, as conservative referral fractions would not encompass this sub group.
The new guidelines considered effectively divided the ‘grey area’ patients into three 
groups: those for which a referral was inappropriate; those for which a referral was not 
strictly necessary; and, those for which the appropriate course of action was unknown. 
Therefore, a ‘grey area’ would still persist. These three groups could be defined using an 
appropriateness scoring system (see §6.6.3).
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Changes to the Goals Driving Activity
Finally, driving activity by seeking a desired waiting list length rather than a waiting time 
goal simply involves changing the way in which the desired activity is calculated. The 
additional information required for this calculation would be readily available. 
Cardiologists will have in mind a desired waiting list goal and they will typically monitor 
the referral rate so that they would be able to provide an estimate of the average referral 
rate.
An Assessment of the Completeness of the Analysis
Therefore, in a number of cases, the SD analysis had not provided the necessary detail to 
translate the policy changes into operational procedures. This is not uncommon in SD 
given its emphasis on the strategic level of decision making (Morecroft 1984). It would be 
difficult to claim that an SD analysis had been useful if it had failed to provide any insight 
into the base case behaviours or what should have been done to improve the situation; if 
there had been weaknesses in the analysis; if SD could only address trivial issues; or, if it 
could have only produced minor improvements. However, it would be misleading to 
conclude that SD was useless because the analysis could not provide the necessary detail 
to translate policy recommendations into operational procedures. This conclusion would 
only be correct from an operational perspective, but incorrect from a strategic perspective. 
The focus of SD tends to be on strategic problems and it is designed for that specific 
purpose. It is important to acknowledge that no modelling method is a panacea to policy 
problems. Each method has its strengths and there is a limit to how far it may be 
stretched; beyond that limit, the method loses its effectiveness.
12.4 THE VALUE OF THE POLICY INSIGHTS
12.4.1 A Necessary Condition for Usefulness
The demonstration of modelling power is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
usefulness. It is also essential that SD can offer valuable policy insights, and as stated in 
§9.4.2, this forms the basis of a formal test of an SD model. As stated in §5.2.1, valuable
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insights are considered on the basis of involving feasible policy recommendations and the 
provision of new information to policy makers.
12.4.2 The Feasibility o f  the Policy Recommendations
Explaining what should have been done to improve the situation is of no benefit if the 
recommended course of action is infeasible. Feasible policy recommendations were 
proposed in this study. The analysis also considered policy changes that would have been 
infeasible in practice but they were included for comparative purposes.
In the case of Ribsley General, it was stated that a periodic district service, to provide 
increases in capacity for CC services, co-ordinated with the use of new moderate referral 
guidelines, to control demand, could have produced more desirable behaviour. Increases 
in tertiary-based CC capacity would have probably represented an infeasible intervention, 
given the extreme pressures on tertiary-based resources. However, the analysis 
demonstrated how the more feasible intervention (a periodic district service) could have 
achieved comparative qualitative improvements in access to CC services. The use of strict 
new referral guidelines would have been unrealistic, even given the conservative referral 
environment at Ribsley General. Therefore, the use of moderate new referral guidelines 
was proposed.
It was suggested that, if the circumstances had been different and there had been adequate 
capacity to meet demand at Ribsley General, the other interventions that were discussed 
could have yielded benefits to those pursuing a health improvement agenda. However, 
they would have also generated higher costs but this would not necessarily indicate that 
these interventions were infeasible. The increases in costs could have been minor or 
beyond the control of the purchasers’ influence. For example, efforts could have been 
made to increase the rate of learning of junior CC operators with the aim of identifying 
more high risk cases. Purchasers could not have controlled how many clinical review 
sessions were conducted and whilst they would have controlled the budgeted activity, they 
might have been forced to support increases in activity in order to meet their waiting time 
targets.
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In the case of Veinbridge General, the conclusions were that the undesirable behaviour 
would not have occurred if the activity rates had been driven by waiting list goals and if 
modest new referral guidelines had been in place. Given that seeking a desired waiting list 
would have also led to the waiting time goal being met, this intervention would not be 
expected to have been contentious. Therefore, it would have been feasible. The use of 
modest new referral guidelines would have met with some resistance given the 
‘aggressive’ referral environment at Veinbridge General. Nevertheless, given the obvious 
need to control demand, these objections would not be expected to have occurred to the 
extent to have rendered the recommendation infeasible.
12.4.3 The Originality o f the Policy Insights
For the analysis to be considered useful, the policy insights need to be original; the 
analysis would be of little use if it simply confirmed or provided an elaborate explanation 
of what the policy makers already knew. The findings of this study to some extent 
corroborated the existing knowledge about the shift in CC services and they also provided 
a number of new insights, some of which were counter-intuitive and thus challenged 
existing knowledge.
The study probed into the processes and causative forces at play across the different 
health service boundaries. This developed a more advanced understanding of the feedback 
mechanisms underlying the stimulation of demand whilst demonstrating the 
circumstances under which a shift in CC services would form a ‘fix that fails’. New 
insights were also offered into how access to services could have been improved.
In the case of Ribsley General, those involved were aware that the imbalance between the 
supply and demand for CC services was such that frequent capacity increases were the 
only way to reverse the persistent rise in the CC waiting list and average waiting time. 
However, the analysis showed that the most obvious approach to increasing capacity (a 
permanent district service) would have created further problems and thus would not have 
constituted an effective solution. The analysis also explained how increasing the delay for 
GPs and patients to perceive changes in the availability of district services would have led 
to increased pressure on CC services and not a reduction in pressure as one might expect.
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Whilst capacity increases formed the key to avoiding the problems at Ribsley General, the 
analysis revealed that this did not apply to Veinbridge General as one might expect. On 
the contrary, no amount of capacity increases would have prevented the rise in the CC 
investigation waiting list. Instead, the study showed how the Veinbridge General 
problems could have been avoided by using the existing information about the system in a 
different way (driving activity rates by a waiting list goal, rather than a waiting time goal) 
in tandem with the implementation of modest new clinical guidelines.
Therefore, the different effects of the introduction of district CC services and the different 
abilities to improve access to services without capacity increases were not due to the 
different referral traditions at the two case study centres (conservative verses 
‘aggressive’). The key to these differences was the balance between supply and demand 
for services. Where there was spare capacity, permanent demand increases could have 
been met, and driving activity rates by a waiting list goal could have controlled both the 
average waiting time and waiting list length (e.g. CC services in the Veinbridge General 
case). In situations where the demand persistently approached the supply or exceeded the 
supply by a small extent, the use of demand management strategies could have produced 
the necessary conditions for both aspects of access to be met by driving activity rates by a 
waiting list goal (e.g. OP services in the Veinbridge General case). In situations where the 
imbalance between supply and demand was persistently excessive, only capacity increases 
could have maintained access (e.g. CC services in the Ribsley General case). Finally, in 
situations where there was a temporary imbalance between supply and demand, the 
departures from the waiting time and waiting list goals would only have been temporary 
(e.g. OP services in the Ribsley General case).
12.5 THE EASE OF USE OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS
12.5.1 A Debatable Determinant o f Usefulness
Another factor that determines the usefulness of a method is its ease of use. However, the 
weight placed upon this factor will be very subjective. Some might reject a method that 
has various practical difficulties as being useless whilst others might accept these 
challenges as an inevitable part of the process of deriving important insights - a ‘no pain, 
no gain’ attitude. System dynamicists argue that the benefits of SD modelling can be 
considerable since they claim that the linkage between the structure of a system and its
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behaviour is the key to long term success or failure. As stated in §5.2.1, the assessment of 
the ease of use is on the basis of the skill, time and client involvement requirements and 
the need to modify the SD paradigm. These factors are dealt with in turn.
12.5.2 Skill Requirements
Applying SD is a non-trivial process. Given the availability of user-friendly purpose-built 
SD software that can produce a useable simulation model in a matter of minutes, it is 
tempting to assume that building an SD model is a straightforward process. However, this 
is not true as the underlying assumptions can be easily violated and the inexperienced 
analyst can easily succumb to a number of possible modelling pitfalls. Therefore, a certain 
level of skill is required to ensure that SD is applied correctly and that the model adheres 
to good modelling practice.
Specialist knowledge of SD would not be necessary if a completed and validated SD 
model was delivered to the client as an ongoing policy analysis tool, known in SD as a 
microworld. In this study, the purpose was not to develop a microworld. Furthermore, the 
necessary skills were available because basic skills in SD were acquired prior to the study 
and these skills developed during the course of the study.
12.5.3 Time Requirements
The process of SD modelling can be very time consuming. As with simulation modelling 
in general, time has to be devoted to data collection and preliminary analysis for 
consistency checks, and the careful construction and testing of the simulation model. In 
SD, the data collection procedures are particularly resource intensive due to the emphasis 
on mental data. Mental data can be collected through formal and informal channels. In 
this study, a series of interviews were conducted with a number of different health 
professionals, several on more than one occasion, and observation work was carried out at 
several different sites.
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12.5.4 Client Involvement Requirements
In modelling studies, effort also needs to be devoted to gaining the clients’ (or 
collaborators’) confidence in the model and securing their participation in the study. 
Without client confidence, the analysis becomes pointless, as the policy recommendations 
will be ignored. Client participation ensures that the analysis maintains relevance. There 
are well established guidelines to securing client confidence and participation. However, 
in SD, there is a particular difficulty as the aggregated, deterministic modelling 
perspective, which is a characteristic of the SD paradigm, could conflict with clients’ 
desire for detail. Moreover, this conflict could undermine their confidence in the model 
and discourage their participation in the study. Health care clients would be expected to 
be particularly demanding given the emphasis in health care on individual patient detail. 
The SD modelling perspective is adopted for a specific purpose. The aggregated view 
aims to isolate the feedback structure whilst the deterministic view emphasises causality 
rather than randomness. Furthermore, the exclusion of unnecessary and confusing detail 
avoids the model becoming cluttered and obscuring the dynamic elements of interest 
(Forrester 1961, 1968; Richardson 1991).
The measures that were taken to involve the collaborators in this study were described in 
Chapter 8 (see §8.3.2). The collaborators did not object to the modelling perspective of 
SD. They accepted the focus on aggregate patient flows rather than individual patients. 
This was perhaps due, to some extent, to the fact that the health professionals involved 
were strategic decision makers. The key medical collaborators were hospital consultants. 
Whilst they work at the operational (clinical) level of decision making, as senior health 
professionals they also need to have a strategic perspective on patient care. Moreover, the 
collaborators accepted the focus on elective patients collectively and they were satisfied 
that, given the purpose of the model, the pressures imposed by emergency cases should be 
considered implicitly and not explicitly. Efforts were not made to work interactively with 
the STELLA software and the collaborators due to time constraints.
12.5.5 The Need to Refine and Extend the SD Paradigm
Adopting the modelling perspective of SD could not only potentially cause conflict with 
clients, or collaborators, but also impose restrictions on the feedback phenomena that may
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be studied. For example, Coyle (1992) claimed that some feedback problems are not 
predominantly continuous (the aggregate view) but involve a combination of discrete and 
continuous elements. He presented a study of the best use of aircraft carriers in a major 
conflict where he contends that carriers should be considered in discrete rather than 
continuous terms, given that they are rare and expensive objects. In another example, 
Allen (1988) insisted that focusing on average behaviour (the deterministic view) is 
inadequate for understanding evolving systems and anticipating structural changes. In 
assessing the origin and nature of evolutionary processes, he argued that evolution is 
driven by the inherent microscopic variability and randomness by bestowing upon the 
system the ability to learn and adapt. Rahn (1985) provided a further example. He adhered 
to the aggregate, deterministic view but argued that system dynamicists should also 
consider how stochastic variation may affect the behaviour of the system. His interest 
concerned the formulation of the rate equations and the exogenous influences on both the 
policy stmcture and the decision streams. In SD, the emphasis is on endogenous 
processes, not exogenous factors.
Calls to refine and extend the SD paradigm have arisen from the need to satisfy both 
clients’ desires for further detail and the desire to extend the range of feedback 
phenomena that can be studied with SD. Varying degrees of departure have thus emerged 
involving the incorporation of discrete and stochastic elements into SD models and 
greater disaggregation (e.g. Wolstenholme and Coyle 1980; Wolstenholme 1980, 1990; 
Crawford 1991; Scholl 1992, 1995; Coyle 1992, 1999). In health care, greater 
disaggregation might involve splitting a single patient flow into parallel flows, reflecting 
different clinical priorities or treatment strategies, or into sequential flows, reflecting 
different stages of care.
In this study, some modifications were made to the SD paradigm but, as stated in the 
previous section, these were not motivated by the need to satisfy the collaborators’ desire 
for further model detail. They arose due to the modelling perspective, which was on 
decisions and processes at the local (individual hospital) level rather than the national 
level. This resulted in the introduction of discrete elements into the model. For example, 
the arrival and departure of trainee CC operators involved single individuals so these 
flows were specified in the model using PULSE functions. Other examples were the 
affordability variables. These referred to single affordability limits corresponding to single
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hospitals so they were specified in the model by IF functions. Other discrete elements 
related to the development of the single district CC facility.
12.6 RETURNING TO THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The assumptions that were made prior to the SD study of the shift in CC services, 
regarding the causal mechanisms and usefulness of applying SD, were articulated in the 
research hypothesis. This was stated in §5.2.2. Given the findings of the research, these 
assumptions may be revised to produce the following statement:
The application of SD has shown that health service shifts, intended to 
improve access to services, may actually reduce access by stimulating further 
demand unless sufficient capacity is available to meet the demand, and efforts 
are made to control both the waiting time and waiting list length. Demand 
may be stimulated by several different feedback mechanisms that interact 
with each other. Under certain conditions, these mechanisms may also 
suppress demand.
By shifting services closer to home, patients and health professionals become 
more knowledgeable and, consequently, more demanding. Those who refer 
patients on for services, from the number of requests for assessment, may 
stimulate demand in response to this increased pressure. The increased 
knowledge of patients and health professionals may also lead to higher 
demand for assessment thus potentially causing access problems further down 
the referral chain. Demand may also be stimulated by reduced waiting times 
and suppressed in response to excessive waiting times.
Another mechanism underlying changes in demand relates to the skills of 
those who refer patients on for services. Service shifts may stimulate demand 
if they produce increases in the skill of identifying patients in need. Demand 
may be stimulated either as a result of the increased knowledge or increased 
confidence associated with the gain in skills. Some service shifts lead to the 
development of new skills as those who refer patients assume new 
responsibilities. Other service shifts provide a new location for the gain of
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existing skills. Service shifts may accelerate the gain of skills (and associated 
increases in demand) by providing opportunties to increase activity. Skills 
may vary periodically due to the existence of a training programme and 
rotation of junior staff. Their degree of inexperience may be reflected by the 
number of under-referrals or over-referrals. The former would typically arise 
in a conservative referral environment whereas periods of the latter would 
reflect the over-confidence which would typically arise in a more ‘aggressive’ 
referral environment. Whether or not skills actually influences demand will 
depend upon the degree of autonomy granted to junior staff.
The stimulation of demand will impose increasing calls for further funding. 
The duration of the service shift will determine whether this pressure is 
sustained or only temporary.
A clinical guideline may be introduced in an attempt to suppress the 
inappropriate use of services. However, this may only have a limited impact 
in reducing pressure because the mechanisms underlying secondary effects are 
so complex. By applying SD, it is possible to explain the primary and 
secondary effects of policy changes and thus inform the policy maker about 
how to intervene more effectively in the system. For example, in cases where 
there is a persistent imbalance between supply and demand, qualitative 
improvements in access cannot be achieved without increases in supply. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the service shift may be improved by co­
ordinating it with supply increases (to meet the existing demand) and with the 
use of new referral guidelines (to control demand so that supply increases 
target the existing demand).
In cases where access problems have resulted from the service shift and not a 
persistent imbalance between supply and demand, more desirable behaviour 
may be achieved without supply increases. The effectiveness of the service 
shift may be improved by co-ordinating it with the use of new referral 
guidelines (to control demand) and with changes to the forces that drive 
activity rates (to ensure that both the average waiting time and waiting list 
length are controlled).
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SD thus presents a useful planning and evaluation tool for exploring health 
service shifts. It can help policy makers to understand and assess the past and 
present, and also plan for the future with more effective policies. It can tackle 
important issues and generate significant improvements. As SD-based 
analyses are generally designed for strategic support, some of the policy 
recommendations do not easily translate into operational procedures. 
However, they may lend themselves to the analysis by another method, more 
appropriately aligned with the analysis of detail complexity such as DES. SD 
can offer valuable policy insights in terms of feasible policy recommendations 
and new insights into service shifts, not simply confirming what policy 
makers already know. The process of applying SD is non trivial but none of 
the practical difficulties associated with its use are excessive.
12.7 GENERALISATIONS
It is necessary to consider whether the research findings are generalisable beyond the two 
case studies. Generalisations maybe drawn from the insights into the dynamics of service 
shifts and the conclusions regarding the usefulness of SD as a tool for exploring service 
shifts. In this section, only generalisations in the context of health care are discussed. 
Extensions beyond health care could relate to future research (See §12.9).
12.7.1 Dynamics o f  Service Shifts
Generalising from the insights into the dynamics of service shifts may be achieved by 
considering the external validity of both the causal theory embodied in the model and the 
case study findings derived from that theory.
External Validity o f the Causal Theory
The external validity of the causal theory embodied in the model may be considered on 
two different dimensions: behaviour and structure. Behavioural external validity relates to 
the range of reference modes that the theory is capable of explaining. This was 
demonstrated by the base case analyses and policy analyses where the model exhibited
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several different reference modes: equilibrium/stability; asymptotic growth; growth 
followed by decline; and, oscillatory behaviour. The policy parameters may be considered 
to correspond with the use of different policies and different circumstances. Therefore, 
policy behaviour could be recast as base case behaviour for the shift in CC services to 
other hospitals.
Structural external validity relates to the variety of service shifts that may be accurately 
represented in the model structure. The structure represented a theory of shifts in health 
services to improve access and it was parameterised to two cases of the shift in CC 
services. Service shifts that would not be represented by this theory are those that 
eliminated delays along the patient pathway.
For this study, it was necessary to use variable names that referred specifically to the shift 
in CC services to ensure that the model had face validity. However, references to CC 
services could be considered, more generally, as the health service of interest. The tertiary 
and district levels could be considered as the established and new levels respectively. 
“Level” could refer to either a service level (primary, secondary or tertiary levels) in the 
context of shifts between service levels or it could refer to a level of care by a particular 
health professional (e.g. GP or nurse) in the context of shifts within service levels. 
References to the OP waiting list could be recast as the number of patients awaiting a 
preliminary investigation and possible selection for the health service of interest. 
Furthermore, references to the CC investigation waiting list could be recast more 
generally as the number of patients awaiting the health service of interest.
Incorporated in the model structure were demand suppression and stimulation 
mechanisms associated with waiting time, knowledge and skills effects on demand and 
the effect of other factors. The re-parameterisation of the model to another service shift 
would select and quantify the relevant effects; the structure relating to effects that did not 
apply would be rendered inactive by the specification of zero switching parameters. The 
model also represented two phases of development of the shift in services. If only a single 
phase applied, as in the case of the shift of CC services to Ribsley General, the 
specification of a very large phase 2-development time would ensure that the structure for 
phase 2 developments remained dormant. It would still be appropriate to include this 
structure, as the generation of further development costs would not be inconceivable.
330
As stated in §9.4.2, the family member test (Forrester and Senge 1980) is a formal test of 
external validity. It considers the ability of an SD model to represent a general theory of a 
family (or class) of problems. Key questions are how the shift in CC services differs from 
other family members (shifts in other services), and how the model would exhibit the 
characteristic behaviour of each family member when policies were altered in accordance 
with their known decision making rules. Table 12.3 lists some examples of service shifts 
in the NHS and their assumed structural characteristics and thus highlights differences 
between different family members. The structural characteristics of service shifts in the 
NHS will typically differ from those in other health care systems by the absence of the 
waiting time effect.
Considering the characteristic behaviour for each family member, the trends followed by 
the key variables (average waiting times and the numbers of patients waiting for the 
service of interest and waiting for investigation and for possible selection for that service) 
would depend upon how the supply for services compared with demand. This, in turn, 
would depend upon various factors including the conditions prior to the service shift, the 
extent and duration of the stimulated demand and the existence and impact of demand 
management strategies. The two case studies illustrated how differences in these factors 
could generate contrasting behaviour. The average waiting times and waiting lists would 
exhibit equilibrium/stability if there was sufficient capacity to meet demand and, in the 
context of referral rate increases, the activity rates were driven by waiting list goals. A 
persistent capacity shortfall would produce asymptotic growth. A pattern of growth 
followed by decline would correspond with a period of sufficient capacity preceded by a 
period of insufficient capacity. Finally, oscillatory behaviour would arise if there were 
temporary periods of insufficient capacity.
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Table 12.3 Examples of Different Service Shifts and Their Structural Characteristics
CC
Investigations
Cancer
Services
ECG Testing 
(Open-Access)
Minor Procedures in 
General Practice
Testing in 
General Practice
Physiotherapy in 
General Practice
GP Services 
(NHS Direct)
Type of Service Shift T->S T->S S->P S->P S->P S^P P->P
Knowledge Effect / Y Y Y Y
Waiting Time Effect Y X 1 Y Y / Y Y
Skills Effect Y Y Y Y Y X 2 X 3
Other Effects on Demand V X 4 Y Y Y ‘x-3 ......
Stimulation of Demand Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Suppression of Demand Y Y Y Y Y xr ..........
T->S - Tertiary to secondary' shift; S~>P - Second ary to primary shift; P->P - Shift within primary level;
1 - Cannot delay due to high risk; 2 - Professionals already fully skilled; 3 - Based upon strict guidelines;
4 - Would expect all ‘grey ares’ cases to be already referred on due to high risk)
External Validity of the Case Study Findings
Examining the external validity of the case study findings derived from the causal theory 
involves generalising to broader theoretical issues, of which there are a number of 
possibilities. In terms of aiming for effective policy intervention, the case of Ribsley 
General illustrated the need to tackle persistent problems with long-term, sustainable 
solutions; temporary solutions will only offer temporary relief. The case studies also 
illustrated the general need to account for the consequences, or knock-on effects, of policy 
changes and thus design co-ordinated or “joined-up” policies. Improvements in access to 
health services will often stimulate further demand. Therefore, policies that are intended 
to improve access to services need to be co-ordinated with demand management 
strategies. Furthermore, in designing “joined-up” policies, it is necessary to consider the 
fact that some consequences of policy changes are more subtle than others. For example, 
policies that alter activity rates will also affect the rate at which junior staff gain skills and 
thus will alter any influence of skills (and confidence) on referral rates.
To consider the consequences of policy changes effectively, it is necessary to use multiple 
performance measures to evaluate the effects of policy changes. Evaluating on too narrow 
a basis can produce misleading conclusions. Calls to monitor complex systems in such a 
sophisticated manner are not a new idea (Ashby 1956; Kaplan and Norton 1992). 
However, there a persistent tendency in health care towards a narrow focus on isolated 
events, short-term results and single performance measures.
Recently, calls have been made to shift the emphasis from the length of the waiting list on 
to the waiting time. The case studies demonstrated how this would be misguided as it 
could produce misleading results and ineffective policies. The importance of monitoring 
both the waiting time and waiting list arises from the fact that each represents different, 
though interrelated, aspects of pressure on the system associated with access times. The 
former represents the delay to undergo investigation (or treatment) whilst the latter 
represents the need for investigation (or treatment).
The case studies demonstrated that driving activity rates by seeking a desired waiting list 
length is more effective than seeking a desired waiting time in the context of referral rate 
increases when there is sufficient capacity available. In general, seeking a desired waiting
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time will meet and maintain this goal provided there are sufficient resources available to 
respond to changes in the length of the waiting list with changes in the waiting list 
removal rate. However, maintaining the average waiting time at its desired level will not 
necessarily indicate that the waiting list goal is met. The length of the waiting list could, 
in fact, be rising above its desired level. Therefore, the desired waiting time will only be 
maintained due to the increases in the waiting list removal rate balancing the increases in 
the waiting list. This result was not specific to the case of CC services but a general 
consequence of the interplay between supply and demand variables that determine the 
waiting list length and average waiting time. Therefore, the recommendation to drive 
activity rates by seeking a waiting list goal rather than waiting time goal could be 
transferred to other service shifts.
The case studies also illustrated the influence of pressure by patients and GPs on clinical 
decisions and the problems that can arise from the inability to cope with this pressure and 
the poor management of demand. There is currently a movement in health care that is 
campaigning for clinical and policy decisions to be driven by the preferences of patients 
and the public (Kassirer 1983; Homberger et al 1995). Questions thus arise about how the 
shift in the balance of care can continue whilst providing high quality care to patients who 
are not, traditionally, conservative.
Note that the generalisability of this research is not undermined by the hospital data being 
old or by the increasing prevalence of district CC facilities. The problems with demand 
being stimulated by improvements in access are recurrent and have existed since the 
inception of the NHS. Furthermore, the shift in the balance of care is a trend, affecting 
many different services, which will continue to develop as long as there is a demand and 
ability to bring services closer to home. This ability will be sustained by the constant 
advances in medical technology. Therefore, the findings of this research could potentially 
have broad current and future relevance. To explore this potential, it is necessary to 
conduct further studies into service shifts to establish if these research findings can be 
replicated or if they require some revision.
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12.7.2 Usefulness o f System Dynamics
To generalise the conclusions regarding the usefulness of SD, the first issue to consider is 
the modelling power of SD. This involves the transferability of the conclusions about the 
ability of SD to explain, rather than the transferability of the explanations themselves, 
which has already been addressed in the previous section. There is no reason to believe 
that an SD analysis would not provide policy insight into other service shifts. The 
characteristics of the case study behaviour and some, if not all, of the feedback 
mechanisms underlying that behaviour also relate to other service shifts.
There is also no reason to believe that the points made about the extent of the modelling 
power would not transfer to other service shifts. For example, provided a new SD study 
was based upon good modelling practice, it would be of sound quality. In this study, SD 
addressed significant policy issues which were not specific to the CC case such as access 
to services and the management of demand. Regarding the completeness of another SD 
analysis, if recommendations involved capacity increases, as in the CC study, the analysis 
might well call for a DES analysis. In terms of the ability to generate valuable insights 
into other service shifts, there is no reason to believe that SD could not offer feasible 
policy recommendations. The same could be said for the ability to offer original insights, 
especially given that SD has not yet been applied to other service shifts.
Regarding the ease of use of SD, to apply SD to other service shifts, fewer skills would be 
required, as the model would simply need to be recalibrated but some skills would be 
necessary as this would be a non-trivial process. In applying SD to another service shift, it 
would not be possible to economise on the time requirements for data collection or the 
effort to secure the involvement of collaborators. On these issues, there is no reason to 
believe that the CC study was atypical. Finally, concerning the comments made about the 
need to modify the SD paradigm, a similar number of refinements would generally apply. 
Fewer refinements would only apply if the analysis were to focus on service shifts at the 
national or regional level.
335
12.8 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This work has produced several contributions, some more substantial than others. The 
main contribution is an assessment of the usefulness of applying SD to support “joined-up 
thinking” in planning for and evaluating health service shifts. Based upon the detailed 
analysis of the shift in CC services in the NHS, SD was shown to be able to contribute to 
the policy making process by offering a means to design “joined-up solutions” to “joined- 
up” problems associated with service shifts. This finding is transferable to other health 
service shifts.
The SD simulation model represents a first attempt to integrate into a testable framework 
a set of propositions about the stimulation and suppression of demand for health services 
associated with shifts in health services. SD thus offers a new “joined-up” perspective on 
health service shifts as previous studies have only focused on isolated parts of the system.
This research has considered the existence of several different feedback mechanisms 
underlying changes in demand and, with a dynamic analysis, provided insight into the 
interaction between these mechanisms. These mechanisms are associated with waiting 
time, knowledge and skills effects on demand and they can lead to the stimulation or 
suppression of demand. In the literature, discussions of changes in demand have tended to 
focus on the stimulation of demand not its suppression. Discussions have also tended to 
concentrate on waiting time and knowledge effects, not skills effects. In discussing 
service shifts to the primary sector, Hamblin et al (1998b) provide an exception by 
highlighting a skills effect on demand associated with the gain in knowledge via the 
development of new skills. This research offers new insight into skills effects by 
considering the process underlying the acceleration of the gain in skills and the effects of 
training programmes and the rotation of junior staff. This research also demonstrates that 
the effect of skills on demand may be due to either the associated changes in knowledge 
or confidence or both. Hamblin et al (1998b) only discuss the former.
Using the SD model, new insight was obtained into how the shift in CC services helped 
and hindered the delivery of cardiac services. It was also shown how purchasers and 
providers could have intervened effectively to improve the behaviour of the system by 
coordinating the service shift with other policy changes. For example, it was revealed that,
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under certain conditions, permanent reductions in waiting lists and waiting times could 
have been achieved without capacity increases. In some cases, the same improvements 
could have been achieved by controlling referrals via the use of new referral guidelines 
alone (controlling, rather than meeting, demand). In other cases, using new referral 
guidelines and changing the forces that drive activity, from seeking a desired waiting time 
to seeking a desired waiting list would have been effective. In fact, these two 
interventions combined could have generated synergy by producing greater improvements 
together than the sum of the improvements generated by each intervention alone.
This work provides a review of the shift in the balance of care in the NHS, which extends 
beyond the usual focus on the developments in primary care, to shifts across the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. Another contribution, which formed the basis of published 
work (Taylor and Lane, 1998), is a clarification of the role for SD in health care and as a 
complement to the traditional approach to simulation modelling. Finally, contributions 
have been made to the field of SD (see Richardson 1996) by offering a new application 
and by proposing a new graphical summary measure.
12.9 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The work presented in this thesis could be developed in several different ways, thus 
providing possibilities for future research. These could involve efforts to: generate further 
insight into shifts in the balance of care; continue model development; address issues 
relating to the SD modelling process; and, consider issues beyond health care.
Shifts in the Balance o f Care
Although this research involved carrying out a number of experiments, they were not 
exhaustive as they only involved a few combinations of interventions. Therefore, further 
research could explore other combinations of interventions into the shift in CC services. 
The current model was only applied to the shift in CC services in the NHS at two 
hospitals. Therefore, attempts could be made to employ the model to study shifts in CC 
services to other hospitals and shifts in other NHS services. Numerous examples of 
service shifts were described in §3.2 and Table 12.3. Following on from the comments 
made in §12.7.1, this would serve to verify if the research findings could be replicated or
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indicate if they required some revision. Replicating the research findings would increase 
the evidence base into supporting the suggestion that service shifts can lead to overall 
increases in demand, which has important policy implications.
As this research only focused on service shifts within the NHS, research efforts could 
examine the dynamics of service shifts that cross into the private sector. An example is 
the development of ‘walk-in’ clinics which are privately run.
As part of this research, GPs were not interviewed. Therefore, by interviewing GPs, a 
closer investigation could be carried out into the changes in GP referral behaviour in 
response to service shifts.
Adopting a regional perspective on the shift in CC services, SD could be applied to 
provide insight into the stimulation and transfer of demand between different district 
hospitals. Research could focus on the connections between the tertiary centre and its 
referring hospitals. Alternatively, the use of a district CC facility by cardiologists from 
neighbouring hospitals could be investigated. It was reported that in order to generate 
enough patient activity to sustain the permanent district service at Veinbridge General, 
neighbouring hospitals were permitted to book laboratory sessions at the catheter 
laboratory. These studies would generate hospital network models. Furthermore, capacity 
increases would be represented as endogenous processes rather than exogenous factors as 
in this research.
Model Development
As a number of simplifying assumptions were made in the current model, future research 
could focus on model extensions and refinements. For example, the model boundary 
could be extended to endogenise the follow-up process of patients after their discharge 
from an OP appointment. Coyle (1984) shows how the arrivals of new and follow-up 
patients could be represented in SD in qualitative terms. Another example would be to 
endogenise the process of the introduction of phase 1 and phase 2 district services 
prompting changes in the referral threshold for CC and district CC. A further example 
would be to disaggregate the model to elucidate the dynamics of changes in clinical 
priority between routine and urgent elective cases.
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The SD Modelling Process
Several possibilities for future research could focus on the process of SD modelling, such 
as the use of the pressure summary index. Efforts could also be directed towards 
improving the usefulness of SD in analysing service shifts. For example, it was suggested 
that DES analyses could be employed to operationalise capacity increases and achieve 
improvements in the efficiency of capacity usage. Therefore, further research could be 
directed towards exploring how DES and SD could complement each other, and the 
practicalities involved. Related work would include that by Mak (1992). Another example 
is an investigation of the usefulness of SD-based analyses of other health care problems 
and issues, beyond shifts in services.
Several other research avenues relate to the unresolved issues in SD that were highlighted 
in §4.6. Whilst some insight was offered into some of these issues, as they were not the 
focus of this research, they inevitably remain unresolved to some extent. They include the 
practicalities involved in conceptualising problems and working with professionals in the 
health service. As the methods and results of an economic appraisal are easily understood, 
it is important that SD models and their analyses are transparent for SD to provide an 
effective complement to economic appraisal.
In this research, it was found that graphs of hospital data provided a fruitful basis for 
discussion and reflection about the mechanics of the system. Further research could 
examine the effectiveness of different diagrammatic tools in eliciting information from 
experts and in facilitating learning about the system.
Due to the time constraints for this research, efforts were not made to work interactively 
on the simulation model with the collaborators so only the model output was presented. If 
interactive work had been conducted, then some of the output graphs would have been 
simplified and the names of the evaluation and policy variables would have been changed 
from abbreviations to full names to make them instantly transparent. Currently, all the 
variable names are abbreviations with the full names given in the extensive model 
documentation. Whilst efforts have been made to ensure consistency in the abbreviations, 
non-modellers would be expected to find full names more transparent. Specifying full
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names is not beyond the capability of the STELLA software. However, they would have 
to be relatively short in order to fit easily on the stock and flow diagrams. More 
informative variable names can be assigned using abbreviations. Therefore, there would 
be a trade-off between the transparency and usefulness of variable names.
Another SD process issue concerns how to effectively convey the results of SD-based 
analyses. In this research, in order to summarise the improvements over the base case 
behaviour, pressure summary indices were proposed. Further work could focus on testing 
these indices and evaluating their usefulness.
Whilst this research aimed to highlight the trade-offs involved in the results of the policy 
experiments and the potential conflict between those pursuing different agendas; no 
attempts were made to impose value judgements. Therefore, another example of future 
work would be to investigate the proposal to combine SD with decision analytic methods 
to attempt to select the ‘best’ policy change (Gardiner and Ford 1980; Reagan-Ciricione et 
al 1991).
Issues Beyond Health care
Future work could involve comparisons between mechanisms underlying changes in 
demand within and outside health care. For example, in manufacturing, the order backlog 
and delivery delay are analogous to the waiting list and waiting time respectively. 
Manufacturing differs from health care in two different respects. Firstly, in certain 
situations, an increased delivery delay will lead to over-ordering to compensate or else 
customers will go elsewhere. This is the opposite of the waiting time effect on demand in 
health care (an increased waiting time can suppress demand). Secondly, the signals differ 
as in manufacturing, the ‘market’ sees the delivery delay but not the order backlog. In 
health care, both the waiting time and waiting list may be monitored. Research could 
draw comparisons with other industries and consider the implications of these differences.
Research could also consider comparisons between service shifts within and those outside 
health care. The development of free legal advice in Citizens Advice Bureaux represents 
an example of the latter.
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APPENDIX A - ABBREVIATIONS
A&E Accident and Emergency
CC Cardiac Catheterisation
CHD Coronary Heart Disease
DES Discrete Event Simulation
DGH District General Hospital
EBM Evidence-Based Medicine
GP General Practitioner
HA Health Authority
NHS National Health Service
OP Outpatient
Q ALY Quality Adj usted Life Y ear
RCT Randomised Controlled Trial
SD System Dynamics
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APPENDIX B - GLOSSARIES
Bl. Glossary o f  Health-Related Terms 
B2. Glossary o f  Modelling Terms
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These two glossaries are derived from a number of sources. In particular, the glossary of health-related 
terms is based upon the British Heart Foundation’s patient information booklet (BHF 1999). Primary 
sources of reference for the modelling glossary are Richardson and Pugh (1981) and the STELLA software 
manuals (High Performance Systems 1997).
Bl. Glossary o f Health-Related Terms
ANGINA - A choking sensation in the chest, caused by insufficient blood reaching the heart. In most cases, 
indicates coronary heart disease.
ARTERY - A main blood vessel carrying blood from the heart to the rest of the body.
CARDIAC - Pertaining to the heart.
CARDIAC CATHETERISATION - An invasive procedure of passing a catheter through a vein or artery 
towards the heart. Used for the diagnosis and treatment of heart disease.
CATHETER - A long, hollow, flexible tube.
CONGENITAL HEART DISEASE - Structural malformation of the heart or its connecting blood vessels, 
present at birth. Forms the third largest group of patients who undergo cardiac catheterisation. 
CORONARY ARTERIES - Arteries which feed blood to the myocardium.
CORONARY ANGIOPLASTY - An invasive treatment for coronary heart disease whereby an attempt 
is made to unblock a narrowing in a coronary artery. This treatment procedure may be carried out 
during cardiac catheterisation.
CORONARY ANGIOGRAPHY - An invasive procedure which involves injecting an X-ray opaque liquid 
through the coronary artery to provide an image of the coronary anatomy. Forms part of a cardiac 
catheterisation investigation.
CORONARY BYPASS SURGERY - An invasive treatment for coronary heart disease whereby a 
bypass channel is constructed around a narrowing in a coronary artery. Involves surgery on the open 
heart while the circulation is diverted to a heart-lung machine (‘open heart’ surgery).
CORONARY HEART DISEASE - Also known as coronary artery disease and ischaemic heart disease. A 
disease process whereby the inner layer of the coronary arteries become thickened and deposits of fat 
are laid down. Forms the vast majority of patients who undergo cardiac catheterisation. 
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS - This term refers to the process of making a correct diagnosis between 
diseases which present a similar clinical picture.
DISTRICT LEVEL - Secondary health service level within the primary, secondary, tertiary divisions. 
ELECTIVE - Non-emergency, waiting list. May be subdivided between routine and urgent.
HEART VALVE DISEASE - Abnormalities of the heart valves. Forms the second largest group of patients 
who undergo cardiac catheterisation.
INCIDENCE - The number of new cases of a disease appearing in a given time period, or the proportion of 
population experiencing new incidents.
INTERVENTION - Treatment procedure 
INVASIVE - Involving penetration of the skin.
INVESTIGATION - Diagnostic procedure 
ISCHAEMIA - Inadequate blood supply
377
MORBIDITY - Illness.
MORTALITY - Death.
MYOCARDIUM - Heart muscle.
MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION - Heart attack.
PREVALENCE - Number or proportion of population affected by a disease.
RESTENOSIS - A stenosis is a constriction as with a coronary artery which is narrowed by coronary 
heart disease. Restenosis is the process whereby re-narrowing occurs.
B2. Glossary o f  Modelling Terms
AUXILIARY - See converter.
BEHAVIOUR - Refers to the evolution over time of a system variable
CAUSAL HYPOTHESIS - Presents an explanation of how the structure of a system causes its behaviour 
over time.
CAUSAL-LOOP DIAGRAM - Also known as an influence diagram. A diagram which is used to represent 
information feedback structure. Useful for conceptualising problems and for presenting policy insights 
in non-technical presentations.
CO-FLOW FORMULATION - Co-flow (co-incident flow or rate-to-rate) formulations are employed to 
represent a process that runs in parallel with some primary process or to track an attribute associated 
with a flow. The inputs to the co-flowing process are usually the primary flow multiplied by a 
conversion coefficient so the two flows will behave identically, provided the conversion coefficient is a 
constant.
CONNECTOR - Used in a stock and flow diagram to represent the transmission of information and 
inputs which are used to regulate the flows.
CONSTANT - See converter.
CONVERTER - Used in a stock and flow diagram for a variety of purposes to represent information used 
to calculate a flow. Converter is the term used in SD models generated by the STELLA software. 
Encompasses constants (constant converters), table functions (graphical converters) and auxiliaries (non­
constant, non-graphical converters).
CLOUD - Used in a stock and flow diagram to represent ‘sources’ and ‘sinks’ of the material flowing 
through the stocks. Marks the boundary of the model.
DELAY - May refer to lags in the flows of materials or lags in perceptions or cognition.
DOMINANT STRUCTURE - Subset of the feedback structure of a SD model which is understood to be 
principally responsible for the behaviour pattern.
FEEDBACK LOOP - See information feedback loop.
FLOW - Used to represent an activity which can fill and/or drain the associated stock. A flow can be in one 
direction (uniflow) or both directions (biflow). The flow regulator contains the algebraic expression 
which determines the volume of the flow. Also known as a rate. Flow is the term used with SD models 
generated by the STELLA software.
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GHOST - A replica of a stock, flow or converter. Can be used to improve the clarity of a stock and flow 
diagram by breaking and uncrossing links and to prevent the diagram resembling a bowl of spaghetti.
Can also be used to collect together parameters into a convenient location.
INFORMATION FEEDBACK LOOP - Arises from a decision, based upon information about some 
property of the system, resulting in an action, which is intended to influence the value of that property. 
The result of the action changes the property of the system and thus leads to new information about that 
property. This may lead to further actions. A closed causal relationship thus propagates through the 
system as time unfolds.
LEVEL - See stock.
NON-LINEARITY - When one factor is not a simple proportion of another factor (e.g. hospital admission 
rates may be proportional to the number of available beds unless the number of vacant beds are low 
when elective admission rates may drop to zero) or when one factor is not independently responsive to 
several other factors (e.g. hospital admission rates are not independently responsive to the number of 
available beds and demand as 100% bed occupancy renders the levels of demand irrelevant in 
determining admission rates). Represented in an SD model by a graphical converter.
MODE OF BEHAVIOUR - A dynamic pattern such as exponential growth or oscillation.
MODEL - A simplified representation of something in the ‘real world’. A model is constructed for a 
specific purpose.
POLICY - In the context of SD, this refers to a rule that continuously transforms information into decisions.
RATE - See flow.
REFERENCE MODE - A graph of an important variable displaying its behaviour over time. Used to 
define the problem focus in a SD study. Reference modes may describe problematic behaviour, more 
desirable system behaviour or observed behaviour under an existing policy.
SIMULATION - A pragmatic, non-optimising approach which involves the construction and dynamic 
analysis of a model.
STOCK - Used to represent anything which accumulates, both physical and non physical. Collects whatever 
flows into and out of it. A stock with two flows (an inflow and an outflow) can be visualised as the level 
in a bath tub, the tap controlling the flow of water into to the bath and the plug controlling the flow of 
water out of the bath. Also known as a level. Stock is the term used with SD models generated by the 
STELLA software.
STOCK AND FLOW DIAGRAM - Compared with a causal-Ioop diagram, a stock and flow diagram is 
more detailed and matches more closely the complete quantitative description of the model.
STRUCTURE - Refers to the integrated network of information linking various flows in the system such as 
people, resources and money.
SYSTEM BOUNDARY - Encloses the smallest possible number of components necessary for the 
behaviour under investigation.
TABLE FUNCTION - See converter.
TIME FRAME - Period of time over which a dynamic problem unfolds.
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APPENDIX C - COLLABORATIVE WORK
Cl, Site Visits
C2. Interviews and Contacts
C2a. Heartwick Hospital 
C2b. Ribsley Hospital 
C2c. Veinbridge Hospital 
C2d. Purchasers/Commissioners 
C2e. Other Relevant Health Practitioner Contacts 
C3. Sources and Quality o f  the Numerical Data
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Cl. Site Visits
Site Nature of Visit
Heartwick Hospital Observation work (20/6/97 and 26/6/97) of CC and coronary angioplasty
procedures in the catheter laboratory and nuclear imaging scans 
(15/7/97) in the nuclear imaging department. Attended a weekly staff 
meeting (20/6/98) which was devoted to a review of patient care. 
Spoke to various medical, nursing and technical staff.
Ribsley General Observational work (24/3/98) of CC mobile unit and ward. Spoke to
various medical, nursing and technical staff.
Veinbridge General Observational work (12/8/97) of CC mobile unit and ward. Spoke to
various medical, nursing and technical staff.
C2. Interviews and Contacts
C2a. Heartwick Hospital
Position
Consultant Cardiologist
Hospital Manager
Information Dept Officer
Information Dept Officer 
Consultant of Nuclear 
Medicine
Nature of Contact
First meeting on 13/6/97 during which feedback was obtained on a 
preliminary causal hypothesis. Interviewed (1/10/97 and 21/1/98) to 
discuss general issues about cardiac services and his experiences of 
district CC services, and to obtain his response to the CC and other 
hypotheses. Met (11/9/98 and 22/10/98) to present some graphs and 
obtain feedback on the conceptual model.
Interviewed (3/7/98) and spoke by telephone on several occasions to 
clarify further issues. Discussed both general issues and specific 
concerns about CC.
Liaised on numerous occasions, mainly between Feb 98 and May 98, 
with regard to the procurement of hospital data
Met briefly (18/3/98) to clarify some hospital coding queries.
Interviewed on 15/7/97 to discuss nuclear imaging and its relationship 
with CC.
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C2b. Ribsley General Hospital
Position
Consultant Cardiologist
Hospital Manager
Information Manager
Nature of Contact
Interviewed (17/2/98 and 24/3/98) to discuss his experiences of district 
CC services and to obtain feedback on results of data analysis. Met 
(13/5/98) to clarify data queries. Met (19/8/98) to obtain his 
feedback on the conceptual model. Also spoke by telephone on 
several occasions to discuss queries. Met to present simulation 
model and illustrative model output and to discuss calibration of 
simulation model (14/6/99 and 10/8/99).
Interviewed (24/3/98) to discuss her experiences of district CC 
services. Subsequently liaised on several occasions by telephone 
with regard to the procurement of hospital data. Met (2/8/99) to 
provide update on project.
Met (2/8/99) to discuss request for OP data. Subsequently spoke on 
telephone on several occasions to discuss queries.
C2c. Veinbridge General Hospital
Position
Consultant Cardiologist
Hospital Manager
Nature of Contact
Interviewed (6/2/98) to discuss his experiences of district CC services 
and other issues. Communicated further via letters (May 98) to 
clarify data queries. Met (1/9/98 and 9/9/98) to clarify data queries, 
obtain further data and to obtain his feedback on the conceptual 
model. Met to present simulation model and illustrative model 
output, and to discuss calibration of simulation model (6/8/99 and 
21/8/99).
Liaised on several occasions by telephone with regard to the 
procurement of hospital data.
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C2d. Purchasers/Commissioners
HA = Health Authority. HA1, HA2 and HA3 are the local purchasers for Heartwick, Veinbridge and 
Ribsley Hospitals respectively. HA4 is another purchaser of services from Heartwick Hospital.
Position
Purchaser, HA1 
Purchaser, HA2
Purchaser, HA2
Purchaser, HA3
Purchaser, HA4
Public Health Consultant, 
HA4
Nature of Contact
Telephone conversation (22/7/97) of a general nature.
Interviewed (18/6/98) to discuss his experiences of district CC 
services. Interview was tape-recorded.
Interviewed (18/6/98) to discuss her experiences of district CC 
services. Interview was tape-recorded.
Interviewed (17/7/97) to discuss her experiences of district CC 
services, and to obtain her response to the CC and other causal 
hypotheses. Interview was tape-recorded.
Interviewed (18/7/98) to discuss her experiences of district CC 
services, and to obtain her response to the CC and other causal 
hypotheses. Tape-recorded interview.
Interviewed (23/7/97) to discuss her experiences of district CC 
services, and to obtain her response to the CC and other causal 
hypotheses. Interview was tape-recorded.
C2e. Other Relevant Health Practitioner Contacts
Hospitals X, Y and Z refer to other hospitals
Position
Business Manager, 
Cardiocare
Operations Manager, 
Cardiocare 
Consultant Cardiologist, 
Hospital X
Consultant Cardiologist, 
Hospital Y
Nature of Contact
Interviewed (17/8/98) to discuss his experiences of district CC services 
and to place the experiences of Veinbridge and Ribsley Hospitals in 
a broader context. Tape-recorded interview.
Liaised on several occasions by telephone with regard to the 
procurement of audit data.
Interviewed (11/2/96) to discuss general issues including his 
experiences of district CC services. Clarified further issues by 
telephone (7/1/98).
Interviewed (19/10/98) to discuss his use of a scoring system which 
enables him to systematically identify high risk patients for 
catheterisation. Also visited his catheter laboratory and spoke 
informally to several of his colleagues.
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Dr Clare Phillips, 
Specialist Clinical 
Services,
Department of Health 
Hospital Manager, 
Hospital Z
Telephone conversations (3/11/97 and 5/11/97) to obtain a
government perspective on several clinical initiatives including the 
development of district CC services.
Interviewed (16/7/98 and 14/8/97) to discuss her experiences of district 
CC services, and to obtain her response to the CC and other 
hypotheses. Tape-recorded interviews.
C3. Sources and Quality o f the Numerical Data
Organisation Databases
Heartwick Hospital Numerical (hospital), written and mental databases
Ribsley General Numerical (CC waiting list) and mental databases
Veinbridge General Numerical (CC and hospital) databases, mental database
Cardiocare Numerical database
The collaborators were very accommodating in providing access to data. However, several problems were 
encountered concerning the acquisition of useful numerical data. According to the experiences of other 
modellers, which are documented in the literature, these data problems are not unusual.
Some of the requested data was unavailable as it was not routinely collected, lost or aggregated with other 
data. Only one of the DGHs held a database on the CC waiting list with dates of patients joining and leaving 
the waiting list. For the other DGH, such information was contained within the patients’ notes which were 
not accessed. Some data was unreliable. Sometimes the actual levels of hospital activity had been under­
recorded. This became apparent when the data was cross-checked against data from other numerical 
databases or when collaborative feedback was sought. Some data was subsequently disregarded completely. 
Some of these could be replaced with data from more reliable sources and sources were used to augment 
existing data which under-recorded activity. Inaccuracies were also revealed in the disaggregation of data 
which was attributed to inconsistencies in data input. It has been suggested in the literature that waiting list 
data are unreliable as referral rates adjust to reduce waiting lists and thus ‘mask’ the true extent of patients 
who are waiting for hospital services. Therefore, it might be concluded that the analysis of waiting lists and 
waiting times should be avoided. However, the consideration of these factors is essential, as this demand 
response is an important feature of interest in the study. There was also fragmentation of data sources and 
inconsistencies arose when data was cross-checked and aggregated, as these data were collected for different 
purposes. Minor adjustments were made to overcome these problems.
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APPENDIX D - CONCEPTUAL MODEL
D l. Main Feedback Structure Represented in the Model: Base Case 
D2. Potential Interactions Between Active Feedback Loops
D3. Main Feedback Structure Represented in the Model: With a Structural Change
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D3. Main Feedback Structure Represented in the Model: With a Structural Change
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D3 depicts the use of a waiting list goal to drive patient activity rates. As with D l, which portrays the 
desired waiting time driving activity rates (a base case assumption), both the referrals onto the CC 
investigation waiting list from inpatients and ‘other’ removals from the waiting list (those which did not 
constitute patient activity such as deaths on the waiting list) are excluded for simplicity. When seeking a 
desired waiting list, the desired elective CC investigation rate is composed o f two parts. The first part is the 
investigation rate required to maintain the existing waiting list size. The investigation rate should at least 
equal the perceived referral rate in order to ensure that the waiting list does not rise further. The second part 
represents the adjustment required in order to bring the waiting list down to its desired level. The calculation 
corresponding to D3 is:
Des. Elective = Average Elective + (CC Inv. Waiting List - Des. CC Inv. Waiting List)
CC Inv. Rate CC Inv. Referral Rate Des. Adj Time
The calculation corresponding to D l where a desired waiting time is sought is:
Des. Elective = CC Inv. Waiting List
CC Inv. Rate Des. Waiting Time for a CC Inv.
In calculating the desired investigation rate, seeking a desired waiting list used information about the 
referral rate; this information was not used when seeking a desired waiting time. Information about the 
current size of the waiting list was also used in a different way in the former compared to the latter. The 
introduction of the causal link between the average referral rate and desired investigation rate created 
several further feedback processes (these processes are not highlighted in D3).
The calculations that featured in the simulation model were more complex as they accounted for the 
inclusion of the inpatient referrals and non-activity removals. The formulation of the model equations also 
ensured that the desired investigation rate did not exceed the number of patients available i.e. it did not drive 
the waiting list below zero. The calculations for the desired OP activity rate followed the same principle as 
those for the desired elective CC investigation rate.
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£1. Stock and Flow Diagrams
Symbols Used in Stock and Flow Diagrams
Stock / Level
Connector / Information Link
— > Material Flow
s *
Flow / Rate
o Non-Graphical Converter / Auxiliary or Constanto Graphical Converter / Table Function
G Model Boundary
G Ghosts
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El a. Key Flows
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E lb . Representation o f  Main Feedback Loops
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(The figure also highlights 2 minor loops, labelled B, that control the 
removal o f ‘other’ waiting list patients. The feedback loops appear 
broken because ghosts have been introduced for DesOPRWT and 
CCWL. To improve clarity, the graphical converters defining 
EffCapLCC, PCapTCC and PCapDCC have been removed.)
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E2. Documented Listings o f Simulation Model Equations
DT = 0.125
Duration of simulation = 54 months (Ribsley General case), 72 months (Veinbridge General case)
The equations are listed in the following order:
1. Stocks (levels) listed alphabetically, with their corresponding flows (rates)
2. Non-graphical convertors (constants and auxiliaries), listed alphabetically
3. Graphical convertors (table functions), listed alphabetically
E2a. Model Equations Parameterised to the Ribsley General Case
AggJDOpSk(t) = AggJDOpSk(t - dt) + (JDOpSkGR - JDOpSkLR) * dt 
INIT AggJDOpSk = AggJDOpSki
DOCUMENT: Aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
It is assumed that in April 1995, the junior operator at that time will have accumulated sufficient skills in CC 
to have almost saturated the 'skills effect' on referrals for CC investigations. The initial value is based on the 
following assumptions: historical elective CC investigation activity levels at the tertiary level equal the level 
at April 1995 (11.75/mth), and junior district operator fraction equal to 0.75.
JDOpSkGR = 1 *( JDOpSkGRRec+JDOpSkGRExp)+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate [skill units/mth].
JDOpSkLR = JDOpDepR* AvSkJDOp+0*PULSE( 1000,10)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills loss rate [skill units/mth].
AvRRCC(t) = AvRRCC(t - dt) + (RRCCAR) * dt 
INIT AvRRCC= 18.69
DOCUMENT: Average rate of referrals for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
RRCCAR = (RRCC-AvRRCC)/ATRRCC
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an elective CC investigation averaging rate [pats/mth/mth].
CCWL(t) = CCWL(t - dt) + (RROPWLtoCC + NRRIPtoCC - CCWLRR) * dt 
INIT CCWL = CCWLi
DOCUMENT: CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
Initialised at the Apr 95 (t=0) level using real data (with some patients removed) plus an expert estimate of 
the other waiting list removals (deaths on waiting list etc).
RROPWLtoCC = OPR*FOPtoCC+RROP WLtoIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Comprises patients who were referred on after attending an OP appointment and patients who, waiting for 
an OP appointment, deteriorated and were referred on following a hospital admission.
NRRIPtoCC = 1 *5.5 *( 1 -0*Step( 1,20))+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: New referral rate from inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
400
Prior to hospital admission, these patients may have been: asymptomatic; symptomatic but the patient may 
not have yet sought medical treatment for their symptoms; or, symptomatic and under GP care. This may 
also include patients who were in hospital receiving non cardiac treatment. "New" refers to patients not 
already known to the cardiologists. This excludes: (1) those who were on the OP waiting list, deteriorated, 
stabilised and were then placed on the CC investigation waiting list (these are already accounted for in the 
referrals from the OP waiting list, RROPWLtoCC) and (2) patients who are already on the CC investigation 
waiting list but have deteriorated, become hospital admissions and restabilised (as they will remain 
classified as in need of an elective CC investigation, they are already included on the CC investigation 
waiting list, CCWL). The value is derived from an expert estimate (6.5 pats/mth) for the total referrals from 
inpatients i.e. including (1) but excluding (2). It is assumed that (2) will form the minority of the total 
referrals from inpatients. The validity of the split in the referrals from inpatients is not important, given the 
purpose of our study.
CCWLRR = CCInvR+OCCWLRR
DOCUMENT: CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
CFPhlDCCP(t) = CFPhlDCCP(t - dt) + (PhlDCCPR) * dt 
INIT CFPhlDCCP = 0
DOCUMENT: Completed fraction of phase 1 district CC service preparation (completed fraction of a basic 
district site) [-].
A district service can be provided by hiring a mobile catheter laboratory. However, a suitable site has to be 
prepared for the mobile. "Site" refers to the base upon which the mobile is situated (it has to be perfectly 
level and able to withstand the considerable weight of the mobile) and the electrical and telecommunication 
links to connect the mobile to the host hospital. At a later stage, the mobile may be replaced by an integrated 
catheter laboratory. The mobile would be used whilst the integrated lab was being constructed so the 
construction of the lab and associated delays would not need to be represented in the model but the 
associated financial costs would. In the model, the different phases of district service are referred to as 
Phase 1 (using a mobile) and Phase 2 (using an integrated catheter lab) and the site for the mobile is referred 
to as a "basic" district site.
PhlDCCPR = FSuppDCC*(IF ((TIME>=STPhlDCCP) AND (CFPhlDCCP<l)) THEN (1/PhlDCCPP) 
ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation rate [-/mth].
Having set the preparation of a basic district site and facility to begin, preparation occurs until the site and 
facility are complete. It relies upon continual financial support for the district service; if financial support 
were withdrawn, development would be suspended.
CumCC(t) = CumCC(t - dt) + (CCInvR) * dt 
INIT CumCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative elective CC investigations [pats].
CCInvR = DCCInvR+TCCInvR
DOCUMENT: Elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
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Overall elective CC investigations at tertiary and district levels for patients referred from a given district 
hospital. For those conducted at the tertiary level, may also involve synchronous treatment.
CumCCAC(t) = CumCCAC(t - dt) + (CCCR) * dt 
INIT CumCCAC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative costs of CC investigations, for patients from a given district hospital. CC investigations 
conducted at the tertiary level may also involve synchronous investigation and intervention (treatment) 
which will be more expensive than a CC intervention. This is one of several several stocks in the model that 
are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of different simulation runs. They measure 
different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and are based upon the area under the relevant 
curve. For this index, we count the total CC investigation activity costs generated over time by considering 
the area under the CC investigation rate curve.
CCCR = AvCTCC*TCCInvR+(AvCDCC+FFurthCC*AvCFurthCC)*DCCInvR 
DOCUMENT: CC activity cost rate [pounds/pat].
Refers to costs of CC procedures for patients originally referred for an elective CC investigation from a 
given district hospital so refers to CC investigations and treatments.
CumCCACATL(t) = CumCCACATL(t - dt) + (CCCRATL) * dt 
INIT CumCCACATL = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC activity costs if all activity were carried out at the tertiary level [pounds]. 
CCCRATL = (DCCInvR+TCCInvR)*AvCTCC
DOCUMENT: CC activity cost rate if all were carried out at the tertiary level [pounds/pat].
This is what the CC cost rate would be if the total elective activity were conducted at the tertiary level, 
assuming the same (district+tertiary) capacity could be achieved at the tertiary level.
CumCCWLAdds(t) = CumCCWLAdds(t - dt) + (CCWLAddR) * dt 
INIT CumCCWLAdds = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC waiting list additions [pats].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of referrals for 
elective CC investigations by considering the area under the CC investigation referral rate curve. 
CCWLAddR = NRRIPtoCC+RROPWLtoCC 
DOCUMENT: CC waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
CumCCWLRems(t) = CumCCWLRems(t - dt) + (CCWLRemR) * dt 
INIT CumCCWLRems = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC waiting list removals [pats]
CCWLRemR = CCWLRR
DOCUMENT: CC waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
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CumDCCPC(t) = CumDCCPC(t - dt) + (DCCPCR) * dt 
INIT CumDCCPC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
DCCPCR = Ph 1 DCCPMCR+Ph2DCCPMCR
DOCUMENT: District CC service preparation cost rate [pounds/mth].
Phase 1 refers to the costs incurred to prepare a site for a mobile-based district service. Phase 2 refers to the 
costs incurred to prepare a site and construct a facility for an integrated cath lab-based district service.
CumDCCRC(t) = CumDCCRC(t - dt) + (DCCRCR) * dt 
INIT CumDCCRC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service running costs [pounds].
DCCRCR = IF(DCCInvR>0) THEN MDCCRCR ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: District CC service running cost rate [pounds/mth].
These costs are not incurred until the district service is up and running.
CumGJDOpSk(t) = CumGJDOpSk(t - dt) + (GRJDOpSk) * dt 
INIT CumGJDOpSk = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative gain in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units]
GRJDOpSk = JDOpSkGR
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
CumLJDOpSk(t) = CumLJDOpSk(t - dt) + (LRJDOpSk) * dt 
INIT CumLJDOpSk = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative loss in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units]
LRJDOpSk = JDOpSkLR
DOCUMENT: Loss rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
CumOP(t) = CumOP(t - dt) + (OPR) * dt 
INIT CumOP = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP activity [pats].
OPR = CapOP*UCapOP 
DOCUMENT: OP rate [pats/mth].
Desired activity which can be delivered depends upon the capacity available and utilisation of that capacity.
CumOPAC(t) = CumOPAC(t - dt) + (OPCR) * dt 
INIT CumOP AC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative costs of OP appointments, for patients from a given district hospital. This is one of several 
several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of different
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simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and are based 
upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total OP activity costs generated over 
time by considering the area under the OP rate curve.
OPCR = AvCOP*OPR 
DOCUMENT: OP cost rate [pounds/pat].
CumOPWLAdds(t) = CumOPWLAdds(t - dt) + (OPWLAddR) * dt 
INIT CumOPWLAdds = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP waiting list additions [pats].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of referrals for 
OP appointments over time by considering the area under the OP referral rate curve.
OPWLAddR = RROP
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
CumOPWLRems(t) = CumOPWLRems(t - dt) + (OPWLRemR) * dt 
INIT CumOP WLRems = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP waiting list removals [pats]
OPWLRemR = OOPWLRR+RROPWLtoCC 
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
DECCWL(t) = DECCWL(t - dt) + (GRDECCWL) * dt 
INIT DECCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the CC investigation waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDECCWL = IF ((CCWL-DesCCWL)>0.5) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth].
DEOPWL(t) = DEOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDEOPWL) * dt 
INIT DEOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the OP waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDEOPWL = IF ((OPWL-DesOPWL)>0.5) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths/mth].
DETnewCCWL(t) = DETnewCCWL(t - dt) + (GRDETnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT DETnewCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
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Total time for which the average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
exceeded its desired value.
GRDETnewCCWL = IF ((AvTnewCCWLe-DesTCC)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation 
waiting list patients [mths/mth]
DETnewOPWL(t) = DETnewOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDETnewOPWL) * dt 
INIT DETnewOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients 
[mths]
Total time for which the average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients exceeded its 
desired value.
GRDETnewOPWL = IF ((AvTnewOPWL-DesTOP)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
DETonCCWL(t) = DETonCCWL(t - dt) + (GRDETonCCWL) * dt 
INIT DETonCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDETonCCWL = IF ((AvTonCCWL-DesTCC)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive time on CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth]
DETonOPWL(t) = DETonOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDETonOPWL) * dt 
INIT DETonOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the average time spent on the OP waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDET onOP WL = IF ((AvTonOPWL-DesTOP)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive time on OP waiting list [mths/mth].
DStDCC(t) = DStDCC(t - dt) + (GRDemStDCC) * dt 
INIT DStDCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths]
GRDemStDCC = IF ((FOPtoCC/(RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC)-l)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths/mth].
Demand can only be suppressed by the skills effect.
DStDemOP(t) = DStDemOP(t - dt) + (GRDemStDOP) * dt 
INIT DStDemOP = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths]
GRDemStDOP = IF ((EffKOP-l)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
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DOCUMENT: Gain rate o f duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths/mth]
JDOp(t) = JDOp(t - dt) + (JDOpRecR - JDOpDepR) * dt 
INIT JDOp = 1
DOCUMENT: Number of junior district-based CC operators [doctors].
JDOpRecR = SwTOpP*PULSE(l,6+JDOpRecD,JDOpTT+JDOpRecD)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator recruitment rate [doctors/mth].
There is no need to synchronise the recruitment of district operator trainees with the availability of the 
district service. The district operator trainees refer to junior cardiologists-in-training who are based at the 
district hospital. In the absence of a district service, they acquire skills in delivering CC at the tertiary 
centre.
JDOpDepR = SwTOpP*(PULSE( 1,6,999)+DELAY(JDOpRecR, JDOpTT,0))
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator departure rate [doctors/mth].
When trainee operators complete their training at the district hospital, they move on to another hospital and 
the trainee vacancy which subsequently arises is subsequently filled with a new novice trainee.
MaxCCWL(t) = MaxCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
SRMaxCCWL = IF (CCWL>MaxCCWL) THEN PULSE(CCWL-MaxCCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats/mth]
MaxOPWL(t) = MaxOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxOPWL) * dt 
INIT MaxOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum OP waiting list [pats]
SRMaxOPWL = IF (OPWL>MaxOPWL) THEN PULSE(OPWL-MaxOPWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of Maximum OP waiting list [pats/mth]
MaxRRCC(t) = MaxRRCC(t - dt) + (SRMaxRRCC) * dt 
INIT MaxRRCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
SRMaxRRCC = IF (RRCOMaxRRCC) THEN PULSE(RRCC-MaxRRCC) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation set rate [pats/mth/mth]
MaxRROP(t) = MaxRROP(t - dt) + (SRMaxRROP) * dt 
INIT MaxRROP = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
SRMaxRROP = IF (RROP>MaxRROP) THEN PULSE(RROP-MaxRROP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth/mth]
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MaxTnewCCWL(t) = MaxTnewCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxT newCC WL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
[mths]
SRMaxT ne wCC WL = IF (AvTnewCCWLe>MaxTnewCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewCCWLe- 
MaxT newCC WL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
MaxTnewOPWL(t) = MaxTnewOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTnewOPWL) * dt 
INIT MaxT ne wOP WL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
SRMaxTnewOPWL = IF (AvTnewOPWL>MaxTnewOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewOPWL- 
MaxTnewOPWL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients
[mths/mth]
MaxTonCCWL(t) = MaxTonCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTonCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxTonCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
SRMaxTonCCWL = IF (AvTonCCWL>MaxTonCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonCCWL-MaxTonCCWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth]
MaxTonOPWL(t) = MaxTonOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTonOPWL) * dt 
INIT MaxTonOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
SRMaxTonOPWL = IF (AvTonOPWL>MaxTonOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonOPWL-MaxTonOPWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth]
MinCCWL(t) = MinCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinCCWL) * dt 
INIT MinCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
SRMinCCWL = IF (CCWL<MinCCWL) THEN PULSE(CCWL-MinCCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats/mth]
MinOPWL(t) = MinOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinOPWL) * dt
INIT MinOPWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum OP waiting list [pats]
SRMinOPWL = IF (OPWL<MinOPWL) THEN PULSE(OPWL-MinOPWL) ELSE 0
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DOCUMENT: Set rate o f minimum OP waiting list set rate [pats/mth]
MinRRCC(t) = MinRRCC(t - dt) + (SRMinRRCC) * dt 
INIT MinRRCC = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
SRMinRRCC = IF (RRCC<MinRRCC) THEN PULSE(RRCC-MinRRCC) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth/mth]
MinRROP(t) = MinRROP(t - dt) + (SRMinRROP) * dt 
INIT MinRROP = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
SRMinRROP = IF (RROP<MinRROP) THEN PULSE(RROP-MinRROP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth/mth]
MinTnewCCWL(t) = MinTnewCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT MinTnewCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
[mths]
SRMinTnewCCWL = IF (AvTnewCCWLe<MinTnewCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewCCWLe- 
MinTnewCCWL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
MinTnewOPWL(t) = MinTnewOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTnewOPWL) * dt 
INIT MinT ne wOP WL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
SRMinTnewOPWL = IF (AvTnewOPWL<MinTnewOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewOPWL-
MinT ne wOP WL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients
[mths/mth]
MinTonCCWL(t) = MinTonCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTonCCWL) * dt 
INIT MinTonCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
SRMinT onCCWL = IF (AvTonCCWL<MinTonCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonCCWL-MinTonCCWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth]
MinT onOP WL(t) = MinTonOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTonOPWL) * dt 
INIT MinTonOPWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
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SRMinT onOP WL = IF (AvTonOPWL<MinTonOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonOPWL-MinTonOPWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth]
OPWL(t) = OPWL(t - dt) + (RROP - RROPWLtoCC - OOPWLRR) * dt
INIT OPWL = OPWLi
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list length [pats].
All references to OP refer to cardiology OP.
We assume that there is sufficient capacity for OP services so that the actual OP activity equals the desired 
OP activity (quoted by the consultant at 80 pats/week), and the avg waiting time list for new patients joining 
the OP waiting list is maintained (quoted by the consultant at 5 weeks). Taking into account the other OP 
waiting list removals (as estimated by the consultant), the initial waiting list size is calculated.
RROP = l*RefRROP*EffKOP+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
RROPWLtoCC = OPR*FOPtoCC+RROPWLtoIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Comprises patients who were referred on after attending an OP appointment and patients who, waiting for 
an OP appointment, deteriorated and were referred on following a hospital admission.
OOPWLRR = PostOPDisR+OPreOPWLRR 
DOCUMENT: Other OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those who were referred on for elective CC investigation. 
Comprises post OP discharges and pre OP appt removals from the waiting list. The latter collectively refers 
to waiting list deaths, patients whose condition improved, moved away from the area, condition deteriorated 
and became emergencies or left NHS to seek private care.
PrSIECCWL(t) = PrSIECCWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIECCWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIECCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC investigation waiting list
[pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering the area under the CC investigation waiting list curve and a conversion 
factor. We assume that the waiting list will only exert pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired length. 
GRPrSIECCWL -  IF (CCWL>DesCCWL) THEN ((CCWL-DesCCWL)*RPrPP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with excessive CC waiting list
[pressure/mth]
PrSIEOPWL(t) = PrSIEOPWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIEOPWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIEOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list [pressure].
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This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering the area under the OP waiting list curve and a conversion factor. We 
assume that the waiting list will only exert pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired length. 
GRPrSIEOPWL = IF (OPWL>DesOPWL) THEN ((OPWL-DesOPWL)*RPrPP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with excessive OP waiting list
[pressure/mth]
PrSIETonCCWL(t) = PrSIETonCCWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIETonCCWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIET onCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the CC
investigation waiting list [pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering a conversion factor and the area under the curve for the average time spent 
on the CC investigation waiting list. We assume that the delay for a CC investigation will only exert 
pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired level.
GRPrSIETonCCWL = IF (AvTonCCWL>DesTCC) THEN ((AvTonCCWL-DesTCC)*RPrPM) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with excessive average time spent on CC 
investigation waiting list [pressure/mth]
PrSIET onOP WL(t) = PrSIETonOPWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIETonOPWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIET onOP WL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the OP waiting 
list [pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering a conversion factor and the area under the curve for the average time spent 
on the OP waiting list. We assume that the delay for an OP appointment will only exert pressure on the 
system if it exceeds its desired level.
GRPrSIETonOPWL = IF (AvTonOPWL>DesTOP) THEN ((AvTonOPWL-DesTOP)*RPrPM) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with excessive average time spent on OP 
waiting list [pressure/mth]
SDCCFA(t) = SDCCFA(t - dt) + (DCCFASR) * dt 
INIT SDCCFA = 0
DOCUMENT: Smoothed district CC facility availability [-].
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The availability of the district facility will determine the values of the goals driving the desired CC 
investigation rate. As changes in availability will not lead to instantaneous changes in the goals, the 
availability is smoothed.
DCCFASR = (DCCFA-SDCCFA)/DCCFAST
DOCUMENT: Smoothing rate of district CC facility availability [-/mth].
STPhlDCCP(t) = STPhlDCCP(t - dt) + (SRSTPPhlDCC) * dt 
INIT STPhlDCCP = 1000
DOCUMENT: Start time of phase 1 district CC service preparation [mths].
The default value of 1000 indicates that preparation of the district site will never take place.
SRSTPPhlDCC = IF ((CFPhlDCCP = 0) AND (EDesDCCF>=l) AND (STPhlDCCP=1000)) THEN 
PULSE(TIME-IOOO) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Start rate of start time of preparation of phase 1 district CC service [mths/mth].
District site preparation is initialised in instances where preparation has not yet taken place and there exists 
an expressed desire for a district facility (either an anticipated or current desire or both).
The formulation of the start time as a level ensures that the preparation of a new site can only be initialised 
once. This is because the model is only designed to represent a single district hospital so there can only be a 
single district site.
SumJTCCWL(t) = SumJTCCWL(t - dt) + (AccRSumJTCCWL - DepRSumJTCCWL) * dt 
INIT SumJTCCWL = 3044.8
DOCUMENT: Sum of join times for patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pat.mths].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from Ribsley 
General. Initialised so that this average waiting time is 2.4 months to correspond with the real system. 
AccRSumJTCCWL = RRCC*CTime
DOCUMENT: Accumulation rate of sum of join times of patients on the CC investigation waiting list 
[pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from a given 
district hospital.
DepRSumJTCCWL = IF(CCWLoO) THEN (CCWLRR* SumJTCCWL/CCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Depletion rate of sum of join times of patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pats]. 
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from a given 
district hospital.
SumJTOPWL(t) = SumJTOPWL(t - dt) + (AccRSumJTOPWL - DepRSumJTOPWL) * dt 
INIT SumJTOPWL = 15198.79
DOCUMENT: Sum of join times for patients on the OP waiting list [pat.mths].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from Ribsley 
General. Initialised so that this average waiting time is equal to the desired waiting time of 1.1538 months (5 
weeks) to correspond with the description that the system was stable and the desired waiting time was 
maintained.
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AccRSumJTOPWL = RROP*CTime
DOCUMENT: Accumulation rate of sum of join times of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from a given 
district hospital.
DepRSumJTOPWL = IF(OPWLoO) THEN (OPWLRR*SumJTOPWL/OPWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Depletion rate of sum of join times of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from a given 
district hospital.
TOCCWLR(t) = TOCCWLR(t - dt) + (OCCWLRR) * dt 
INIT TOCCWLR = 0
DOCUMENT: Total other CC investigation waiting list removals [pats].
Used for validation purposes only. To check the total number of other waiting list removals (deaths on 
waiting list etc) from the CC waiting list against the actual data during the period Apr95 to Apr 98 (t=0 to 
t=36). Will only be precise if driving model with historical activity data.
OCCWLRR = CCWL*FOCCWLRR
DOCUMENT: Other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
These are removals from the waiting list "other" than those that constitute patient (elective CC investigation) 
activity because they represent patients who died on the waiting list, left the list because: their condition 
improved; they moved to another area; deteriorated and became emergency CC cases; or, choose to seek 
private care.
ACumDCCRC = IF(CumDCCRC<CumDCCRCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of cumulative district CC service running costs [-].
Support is not given to district service if the cumulative running costs exceed a certain level.
ADesDCCF = IF((FSuppDCC=l) AND (TIME>=TADesDCCF)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Anticipated desire for a district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district service may be anticipated, given the knowledge of the planned withdrawal of tertiary 
capacity in the future and financial support for a district service.
AggJDOpSki = 1*73.95
DOCUMENT: Initial aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
AMDCCRCR = IF (MDCCRCR<=MDCCRCRAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of monthly district CC facility running cost rate [-].
Support is not given to district service if the monthly running costs exceed a certain level.
APhlDCCPC = IF (PhlDCCPC<=PhlDCCPCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Support is not given to district service if the phase 1 preparation costs exceed a certain level.
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APh2DCCPC = IF (Ph2DCCPC<=Ph2DCCPCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Support is not given to phase 2 of a district service if the phase 2 preparation costs exceed a certain level.
ATRRCC = 3
DOCUMENT: Averaging time of referral rate for an elective CC investigation [mths].
An expert estimate.
AvCCWLRRe = SMTH1(CCWLRR,1)
DOCUMENT: Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the Evaluation of 
pressure on the system [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of one month is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
changes in pressure on the system.
AvCCWLRRe&r = SMTH1(CCWLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the Evaluation of 
pressure on the system and the Response to that pressure [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of 3 months is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
pressure on the system and respond to that pressure e.g. by changing referral rate or desired activity.
AvCDCC = 521
DOCUMENT: Average cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
Only costs at March 1997 are known.
AvCFurthCC = AvCTCCT/(l+DR)A(AvTFurthCC/12)
DOCUMENT: Average cost per further CC procedure [pounds/pat].
A weighted average. Patients who underwent investigation at the district level which showed that they 
required treatment will have to undergo a 2nd CC procedure at a later date. The cost, therefore, needs to be 
discounted. We assume that the price does not change during the discounted period. Otherwise, another 
adjustment would need to be made to AvCTCCT. We assume that 1/3 of patients require the 2nd CC 
procedure to be carried out on an inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate) and 50% will involve the use of 
coronary stents.
AvCOP = 100
DOCUMENT: Average cost per OP appointment [pounds/pat].
Actual costs were not available so this is an approximation.
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AvCTCC = AvCTCCI*( 1 -FFurthCC)+FFurthCC* AvCTCCT 
DOCUMENT: Average cost per tertiary-based CC procedure [pounds/pat].
A weighted average. Only costs in March 1997 are available. Considers the patients who require 
investigation only and those who also require treatment. For the latter group, if they undergo CC 
investigation at the tertiary level can have their treatment procedure carried out at the same time. Otherwise, 
they need to undergo a further CC procedure (investigation at the district level and treatment at the tertiary 
level).
AvCTCCI = 525
DOCUMENT: Average cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
This relates to patients directly referred for a CC from the given district hospital. We assume that 1/3 of 
patients require the CC procedure to be carried out on an inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate). Only 
cost in March 1997 is known.
AvCTCCT =1361
DOCUMENT: Average cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and treatment) 
[pounds/pat].
A weighted average. We assume that 1/3 of patients require the CC procedure to be carried out on an 
inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate) and 50% of interventional CC will involve the use of coronary 
stents. Higher estimates of the proportion with stents will result in a higher average cost per tertiary 
procedure. We assume that the cost of synchronous investigation and treatment will equal the cost of a 
treatment procedure only. Only costs for March 1997 are known.
AvOCCWLRR = SMTH1 (OCCWLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
This waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of 3 months is assumed to model the evaluation of pressure on the 
system and response to that pressure e.g. a change in referrals or desired activity.
AvOPWLRR = SMTH1 (OP WLRR, 1)
DOCUMENT: Average OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of one month is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
changes in pressure on the system.
AvPreOPWLRR = SMTH 1 (PreOP WLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of 3 months is assumed to model the evaluation of pressure on the 
system and response to that pressure e.g. a change in referrals or desired activity.
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AvRROP = SMTH 1 (RROP,3)
DOCUMENT: Average rate of referrals for cardiology OP appointment [pats/mth].
The averaging period is an expert estimate.
AvSkJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE (AggJDOpSk/JDOp)
DOCUMENT: Average CC operator skill per junior district-based operator [skill units/doctor].
The use of the IF statement prevents a division by zero forcing the simulation to stop.
AvSkNJDOp = 0
DOCUMENT: Average skill per new junior district-based CC operator [skill units/doctor].
Assume that trainee CC operators arrive at Ribsley district hospital as complete novices.
AvTFurthCC = 4.5
DOCUMENT: Average waiting time for further CC procedure (following a district-based CC investigation) 
[mths].
Used for illustrative purposes only. Based upon simplifying assumptions.
AvTnewCCWLe = IF (AvCCWLRRe = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (CCWL/AvCCWLRRe)
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, used to 
represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system [mths].
This estimate is based upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto 
the waiting list. This is used to evaluate changes in pressure on the system. A zero average removal rate 
would suggest an infinite waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case 
and enable the simulation to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTnewCCWLe&r = IF (AvCCWLRRe&r = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (CCWL/AvCCWLRRe&r) 
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, used to 
represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system and the Response to that pressure [mths].
This estimate is based upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto 
the waiting list. This is used to calculate the effect of changes in the WT on referrals for CC investigations. 
Changes in the waiting list removal rate do not lead to instantaneous changes in referrals for CC 
investigations, but changes are smoothed over a 3 month period. A zero smoothed removal rate would 
suggest an infinite waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case and 
enable the simulation to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTnewOPWL = IF (AvOPWLRR = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (OPWL/AvOPWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths].
This estimate is based upon the average waiting time for new patients joining the OP waiting list, based 
upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto the waiting list. This is 
used to evaluate changes in pressure on the system. A zero average removal rate would suggest an infinite
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waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation 
to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTonCCWL = IF (CCWLoO) THEN (CTime-(SumJTCCWL/CCWL))
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list [mths].
The formulation avoids, in cases where there are no patients on the waiting list, a division by zero, and
forces a value of zero which is consistent with reality.
AvTonOPWL = IF (OPWLoO) THEN (CTime-(SumJTOPWL/OPWL))
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths].
The formulation avoids, in cases where there are no patients on the waiting list, a division by zero, and
forces a value of zero which is consistent with reality.
AvWLRT = 0.5
DOCUMENT: Average waiting list removal time [mths].
This represents the average time it would take to arrange an investigation of a patient waiting on the CC 
investigation waiting list.
CapDCC = IF (OA=l) THEN (PCapDCC*DCCFA) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Capacity for district-based CC [pats/mth].
By definition, these are elective investigations.
CapOP = IF (OA=l) THEN ((l-SwIOPCap)*NOPCap+SwIOPCap*IncOPCap) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Capacity for OP appointments [pats/mth].
Specified by the consultant. Altered during policy analysis.
CapSEDCC = IF (DesECCInvR<PcvdTCapAEDCC) THEN 0 ELSE (DesECCInvR-PcvdTCapAEDCC) 
DOCUMENT: Capacity shortfall (at tertiary level) with respect to patients who are eligible to undergo 
district-based CC investigation [pats/mth].
The capacity shortfall at the tertiary level is the activity level that desired minus the maximum activity that it 
is able to do (i.e. capacity). However, that is not what we are considering in the context of a shift to the 
district level. We are only interested in the shortfall that is eligible to be shifted to the district level - only 
that which constitutes low risk investigations. By definition, these will be elective cases. Furthermore, high 
risk elective cases (not eligible to be investigated at the district level) will take precedence over the low risk 
cases in using the available capacity at the tertiary level. Therefore, eligible capacity shortfall 
= desired eligible activity - tertiary capacity that could be devoted to eligible patients 
= desired eligible activity - (tertiary capacity - avg activity at tertiary level devoted to non eligible patients).
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CapTCC = IF (0A=1) THEN PCapTCC ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [pats/mth].
CCWLi = 88
DOCUMENT: Initial CC investigation waiting list length [pats]
Calculated using real data excluding other waiting list removals plus an estimate for other waiting list
removals.
CDesDCCF = IF((CapSEDCC>=MinDCCInvR) AND (FSuppDCC=l)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Current desire for district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district service is expressed if there exists sufficient demand to sustain the service and
financial support.
CTime = 37+TIME 
DOCUMENT: Current time [mths].
The adjustment of 37 refers to the initialisation period to set average time on waiting lists to the real values.
CumC = CumCCAC+CumOPAC+CumDCCPC+CumDCCRC 
DOCUMENT: Cumulative costs [pounds].
Comprises patient activity costs, district service preparation and running costs.
CumCAL = 10000000
DOCUMENT: Cumulative costs affordability limit [pounds].
The use of a very large number represents unconstrained patient activity.
CumDCCRCAL = Step(500,TDCCSFA)+Step(200,34)+0*Step( 150,46)+0*Step( 150,58)+0*Step( 150,70) 
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service running costs affordability limit [pounds].
This amount is equivalent to 10 month's worth of running costs initially and then, at a later stage, is 
increased by an amount equivalent to 4 further month's worth of running costs. We assume that the lack of 
affordability forces the suspension of the district service at t=24 (end March 1997) and t=38 (end May 
1998). Financial constraints may be imposed to prevent the second district service as part of the policy 
analysis. Also as part of the policy analysis, the period of the second district service may be extended or 
further temporary injections of funding may be made.
DCCFA = IF((CFPhlDCCP>=0.95) AND (CDesDCCF=l) AND (PCapDCOO)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: District CC facility availability [-].
For a district site to be available, a desire for a district facility has to prevail, the district site has to be at a 
sufficient level of completion and staff have to be available.
DCCFAST = 1
DOCUMENT: District CC facility availability smoothing time [mths].
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The availability of the district facility influences the value of the goals driving the desired CC investigation 
rate. As changes in availability will not lead to instantaneous changes in the goals, the availability is 
smoothed.
DCCInvR = CapDCC*UCapDCC
DOCUMENT: District-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired activity which can be delivered depends upon the capacity available and utilisation of that capacity. 
Only low risk CC investigations can be conducted at the district level. This forms the majority of elective 
investigations. All CC investigations at the district level are carried out by district CC operators.
DesCCInvR = SwPADr*DesCCInvRWL+(l-SwPADr)*DesCCInvRWT 
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
The goal driving the desired level of activity may be a desired waiting time for new patients joining the 
waiting list (a WT policy - the base case) or a desired waiting list size (a WL policy - a policy analysis 
case).
DesCCInvRWL=MAX(MIN(AvRRCC+(CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT-AvOCCWLRR,
CCWL/AvWLRT+AvRRCC),0)
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by the waiting list goal [pats/mth].
In seeking a waiting list goal (desired waiting list length), the desired activity rate will be composed of: (1) 
the average number of patients joining the waiting list (in order to maintain the waiting list at its existing 
level); plus (2) any additional adjustment required to meet the desired waiting list size, and, minus (3) any 
other removals from the waiting list (otherwise, more activity may be carried out than is necessary). 
However, there are two situations which place bounds on the actual values that the desired activity can take. 
The first situation is where there are insufficient patients available to meet the calculated desired activity 
rate - the actual activity rate will be derived from the existing waiting list and new patients joining the 
waiting list. This is formulated using the MIN( ) function. The second situation is when the calculated 
desired activity rate works out as being negative - the actual desired activity rate will be zero. This is 
represented by the use of the MAX() function.
DesCCInvRWT = IF(DesTCC=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by the waiting time goal [pats/mth].
In calculating the activity rate desired to meet the waiting time goal, it is necessary to account for other 
waiting list removals (which will reduce the required activity rate). Otherwise, more activity may be carried 
out than is necessary. A desired waiting time of zero would call for an infinitely large activity rate. For the 
model to accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation to proceed (i.e. avoid a division by 
zero), an IF statement is used involving the assignment of a very large number to the desired activity rate.
DesCCWL = IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 30 ELSE 60 
DOCUMENT: Desired CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
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The desired waiting list is 60 patients (quoted by the consultant) but we assume that, as the district service 
can provide additional capacity, the desired waiting list is reduced to 30 patients when the district service is 
present. A desired waiting list of 56 is specified as part of the policy analysis.
DesCCWLAT = 2
DOCUMENT: Desired CC investigation waiting list adjustment time [mths],
A value of 2 was quoted by the consultant. Varied to 2.7 as part of the policy analysis.
DesDCCF = ADesDCCF+CDesDCCF 
DOCUMENT: Desire for a district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district facility may be anticipated given the knowledge that a tertiary facility is going to be 
closed in the future which would result in a significant loss of capacity.
DesDCCInvR = CapSEDCC*DCCFA
DOCUMENT: Desired district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
For a shortfall in activity to represent desired district activity, a suitable facility has to be in place at the 
district hospital.
DesECCInvR = DesCCInvR*FEDCC
DOCUMENT: Desired eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
This refers to patients who are eligible to undergo CC investigation at the district level - low risk elective 
investigations.
DesNECCInvR = DesCCInvR*(l-FEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Desired non-eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
This refers to patients who are not eligible to undergo CC investigation at the district level - high risk 
elective investigations.
DesOPR = SwPADr*DesOPRWL+( 1 -SwPADr)*DesOPRWT 
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate [pats/mth].
The goal driving the desired level of activity may be a desired waiting time for new patients joining the 
waiting list (a WT policy - the base case) or a desired waiting list size (a WL policy - a policy analysis 
case).
DesOPRWL=MAX(MIN(AvRROP+(OPWL-DesOPWL)/DesOPWLAT-AvPreOPWLRR,
OPWL/AvWLRT+AvRROP),0)
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate driven by the waiting list goal [pats/mth].
In seeking a waiting list goal (desired waiting list length), the desired activity rate will be composed of: (1) 
the average number of patients joining the waiting list (in order to maintain the waiting list at its existing 
level); plus (2) any additional adjustment required to meet the desired waiting list size, and, minus (3) any 
other removals from the waiting list (otherwise, more activity may be carried out than is necessary).
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However, there are two situations which place bounds on the actual values that the desired activity can take. 
The first situation is where there are insufficient patients available to meet the calculated desired activity 
rate - the actual activity rate will be derived from the existing waiting list and new patients joining the 
waiting list. This is formulated using the MIN( ) function. The second situation is when the calculated 
desired activity rate works out as being negative - the actual desired activity rate will be zero. This is 
represented by the use of the MAX() function.
DesOPRWT = IF(DesTOP=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((OPWL/DesTOP)-AvPreOPWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate driven by the waiting time goal [pats/mth].
In calculating the activity rate desired to meet the waiting time goal, it is necessary to account for other 
waiting list removals (which will reduce the required activity rate). Otherwise, more activity may be carried 
out than is necessary. A desired waiting time of zero would call for an infinitely large activity rate. For the 
model to accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation to proceed (i.e. avoid a division by 
zero), an IF statement is used involving the assignment of a very large number to the desired activity rate.
DesOPWL = 424
DOCUMENT: Desired OP waiting list length [pats].
Set to equal the initial OP waiting list size, taking into account an estimate for the other waiting list 
removals (deaths on the waiting list, moved away from the area etc).
DesOPWLAT = 2
DOCUMENT: Desired OP waiting list adjustment time [mths].
A value of 2 was quoted by the consultant. Varied to 2.7 as part of the policy analysis.
DesTCC = IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 1.5 ELSE 3 
DOCUMENT: Desired waiting time for a CC investigation [mths].
The WT goal is 3 months (quoted by the consultant), but we assume that as the district service can provide 
additional capacity, the WT goal is halved when the district service is present.
DesTOP = 1.1538
DOCUMENT: Desired waiting time for an OP appointment [mths].
A goal of 5 weeks was specified by the consultant. This has been converted to months.
DR = 0.03
DOCUMENT: Discount rate [-].
Costs which occur in the future are discounted. Set at 0.03 per annum for illustrative purposes.
EDesDCCF = DELAY(DesDCCF,PhlDCCPD)
DOCUMENT: Expressed desire for a district CC facility [-].
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EffCapLCC=l*EffCapLCCB+0*EffCapLCCN+0*EffCapLCCS+0*EffCapLCCPI+0*EffCapLCCFDS
+0*EffCapLCCW+0*EffCapLCCSPRDS
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
We assume that a significant loss of capacity will result in a reduction in referrals as a 'knee jerk' reaction. 
The timing of this effect will depend on the timing of the capacity losses. The '0"s act as switches for the 
sensitivity and policy analysis.
EffCDSuppDCC = IF (AvCDCC<=AvCTCCI) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC investigation cost differential on support for district-based CC service [-]. 
Support is not given to district service if the cost of district CC investigations is more than the cost of CC 
investigation at the tertiary level.
EffKCC = l*NEffKCC+0*EffKCCPDCCS+0*SuppEffKCC
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
The knowledge effect on referrals for CC investigations may be altered as part of the sensitivity analysis or 
policy analysis.
EffKOP = l*NEffKOP+0*EffKOPPDCCS+0*SuppEffKOP+0*IncrEffKOP 
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
The knowledge effect on demand for OP appointments may be altered as part of the sensitivity analysis or 
policy analysis.
EffODSCC = 1/6
DOCUMENT: Effect of other district-based screeners on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Refers to doctors who screen patients for CC investigations but are non CC operators. At Ribsley General, 
non CC operators refer 0.5 to 1 patients in 80 (0.75/80) whilst expert operators refer 4 to 5 patients in 80 
(4.5/80). Therefore, non CC operators refer 1/6 of the number of patients referred by expert operators. 
These are expert estimates.
EffOFCC = 1
DOCUMENT: Effect of other factors on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
A example of another factor which might influence the referral threashold is the introduction of a permanent 
district service which, given the ability to increase capacity, might encourage the referral threshold to drop 
so that more 'grey area' cases would be investigated by CC. Given that district services at Ribsley General 
were only temporary, this is set to the default value of 1 (no effect).
EffSkCC = EffSkECC*FEDOp+EffSkJCC*FJDOp+( 1 -FEDOp-F JDOp)*EffODSCC 
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
The skills effect is a weighted average considering the skills multipliers and proportions of patient decisions 
made by expert CC operators, junior CC operators and other screening doctors at the district hospital.
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EffSkECC = 1
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of expert district-based operators on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
As the reference referral factor is based upon an assumption of fully skilled CC operators, it is consistent 
that the skills effect for expert district operators should take a value of 1.
EffSkJCC = IF(JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE (SwOC*EffSkOJCC+(l-SwOC)*EffSkUJCC)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of junior district-based operators on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
The effect of CC skills of junior district CC operators on their referral rates for CC investigations will 
depend on whether they are naturally overconfident or underconfident. It is assumed that overconfidence 
will result in a period of over-referrals whilst underconfidence will lead to under-referrals. This refers to 
aggregate behaviour. The system being considered involves a single district hospital and the reference to 
overconfidence or underconfidence is determined by the culture at that hospital. This effect only applies in 
cases where there are junior operators.
EffWTCC = 1 *NEffWTCC+0*SuppEffWTCC
DOCUMENT: Effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
This waiting time effect may be suppressed as part of the policy analysis, representing the affect of the 
implementation of a clinical guideline.
FEDCC = 0.9
DOCUMENT: Fraction of CC investigation waiting list that are eligible for district-based investigation [-]. 
Assumes that the majority of elective patients could be investigated at the district level. An expert estimate.
FEDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0.53 ELSE 0.4
DOCUMENT: Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators [-].
This refers to final decisions made. In the absence of juniors, final decisions would not be on a 50:50 split 
between the expert and others. At Ribsley General, with juniors, initial assessments are on a 20:20:60 split 
between the expert, juniors and others respectively. We assume that if there were no juniors, their workload 
(20% of the total workload) would be split evenly between the expert and others. Therefore, initial 
assessments would be on a 30:70 split between the expert and others. The expert then reviews 1/3 of the 
patients initially assessed by others (1/3 x 70% of the total workload = 23% of the total workload) so final 
decisions would be on a (30+23):(70-23) i.e. 53:47 split between the expert and others.
FFurthCC = 0.1
DOCUMENT: Fraction of patients referred for further CC (following a district-based CC investigation) [-]. 
An average, based upon patient activity data. Since synchronous investigations and interventions (treatment) 
procedures cannot be carried out at the district level, the fraction of patients who require a CC-based 
treatment have to be referred on the tertiary level for a second CC procedure.
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FJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE 0.2
DOCUMENT: Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators [-].
This refers to final decisions made. An expert estimate. The fraction decided by junior district operators 
would be zero if there were no junior district operators present.
FOCCWLRR = 0.025
DOCUMENT: Fractional other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
These are removals from the waiting list "other" than those that constitute patient (elective CC investigation) 
activity. An expert estimate.
FOPreOPWLRR = 0.048
DOCUMENT: Fractional other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
This refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those on the waiting list who deteriorated, were 
admitted into hospital, stabilised and were sent home and placed on the CC investigation waiting list. Based 
on an expert estimate.
FOPtoCC=RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*(IF(EffCapLCC<l) THEN EffCapLCC ELSE (EffCapLCC*EffKCC* 
EffWTCC*EffOFCC))
DOCUMENT: Fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an elective CC 
investigation [-].
The use of the IF( ) function reflects the assumption that the 'knee jerk' reaction to the capacity losses will 
dominate over the effects of WT, knowledge of CC and other factors on referrals for elective CC 
investigations.
FRROPWLtoIPtoCC = 0.002*(l-0*Step(l,20))
DOCUMENT: Fractional rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC
investigation [-/mth].
Based on an expert estimate.
FSuppDCC = IF ((ACumDCCRC=l) AND (AMDCCRCR=1) AND (APhlDCCPC=l) AND 
(EffCDSuppDCC=l) AND (OA=l)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Financial support for a district CC service [-].
The district service relies upon the running costs and site preparation costs being affordable, the district 
procedural cost being attractive compared to a CC investigation carried out at the tertiary level, and there 
being sufficient funds to continue delivering services. Both the cumulative and monthly running costs are 
considered. This is because whilst a given monthly running cost might be considered reasonable to warrant 
the introduction of a district service, this may not necessary imply that a permanent service can be afforded. 
There may only be sufficient funding available to pay the running costs for a limited period. A value o f " 1" 
will indicate 'affordable' whilst a value of "0" will indicate 'not affordable'.
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FSuppPh2DCC = IF ((APh2DCCPC=l) AND (FSuppDCOl)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Financial support for a phase 2 district CC service [-].
Refers to support for an integrated catheter laboratory.
FTCCbyDOp = IF (DCCFAoO) THEN 0 ELSE 0.95
DOCUMENT: Fraction of tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district-based CC 
operator [-].
An expert estimate. Refers to patients referred from the given district hospital of interest and to district- 
based CC operators from that hospital. District cardiologists with CC operator skills are allocated sessions at 
the tertiary centre to investigate their patients. The fraction is not 1 because allowances are made for 
absences due to sickness and holidays. District cardiologists who are CC operators and only carry out CC 
investigations will not have sessions at the tertiary centre for elective CC investigations if there is a district 
service in place at their (district) hospital. District cardiologists who also do interventional CC work 
(treatments) and have CC facilities in place at their hospital will retain sessions for elective CC 
investigations on their high risk patients at the tertiary centre. The consultant at Ribsley General only does 
investigations.
IncOPCap = 390
DOCUMENT: Increased OP capacity [pats/mth]
Used as part of the policy analysis.
IRROP = 0
DOCUMENT: Increase in referral rate for OP appointment [-]
Expressed as a percentage. Used for conducting sensitivity analysis.
JDOpRecD = 0
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator recruitment delay [mths].
The delay in filling the trainee CC operator vacancy, following the departure of the junior operator after 
completion of his/her training period.
JDOpSkGRExp = LEJDOp*LPP
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via experience [skill units/mth].
Assumes that all trainees work under supervision so trainees and trainers don't operate on separate patients.
JDOpSkGRRec = AvSkNJDOp*JDOpRecR
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via recruitment [skill units/mth].
A new trainee recruit may have come via from another district hospital with some exposure to CC 
investigations and therefore not arrive as a complete novice. Therefore, some CC skills may be gained via 
recruitment.
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JDOpTT =12
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator training time [mths].
Quoted by the consultant.
LEJDOp = (DCCInvR+TCCInvR*FTCCbyDOp)*LFJDOp
DOCUMENT: Learning experiences for junior district-based CC operators [pats/mth].
The pool of patients from which junior district CC operators gain skills is a fraction of the patients from the 
district hospital that are investigated at the district level and a fraction of the elective patients investigated at 
the tertiary level.
LFJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE 0.75
DOCUMENT: (Patient activity) learning fraction of junior district-based CC operators [-].
This is the fraction of investigations from which the junior operator learns. It will exceed the fraction for 
which the junior actually conducts the investigation because the junior operator will leam from discussions 
with the consultant, audit etc. Increased to 0.9 as part of the policy analysis, to represent a change in policy.
MaxSkOp =100
DOCUMENT: Maximum CC skills per CC operator [skill units/doctor].
MBCheckPats = OPWLi+CCWLi+CumOPWLAdds+CumCCWLAdds-CumOPWLRems-CumCCWLRems 
-1 *Max(OPWL,0)-1 *Max(CCWL,0)-0*OP WL-0*CCWL 
DOCUMENT: Mass balance check on patients [pats]
MBCheckSk = AggJDOpSki+CumGJDOpSk-CumLJDOpSk-Max(AggJDOpSk,0)
DOCUMENT: Mass balance check on skills of junior district-based CC operators [skill units]
MDCCRCR = 50
DOCUMENT: Monthly district CC facility running cost rate [pounds/mth].
An approximation.
MDCCRCRAL = Step(100,TDCCSFA)
DOCUMENT: Monthly district CC facility running cost rate affordability limit [pounds/mth].
An expert estimate since data is not available.
MinDCCInvR = 4
DOCUMENT: Minimum district-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
The minimum observed activity level using a single session in a mobile catheter laboratory.
NOPCap = 1105/3
DOCUMENT: Normal OP capacity [pats/mth].
Quoted as 85 patients/week.
425
OA = IF (CumC<=CumCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Overall affordability [-].
If the total overall costs exceed a certain level, support for the district service will be withdrawn and all 
elective patient activity will be suspended.
OPreOPWLRR = OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR
DOCUMENT: Other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
This refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those on the waiting list who deteriorated, were 
admitted into hospital, stabilised and were sent home and placed on the CC investigation waiting list. 
Instead, these are removals from the waiting list that do not constitute OP activity because they represent 
patients who died on the waiting list or left the list because: their condition improved; they moved to another 
area; deteriorated and became emergency referrals for CC investigation; deteriorated, became hospital 
admissions, stabilised and then were simply sent home (i.e. were not referred on for an elective or 
emergency CC investigation); or, choose to seek private care.
OPWLi = 424
DOCUMENT: Initial OP waiting list length [pats].
Calculation based upon the available data and the description that the system was stable.
OPWLRR = OPR+PreOPWLRR
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
PCapDCC= l*PCapDCCB+0*PCapDCCSPRDS+0*PCapDCCPermDS+0*PCapDCCFDS
+0*PCapDCCET+0*PCapDCCW
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable.
PCapTCC=l*PCapTCCB+0*PCapTCCSPRDS+0*PCapTCCPermDS+0*PCapTCCFDS
+0*PCapTCCET+0*PCapTCCW+0*PCapTCCSDS+0*PCapTCCNDS
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigations [pats/mth].
This is the elective tertiary-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if it were affordable. 
Capacity data is specified using an approximation of historical activity data (smoothed), extracting the 
behaviour of interest. Increased as part of the policy analysis.
PcvdDCCInvR = SMTH3(DCCInvR,PDDCCInvR)
DOCUMENT: Perceived district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
A 3rd order delay is chosen rather than a 1st order delay because a sudden increase in CC Inv activity at the 
district level would not be perceived immediately. These are perceptions by those outside the district 
hospital (GPs and patients) of something occurring within the district hospital. GPs will leam about the
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availability of the district service via written communication with the district hospital (referral letters) and 
patients will gain knowledge through 'word of mouth'. Because the district service was only temporary at 
Ribsley General, it was not marketed (unlike the case of the permanent service at Veinbridge) so the 
perception delay would be longer.
PcvdTCapAEDCC = SMTHl(TCapAEDCC,STTCapUNEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Perceived tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to 
undergo district-based CC [pats/mth].
The capacity available for eligible patients needs to be averaged since it is derived from an instantaneous 
rate which is, therefore, unobservable.
PDDCCInvR = 6
DOCUMENT: Perception delay of district-based CC investigation rate (by GPs and patients) [mths].
An expert estimate.
PhlDCCPC = 30000
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
An expert estimate since data not available.
PhlDCCPCAL = Step(35000,TDCCSF A)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs affordability limit [pounds].
An expert estimate.
PhlDCCPD = 1
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
An expert estimate. This refers to the delay to respond to the need for a district facility.
PhlDCCPMCR = (IF (PhlDCCPR>0) THEN (PhlDCCPC/PhlDCCPP) ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
Monthly costs incurred to prepare a site for phase 1 (i.e. mobile cath lab-based) district service. It is 
assumed that the total costs are spread evenly over the site preparation period.
PhlDCCPP = 3
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation period [mths].
An approximation.
Ph2DCCPC = 1000000
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
Ph2DCCPCAL = 0
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs affordablity limit [pounds].
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The construction of an integrated cath lab at Ribsley General is prevented due to financial constraints.
Ph2DCCPD = 999
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
A very large number is specified to indicate that the district service at Risbley General will never enter 
phase 2.
Ph2DCCPMCR=FSuppPh2DCC*(IF(CumDCCPC<(PhlDCCPC+Ph2DCCPC))THEN 
STEP(Ph2DCCPC/Ph2DCCPP, (STPhlDCCP+Ph2DCCPD)) ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
This refers to the costs incurred to construct an integrated catheter laboratory. It is assumed that the total 
costs are spread evenly over the site and facility preparation period.
Ph2DCCPP = 6
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation period [mths].
This is the time it would take to construct an integrated lab if funding were available.
PostOPDisR = OPR*( 1 -FOPtoCC)
DOCUMENT: Post-OP appointment discharge rate [pats/mth].
These are patients which are not referred on for an elective CC investigation.
PreOPWLRR = RROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPreOPWLRR 
DOCUMENT: Pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
These are all the removals from the waiting list that do not constitute patient (outpatient) activity. They 
represent patients who died on the waiting list, left the list because: their condition improved; they moved to 
another area; deteriorated and became emergency referrals for CC investigation; deteriorated, became 
hospital admissions, stabilised and were then sent home (i.e. didn't result in being referred for elective or 
emergency CC investigation; deteriorated, became hospital admissions, stabilised and were placed on the 
CC investigation waiting list; or, choose to seek private care.
RefFOPtoCC = 0.05625
DOCUMENT: Reference fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an 
elective CC investigation [-].
This is the referral fraction for which there was no district service, normal capacity levels, all district 
screeners are fully skilled and there is no stimulation nor suppression of demand due to the waiting time or 
patient/GP pressure effects. This would correspond with a situation for which GPs' and patients' knowledge 
of CC relies totally on that derived from tertiary activity and the waiting time is at a level so that it neither 
stimulates nor suppresses demand. An expert estimate (between 4 and 5 patients in 80 or 4.5/80) at Ribsley 
General. The remaining patients are discharged back to their GP following their OP appointment. Some will 
be subsequently followed up. The follow-up process is not being modelled and this will form a 
recommendation for further development of the model.
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RefRROP = 367.87*(l+Step(IRROP,48))
DOCUMENT: Reference rate of referrals for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
Represents new and follow-up patients. This is the OP referral rate for which the effect of patient and GP 
knowledge of CC is 1 i.e. knowledge is based upon tertiary activity only. Initially set at a level such that the 
OP waiting list additions and removals balance (as reported by the consultant). Later increased by 5% as 
part of the policy analysis.
RefTnewCCWL = 3
DOCUMENT: Reference waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients [mths].
Used to calculate 'WT effect' on referrals for CC. Represents the waiting time for which referrals will neither 
be suppressed not stimulated; waiting times greater than this reference value will suppress demand and 
waiting times lower than this reference value will stimulate demand. 6 months was quoted by the expert but 
this produced behaviour which was inconsistent with the real world system. Therefore, the value was 
adjusted.
RPrPM = 1
DOCUMENT: Rate of pressure gain per month (spent on the waiting list) [pressure/mth/mth]
We arbitrarily specifiy that each month spent on the waiting list exerts one unit of pressure each month. As 
the purpose is to compare pressure associated with different simulation runs, its value is irrelevant.
RPrPP = 1
DOCUMENT: Rate of pressure gain per patient (on the waiting list) [pressure/patient/mth]
We arbitrarily specifiy that a patient exerts one unit of pressure on the system for each month spent on the
waiting list. As the purpose is to compare pressure associated with different simulation runs, the value of
this parameter is irrelevant.
RRCC = RROPWLtoCC+NRRIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Considers referrals from both the outpatient and inpatient route.
RRFurthCC = DCCInvR*FFurthCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referral (from a district-based CC investigation) to a further CC (treatment)
procedure [pats/mth].
As only CC investigations can be carried out at the district level, patients who also require interventional CC 
(treatment) have to be referred to the tertiary level for a 2nd procedure. When necessary, synchronous 
diagnostic and treatments are carried out on patients investigated at the tertiary level so none of these 
patients require a 2nd procedure.
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RROPWLtoIPtoCC = OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC investigation 
[pats/mth].
This refers to patients on the OP waiting list who deteriorated, were admitted into hospital, stabilised and 
then placed on the CC investigation waiting list. Therefore, they were referred for an elective CC 
investigation after admission as an inpatient as opposed to after assessment as an outpatient.
STTCapUNEDCC = 3+l*(-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,15)-Step(2.75,34)+Step(2.75,35))
DOCUMENT: Smoothing time of tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity use by patients not 
eligible to undergo a district-based CC [mths].
An expert estimate. We assume that response time is shorter when the tertiary capacity shortfall is 
anticipated.
SwB3 = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop B3 [-].
0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the waiting time effect on referrals for elective CC investigations.
SwIOPCap = 0
DOCUMENT: Switch for increase in OP capacity [-]
0 = normal OP capacity level; 1 = increased OP capacity level. Used as part of the policy analysis.
SwOC = 0
DOCUMENT: Switch for overconfidence in referral behaviour (of junior district-based CC operators) [-].
0 = Off (underconfidence); 1 = On (overconfidence). "Underconfidence" is the tendency of junior 
cardiologists, as they embark upon their CC training, to hesitate and under-refer patients. As they gain CC 
skills, they gain confidence and this is reflected by them wanting to refer more patients on for CC 
investigations. This behaviour pattern would be expected in a hospital in which the referral behaviour was 
conservative, typically led by a consultant cardiologist who only carried out CC investigations. 
Overconfident referral behaviour among juniors would be expected in a hospital in which the referral 
behaviour was more 'aggressive', typically led by a consultant cardiologist who also carried out CC 
treatments. We assume underconfidence at Ribsley General.
SwPADr = 0
DOCUMENT: Switch for patient activity driver [-].
1 = Seeks a desired waiting list length; 0 = Seeks a desired average waiting time. The desired activity rate is 
driven by a desired waiting time for new patients joining the waiting list or a desired waiting list size. The 
desired activity rate is currently driven by a waiting time goal. This reflects the policy currently used by the 
consultant. Used for the policy analysis.
SwRl = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
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0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the knowledge effect on referrals for cardiology outpatient appointments.
SwR2 = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the knowledge effect on referrals for CC investigations.
SwTOpP = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for trainee district CC operator programme [-].
0 = Off (No trainee operator programme); 1 = On (Use of a trainee operator programme). Used as part of 
the policy analysis.
TADesDCCF = IF (TCapLT=999) THEN 999 ELSE (TCapLT-PhlDCCPP)
DOCUMENT: Time of anticipated desire for district CC facility [mths].
999 is the default value indicating no anticipated desire for district facility.
TCapAEDCC = IF(FEDCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE (CapTCC-TCCInvRNEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to undergo 
district-based CC [pats/mth].
This is the fraction of tertiary capacity which is not being used by non eligible patients (who have first 
priority on the use of tertiary resources). It is assumed that, if  no cases were eligible to be shifted to the 
district level, the capacity that would be available for these patients would be allocated elsewhere.
TCapLT = 13
DOCUMENT: Tertiary capacity loss time [mths].
A value is 999 would indicate no anticipated desire. Changes from default if a loss in tertiary capacity is 
anticipated. Currently specifies simulation time corresponding to May 96.
TCCInvR = CapTCC*UCapTCC
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
This represents patients referred from the district hospital of interest for an elective CC investigation. 
Elective CC investigations on patients referred by GPs directly to the tertiary centre, elective CC 
investigations on patients referred from district hospitals which do not have consultants with CC skills, 
emergency CC investigations and CC interventions (treatments) lie outside the boundary of the model. The 
elective CC investigation rate at the tertiary level will depend upon the capacity available and its utilisation. 
The level of capacity utilisation will be driven by the desired activity rate. All CC investigations can be 
safely conducted at the tertiary level whereas only low risk elective investigations can be safely delivered at 
the district level.
TCCInvRNEDCC = CapTCC*UCapTCCNEDCC
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate of those not eligible to undergo district-based 
CC [pats/mth].
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TDCCSFA = IF (TADesDCCF=999) THEN 999 ELSE TADesDCCF 
DOCUMENT: Time district CC service first affordable [mths].
A value of 999 indicates the case where a district service is never affordable. In the case of Ribsley General, 
it was the situation that led to the anticipated desire (planned temporary closure of tertiary facilities) that led 
to the district service being affordable. If the closure of tertiary facilities had not occurred, it is assumed that 
the district service would have never been affordable.
TRnewCCWL = IF(RefTnewCCWL=0) THEN 999 ELSE (AvTnewCCWLe&r/RefTnewCCWL) 
DOCUMENT: Waiting time ratio for new CC investigation waiting list patients [-].
The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero will not cause the simulation to stop. However, in 
reality the reference WT for new CC waiting list patients would never be zero since we are dealing with 
elective patients.
EffCapLCCB = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5),
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 0.25), (26.0, 0.5), (27.0, 0.75), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 0.25),
(40.0, 0.5), (41.0, 0.75), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for an elective CC investigation
corresponding to the base case scenario [-].
A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop in capacity will cause referrals to 
be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first capacity loss relates to the delay in introducing 
the district service to compensate for the loss of tertiary capacity. The second and third capacity losses relate 
to the significant drops in capacity following the withdrawal of the district service. It is assumed that the 
effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffCapLCCFDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5),
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 0.25), (26.0, 0.5), (27.0, 0.75), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 0.25),
(40.0, 0.5), (41.0, 0.75), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 0.25), (51.0, 0.5), (52.0, 0.75), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with further district sessions [-].
A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop in capacity will cause referrals to 
be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first capacity loss relates to the delay in introducing
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the district service to compensate for the loss of tertiary capacity. The second, third, fourth and fifth capacity 
losses relate to the significant drops in capacity following the withdrawal of the district service. It is 
assumed that the effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffCapLCCN = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00), 
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5), 
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 1.00), (26.0, 1.00), (27.0, 1.00), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 0.25), (38.0, 0.5), (39.0, 0.75),
(40.0, 1.00), (41.0, 1.00), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with no district service [-].
Used as part of the sensitivity analysis. A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant 
drop in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first and 
second capacity losses relate to the loss of tertiary capacity. It is assumed that the effect dimishes over a 
period of three months.
EffCapLCCPI = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00), 
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5), 
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 1.00), (26.0, 1.00), (27.0, 1.00), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 1.00),
(40.0, 1.00), (41.0, 1.00), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with permanent increases in 
capacity [-].
Used as part of the policy analysis. A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop 
in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The capacity loss 
relates to the delay in introducing the district service to compensate for the loss of tertiary capacity. It is 
assumed that the effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffCapLCCS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00), 
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5), 
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 0.25), (26.0, 0.5), (27.0, 0.75), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 0.25), (38.0, 0.5), (39.0, 0.75),
(40.0, 1.00), (41.0, 1.00), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
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DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a single district service [-]. 
Used as part o f the policy analysis. A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop 
in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first capacity loss 
relates to the delay in introducing the district service to compensate for the loss of tertiary capacity. The 
second capacity loss relates to the significant drop in capacity following the withdrawal of the district 
service. The third capacity loss relates to the second temporary closure of tertiary facilities. It is assumed 
that the effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffCapLCCSPRDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5),
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 1.00), (26.0, 1.00), (27.0, 1.00), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 0.25),
(40.0, 0.5), (41.0, 0.75), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a semi permanent reduced 
district service [-].
Used as part of the policy analysis. A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop 
in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first capacity loss 
relates to the loss of tertiary capacity and the second capacity loss relates to the loss of the district service. It 
is assumed that the effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffCapLCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5),
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 0.25), (26.0, 0.5), (27.0, 0.75), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 0.25), (34.0, 0.5), (35.0, 0.75), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 0.25),
(40.0, 0.5), (41.0, 0.75), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a winter crisis [-].
This crisis involves a further temporary loss of elective capacity without a replacement district service. A 
value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop in capacity will cause referrals to be 
temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The first capacity loss relates to the delay in introducing the 
district service to compensate for the loss of tertiary capacity. The second and fourth capacity losses relate 
to the significant drops in capacity following the withdrawal of the district service. The third capacity loss 
relates to the further temporary loss of (tertiary) elective capacity, representing a winter crisis. It is assumed 
that the effect diminishes over a period of three months.
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EffKCCPDCCS = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.02), (10.0, 1.09), (12.5, 1.13), (15.0, 1.15), (17.5, 1.15), 
(20.0, 1.15)
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation with a permanent 
district CC service [-].
Relates to GP and patient knowledge of CC. It is assumed that a permanent district service would stimulate 
more demand than a temporary service as greater efforts would be devoted to promoting the service and 
greater interest would be generated. Furthermore, a permanent district service at Ribsley General would be 
assumed to generate less demand than a permanent district service at Veinbridge General, assuming the 
same patient and GP behaviour. This follows because increased pressure to refer would have a greater effect 
on the typically more 'aggressive' cardiologists at Veinbridge General; the effects of knowledge on referrals 
represents the effect of pressure to refer, generated by increased knowledge, and the response to that 
pressure. If the loop is switched off or the district service is not present, the input is zero forcing the effect to 
equal 1. We assume that pressure can only be exerted to refer whilst the district service is present.
EffKOPPDCCS = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.05), (12.5, 1.15), (15.0, 1.20), (17.5, 1.20), 
(20 .0 , 1.20)
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment with a permanent district CC 
service [-].
Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. If the loop is switched off the input is zero forcing effect to 
equal 1. It is assumed that a permanent district service would stimulate more demand than a temporary 
service as greater efforts would be devoted to promoting the service and greater interest would be generated. 
Furthermore, a permanent district service at Ribsley General would be assumed to generate less demand 
than a permanent district service at Veinbridge General, assuming the same patient and GP behaviour. This 
follows because increased pressure to refer would have a greater effect on the typically more 'aggressive' 
cardiologists at Veinbridge General; the effects of knowledge on referrals represents the effect of pressure to 
refer, generated by increased knowledge, and the response to that pressure.
EffSkOJCC = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp)
(0.00, 0.167), (10.0, 0.167), (20.0, 0.167), (30.0, 0.167), (40.0, 0.285), (50.0, 0.8), (60.0, 1.21), (70.0, 
1.21), (80.0, 1.00), (90.0, 1.00), (100, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of overconfident junior district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
Graph was constructed using expert estimates.
EffSkUJCC = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp)
(0.00, 0.167), (10.0, 0.167), (20.0, 0.167), (30.0, 0.167), (40.0, 0.167), (50.0, 0.167), (60.0, 0.36), (70.0, 
0.862), (80.0, 1.00), (90.0, 1.00), (100, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of underconfident junior district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
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Graph was constructed using expert estimates. This reflects the base case assumption for Ribsley General. 
IncrEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (12.5, 1.01), (15.0, 1.04), (17.5, 1.05), 
(20.0, 1.05)
DOCUMENT: Increased effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for a cardiology OP appointment [-]. 
Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. Used during the sensitivity analysis.
LPP = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp/MaxSkOp)
(0.00, 2.00), (0.1, 2.00), (0.2, 2.00), (0.3, 2.00), (0.4, 2.00), (0.5, 2.00), (0.6, 1.72), (0.7, 0.46), (0.8, 0.12), 
(0.9, 0.04), (1,0.00)
DOCUMENT: Learning per patient [skill units/patient].
Constructed using expert estimates.
NEffKCC = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.02), (10.0, 1.04), (12.5, 1.09), (15.0, 1.10), (17.5, 1.10), 
(20 .0, 1.10)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation [-].
Relates to GP and patient knowledge of CC. For Ribsley General, the normal effect is that generated by a 
temporary district service. If the loop is switched off or district service is not present, input is zero forcing 
effect to equal 1. We assume that pressure can only be exerted to refer whilst the district service is present. 
This graph was presented to the consultant who thought that it seemed quite reasonable. Variations were 
explored via the sensitivity analysis.
NEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (12.5, 1.01), (15.0, 1.02), (17.5, 1.02), 
(20 .0 , 1.02)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. For Ribsley General, the normal effect is that generated by a 
temporary district service. If the loop is switched off, the input is zero forcing the effect to equal 1. We 
assume that as the district service was temporary, it would not be heavily marketed and generally low 
interest in CC would be generated so the effect of the district service on referrals for an OP appt, would be 
low. The consultant stated that he could not comment on the validity of the graph. Variations were explored 
via the sensitivity analysis.
NEffWTCC = GRAPH(IF(SwB3=0) THEN 1 ELSE TRnewCCWL)
(0.00, 1.10), (0.2, 1.10), (0.4, 1.10), (0.6, 1.09), (0.8, 1.06), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 0.97), (1.40, 0.96), (1.60, 
0.95), (1.80, 0.95)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC investigation 
[-]•
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Assumes that a low WT will stimulate demand but long WT will suppress demand. If the loop is switched 
off, the input is zero forcing the effect to equal 1. Based on expert estimates.
PCapDCCB = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 23.0),
(16.0, 23.0), (17.0, 23.0), (18.0, 23.0), (19.0, 23.0), (20.0, 23.0), (21.0, 23.0), (22.0, 23.0), (23.0, 23.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 19.6), (35.0, 19.6), (36.0, 19.6), (37.0, 19.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations corresponding to the base 
case scenario [pats/mth].
This uses an approximation of the historical activity data (the district service was affordable) and capacities 
are implied from the comment by the consultant that the system often operated at full capacity. The 
historical data (smoothed) were divided between four different situations and, for each situation, averages 
were taken to derive four different capacity levels. Corresponding to increasing levels of capacity, these 
situations were: (1) no district service, (2) district service in first month of operation, (3) district service with 
normal capacity levels e.g. providing a replacement service during a moderate closure of tertiary facilities, 
and (4) district service with elevated capacity levels e.g. providing a replacement service during a major 
closure of tertiary facilities or to support a major shift to district level.
PCapDCCET = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 18.1),
(16.0, 18.1), (17.0, 18.1), (18.0, 18.1), (19.0, 18.1), (20.0, 18.1), (21.0, 18.1), (22.0, 18.1), (23.0, 18.1),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 0.00), (35.0, 0.00), (36.0, 12.6), (37.0, 12.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with an expanded tertiary- 
based service [pats/mth].
This represents a resource neutral policy for April 1995 to May 1998 only. The capacity from July 1996 
onwards is level, set the average base case level for the period July 1996 to May 1998 (allowances are made 
for the low first month of the district service). We assume that capacity increases were planned at the 
tertiary level and the district service is only used to provide cover for the tertiary facility closures. Used as 
part of the policy analysis.
PCapDCCFDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 23.0),
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(16.0, 23.0), (17.0, 23.0), (18.0, 23.0), (19.0, 23.0), (20.0, 23.0), (21.0, 23.0), (22.0, 23.0), (23.0, 23.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 19.6), (35.0, 19.6), (36.0, 19.6), (37.0, 19.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 19.6), (47.0, 19.6),
(48.0, 19.6), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with further district sessions 
[pats/mth].
This involves additional district sessions in February to April 1999, 2000 and 2001.
PCapDCCPermDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 18.1),
(16.0, 18.1), (17.0, 18.1), (18.0, 18.1), (19.0, 18.1), (20.0, 18.1), (21.0, 18.1), (22.0, 18.1), (23.0, 18.1),
(24.0, 12.6), (25.0, 12.6), (26.0, 12.6), (27.0, 12.6), (28.0, 12.6), (29.0, 12.6), (30.0, 12.6), (31.0, 12.6),
(32.0, 12.6), (33.0, 12.6), (34.0, 12.6), (35.0, 12.6), (36.0, 12.6), (37.0, 12.6), (38.0, 12.6), (39.0, 12.6),
(40.0, 12.6), (41.0, 12.6), (42.0, 12.6), (43.0, 12.6), (44.0, 12.6), (45.0, 12.6), (46.0, 12.6), (47.0, 12.6),
(48.0, 12.6), (49.0, 12.6), (50.0, 12.6), (51.0, 12.6), (52.0, 12.6), (53.0, 12.6), (54.0, 12.6)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a permanent district 
service [pats/mth].
This represents a resource neutral policy for April 1995 to May 1998 only. However, unlike the base case, 
the district service is not withdrawn and the capacity from July 1996 onwards is level, set the average base 
case level for the period July 1996 to May 1998 (allowances are made for the low first month of the district 
service). Used as part of the policy analysis.
PCapDCCSPRDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 18.1),
(16.0, 18.1), (17.0, 18.1), (18.0, 18.1), (19.0, 18.1), (20.0, 18.1), (21.0, 18.1), (22.0, 18.1), (23.0, 18.1),
(24.0, 12.6), (25.0, 12.6), (26.0, 12.6), (27.0, 12.6), (28.0, 12.6), (29.0, 12.6), (30.0, 12.6), (31.0, 12.6),
(32.0, 12.6), (33.0, 12.6), (34.0, 12.6), (35.0, 12.6), (36.0, 12.6), (37.0, 12.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a semi-permanent
reduced district service [pats/mth].
This represents a resource neutral policy in that the total capacity that was provided for Ribsley General 
patients between April 1995 and April 2001 is unchanged. However, unlike the base case, the district 
service is not withdrawn until June 1998 and the capacity from July 1996 to May 1998 is level (allowances 
are made for the low first month of the district service), set to the average base case level for this period. 
Used as part of the policy analysis.
PCapDCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
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(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.00), (14.0, 8.00), (15.0, 23.0),
(16.0, 23.0), (17.0, 23.0), (18.0, 23.0), (19.0, 23.0), (20.0, 23.0), (21.0, 23.0), (22.0, 23.0), (23.0, 23.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 0.00), (35.0, 19.6), (36.0, 19.6), (37.0, 19.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a winter crisis
[pats/mth].
Assumes loss of capacity due to a winter crisis over 3 months where resources are diverted from elective 
investigations to emergency and treatment cases.
PCapTCCB = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 11.8), (25.0, 11.8), (26.0, 11.8), (27.0, 11.8), (28.0, 11.8), (29.0, 11.8), (30.0, 11.8), (31.0, 11.8),
(32.0, 11.8), (33.0, 11.8), (34.0, 6.50), (35.0, 6.50), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 11.8), (47.0, 11.8),
(48.0, 11.8), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations corresponding to the base 
case scenario [pats/mth].
This is the tertiary elective CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable. It uses an 
approximation of the historical activity data and capacities are implied from the comment by the consultant 
that the system often operated at full capacity. The historical data (smoothed) were divided between five 
different situations and, for each situation, averages were taken to derive five different capacity levels. 
Corresponding to increasing levels of capacity, these situations were: (1) with a major reduction in capacity 
e.g. during a major closure of tertiary facilities, (2) with a moderate reduction in capacity e.g. during a 
moderate closure of tertiary facilities, (3) during the first month of a major closure of tertiary facilties, (4) 
normal capacity levels (5) elevated capacity levels.
PCapTCCET = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 19.1), (25.0, 19.1), (26.0, 19.1), (27.0, 19.1), (28.0, 19.1), (29.0, 19.1), (30.0, 19.1), (31.0, 19.1),
(32.0, 19.1), (33.0, 19.1), (34.0, 19.1), (35.0, 19.1), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 19.1), (39.0, 19.1),
(40.0, 19.1), (41.0, 19.1), (42.0, 19.1), (43.0, 19.1), (44.0, 19.1), (45.0, 19.1), (46.0, 19.1), (47.0, 19.1),
(48.0, 19.1), (49.0,19.1), (50.0, 19.1), (51.0, 19.1), (52.0, 19.1), (53.0, 19.1), (54.0, 19.1)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with an expanded tertiary- 
based service [pats/mth].
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This represents a resource neutral policy for April 1995 to May 1998 only. The capacity from July 1996 
onwards is level, set the average base case level for the period July 1996 to May 1998 (allowances are made 
for the low first month of the district service). We assume that capacity increases were planned at the 
tertiary level and the district service is only used to provide cover for the tertiary facility closures. Used as 
part of the policy analysis.
PCapTCCFDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 11.8), (25.0, 11.8), (26.0, 11.8), (27.0, 11.8), (28.0, 11.8), (29.0, 11.8), (30.0, 11.8), (31.0, 11.8),
(32.0, 11.8), (33.0, 11.8), (34.0, 6.50), (35.0, 6.50), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 6.50), (47.0, 6.50),
(48.0, 6.50), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with further district sessions 
[pats/mth].
This involves additional district sessions in February to April in 1999, 2000 and 2001.
PCapTCCNDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 11.8), (25.0, 11.8), (26.0, 11.8), (27.0, 11.8), (28.0, 11.8), (29.0, 11.8), (30.0, 11.8), (31.0, 11.8),
(32.0, 11.8), (33.0, 11.8), (34.0, 11.8), (35.0, 11.8), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 11.8), (47.0, 11.8),
(48.0, 11.8), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with no district service
[pats/mth].
PCapTCCPermDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 6.50), (25.0, 6.50), (26.0, 6.50), (27.0, 6.50), (28.0, 6.50), (29.0, 6.50), (30.0, 6.50), (31.0, 6.50),
(32.0, 6.50), (33.0, 6.50), (34.0, 6.50), (35.0, 6.50), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 6.50), (39.0, 6.50),
(40.0, 6.50), (41.0, 6.50), (42.0, 6.50), (43.0, 6.50), (44.0, 6.50), (45.0, 6.50), (46.0, 6.50), (47.0, 6.50),
(48.0, 6.50), (49.0, 6.50), (50.0, 6.50), (51.0, 6.50), (52.0, 6.50), (53.0, 6.50), (54.0, 6.50)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a permanent district 
service [pats/mth].
This represents a resource neutral policy for April 1995 to May 1998 only. However, unlike the base case, 
the district service is not withdrawn and the capacity from July 1996 onwards is level, set the average base
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case level for the period July 1996 to May 1998 (allowances are made for the low first month of the district 
service). Used as part of the policy analysis.
PCapTCCSDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 11.8), (25.0, 11.8), (26.0, 11.8), (27.0, 11.8), (28.0, 11.8), (29.0, 11.8), (30.0, 11.8), (31.0, 11.8),
(32.0, 11.8), (33.0, 11.8), (34.0, 11.8), (35.0, 11.8), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 11.8), (47.0, 11.8),
(48.0, 11.8), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with single district service 
[pats/mth].
PCapTCCSPRDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 6.50), (25.0, 6.50), (26.0, 6.50), (27.0, 6.50), (28.0, 6.50), (29.0, 6.50), (30.0, 6.50), (31.0, 6.50),
(32.0, 6.50), (33.0, 6.50), (34.0, 6.50), (35.0, 6.50), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 11.8), (47.0, 11.8),
(48.0, 11.8), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a semi-permanent
reduced district service [pats/mth].
This represents a resource neutral policy in that the total capacity that was provided for Ribsley General 
patients between April 1995 and April 2001 is unchanged. However, unlike the base case, the district 
service is not withdrawn until June 1998 and the capacity from July 1996 to May 1998 is level (allowances 
are made for the low first month of the district service), set to the average base case level for this period. 
Used as part of the policy analysis.
PCapTCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 11.8), (1.00, 11.8), (2.00, 11.8), (3.00, 11.8), (4.00, 11.8), (5.00, 11.8), (6.00, 21.6), (7.00, 21.6),
(8.00, 21.6), (9.00, 21.6), (10.0, 21.6), (11.0, 21.6), (12.0, 21.6), (13.0, 10.8), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 11.8), (25.0, 11.8), (26.0, 11.8), (27.0, 11.8), (28.0, 11.8), (29.0, 11.8), (30.0, 11.8), (31.0, 11.8),
(32.0, 3.00), (33.0, 3.00), (34.0, 3.00), (35.0, 6.50), (36.0, 6.50), (37.0, 6.50), (38.0, 11.8), (39.0, 11.8),
(40.0, 11.8), (41.0, 11.8), (42.0, 11.8), (43.0, 11.8), (44.0, 11.8), (45.0, 11.8), (46.0, 11.8), (47.0, 11.8),
(48.0, 11.8), (49.0, 11.8), (50.0, 11.8), (51.0, 11.8), (52.0, 11.8), (53.0, 11.8), (54.0, 11.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a winter crisis
[pats/mth].
441
Assumes loss of capacity due to a winter crisis over 3 months where resources are diverted from elective 
investigations to emergency and treatment cases.
SuppEffKCC = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.02), (12.5, 1.04), (15.0, 1.05), (17.5, 1.05), 
(20.0, 1.05)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Assumes that the use of a guideline could suppress some of the stimulated demand. Used as part of the 
policy analysis.
SuppEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (12.5, 1.00), (15.0, 1.01), (17.5, 1.01), 
(20.0, 1.01)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for OP appointments [-].
Assumes that the use of a guideline could suppress some of the stimulated demand. Used as part of the 
policy analysis.
SuppEffWTCC = GRAPH(IF(SwB3=0) THEN 1 ELSE TRnewCCWL)
(0.00, 1.05), (0.2, 1.05), (0.4, 1.05), (0.6, 1.04), (0.8, 1.01), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 0.97), (1.40, 0.96), (1.60, 
0.95), (1.80, 0.95)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC
investigation [-].
Assumes that the use of a guideline could suppress some of the stimulated demand. Used as part of the 
policy analysis.
UCapDCC = GRAPH(IF (CapDCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE (DesDCCInvR/CapDCC))
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1,0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for district-based CC [-].
By definition, this refers to elective CC investigations.
If exactly the full capacity was desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical 
difficulties. The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
UCapOP = GRAPH(IF (CapOP=0) THEN 0 ELSE (DesOPR/CapOP))
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3), (0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), 
(0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65), (0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), 
(0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 0.97), (1.05, 1.00), (1.10, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for OP appointments [-].
If exactly the full capacity was desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical 
difficulties. The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
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UCapTCC = GRAPH(IF(CapTCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE DesCCInvR/CapTCC)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1, 0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [-].
If full capacity is desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical difficulties. The use of 
the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
UCapTCCNEDCC = GRAPH(IF(CapTCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE DesCCInvR*(l-FEDCC)/CapTCC)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1,0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigation by those not eligible to 
undergo a district-based investigation [-].
If full capacity is desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical difficulties. The use of 
the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
E2b. Model Equations Parameterised to the Veinbridge General Case
AggJDOpSk(t) = AggJDOpSk(t - dt) + (JDOpSkGR - JDOpSkLR) * dt 
INIT AggJDOpSk = AggJDOpSki
DOCUMENT: Aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
It is assumed that in April 1995, the junior operator at that time will have accumulated sufficient skills in CC 
to have almost saturated the 'skills effect' on referrals for CC investigations. The initial value is based on the 
following assumptions: historical elective CC investigation activity levels at the tertiary level equal the level 
at April 1995 (11.75/mth), and junior district operator fraction equal to 0.75.
JDOpSkGR = 1 *( JDOpSkGRRec+JDOpSkGRExp)+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate [skill units/mth].
JDOpSkLR = JDOpDepR* AvSkJDOp+0*PULSE( 1000,10)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills loss rate [skill units/mth].
AvRRCC(t) = AvRRCC(t - dt) + (RRCCAR) * dt 
INIT AvRRCC = 35.64
DOCUMENT: Average rate of referrals for elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
RRCCAR = (RRCC-AvRRCC)/ATRRCC
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an elective CC investigation averaging rate [pats/mth/mth].
CCWL(t) = CCWL(t - dt) + (RROPWLtoCC + NRRIPtoCC - CCWLRR) * dt 
INIT CCWL = CCWLi
DOCUMENT: CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
Initialised at the Apr 95 (t=0) level using real data (with some patients removed) plus an expert estimate of 
the other waiting list removals (deaths on waiting list etc).
RROPWLtoCC = OPR*FOPtoCC+RROPWLtoIPtoCC
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DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Comprises patients who were referred on after attending an OP appointment and patients who, waiting for 
an OP appointment, deteriorated and were referred on following a hospital admission.
NRRIPtoCC = 1 *5.5 *( 1 -0*Step( 1,20))+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: New referral rate from inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Prior to hospital admission, these patients may have been: asymptomatic; symptomatic but the patient may 
not have yet sought medical treatment for their symptoms; or, symptomatic and under GP care. This may 
also include patients who were in hospital receiving non cardiac treatment. "New" refers to patients not 
already known to the cardiologists. This excludes: (1) those who were on the OP waiting list, deteriorated, 
stabilised and were then placed on the CC investigation waiting list (these are already accounted for in the 
referrals from the OP waiting list, RROPWLtoCC) and (2) patients who are already on the CC investigation 
waiting list but have deteriorated, become hospital admissions and restabilised (as they will remain 
classified as in need of an elective CC investigation, they are already included on the CC investigation 
waiting list, CCWL). The value is derived from an expert estimate (6.5 pats/mth) for the total referrals from 
inpatients i.e. including (1) but excluding (2). It is assumed that (2) will form the minority of the total 
referrals from inpatients. The validity of the split in the referrals from inpatients is not important, given the 
purpose of our study.
CCWLRR = CCInvR+OCCWLRR
DOCUMENT: CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
CFPhlDCCP(t) = CFPhlDCCP(t - dt) + (PhlDCCPR) * dt 
INIT CFPhlDCCP = 0
DOCUMENT: Completed fraction of phase 1 district CC service preparation (completed fraction of a basic 
district site) [-].
A district service can be provided by hiring a mobile catheter laboratory. However, a suitable site has to be 
prepared for the mobile. "Site" refers to the base upon which the mobile is situated (it has to be perfectly 
level and able to withstand the considerable weight of the mobile) and the electrical and telecommunication 
links to connect the mobile to the host hospital. At a later stage, the mobile may be replaced by an integrated 
catheter laboratory. The mobile would be used whilst the integrated lab was being constructed so the 
construction of the lab and associated delays would not need to be represented in the model but the 
associated financial costs would. In the model, the different phases of district service are referred to as 
Phase 1 (using a mobile) and Phase 2 (using an integrated catheter lab) and the site for the mobile is referred 
to as a "basic" district site.
PhlDCCPR = FSuppDCC*(IF ((TIME>=STPhlDCCP) AND (CFPhlDCCP<l)) THEN (1/PhlDCCPP) 
ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation rate [-/mth].
Having set the preparation of a basic district site and facility to begin, preparation occurs until the site and 
facility are complete. It relies upon continual financial support for the district service; if financial support 
were withdrawn, development would be suspended.
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CumCC(t) = CumCC(t - dt) + (CCInvR) * dt 
INIT CumCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative elective CC investigations [pats].
CCInvR = DCCInvR+TCCInvR
DOCUMENT: Elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Overall elective CC investigations at tertiary and district levels for patients referred from a given district 
hospital. For those conducted at the tertiary level, may also involve synchronous treatment.
CumCCAC(t) = CumCCAC(t - dt) + (CCCR) * dt 
INIT CumCCAC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative costs of CC investigations, for patients from a given district hospital. CC investigations 
conducted at the tertiary level may also involve synchronous investigation and intervention (treatment) 
which will be more expensive than a CC intervention. This is one of several several stocks in the model that 
are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of different simulation runs. They measure 
different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and are based upon the area under the relevant 
curve. For this index, we count the total CC investigation activity costs generated over time by considering 
the area under the CC investigation rate curve.
CCCR = AvCTCC*TCCInvR+(AvCDCC+FFurthCC*AvCFurthCC)*DCCInvR 
DOCUMENT: CC activity cost rate [pounds/pat].
Refers to costs of CC procedures for patients originally referred for an elective CC investigation from a 
given district hospital so refers to CC investigations and treatments.
CumCCACATL(t) = CumCCACATL(t - dt) + (CCCRATL) * dt 
INIT CumCCACATL = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC activity costs if all activity were carried out at the tertiary level [pounds]. 
CCCRATL = (DCCInvR+TCCInvR)*AvCTCC
DOCUMENT: CC activity cost rate if all were carried out at the tertiary level [pounds/pat].
This is what the CC cost rate would be if the total elective activity were conducted at the tertiary level, 
assuming the same (district+tertiary) capacity could be achieved at the tertiary level.
CumCCWLAdds(t) = CumCCWLAdds(t - dt) + (CCWLAddR) * dt 
INIT CumCCWLAdds = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC waiting list additions [pats].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of referrals for 
elective CC investigations by considering the area under the CC investigation referral rate curve. 
CCWLAddR = NRRIPtoCC+RROPWLtoCC 
DOCUMENT: CC waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
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CumCCWLRems(t) = CumCCWLRems(t - dt) + (CCWLRemR) * dt 
INIT CumCCWLRems = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative CC waiting list removals [pats]
CCWLRemR = CCWLRR
DOCUMENT: CC waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
CumDCCPC(t) = CumDCCPC(t - dt) + (DCCPCR) * dt 
INIT CumDCCPC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
DCCPCR = Ph 1 DCCPMCR+Ph2DCCPMCR
DOCUMENT: District CC service preparation cost rate [pounds/mth].
Phase 1 refers to the costs incurred to prepare a site for a mobile-based district service. Phase 2 refers to the 
costs incurred to prepare a site and construct a facility for an integrated cath lab-based district service.
CumDCCRC(t) = CumDCCRC(t - dt) + (DCCRCR) * dt 
INIT CumDCCRC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service running costs [pounds].
DCCRCR = IF(DCCInvR>0) THEN MDCCRCR ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: District CC service running cost rate [pounds/mth].
These costs are not incurred until the district service is up and running.
CumGJDOpSk(t) = CumGJDOpSk(t - dt) + (GRJDOpSk) * dt 
INIT CumGJDOpSk = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative gain in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units]
GRJDOpSk = JDOpSkGR
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
CumLJDOpSk(t) = CumLJDOpSk(t - dt) + (LRJDOpSk) * dt 
INIT CumLJDOpSk = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative loss in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units]
LRJDOpSk = JDOpSkLR
DOCUMENT: Loss rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
CumOP(t) = CumOP(t - dt) + (OPR) * dt 
INIT CumOP = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP activity [pats].
OPR = CapOP*UCapOP 
DOCUMENT: OP rate [pats/mth].
Desired activity which can be delivered depends upon the capacity available and utilisation of that capacity.
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CumOPAC(t) = CumOPAC(t - dt) + (OPCR) * dt 
INIT CumOPAC = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative costs of OP appointments, for patients from a given district hospital. This is one of several 
several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of different 
simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and are based 
upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total OP activity costs generated over 
time by considering the area under the OP rate curve.
OPCR = AvCOP*OPR 
DOCUMENT: OP cost rate [pounds/pat].
CumOPWLAdds(t) = CumOPWLAdds(t - dt) + (OPWLAddsR) * dt 
INIT CumOPWLAdds = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP waiting list additions [pats].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of referrals for 
OP appointments over time by considering the area under the OP referral rate curve.
OPWLAddsR = RROP
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
CumOPWLRems(t) = CumOPWLRems(t - dt) + (OPWLRemR) * dt 
INIT CumOPWLRems = 0
DOCUMENT: Cumulative OP waiting list removals [pats]
OPWLRemR = OOPWLRR+RROPWLtoCC 
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
DECCWL(t) = DECCWL(t - dt) + (GRDECCWL) * dt 
INIT DECCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the CC investigation waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDECCWL = IF ((CCWL-DesCCWL)>0.5) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth].
DEOPWL(t) = DEOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDEOPWL) * dt 
INIT DEOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the OP waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDEOPWL = IF ((OPWL-DesOPWL)>0.5) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths/mth].
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DETnewCCWL(t) = DETnewCCWL(t - dt) + (GRDETnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT DETnewCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
Total time for which the average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
exceeded its desired value.
GRDETnewCCWL = IF ((AvTnewCCWLe-DesTCC)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive estimated average waiting time for new CC investigation 
waiting list patients [mths/mth]
DETnewOPWL(t) = DETnewOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDETnewOPWL) * dt 
INIT DETnewOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients 
[mths]
Total time for which the average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients exceeded its 
desired value.
GRDET newOP WL = IF ((AvTnewOPWL-DesTOP)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
DETonCCWL(t) = DETonCCWL(t - dt) + (GRDETonCCWL) * dt 
INIT DETonCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average time spent on waiting list for a CC investigation [mths]
Total time for which the average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list exceeded its desired value. 
GRDET onCC WL = IF ((AvTonCCWL-DesTCC)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive average time spent on CC investigation waiting list 
[mths/mth]
DETonOPWL(t) = DETonOPWL(t - dt) + (GRDETonOPWL) * dt 
INIT DETonOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of excessive average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths]
Total time for which the average time on the OP waiting list exceeded its desired value.
GRDETonOPWL = IF ((AvTonOPWL-DesTOP)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of excessive average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth].
DStDemCC(t) = DStDemCC(t - dt) + (GRDStDemCC) * dt 
INIT DStDemCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths]
GRDStDemCC = IF ((FOPtoCC/(RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC)-l)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths/mth].
Demand can only be suppressed by the skills effect.
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DStDemOP(t) = DStDemOP(t - dt) + (GRDStDemOP) * dt 
INIT DStDemOP = 0
DOCUMENT: Duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths]
GRDStDemOP = IF ((EffKOP-l)>0.001) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths/mth]
JDOp(t) = JDOp(t - dt) + (JDOpRecR - JDOpDepR) * dt 
INIT JDOp = 1
DOCUMENT: Number of junior district-based CC operators [doctors].
JDOpRecR = SwTOpP*PULSE(l,6+JDOpRecD,JDOpTT+JDOpRecD)
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator recruitment rate [doctors/mth].
There is no need to synchronise the recruitment of district operator trainees with the availability of the 
district service. The district operator trainees refer to junior cardiologists-in-training who are based at the 
district hospital. In the absence of a district service, they acquire skills in delivering CC at the tertiary 
centre.
JDOpDepR = SwTOpP*(PULSE(l,6,999)+DELAY(JDOpRecR,JDOpTT,0))
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator departure rate [doctors/mth].
When trainee operators complete their training at the district hospital, they move on to another hospital and 
the trainee vacancy which subsequently arises is subsequently filled with a new novice trainee.
MaxCCWL(t) = MaxCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
SRMaxCCWL = IF (CCWL>MaxCCWL) THEN PULSE(CCWL-MaxCCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats/mth]
MaxOPWL(t) = MaxOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxOPWL) * dt 
INIT MaxOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum OP waiting list [pats]
SRMaxOPWL = IF (OPWL>MaxOPWL) THEN PULSE(OPWL-MaxOPWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum OP waiting list [pats/mth]
MaxRRCC(t) = MaxRRCC(t - dt) + (SRMaxRRCC) * dt 
INIT MaxRRCC = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
SRMaxRRCC = IF (RRCOMaxRRCC) THEN PULSE(RRCC-MaxRRCC) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth/mth]
MaxRROP(t) = MaxRROP(t - dt) + (SRMaxRROP) * dt 
INIT MaxRROP = 0
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DOCUMENT: Maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
SRMaxRROP = IF (RROP>MaxRROP) THEN PULSE(RROP-MaxRROP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth/mth]
MaxTnewCCWL(t) = MaxTnewCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxTnewCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
[mths]
SRMaxTnewCCWL = IF (AvTnewCCWLe>MaxTnewCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewCCWLe- 
MaxTnewCCWL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
MaxTnewOPWL(t) = MaxTnewOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxT newOP WL) * dt 
INIT MaxTnewOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths]
SRMaxT newOP WL = IF (AvTnewOPWL>MaxTnewOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewOPWL- 
MaxTnewOPWL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients
[mths/mth]
MaxTonCCWL(t) = MaxTonCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTonCCWL) * dt 
INIT MaxTonCCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
SRMaxTonCCWL = IF (AvTonCCWL>MaxTonCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonCCWL-MaxTonCCWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average time on CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth]
MaxTonOPWL(t) = MaxTonOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMaxTonOPWL) * dt 
INIT MaxTonOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Maximum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
SRMaxTonOPWL = IF (AvTonOPWL>MaxTonOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonOPWL-MaxTonOPWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of maximum average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths/mth]
MinCCWL(t) = MinCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinCCWL) * dt 
INIT MinCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
SRMinCCWL = IF (CCWL<MinCCWL) THEN PULSE(CCWL-MinCCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats/mth]
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MinOPWL(t) = MinOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinOPWL) * dt
INIT MinOPWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum OP waiting list [pats]
SRMinOPWL = IF (OPWL<MinOPWL) THEN PULSE(OPWL-MinOPWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum OP waiting list [pats/mth]
MinRRCC(t) = MinRRCC(t - dt) + (SRMinRRCC) * dt 
INIT MinRR.CC = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
SRMinRRCC = IF (RRCC<MinRRCC) THEN PULSE(RRCC-MinRRCC) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum referral rate for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth/mth]
MinRROP(t) = MinRROP(t - dt) + (SRMinRROP) * dt 
INIT MinRROP = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
SRMinRROP = IF (RROP<MinRROP) THEN PULSE(RROP-MinRROP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum referral rate for an OP appointment [pats/mth/mth]
MinTnewCCWL(t) = MinTnewCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTnewCCWL) * dt 
INIT MinTnewCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients 
[mths]
SRMinTnewCCWL = IF (AvTnewCCWLe<MinTnewCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewCCWLe- 
MinTnewCCWL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
MinTnewOPWL(t) = MinTnewOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTnewOPWL) * dt 
INIT MinTnewOPWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
SRMinTnewOPWL = IF (AvTnewOPWL<MinTnewOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTnewOPWL-
MinT newOP WL) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients 
[mths/mth]
MinT onCCWL(t) = MinTonCCWL(t - dt) + (SRMinT onCC WL) * dt 
INIT MinTonCCWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
SRMinT onCC WL = IF (AvTonCCWL<MinTonCCWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonCCWL-MinTonCCWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average time spent on CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth]
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MinTonOPWL(t) = MinTonOPWL(t - dt) + (SRMinTonOPWL) * dt 
INIT MinTonOPWL = 1000
DOCUMENT: Minimum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths]
SRMinT onOP WL = IF (AvTonOPWL<MinTonOPWL) THEN PULSE(AvTonOPWL-MinTonOPWL) 
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Set rate of minimum average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths/mth]
OPWL(t) = OPWL(t - dt) + (RROP - RROPWLtoCC - OOPWLRR) * dt
INIT OPWL = OPWLi
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list length [pats].
All references to OP refer to cardiology OP.
RROP = l*RefRROP*EffKOP+0*PULSE( 1000,10,0)
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an OP appointment [pats/mth],
RROPWLtoCC = OPR*FOPtoCC+RROPWLtoIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Comprises patients who were referred on after attending an OP appointment and patients who, waiting for 
an OP appointment, deteriorated and were referred on following a hospital admission.
OOPWLRR = PostOPDisR+OPreOPWLRR 
DOCUMENT: Other OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those who were referred on for elective CC investigation. 
Comprises post OP discharges and pre OP appt removals from the waiting list. The latter collectively refers 
to waiting list deaths, patients whose condition improved, moved away from the area, condition deteriorated 
and became emergencies or left NHS to seek private care.
PrSIECCWL(t) = PrSIECCWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIECCWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIECCWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC investigation waiting list length 
[pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering the area under the CC investigation waiting list curve and a conversion 
factor. We assume that the waiting list will only exert pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired length. 
GRPrSIECCWL = IF (CCWL>DesCCWL) THEN ((CCWL-DesCCWL)*RPrPP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC investigation waiting 
list length [pressure/mth].
PrSIEOPWL(t) = PrSIEOPWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIEOPWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIEOPWL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list length [pressure].
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This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering the area under the OP waiting list curve and a conversion factor. We 
assume that the waiting list will only exert pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired length. 
GRPrSIEOPWL = IF (OPWL>DesOPWL) THEN ((OPWL-DesOPWL)*RPrPP) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list length 
[pressure/mth].
PrSIETonCCWL(t) = PrSIETonCCWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIETonCCWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIET onCC WL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the CC
investigation waiting list [pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering a conversion factor and the area under the curve for the average time spent 
on the CC investigation waiting list. We assume that the delay for a CC investigation will only exert 
pressure on the system if it exceeds its desired level.
GRPrSIETonCCWL = IF (AvTonCCWL>DesTCC) THEN ((AvTonCCWL-DesTCC)*RPrPM) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
OP waiting list [pressure/mth].
PrSIET onOP WL(t) = PrSIETonOPWL(t - dt) + (GRPrSIETonOPWL) * dt 
INIT PrSIET onOP WL = 0
DOCUMENT: Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the OP waiting 
list [pressure].
This is one of several stocks in the model that are used to summarise and compare the graphical output of 
different simulation runs. They measure different aspects of pressure exerted on the system over time and 
are based upon the area under the relevant curve. For this index, we count the total number of 
'pressure.months' by considering a conversion factor and the area under the curve for the average time spent 
on the OP waiting list. We assume that the delay for an OP appointment will only exert pressure on the 
system if it exceeds its desired level.
GRPrSIETonOPWL = IF (AvTonOPWL>DesTOP) THEN ((AvTonOPWL-DesTOP)*RPrPM) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
CC investigation waiting list [pressure/mth].
SDCCFA(t) = SDCCFA(t - dt) + (SRDCCFA) * dt 
INIT SDCCFA = 0
DOCUMENT: Smoothed district CC facility availability [-].
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The availability of the district facility will determine the values of the goals driving the desired CC 
investigation rate. As changes in availability will not lead to instantaneous changes in the goals, the 
availability is smoothed.
SRDCCFA = (DCCFA-SDCCFA)/DCCFAST
DOCUMENT: Smoothing rate of district CC facility availability [-/mth].
STPhlDCCP(t) = STPhlDCCP(t - dt) + (STSRPhlDCCP) * dt 
INIT STPhlDCCP = 1000
DOCUMENT: Start time of phase 1 district CC service preparation [mths].
The default value of 1000 indicates that preparation of the district site will never take place.
STSRPhlDCCP = IF ((CFPhlDCCP = 0) AND (EDesDCCF>=l) AND (STPhlDCCP=1000)) THEN 
PULSE(TIME-IOOO) ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Start time of set rate of phase 1 district CC service preparation [mths/mth].
District site preparation is initialised in instances where preparation has not yet taken place and there exists 
an expressed desire for a district facility (either an anticipated or current desire or both).
The formulation of the start time as a level ensures that the preparation of a new site can only be initialised 
once. This is because the model is only designed to represent a single district hospital so there can only be a 
single district site.
SumJTCCWL(t) = SumJTCCWL(t - dt) + (AccRCCWLJT - DepRCCWLJT) * dt 
INIT SumJTCCWL = 6592
DOCUMENT: Sum of join times for patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pat.mths].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from 
Veinbridge General. Initialised so that the average time spent on the waiting list equals the desired waiting 
time which is consistent with the descriptions that the system was stable prior to the introduction of the 
district service.
AccRCCWLJT -  RRCC*CTime
DOCUMENT: Accumulation rate of join times of patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from a given 
district hospital.
DepRCCWLJT = IF(CCWLoO) THEN (CCWLRR*SumJTCCWL/CCWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Depletion rate of join times of patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for CC investigations, for patients from a given 
district hospital.
SumJTOPWL(t) = SumJTOPWL(t - dt) + (AccROPWLJT - DepROPWLJT) * dt 
INIT SumJTOPWL = 18277.99
DOCUMENT: Sum of join times for patients on the OP waiting list [pat.mths].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from 
Veinbridge General. Initialised so that the average time spent on the waiting list equals the desired waiting
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time which is consistent with the descriptions that the system was stable prior to the introduction of the 
district service.
AccROPWLJT = RROP*CTime
DOCUMENT: Accumulation rate of join times of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from a given 
district hospital.
DepROPWLJT = IF(OPWLoO) THEN (OPWLRR*SumJTOPWL/OPWL) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Depletion rate of join times of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
Used to calculate the average time spent on the waiting list for an OP appointment for patients from a given 
district hospital.
TOCCWLR(t) = TOCCWLR(t - dt) + (OCCWLRR) * dt 
INIT TOCCWLR = 0
DOCUMENT: Total other CC investigation waiting list removals [pats].
Used for validation purposes only. To check the total number of other waiting list removals (deaths on 
waiting list etc) from the CC waiting list against the actual data during the period Apr95 to Apr 98 (t=0 to 
t=36).
OCCWLRR = CCWL*FOCCWLRR
DOCUMENT: Other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
These are removals from the waiting list "other" than those that constitute patient (elective CC investigation) 
activity because they represent patients who died on the waiting list, left the list because: their condition 
improved; they moved to another area; deteriorated and became emergency CC cases; or, choose to seek 
private care.
ACumDCCRC = IF(CumDCCRC<CumDCCRCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of cumulative district CC service running costs [-].
Support is not given to district service if the cumulative running costs exceed a certain level.
ADesDCCF = IF((FSuppDCC=l) AND (TIME>=TADesDCCF)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Anticipated desire for a district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district service may be anticipated, given the knowledge of the planned withdrawal of tertiary 
capacity in the future and financial support for a district service.
AggJDOpSki = 80
DOCUMENT: Initial aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
We assume that as the level of tertiary activity is higher for Veinbridge patients, we would expect a quicker 
rate of gain of experience and skills. Therefore, we assume that at t=0 (Apr 95) the existing trainee at 
Veinbridge would have gained sufficient skills to have reached saturation point i.e. skills to have reached at 
least 80 units.
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AMDCCRCR = IF (MDCCRCR<=MDCCRCRAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of monthly district CC facility running cost rate [-].
Support is not given to district service if the monthly running costs exceed a certain level.
APhlDCCPC = IF (Ph 1 DCCPC<=Phl DCCPCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Support is not given to district service if the phase 1 preparation costs exceed a certain level.
APh2DCCPC = IF (Ph2DCCPC<=Ph2DCCPCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Affordability of phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Support is not given to phase 2 of a district service if the phase 2 preparation costs exceed a certain level.
ATRRCC = 3
DOCUMENT: Averaging time of referral rate for an elective CC investigation [mths].
An expert estimate.
AvCCWLRRe = SMTH1(CCWLRR,1)
DOCUMENT: Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the Evaluation of 
pressure on the system [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of one month is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
changes in pressure on the system.
AvCCWLRRe&r = SMTH1(CCWLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the Evaluation of 
pressure on the system and the Response to that pressure [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. A averaging period of 3 months is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
pressure on the system and respond to that pressure e.g. by changing referral rate or desired activity.
AvCDCC = 525
DOCUMENT: Average cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
Only costs at March 1997 are known. Told that prices were consistent with those of Heartwick Hospital. 
Calculated as a weighted average of costs of day case and inpatient procedures and assumes 1/3 requires 
procedure as an inpatient.
AvCFurthCC = AvCTCCT/(l+DR)A(AvTFurthCC/12)
DOCUMENT: Average cost per further CC procedure [pounds/pat].
A weighted average. Patients who underwent investigation at the district level which showed that they 
required treatment will have to undergo a 2nd CC procedure at a later date. The cost, therefore, needs to be 
discounted. We assume that the price does not change during the discounted period. Otherwise, another
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adjustment would need to be made to AvCTCCT. We assume that 1/3 of patients require the 2nd CC 
procedure to be carried out on an inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate) and 50% will involve the use of 
coronary stents.
AvCOP = 100
DOCUMENT: Average cost per OP appointment [pounds/pat].
Actual costs were not available so this is an approximation.
AvCTCC = AvCTCCI*( 1 -FFurthCC)+FFurthCC*AvCTCCT 
DOCUMENT: Average cost per tertiary-based CC procedure [pounds/pat].
A weighted average. Only costs in March 1997 are available. Considers the patients who require 
investigation only and those who also require treatment. For the latter group, if they undergo CC 
investigation at the tertiary level can have their treatment procedure carried out at the same time. Otherwise, 
they need to undergo a further CC procedure (investigation at the district level and treatment at the tertiary 
level).
AvCTCCI = 525
DOCUMENT: Average cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
This relates to patients directly referred for a CC from the given district hospital. Told that cost was equal to 
that of a district-based investigation. We assume that 1/3 of patients require the CC procedure to be carried 
out on an inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate). Only cost in March 1997 is known.
AvCTCCT = 1361
DOCUMENT: Average cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and treatment) 
[pounds/pat].
A weighted average. We assume that 1/3 of patients require the CC procedure to be carried out on an 
inpatient basis (an expert's lower estimate) and 50% of interventional CC will involve the use of coronary 
stents. Higher estimates of the proportion with stents will result in a higher average cost per tertiary 
procedure. We assume that the cost of synchronous investigation and treatment will equal the cost of a 
treatment procedure only. Only costs for March 1997 are known.
AvOCCWLRR = SMTH1 (OCCWLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
This waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of 3 months is assumed to model the evaluation of pressure on the 
system and response to that pressure e.g. a change in referrals or desired activity.
AvOPWLRR = SMTH1 (OPWLRR, 1)
DOCUMENT: Average OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
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The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of one month is assumed to represent the average delay to evaluate 
changes in pressure on the system.
AvPreOPWLRR = SMTHl(PreOPWLRR,3)
DOCUMENT: Average pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
The waiting list removal rate needs to be averaged because it is an instantaneous rate and as such is 
unobservable. An averaging period of 3 months is assumed to model the evaluation of pressure on the 
system and response to that pressure e.g. a change in referrals or desired activity.
AvRROP = SMTHl(RROP,3)
DOCUMENT: Average rate of referrals for OP appointment [pats/mth].
The averaging period is an expert estimate.
AvSkJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE (AggJDOpSk/JDOp)
DOCUMENT: Average skill per junior district-based operator [skill units/doctor].
The use of the IF statement prevents a division by zero forcing the simulation to stop.
AvSkNJDOp = 0
DOCUMENT: Average skill per new junior district-based CC operator [skill units/doctor].
Assume that trainee CC operators arrive at Ribsley district hospital as complete novices.
AvTFurthCC = 4.5
DOCUMENT: Average waiting time for further CC procedure (following a district-based CC investigation) 
[mths].
Used for illustrative purposes only. Based upon simplifying assumptions.
AvTnewCCWLe = IF (AvCCWLRRe = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (CCWL/AvCCWLRRe)
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, used to 
represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system [mths].
This estimate is based upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto 
the waiting list. This is used to evaluate changes in pressure on the system. A zero average removal rate 
would suggest an infinite waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case 
and enable the simulation to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTnewCCWLe&r = IF (AvCCWLRRe&r = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (CCWL/AvCCWLRRe&r) 
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, used to 
represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system and the Response to that pressure [mths].
This estimate is based upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto 
the waiting list. This is used to calculate the effect of changes in the WT on referrals for CC investigations. 
Changes in the waiting list removal rate do not lead to instantaneous changes in referrals for CC
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investigations, but changes are smoothed over a 3 month period. A zero smoothed removal rate would 
suggest an infinite waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case and 
enable the simulation to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTnewOPWL = IF (AvOPWLRR = 0) THEN 999 ELSE (OPWL/AvOPWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths].
This estimate is based upon the average waiting time for new patients joining the OP waiting list, based 
upon size of waiting list and average waiting list removal rate at time of entry onto the waiting list. This is 
used to evaluate changes in pressure on the system A zero average removal rate would suggest an infinite 
waiting time as activity would be suspended. To accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation 
to proceed, a very large waiting time has been specified.
AvTonCCWL = IF (CCWLoO) THEN (CTime-(SumJTCCWL/CCWL))
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list [mths].
The formulation avoids, in cases where there are no patients on the waiting list, a division by zero, and
forces a value of zero which is consistent with reality.
AvTonOPWL = IF (OPWLoO) THEN (CTime-(SumJTOPWL/OPWL))
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths].
The formulation avoids, in cases where there are no patients on the waiting list, a division by zero, and
forces a value of zero which is consistent with reality.
AvWLRT = 0.5
DOCUMENT: Average waiting list removal time [mths].
This represents the average time it would take to arrange an investigation of a patient waiting on the CC 
investigation waiting list.
CapDCC = IF (OA=l) THEN (PCapDCC*DCCFA) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Capacity for district-based CC [pats/mth].
By definition, these are elective investigations.
CapOP = IF (OA=l) THEN ((l-SwIOPCap)*NOPCap+SwIOPCap*IncOPCap) ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Capacity for OP appointments [pats/mth].
Specified by the consultant. Altered during policy analysis.
CapSEDCC = IF (DesECCInvR<PcvdTCapAEDCC) THEN 0 ELSE (DesECCInvR-PcvdTCapAEDCC) 
DOCUMENT: Capacity shortfall (at tertiary level) with respect to patients who are eligible to undergo 
district-based CC investigation [pats/mth].
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The capacity shortfall at the tertiary level is the activity level that desired minus the maximum activity that it 
is able to do (i.e. capacity). However, that is not what we are considering in the context of a shift to the 
district level. We are only interested in the shortfall that is eligible to be shifted to the district level - only 
that which constitutes low risk investigations. By definition, these will be elective cases. Furthermore, high 
risk elective cases (not eligible to be investigated at the district level) will take precedence over the low risk 
cases in using the available capacity at the tertiary level. Therefore, eligible capacity shortfall 
= desired eligible activity - tertiary capacity that could be devoted to eligible patients 
= desired eligible activity - (tertiary capacity - avg activity at tertiary level devoted to non eligible patients).
CapTCC = IF (OA=l) THEN PCapTCC ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [pats/mth],
CCWLi= 128
DOCUMENT: Initial CC investigation waiting list length [pats]
CDesDCCF = IF((CapSEDCC>=MinDCCInvR) AND (FSuppDCC=l)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Current desire for district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district service is expressed if there exists sufficient demand to sustain the service and 
financial support.
CTime = 55+TIME 
DOCUMENT: Current time [mths].
The adjustment of 55 refers to the initialisation period to set average time on waiting lists to the average 
time estimated for new patients joining the waiting lists.
CumC = CumCCAC+CumOPAC+CumDCCPC+CumDCCRC 
DOCUMENT: Cumulative costs [pounds].
Comprises patient activity costs, district service preparation and running costs.
CumCAL = 10000000
DOCUMENT: Cumulative costs affordability limit [pounds].
The use of a very large number represents unconstrained patient activity.
CumDCCRCAL =
1 *Step( 1000000,TDCCFA)+0*(Step(550,TDCCFA)+Step( 100,36))+0*(Step( 150,46)+Step( 150,58)+Step( 
150,70))
DOCUMENT: Cumulative district CC service running costs affordability limit [pounds].
This amount is equivalent to 10 month's worth of running costs initially and then, at a later stage, is 
increased by an amount equivalent to 4 further month's worth of running costs. We assume that the lack of 
affordability forces the suspension of the district service at t=24 (end March 1997) and t=38 (end May 
1998). Financial constraints may be imposed to prevent the second district service as part of the policy
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analysis. Also as part of the policy analysis, the period of the second district service may be extended or 
further temporary injections of funding may be made.
DCCFA = IF((CFPhlDCCP>=0.95) AND (CDesDCCF=l) AND (PCapDCOO)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: District CC facility availability [-].
For a district site to be available, a desire for a district facility has to prevail, the district site has to be at a 
sufficient level of completion and staff have to be available.
DCCFAST = 1
DOCUMENT: District CC facility availability smoothing time [mths].
The availability of the district facility influences the value of the goals driving the desired CC investigation 
rate. As changes in availability will not lead to instantaneous changes in the goals, the availability is 
smoothed.
DCCInvR = CapDCC*UCapDCC
DOCUMENT: District-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired activity which can be delivered depends upon the capacity available and utilisation of that capacity. 
Only low risk CC investigations can be conducted at the district level. This forms the majority of elective 
investigations. All CC investigations at the district level are carried out by district CC operators.
DesCCInvR = SwPADr*DesCCInvRWL+(l-SwPADr)*DesCCInvRWT 
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
The goal driving the desired level of activity may be a desired waiting time for new patients joining the 
waiting list (a WT policy - the base case) or a desired waiting list size (a WL policy - a policy analysis 
case).
DesCCInvRWL=MAX(MIN(AvRRCC+(CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT-AvOCCWLRR, 
CCWL/AvWLRT+AvRRCC),0)
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by the waiting list goal [pats/mth].
In seeking a waiting list goal (desired waiting list length), the desired activity rate will be composed of: (1) 
the average number of patients joining the waiting list (in order to maintain the waiting list at its existing 
level); plus (2) any additional adjustment required to meet the desired waiting list size, and, minus (3) any 
other removals from the waiting list (otherwise, more activity may be carried out than is necessary). 
However, there are two situations which place bounds on the actual values that the desired activity can take. 
The first situation is where there are insufficient patients available to meet the calculated desired activity 
rate - the actual activity rate will be derived from the existing waiting list and new patients joining the 
waiting list. This is formulated using the MIN( ) function. The second situation is when the calculated 
desired activity rate works out as being negative - the actual desired activity rate will be zero. This is 
represented by the use of the MAX() function.
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DesCCInvRWT = IF(DesTCC=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by the waiting time goal [pats/mth].
In calculating the activity rate desired to meet the waiting time goal, it is necessary to account for other 
waiting list removals (which will reduce the required activity rate). Otherwise, more activity may be carried 
out than is necessary. A desired waiting time of zero would call for an infinitely large activity rate. For the 
model to accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation to proceed (i.e. avoid a division by 
zero), an IF statement is used involving the assignment of a very large number to the desired activity rate.
DesCCWL = IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 128 ELSE 128 
DOCUMENT: Desired CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
DesCCWLAT = 2
DOCUMENT: Desired CC investigation waiting list adjustment time [mths].
A value of 2 was quoted by the consultant. Varied to 3 as part of the policy analysis.
DesDCCF = ADesDCCF+CDesDCCF 
DOCUMENT: Desire for a district CC facility [-].
A desire for a district facility may be anticipated given the knowledge that a tertiary facility is going to be 
closed in the future which would result in a significant loss of capacity.
DesDCCInvR = CapSEDCC*DCCFA
DOCUMENT: Desired district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
For a shortfall in activity to represent desired district activity, a suitable facility has to be in place at the 
district hospital.
DesECCInvR = DesCCInvR*FEDCC
DOCUMENT: Desired eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
This refers to patients who are eligible to undergo CC investigation at the district level - low risk elective 
investigations.
DesNECCInvR = DesCCInvR*(l-FEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Desired non-eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
This refers to patients who are not eligible to undergo CC investigation at the district level - high risk 
elective investigations.
DesOPR = SwPADr*DesOPRWL+(l-SwPADr)*DesOPRWT 
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate [pats/mth].
The goal driving the desired level of activity may be a desired waiting time for new patients joining the 
waiting list (a WT policy - the base case) or a desired waiting list size (a WL policy - a policy analysis 
case).
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DesOPRWL=MAX(MIN(AvRROP+(OPWL-DesOPWL)/DesOPWLAT-AvPreOPWLRR,
OP WL/AvWLRT+AvRROP),0)
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate driven by the waiting list goal [pats/mth].
In seeking a waiting list goal (desired waiting list length), the desired activity rate will be composed of: (1) 
the average number of patients joining the waiting list (in order to maintain the waiting list at its existing 
level); plus (2) any additional adjustment required to meet the desired waiting list size, and, minus (3) any 
other removals from the waiting list (otherwise, more activity may be carried out than is necessary). 
However, there are two situations which place bounds on the actual values that the desired activity can take. 
The first situation is where there are insufficient patients available to meet the calculated desired activity 
rate - the actual activity rate will be derived from the existing waiting list and new patients joining the 
waiting list.This is formulated using the MIN( ) function. The second situation is when the calculated 
desired activity rate works out as being negative - the actual desired activity rate will be zero. This is 
represented by the use of the M AX() function.
DesOPRWT = IF(DesTOP=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((OPWL/DesTOP)-AvPreOPWLRR)
DOCUMENT: Desired OP rate driven by the waiting time goal [pats/mth].
In calculating the activity rate desired to meet the waiting time goal, it is necessary to account for other 
waiting list removals (which will reduce the required activity rate). Otherwise, more activity may be carried 
out than is necessary. A desired waiting time of zero would call for an infinitely large activity rate. For the 
model to accommodate this extreme case and enable the simulation to proceed (i.e. avoid a division by 
zero), an IF statement is used involving the assignment of a very large number to the desired activity rate.
DesOPWL = 338
DOCUMENT: Desired OP waiting list length [pats].
Set to equal the initial OP waiting list size which is consistent with the description that the system was 
stable, there was sufficient capacity to meet demand and the desired waiting times were maintained.
DesOPWLAT = 2
DOCUMENT: Desired OP waiting list adjustment time [mths].
A value of 2 was quoted by the consultant. Varied to 3 as part of the policy analysis.
DesTCC = IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 3.5 ELSE 3.5 
DOCUMENT: Desired waiting time for a CC investigation [mths].
The WT goal is 3.5 months (quoted by the consultant).
DesTOP = 0.9231
DOCUMENT: Desired waiting time for an OP appointment [mths].
A goal of 4 weeks was specified by the consultant. This has been converted to months.
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DR = 0.03
DOCUMENT: Discount rate [-].
Costs which occur in the future are discounted. Set at 0.03 per annum for illustrative purposes.
EDesDCCF = DELAY(DesDCCF,PhlDCCPD)
DOCUMENT: Expressed desire for a district CC facility [-].
EffCapLCC = l*EffCapLCCB+0*EffCapLCCN+0*EffCapLCCW
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
We assume that a significant loss of capacity will result in a reduction in referrals as a 'knee jerk' reaction. 
The timing of this effect will depend on the timing of the capacity losses. The '0"s act as switches for the 
sensitivity and policy analysis.
EffCapLCCB = 1
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation corresponding to 
the base case scenario [-].
A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop in capacity will cause referrals to 
be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. The base case involves no significant capacity losses.
EffCDSuppDCC = IF (AvCDCC<=AvCTCCI) THEN 1 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC investigation cost differential on support for district-based CC service [-]. 
Support is not given to district service if the cost of district CC investigations is more than the cost of CC 
investigation at the tertiary level.
EffKCC = l*NEffKCC+0*EffKCCTDCCS+0*SuppEffKCC
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
The knowledge effect on referrals for CC investigations may be altered as part of the sensitivity analysis or 
policy analysis.
EffKOP = l*NEffKOP+0*EffKOPTDCCS+0*SuppEffKOP+0*IncrEffKOP 
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
The knowledge effect on demand for OP appointments may be altered as part of the sensitivity analysis or 
policy analysis.
EffODSCC = 1/6
DOCUMENT: Effect of other district-based screeners on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Refers to doctors who screen patients for CC investigations but are non CC operators. We assume that the 
referral behaviour at Veinbridge is more aggressive than that at Ribsley General so that the referrals of non 
CC operators will be higher. We use the same multiplier.
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EffSkCC = EffSkECC*FEDOp+EffSkJCC*FJDOp+( 1 -FEDOp-FJDOp)*EffODSCC 
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
The skills effect is a weighted average considering the skills multipliers and proportions of patient decisions 
made by expert CC operators, junior CC operators and other screening doctors at the district hospital.
EffSkECC = 1
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of expert district-based operators on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
As the reference referral factor is based upon an assumption of fully skilled CC operators, it is consistent 
that the skills effect for expert district operators should take a value of 1.
EffSkJCC = IF(JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE (S wOC*EffSkO JCC+( 1 -SwOC)*EffSkUJCC)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of junior district-based operators on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
The effect of CC skills of junior district CC operators on their referral rates for CC investigations will 
depend on whether they are naturally overconfident or underconfident. It is assumed that overconfidence 
will result ina period of over-referrals whilst underconfidence will lead to under-referrals. This refers to 
aggregate behaviour. The system being considered involves a single district hospital and the reference to 
overconfidence or underconfidence is determined by the culture at that hospital. This effect only applies in 
cases where there are junior operators.
EffWTCC = 1 *NEffWTCC+0*SuppEffWTCC
DOCUMENT: Effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
This waiting time effect may be suppressed as part of the policy analysis, representing the affect of the 
implementation of a clinical guideline.
FEDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 1 ELSE 1
DOCUMENT: Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators [-].
This refers to final decisions made. The consultant stated that the expert CC operator makes final decisions 
on all patients.
FFurthCC = 0.17
DOCUMENT: Fraction of patients referred for further CC (following a district-based CC investigation) [-]. 
An average, based upon patient activity data. Since synchronous investigations and interventions (treatment) 
procedures cannot be carried out at the district level, the fraction of patients who require a CC-based 
treatment have to be referred on the tertiary level for a second CC procedure.
FJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators [-].
This refers to final decisions made. An expert estimate. The fraction decided by junior district operators 
would be zero if there were no junior district operators present.
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FOCCWLRR = 0.0078
DOCUMENT: Fractional other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
These are removals from the waiting list "other" than those that constitute patient (elective CC investigation) 
activity. Based upon an expert estimate.
FOPreOPWLRR = 0.022
DOCUMENT: Fractional other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
This refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those on the waiting list who deteriorated, were 
admitted into hospital, stabilised and were sent home and placed on the CC investigation waiting list. Based 
on an expert estimate.
FOPtoCC=RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*(IF(EffCapLCC<l) THEN EffCapLCC ELSE (EffCapLCC*EffKCC 
*EffWTCC*EffOFCC))
DOCUMENT: Fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an elective CC 
investigation [-].
The use of the IF () function reflects the assumption that the 'knee jerk' reaction to the capacity losses will 
dominate over the effects of WT, knowledge of CC and other factors on referrals for elective CC 
investigations.
FRROPWLtoIPtoCC = 0.003
DOCUMENT: Fractional rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC
investigation [-/mth].
Based on an expert estimate.
FSuppDCC=IF ((ACumDCCRC=l) AND (AMDCCRCR=1) AND (APhlDCCPC=l) AND 
(EffCDSuppDCC=l) AND (OA=l)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Financial support for a district CC service [-].
The district service relies upon the running costs and site preparation costs being affordable, the district 
procedural cost being attractive compared to a CC investigation carried out at the tertiary level, and there 
being sufficient funds to continue delivering services. Both the cumulative and monthly running costs are 
considered. This is because whilst a given monthly running cost might be considered reasonable to warrant 
the introduction of a district service, this may not necessary imply that a permanent service can be afforded. 
There may only be sufficient funding available to pay the running costs for a limited period. A value of " 1" 
will indicate 'affordable' whilst a value of "0" will indicate 'not affordable'.
FSuppPh2DCC = IF ((APh2DCCPC=l) AND (FSuppDCC=l)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Financial support for a phase 2 district CC service [-].
Refers to support for an integrated catheter laboratory.
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FTCCbyDO = IF (DCCFAoO) THEN 0.95 ELSE 0.95
DOCUMENT: Fraction of tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district-based CC 
operator [-].
An expert estimate. Refers to patients referred from the given district hospital of interest and to district- 
based CC operators from that hospital. District cardiologists with CC operator skills are allocated sessions at 
the tertiary centre to investigate their patients. The fraction is not 1 because allowances are made for 
absences due to sickness and holidays. District cardiologists who are CC operators and only carry out CC 
investigations will not have sessions at the tertiary centre for elective CC investigations if there is a district 
service in place at their (district) hospital. District cardiologists who also do interventional CC work 
(treatments) and have CC facilities in place at their hospital will retain sessions for elective CC 
investigations on their high risk patients at the tertiary centre. The consultant at Veinbridge General does 
investigations and interventional work.
IncOPCap = 462.91
DOCUMENT: Increased OP capacity [pats/mth]
10% increase. Used as part of the policy analysis.
IRROP = 0
DOCUMENT: Increase in referral rate for OP appointment [-]
Expressed as a percentage. Used for conducting sensitivity analysis.
JDOpRecD = 0
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator recruitment delay [mths].
The delay in filling the trainee CC operator vacancy, following the departure of the junior operator after 
completion of his/her training period.
JDOpSkGRExp = LEJDOp*LPP
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via experience [skill units/mth].
Assumes that all trainees work under supervision so trainees and trainers don't operate on separate patients.
JDOpSkGRRec = AvSkNJDOp*JDOpRecR
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via recruitment [skill units/mth].
A new trainee recruit may have come via from another district hospital with some exposure to CC 
investigations and therefore not arrive as a complete novice. Therefore, some CC skills may be gained via 
recruitment.
JDOpTT = 24
DOCUMENT: Junior district-based CC operator training time [mths].
Quoted by the consultant.
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LEJDOp = (DCCInvR+TCCInvR*FTCCbyDO)*LFJDOp
DOCUMENT: Learning experiences for junior district-based CC operators [pats/mth].
The pool of patients from which junior district CC operators gain skills is a fraction of the patients from the 
district hospital which are investigated at the district level and a fraction of the elective patients investigated 
at the tertiary level.
LFJDOp = IF (JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE 0.75
DOCUMENT: (Patient activity) learning fraction of junior district-based CC operators [-].
This is the fraction of investigations from which the junior operator leams. It will exceed the fraction for 
which the junior actually conducts the investigation because the junior operator will leam from discussions 
with the consultant, audit etc. Increased to 0.9 as part of the policy analysis, to represent a change in policy.
MaxSkOp =100
DOCUMENT: Maximum CC skills per CC operator [skill units/doctor].
MBCheckPats=OPWLi+CCWLi+CumOPWLAdds+CumCCWLAdds-CumOPWLRems-CumCCWLRems- 
1 *Max(OPWL,0)-1 *Max(CCWL,0)-0*OPWL-0*CCWL 
DOCUMENT: Mass balance check on patients [pats]
MBCheckSk = AggJDOpSki+CumGJDOpSk-CumLJDOpSk-Max(AggJDOpSk,0)
DOCUMENT: Mass balance check on skills of junior district-based CC operators [skill units]
MDCCRCR = 50
DOCUMENT: Monthly district CC facility running cost rate [pounds/mth].
An approximation.
MDCCRCRAL = Step(100,TDCCFA)
DOCUMENT: Monthly district CC facility running cost rate affordability limit [pounds/mth].
An expert estimate since data is not available.
MinDCCInvR = 9
DOCUMENT: Minimum district-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
The minimum observed activity level using a single session in a mobile catheter laboratory.
NOPCap = 420.83
DOCUMENT: Normal OP capacity [pats/mth].
Calculated from an expert estimate for the OP capacity utilisation of 85% and an estimate for the average 
OP rate prior to the introduction of the district service. The OP activity data was unreliable. Consequently, 
this parameter was estimated from the descriptions of the system (system was stable, sufficient capacity to 
meet demand, desired waiting times were maintained) and the assumption that Veinbridge cardiologists 
referred 50% more patients on for a CC investigation than cardiologists at Ribsley.
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OA = IF (CumC<=CumCAL) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
DOCUMENT: Overall affordability [-].
If the total overall costs exceed a certain level, support for the district service will be withdrawn and all 
elective patient activity will be suspended.
OPreOPWLRR = OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR
DOCUMENT: Other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
This refers to OP waiting list removals "other" than those on the waiting list who deteriorated, were 
admitted into hospital, stabilised and were sent home and placed on the CC investigation waiting list. 
Instead, these are removals from the waiting list that do not constitute OP activity because they represent 
patients who died on the waiting list or left the list because: their condition improved; they moved to another 
area; deteriorated and became emergency referrals for CC investigation; deteriorated, became hospital 
admissions, stabilised and then were simply sent home (i.e. were not referred on for an elective or 
emergency CC investigation); or, choose to seek private care.
OPWLi = 338
DOCUMENT: Initial OP waiting list length [pats].
There was no hard data on the OP waiting list so this parameter was estimated from the descriptions of the 
system (system was stable, sufficient capacity to meet demand, desired waiting times were maintained) and 
the assumption that Veinbridge cardiologists referred 50% more patients on for a CC investigation than 
cardiologists at Ribsley.
OPWLRR = OPR+PreOPWLRR
DOCUMENT: OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
PCapDCC=l*PCapDCCB+0*PCapDCCET+0*PCapDCCPDS+0*PCapDCCTDS+0*PCapDCCNSDem+0
♦PCapDCCW
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable.
PCapTCC= l*PCapTCCB+0*PCapTCCET+0*PCapTCCNDS+0*PCapTCCTDS+0*PCapTCCPDS+0*PCa
pTCCNSDem+0*PCapTCCW
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigations [pats/mth].
This is the elective tertiary-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if it were affordable. 
Capacity data is specified using an approximation of historical activity data (smoothed), extracting the 
behaviour of interest. Increased as part of the policy analysis.
PcvdDCCInvR = SMTH3(DCCInvR,PDDCCInvR)
DOCUMENT: Perceived district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
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A 3rd order delay is chosen rather than a 1st order delay because a sudden increase in CC Inv activity at the 
district level would not be perceived immediately. These are perceptions by those outside the district 
hospital (GPs and patients) of something occurring within the district hospital. GPs will learn about the 
availability of the district service via written communication with the district hospital (referral letters) and 
patients will gain knowledge through 'word of mouth'. Because the district service was only temporary at 
Ribsley General, it was not marketed (unlike the case of the permanent service at Veinbridge) so the 
perception delay would be longer.
PcvdTCapAEDCC = 0*TCapAEDCC+l*SMTHl(TCapAEDCC,STTCapUNEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Perceived tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to 
undergo district-based CC [pats/mth].
The capacity available for eligible patients needs to be averaged since it is derived from an instantaneous 
rate which is, therefore, unobservable.
PDDCCInvR = 6
DOCUMENT: Perception delay of district-based CC investigation rate (by GPs and patients) [mths].
An expert estimate.
PhlDCCPC = 6500
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
An expert estimate since data not available.
PhlDCCPCAL = Step(6500,TDCCFA)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs affordability limit [pounds].
An expert estimate.
PhlDCCPD = 0
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
An expert estimate. This refers to the delay to respond to the need for a district facility. In constrast with 
Ribsley General, at Veinbridge the support for a district service was such that there was no delay in 
responding to the knowledge of an anticipated loss of tertiary capacity.
PhlDCCPMCR = (IF (PhlDCCPR>0) THEN (PhlDCCPC/PhlDCCPP) ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
Monthly costs incurred to prepare a site for phase 1 (i.e. mobile cath lab-based) district service. It is 
assumed that the total costs are spread evenly over the site preparation period.
PhlDCCPP = 2
DOCUMENT: Phase 1 district CC service preparation period [mths].
An approximation.
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Ph2DCCPC = 1000000
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
Ph2DCCPCAL = 1000000
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs affordablity limit [pounds].
An integrated cath lab is constructed at Veinbridge General.
Ph2DCCPD =17
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
This delay is measured from the beginning of phase 1 preparation. A very large number would indicate that
the district service will never enter phase 2.
Ph2DCCPMCR=FSuppPh2DCC*(IF(CumDCCPC<(PhlDCCPC+Ph2DCCPC))THEN 
STEP(Ph2DCCPC/Ph2DCCPP, (STPhlDCCP+Ph2DCCPD)) ELSE 0)
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
This refers to the costs incurred to construct an integrated catheter laboratory. It is assumed that the total
costs are spread evenly over the site and facility preparation period.
Ph2DCCPP = 6
DOCUMENT: Phase 2 district CC service preparation period [mths].
This is the time it would take to construct an integrated lab if funding were available.
PostOPDisR = OPR*( 1 -FOPtoCC)
DOCUMENT: Post-OP appointment discharge rate [pats/mth].
These are patients which are not referred on for an elective CC investigation.
PreOPWLRR = RROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPreOPWLRR 
DOCUMENT: Pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
These are all the removals from the waiting list that do not constitute patient (outpatient) activity. They 
represent patients who died on the waiting list, left the list because: their condition improved; they moved to 
another area; deteriorated and became emergency referrals for CC investigation; deteriorated, became 
hospital admissions, stabilised and were then sent home (i.e. didn't result in being referred for elective or 
emergency CC investigation; deteriorated, became hospital admissions, stabilised and were placed on the 
CC investigation waiting list; or, choose to seek private care.
RefFOPtoCC = 0.05625*1.5
DOCUMENT: Reference fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an 
elective CC investigation [-].
This is the referral fraction for which there was no district service, normal capacity levels, all district 
screeners are fully skilled and there is no stimulation nor suppression of demand due to the waiting time or 
patient/GP pressure effects. This would correspond with a situation for which GPs' and patients' knowledge
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of CC relies totally on that derived from tertiary activity and the waiting time is at a level so that it neither 
stimulates nor suppresses demand. The remaining patients are discharged back to their GP following their 
OP appointment. Some will be subsequently followed up. The follow-up process is not being modelled and 
this will form a recommendation for further development of the model.
The expert estimate was unreliable as applying it would produce behaviour (continual growth in the CC 
waiting list and waiting times) that was inconsistent with that described prior to the introduction of district 
services (sufficient capacity to meet demand). Instead, the value used was based on the assumption that 
Veinbridge General cardiologists would refer 50% more than those at Ribsley General. The actual value 
chosen is not important as our focus is on the mode of behaviour of the system. This assumed value is used 
to derive values of several other variables in the model.
RefRROP = 366.16*(l+Step(IRROP,48))
DOCUMENT: Reference rate of referrals for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
Represents new and follow-up patients. This is the OP referral rate for which the effect of patient and GP 
knowledge of CC is 1 i.e. knowledge is based upon tertiary activity only. Initially set at a level such that the 
OP waiting list additions and removals balance (as reported by the consultant). Later increased as part of the 
policy analysis.
Calculation of this value is based on the assumption that Veinbridge cardiologists refer 50% more patients 
on for a CC investigation than cardiologists at Ribsley.
RefTnewCCWL = 3.5
DOCUMENT: Reference waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients [mths].
Used to calculate 'WT effect' on referrals for CC. Represents the waiting time for which referrals will neither 
be suppressed not stimulated; waiting times greater than this reference value will suppress demand and 
waiting times lower than this reference value will stimulate demand. Set to desired waiting time.
RPrPM = 1
DOCUMENT: Rate of pressure per month (spent on the waiting list) [pressure/mth/mth]
We arbitrarily specifiy that each month spent on the waiting list exerts one unit of pressure per month. As 
the purpose is to compare pressure associated with different simulation runs, its value is irrelevant.
RPrPP = 1
DOCUMENT: Rate of pressure gain per patient (on the waiting list) [pressure/patient/mth]
We arbitrarily specifiy that a patient exerts one unit of pressure on the system for each month spent on the 
waiting list. As the purpose is to compare pressure associated with different simulation runs, the value of 
this parameter is irrelevant.
RRCC = RROPWLtoCC+NRRIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Referral rate for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
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Considers referrals from both the outpatient and inpatient route.
RRFurthCC = DCCInvR*FFurthCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referral (from a district-based CC investigation) to a further CC (treatment)
procedure [pats/mth].
As only CC investigations can be carried out at the district level, patients who also require interventional CC 
(treatment) have to be referred to the tertiary level for a 2nd procedure. When necessary, synchronous 
diagnostic and treatments are carried out on patients investigated at the tertiary level so none of these 
patients require a 2nd procedure.
RROPWLtoIPtoCC = OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC
DOCUMENT: Rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC investigation 
[pats/mth].
This refers to patients on the OP waiting list who deteriorated, were admitted into hospital, stabilised and 
then placed on the CC investigation waiting list. Therefore, they were referred for an elective CC 
investigation after admission as an inpatient as opposed to after assessment as an outpatient.
STTCapUNEDCC = 3-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)-0*(Step(2.75,36)-Step(2.75,37))-0*(Step(2.75,46)-
Step(2.75,47)+Step(2.75,58)-Step(2.75,59)+Step(2.75,70)-Step(2.75,71))
DOCUMENT: Smoothing time of tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity use by patients not 
eligible to undergo a district-based CC [mths].
Although there were no capacity shortfalls for Veinbridge General patients, we would assume that the 
response time would have been shorter if a capacity shortfall was anticipated.
SwB3 = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop B3 [-].
0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the waiting time effect on referrals for elective CC investigations.
SwIOPCap = 0
DOCUMENT: Switch for increase in OP capacity [-]
0 = normal OP capacity level; 1 = increased OP capacity level. Used as part of the policy analysis.
SwOC = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for overconfidence in referral behaviour (of junior district-based CC operators) [-].
0 = Off (underconfidence); 1 = On (overconfidence). "Underconfidence" is the tendency of junior 
cardiologists, as they embark on their CC training, to hesitate and under-refer patients. As they gain CC 
skills, they gain confidence and this is reflected by them wanting to refer more patients on for CC 
investigations. This behaviour pattern would be expected in a hospital in which the referral behaviour was 
conservative, typically led by a consultant cardiologist who only carried out CC investigations. 
Overconfident referral behaviour among juniors would be expected in a hospital in which the referral
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behaviour was more 'aggressive', typically led by a consultant cardiologist who also carried out CC 
treatments. We assume overconfidence at Veinbridge General.
SwPADr = 0
DOCUMENT: Switch for patient activity driver [-].
1 = Seeks a desired waiting list length; 0 = Seeks a desired average waiting time. The desired activity rate is 
driven by a desired waiting time for new patients joining the waiting list or a desired waiting list size. The 
desired activity rate is currently driven by a waiting time goal. This reflects the policy currently used by the 
consultant. Used for the policy analysis.
SwRl = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the knowledge effect on referrals for cardiology outpatient appointments.
SwR2 = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
0 = Off; 1 = On. Refers to the knowledge effect on referrals for CC investigations.
SwTOpP = 1
DOCUMENT: Switch for trainee district CC operator programme [-].
0 = Off (No trainee operator programme); 1 = On (Use of a trainee operator programme). Used as part of 
the policy analysis.
TADesDCCF = IF (TCapLT=999) THEN 999 ELSE (TCapLT-PhlDCCPP)
DOCUMENT: Time of anticipated desire for district CC facility [mths].
999 is the default value indicating no anticipated desire for district facility.
TCapAEDCC = IF(FEDCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE (CapTCC-TCCInvRNEDCC)
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to undergo 
district-based CC [pats/mth].
This is the fraction of tertiary capacity which is not being used by non eligible patients (who have first 
priority on the use of tertiary resources). It is assumed that, if no cases were eligible to be shifted to the 
district level, the capacity that would be available for these patients would be allocated elsewhere.
TCapLT = 13
DOCUMENT: Tertiary capacity loss time [mths].
A value is 999 would indicate no anticipated desire. Changes from default if a loss in tertiary capacity is 
anticipated. Currently specifies simulation time corresponding to May 96.
TCCInvR = CapTCC*UCapTCC
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
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This represents patients referred from the district hospital of interest for an elective CC investigation. 
Elective CC investigations on patients referred by GPs directly to the tertiary centre, elective CC 
investigations on patients referred from district hospitals which do not have consultants with CC skills, 
emergency CC investigations and CC interventions (treatments) lie outside the boundary of the model. The 
elective CC investigation rate at the tertiary level will depend upon the capacity available and its utilisation. 
The level of capacity utilisation will be driven by the desired activity rate. All CC investigations can be 
safely conducted at the tertiary level whereas only low risk elective investigations can be safely delivered at 
the district level.
TCCInvRNEDCC = CapTCC*UCapTCCNEDCC
DOCUMENT: Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate of those not eligible to undergo district-based 
CC [pats/mth].
TDCCFA = IF (TADesDCCF=999) THEN 999 ELSE TADesDCCF 
DOCUMENT: Time district CC service first affordable [mths].
A value of 999 indicates the case where a district service is never affordable. In the case of Ribsley General, 
it was the situation that led to the anticipated desire (planned temporary closure of tertiary facilities) that led 
to the district service being affordable. If the closure of tertiary facilities had not occurred, it is assumed that 
the district service would have never been affordable.
TRnewCCWL = IF(RefTnewCCWL=0) THEN 999 ELSE (AvTnewCCWLe&r/RefTnewCCWL) 
DOCUMENT: Waiting time ratio for new CC investigation waiting list patients [-].
The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero will not cause the simulation to stop. However, in 
reality the reference WT for new CC waiting list patients would never be zero since we are dealing with 
elective patients.
EffCapLCCN = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00), 
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.5), 
(16.0, 0.75), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 1.00), (26.0, 1.00), (27.0, 1.00), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 1.00), (34.0, 1.00), (35.0, 1.00), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 0.25), (38.0, 0.5), (39.0, 0.75), 
(40.0, 1.00), (41.0, 1.00), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00), (55.0, 1.00),
(56.0, 1.00), (57.0, 1.00), (58.0, 1.00), (59.0, 1.00), (60.0, 1.00), (61.0, 1.00), (62.0, 1.00), (63.0, 1.00),
(64.0, 1.00), (65.0, 1.00), (66.0, 1.00), (67.0, 1.00), (68.0, 1.00), (69.0, 1.00), (70.0, 1.00), (71.0, 1.00),
(72.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with no district service [-].
Used as part of the sensitivity analysis. A value of 1 indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant 
drop in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. Both capacity
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losses relate to losses of tertiary capacity. It is assumed that the effect dimishes over a period of three 
months.
EffCapLCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), 'T
j o © 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 1.00), (15.0, 1.00),
(16.0, 1.00), (17.0, 1.00), (18.0, 1.00), (19.0, 1.00), (20.0, 1.00), (21.0, 1.00), (22.0, 1.00), (23.0, 1.00),
(24.0, 1.00), (25.0, 1.00), (26.0, 1.00), (27.0, 1.00), (28.0, 1.00), (29.0, 1.00), (30.0, 1.00), (31.0, 1.00),
(32.0, 1.00), (33.0, 0.25), (34.0, 0.5), (35.0, 0.75), (36.0, 1.00), (37.0, 1.00), (38.0, 1.00), (39.0, 1.00),
(40.0, 1.00), (41.0, 1.00), (42.0, 1.00), (43.0, 1.00), (44.0, 1.00), (45.0, 1.00), (46.0, 1.00), (47.0, 1.00),
(48.0, 1.00), (49.0, 1.00), (50.0, 1.00), (51.0, 1.00), (52.0, 1.00), (53.0, 1.00), (54.0, 1.00), (55.0, 1.00),
(56.0, 1.00), (57.0, 1.00), (58.0, 1.00), (59.0, 1.00), (60.0, 1.00), (61.0, 1.00), (62.0, 1.00), (63.0, 1.00),
(64.0, 1.00), (65.0, 1.00), (66.0, 1.00), (67.0, 1.00), (68.0, 1.00), (69.0, 1.00), (70.0, 1.00), (71.0, 1.00),
(72.0, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a winter crisis [-].
This crisis involves a temporary loss of elective capacity at both the district and tertiary levels. A value of 1 
indicates a zero effect. It is assumed that a significant drop in capacity will cause referrals to be temporarily 
suppressed as a 'knee jerk' reaction. There is only a single knee jerk reaction as the capacity losses due to the 
closures of tertiary facilities are compensated for by the use of the district service. It is assumed that the 
effect diminishes over a period of three months.
EffKCCTDCCS = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.02), (10.0, 1.09), (12.5, 1.13), (15.0, 1.15), (17.5, 1.15), 
(20.0, 1.15)
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation with a temporary 
district service [-].
Relates to GP and patient knowledge of CC. It is assumed that a temporary district service would stimulate 
less demand than a permanent service as less effort would be devoted to promoting the service and less 
interest would be generated. Furthermore, a temporary district service at Veinbridge General would be 
assumed to generate more demand than a temporary district service at Ribsley General, assuming the same 
patient and GP behaviour. This follows because increased pressure to refer would have a greater effect on 
the typically more 'aggressive' cardiologists at Veinbridge General; the effects of knowledge on referrals 
represents the effect of pressure to refer, generated by increased knowledge, and the response to that 
pressure. If the loop is switched off or the district service is not present, the input is zero forcing the effect to 
equal 1. We assume that pressure can only be exerted to refer whilst the district service is present.
EffKOPTDCCS = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (12.5, 1.02), (15.0, 1.05), (17.5, 1.05), 
(20.0, 1.05)
DOCUMENT: Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment with a temporary district CC 
service [-].
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Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. If loop switched off the input is zero forcing effect to equal 1. 
It is assumed that a temporary district service would stimulate less demand than a permanent service as less 
effort would be devoted to promoting the service and less interest would be generated. Furthermore, a 
temporary district service at Veinbridge General would be assumed to generate more demand than a 
temporary district service at Ribsley General, assuming the same patient and GP behaviour. This follows 
because increased pressure to refer would have a greater effect on the typically more 'aggressive' 
cardiologists at Veinbridge General; the effects of knowledge on referrals represents the effect of pressure to 
refer, generated by increased knowledge, and the response to that pressure.
EffOFCC = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (6.00, 1.00), (7.00, 1.00),
(8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00), (11.0, 1.00), (12.0, 1.00), (13.0, 1.00), (14.0, 1.18), (15.0, 1.20),
(16.0, 1.20), (17.0, 1.20), (18.0, 1.20), (19.0, 1.20), (20.0, 1.20), (21.0, 1.20), (22.0, 1.20), (23.0, 1.20),
(24.0, 1.20), (25.0, 1.20), (26.0, 1.20), (27.0, 1.20), (28.0, 1.20), (29.0, 1.20), (30.0, 1.20), (31.0, 1.20),
(32.0, 1.20), (33.0, 1.20), (34.0, 1.20), (35.0, 1.36), (36.0, 1.40), (37.0, 1.40), (38.0, 1.40), (39.0, 1.40),
(40.0, 1.40), (41.0, 1.40), (42.0, 1.40), (43.0, 1.40), (44.0, 1.40), (45.0, 1.40), (46.0, 1.40), (47.0, 1.40),
(48.0, 1.40), (49.0, 1.40), (50.0, 1.40), (51.0, 1.40), (52.0, 1.40), (53.0, 1.40), (54.0, 1.40), (55.0, 1.40),
(56.0, 1.40), (57.0, 1.40), (58.0, 1.40), (59.0, 1.40), (60.0, 140), (61.0, 1.40), (62.0, 1.40), (63.0, 1.40),
(64.0, 1.40), (65.0, 1.40), (66.0, 1.40), (67.0, 1.40), (68.0, 1.40), (69.0, 1.40), (70.0, 1.40), (71.0, 1.40),
(72.0, 1.40)
DOCUMENT: Effect of other factors on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
A example of another factor which might influence the referral threshold is the introduction of a permanent 
district service which, given the ability to increase capacity, might encourage the referral threshold to drop 
so that more 'grey area' cases would be investigated by CC. The values were derived from sensitivity 
analysis to produce the utilisation of district-based CC capacity of approximately 54% representing 
adequate district-based CC capacity to meet demand (See PCapDCCB).
EffSkOJCC = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp)
(0.00, 0.167), (10.0, 0.167), (20.0, 0.167), (30.0, 0.167), (40.0, 0.285), (50.0, 0.8), (60.0, 1.21), (70.0, 
1.21), (80.0, 1.00), (90.0, 1.00), (100, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of overconfident junior district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
Graph was constructed using expert estimates.
EffSkUJCC = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp)
(0.00, 0.167), (10.0, 0.167), (20.0, 0.167), (30.0, 0.167), (40.0, 0.167), (50.0, 0.167), (60.0, 0.36), (70.0, 
0.862), (80.0, 1.00), (90.0, 1.00), (100, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Effect of CC operator skills of underconfident junior district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
Graph was constructed using expert estimates. This reflects the base case assumption for Ribsley General.
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FEDCC = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.9), (1.00, 0.9), (2.00, 0.9), (3.00, 0.9), (4.00, 0.9), (5.00, 0.9), (6.00, 0.9), (7.00, 0.9), (8.00, 0.9),
(9.00, 0.9), (10.0, 0.9), (11.0, 0.9), (12.0, 0.9), (13.0, 0.9), (14.0, 0.9), (15.0, 0.9), (16.0, 0.9), (17.0, 0.9),
(18.0, 0.9), (19.0, 0.9), (20.0, 0.9), (21.0, 0.9), (22.0, 0.9), (23.0, 0.9), (24.0, 0.9), (25.0, 0.9), (26.0, 0.9),
(27.0, 0.9), (28.0, 0.9), (29.0, 0.9), (30.0, 0.9), (31.0, 0.9), (32.0, 0.9), (33.0, 0.9), (34.0, 0.909), (35.0,
0.924), (36.0, 0.943), (37.0, 0.95), (38.0, 0.95), (39.0, 0.95), (40.0, 0.95), (41.0, 0.95), (42.0, 0.95), (43.0,
0.95), (44.0, 0.95), (45.0, 0.95), (46.0, 0.95), (47.0, 0.95), (48.0, 0.95), (49.0, 0.95), (50.0, 0.95), (51.0,
0.95), (52.0, 0.95), (53.0, 0.95), (54.0, 0.95), (55.0, 0.95), (56.0, 0.95), (57.0, 0.95), (58.0, 0.95), (59.0,
0.95), (60.0, 0.95), (61.0, 0.95), (62.0, 0.95), (63.0, 0.95), (64.0, 0.95), (65.0, 0.95), (66.0, 0.95), (67.0,
0.95), (68.0, 0.95), (69.0, 0.95), (70.0, 0.95), (71.0, 0.95), (72.0, 0.95)
DOCUMENT: Fraction of CC investigation waiting list that are eligible for district-based investigation [-]. 
Assumes that the majority of elective patients could be investigated at the district level. This is altered with 
the development with the integrated cath lab at Veinbridge to reflect the reported change in policy by 
shifting slightly higher risk investigations to the district level.
IncrEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.05), (12.5, 1.15), (15.0, 1.38), (17.5, 1.40),
(20.0, 1.40)
DOCUMENT: Increased effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for a cardiology OP appointment [-]. 
Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. Used during the sensitivity analysis.
LPP = GRAPH(AvSkJDOp/MaxSkOp)
(0.00, 2.00), (0.1, 2.00), (0.2, 2.00), (0.3, 2.00), (0.4, 2.00), (0.5, 2.00), (0.6, 1.72), (0.7, 0.46), (0.8, 0.12), 
(0.9, 0.04), (1,0.00)
DOCUMENT: Learning per patient [skill units/patient].
Constructed using expert estimates.
NEffKCC = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.02), (10.0, 1.09), (12.5, 1.14), (15.0, 1.19), (17.5, 1.20), 
(20.0, 1.20)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation [-].
Relates to GP and patient knowledge of CC. For Veinbridge General, the normal effect is that generated by 
a permanent district service. If the loop is switched off or district service is not present, input is zero forcing 
effect to equal 1. We assume that pressure can only be exerted to refer whilst the district service is present. 
This graph was presented to the consultant who thought that it seemed quite reasonable. Variations were 
explored via the sensitivity analysis.
NEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.05), (12.5, 1.15), (15.0, 1.20), (17.5, 1.20), 
(20 .0 , 1.20)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
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Represents GP and patient knowledge effect. For Veinbridge General, the normal effect is that generated by 
a permanent district service. If the loop is switched off, the input is zero forcing the effect to equal 1. We 
assume that as the district service was permanent, it would be heavily marketed and generally strong interest 
in CC would be generated so the effect of the district service on referrals for an OP appt, would be high. The 
consultant stated that he could not comment on the validity of the graph. Variations were explored via the 
sensitivity analysis.
NEffWTCC = GRAPH(IF(SwB3=0) THEN 1 ELSE TRnewCCWL)
(0.00, 1.00), (0.2, 1.00), (0.4, 1.00), (0.6, 1.00), (0.8, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00), (1.40, 1.00), (1.60,
1.00), (1.80, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Normal effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC investigation 
[-]•
The consultant stated that referrals were never influenced by waiting times. A value represents a zero effect. 
PCapDCCB = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 87.0), (25.0, 87.0), (26.0, 87.0), (27.0, 87.0), (28.0, 87.0), (29.0, 87.0), (30.0, 87.0), (31.0, 87.0),
(32.0, 87.0), (33.0, 87.0), (34.0, 96.8), (35.0, 104), (36.0, 104), (37.0, 104), (38.0, 104), (39.0, 104), (40.0,
104), (41.0, 104), (42.0, 104), (43.0, 104), (44.0, 104), (45.0, 104), (46.0, 104), (47.0, 104), (48.0, 104),
(49.0, 104), (50.0, 104), (51.0, 104), (52.0, 104), (53.0, 104), (54.0, 104), (55.0, 104), (56.0, 104), (57.0,
104), (58.0, 104), (59.0, 104), (60.0, 104), (61.0, 104), (62.0, 104), (63.0, 104), (64.0, 104), (65.0, 104),
(66.0, 104), (67.0, 104), (68.0, 104), (69.0, 104), (70.0, 104), (71.0, 104), (72.0, 104)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations corresponding to the base 
case scenario [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable. The consultant quoted activity of 20 pats/week = 87 pats/mth and with integrated 
laboratory, activity increased to 24 pats/week=104 pats/mth and he said that the capacity would expand to 
support this. Suggests high capacity utilisation but data does not support this (perhaps his figures included 
private patients). For example, if the capacity was 87 pats/mth, the maximum activity (May 96 to Dec 97) 
=75 would imply 86% utilisation but average activity (Jun 96 to Dec 97) = 47.11 implies only 54% 
utilisation. Activity (May 96) = 18. If we assume 1/2 capacity = 43.5, this implies only 41% utilisation. 
However, we were told that there was adequate capacity to meet demand for the district CC service (unlike 
the OP service which was under pressure) so provided that the model reflects the district CC capacity 
constraint not being reached, we can assume that model provides an adequate representation of the real 
world in the base case (behaviourally, albeit not numerically). Caution will be required in considering the 
potential effects of further increases in demand for the district CC service and reductions in the district CC 
capacity. For these situations, the discrepancy between the real capacity and capacity specified in the model 
might be significant.
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We specify capacities for four different situations. Corresponding to increasing levels of capacity, these 
situations were: (1) no district service (0 pats/mth), (2) district service in first month of operation (43.5 
pats/mth), (3) district service with normal capacity levels e.g. providing a replacement service during a 
major closure of tertiary facilities (87 pats/mth), (4) district service with integrated facility (104 pats/mth).
PCapDCCET = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 0.00), (35.0, 0.00), (36.0, 76.6), (37.0, 76.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00), (55.0, 0.00),
(56.0, 0.00), (57.0, 0.00), (58.0, 0.00), (59.0, 0.00), (60.0, 0.00), (61.0, 0.00), (62.0, 0.00), (63.0, 0.00),
(64.0, 0.00), (65.0, 0.00), (66.0, 0.00), (67.0, 0.00), (68.0, 0.00), (69.0, 0.00), (70.0, 0.00), (71.0, 0.00),
(72.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with an expanded tertiary- 
based service [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable. An expanded tertiary service is assumed with the district service used to cover tertiary 
facility closures only. Used for policy analysis.
PCapDCCNSDem = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 87.0), (25.0, 87.0), (26.0, 87.0), (27.0, 87.0), (28.0, 87.0), (29.0, 87.0), (30.0, 87.0), (31.0, 87.0),
(32.0, 87.0), (33.0, 87.0), (34.0, 87.0), (35.0, 87.0), (36.0, 87.0), (37.0, 87.0), (38.0, 87.0), (39.0, 87.0),
(40.0, 87.0), (41.0, 87.0), (42.0, 87.0), (43.0, 87.0), (44.0, 87.0), (45.0, 87.0), (46.0, 87.0), (47.0, 87.0),
(48.0, 87.0), (49.0, 87.0), (50.0, 87.0), (51.0, 87.0), (52.0, 87.0), (53.0, 87.0), (54.0, 87.0), (55.0, 87.0),
(56.0, 87.0), (57.0, 87.0), (58.0, 87.0), (59.0, 87.0), (60.0, 87.0), (61.0, 87.0), (62.0, 87.0), (63.0, 87.0),
(64.0, 87.0), (65.0, 87.0), (66.0, 87.0), (67.0, 87.0), (68.0, 87.0), (69.0, 87.0), (70.0, 87.0), (71.0, 87.0),
(72.0, 87.0)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with no simulated demand 
(due to other factors) [pats/mth].
PCapDCCPDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
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(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 0.00), (35.0, 0.00), (36.0, 76.6), (37.0, 76.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 76.6), (47.0, 76.6),
(48.0, 76.6), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00), (55.0, 0.00),
(56.0, 0.00), (57.0, 0.00), (58.0, 76.6), (59.0, 76.6), (60.0, 76.6), (61.0, 0.00), (62.0, 0.00), (63.0, 0.00),
(64.0, 0.00), (65.0, 0.00), (66.0, 0.00), (67.0, 0.00), (68.0, 0.00), (69.0, 0.00), (70.0, 76.6), (71.0, 76.6),
(72.0, 76.6)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a periodic district 
service [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable. District service used to cover tertiary facility closures and provides several further 
temporary sessions. Used for policy analysis.
PCapDCCTDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 0.00), (26.0, 0.00), (27.0, 0.00), (28.0, 0.00), (29.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (31.0, 0.00),
(32.0, 0.00), (33.0, 0.00), (34.0, 0.00), (35.0, 0.00), (36.0, 76.6), (37.0, 76.6), (38.0, 0.00), (39.0, 0.00),
(40.0, 0.00), (41.0, 0.00), (42.0, 0.00), (43.0, 0.00), (44.0, 0.00), (45.0, 0.00), (46.0, 0.00), (47.0, 0.00),
(48.0, 0.00), (49.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (51.0, 0.00), (52.0, 0.00), (53.0, 0.00), (54.0, 0.00), (55.0, 0.00),
(56.0, 0.00), (57.0, 0.00), (58.0, 0.00), (59.0, 0.00), (60.0, 0.00), (61.0, 0.00), (62.0, 0.00), (63.0, 0.00),
(64.0, 0.00), (65.0, 0.00), (66.0, 0.00), (67.0, 0.00), (68.0, 0.00), (69.0, 0.00), (70.0, 0.00), (71.0, 0.00),
(72.0, 0.00)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a temporary district 
service [pats/mth].
This is the elective district-based CC investigation capacity that would be available if the district service 
were affordable. District service covers tertiary facility closures only. Used for policy analysis.
PCapDCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00),
(8.00, 0.00), (9.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (11.0, 0.00), (12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 43.5), (14.0, 87.0), (15.0, 87.0),
(16.0, 87.0), (17.0, 87.0), (18.0, 87.0), (19.0, 87.0), (20.0, 87.0), (21.0, 87.0), (22.0, 87.0), (23.0, 87.0),
(24.0, 87.0), (25.0, 87.0), (26.0, 87.0), (27.0, 87.0), (28.0, 87.0), (29.0, 87.0), (30.0, 87.0), (31.0, 87.0),
(32.0, 22.0), (33.0, 22.0), (34.0, 22.0), (35.0, 96.8), (36.0, 104), (37.0, 104), (38.0, 104), (39.0, 104), (40.0,
104), (41.0, 104), (42.0, 104), (43.0, 104), (44.0, 104), (45.0, 104), (46.0, 104), (47.0, 104), (48.0, 104),
(49.0, 104), (50.0, 104), (51.0, 104), (52.0, 104), (53.0, 104), (54.0, 104), (55.0, 104), (56.0, 104), (57.0,
104), (58.0, 104), (59.0, 104), (60.0, 104), (61.0, 104), (62.0, 104), (63.0, 104), (64.0, 104), (65.0, 104),
(66.0, 104), (67.0, 104), (68.0, 104), (69.0, 104), (70.0, 104), (71.0, 104), (72.0, 104)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a winter crisis
[pats/mth].
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Assumes loss of capacity due to a winter crisis over 3 months where resources are diverted from elective 
investigations to emergency and treatment cases.
PCapTCCB = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7) (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7) (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42) (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 9.42), (25.0, 9.42), (26.0, 9.42), (27.0, 9.42), (28.0, 9.42), (29.0, 9.42) (30.0, 9.42), (31.0, 9.42),
(32.0, 9.42), (33.0, 9.42), (34.0, 7.00), (35.0, 4.70), (36.0, 4.71), (37.0, 4.71) (38.0, 4.71), (39.0, 4.71),
(40.0, 4.71), (41.0, 4.71), (42.0, 4.71), (43.0, 4.71), (44.0, 4.71), (45.0, 4.71) (46.0, 4.71), (47.0, 4.71),
(48.0, 4.71), (49.0, 4.71), (50.0, 4.71), (51.0, 4.71), (52.0, 4.71), (53.0, 4.71) (54.0, 4.71), (55.0, 4.71),
(56.0, 4.71), (57.0, 4.71), (58.0, 4.71), (59.0, 4.71), (60.0, 4.71), (61.0, 4.71) (62.0, 4.71), (63.0, 4.71),
(64.0, 4.71), (65.0, 4.71), (66.0, 4.71), (67.0, 4.71), (68.0, 4.71), (69.0, 4.71) (70.0, 4.71), (71.0, 4.71),
(72.0,4.71)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations corresponding to the base 
case scenario [pats/mth].
This is the tertiary elective CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable. It uses an 
approximation of the historical activity data and capacities are implied from the comments by the consultant 
about the utilisation of capacity. The historical data were divided between three different situations and, for 
each situation, averages were taken to derive three different capacity levels. Corresponding to decreasing 
levels of capacity, these situations were: (1) normal capacity levels, (2) during the first month of a major 
closure of tertiary facilities, (3) during a major closure of tertiary facilities or involving a major shift in 
workload to the district level. Two further capacity levels represented a further shift in workload to the 
district level (of higher risk patients). The consultant at Veinbridge stated that prior to the introduction fo 
the district service, the tertiary service operated at 90% utilisation. We assume that following the 
introduction of the district service, cases would be shifted to the district level so that the tertiary service 
would operate at 100% utilisation.
PCapTCCET = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 59.5), (25.0, 59.5), (26.0, 59.5), (27.0, 59.5), (28.0, 59.5), (29.0, 59.5), (30.0, 59.5), (31.0, 59.5),
(32.0, 59.5), (33.0, 59.5), (34.0, 59.5), (35.0, 59.5), (36.0, 19.8), (37.0, 19.8), (38.0, 59.5), (39.0, 59.5),
(40.0, 59.5), (41.0, 59.5), (42.0, 59.5), (43.0, 59.5), (44.0, 59.5), (45.0, 59.5), (46.0, 59.5), (47.0, 59.5),
(48.0, 59.5), (49.0, 59.5), (50.0, 59.5), (51.0, 59.5), (52.0, 59.5), (53.0, 59.5), (54.0, 59.5), (55.0, 59.5),
(56.0, 59.5), (57.0, 59.5), (58.0, 59.5), (59.0, 59.5), (60.0, 59.5), (61.0, 59.5), (62.0, 59.5), (63.0, 59.5),
(64.0, 59.5), (65.0, 59.5), (66.0, 59.5), (67.0, 59.5), (68.0, 59.5), (69.0, 59.5), (70.0, 59.5), (71.0, 59.5),
(72.0, 59.5)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with an expanded tertiary- 
based service [pats/mth].
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This is the tertiary elective CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable. An expanded tertiary- 
based service is assumed with the district service used to cover tertiary facility closures only. The tertiary- 
based capacity is increased by 50%. This produces capacity levels which are lower than those assumed at 
the district level for the base case scenario. However, larger increases at the tertiary level were assumed to 
be unrealistic and besides, the base case assumptions are slightly suspect. For the 1998 tertiary facility 
closure it is assumed that 1/2 the capacity is lost. Used for policy analysis.
PCapTCCNDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 39.7), (25.0, 39.7), (26.0, 39.7), (27.0, 39.7), (28.0, 39.7), (29.0, 39.7), (30.0, 39.7), (31.0, 39.7),
(32.0, 39.7), (33.0, 39.7), (34.0, 39.7), (35.0, 39.7), (36.0, 19.8), (37.0, 19.8), (38.0, 39.7), (39.0, 39.7),
(40.0, 39.7), (41.0, 39.7), (42.0, 39.7), (43.0, 39.7), (44.0, 39.7), (45.0, 39.7), (46.0, 39.7), (47.0, 39.7),
(48.0, 39.7), (49.0, 39.7), (50.0, 39.7), (51.0, 39.7), (52.0, 39.7), (53.0, 39.7), (54.0, 39.7), (55.0, 39.7),
(56.0, 39.7), (57.0, 39.7), (58.0, 39.7), (59.0, 39.7), (60.0, 39.7), (61.0, 39.7), (62.0, 39.7), (63.0, 39.7),
(64.0, 39.7), (65.0, 39.7), (66.0, 39.7), (67.0, 39.7), (68.0, 39.7), (69.0, 39.7), (70.0, 39.7), (71.0, 39.7),
(72.0, 39.7)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with no district service
[pats/mth].
This is the tertiary elective CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable.
PCapTCCNSDem = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 9.42), (25.0, 9.42), (26.0, 9.42), (27.0, 9.42), (28.0, 9.42), (29.0, 9.42), (30.0, 9.42), (31.0, 9.42),
(32.0, 9.42), (33.0, 9.42), (34.0, 9.42), (35.0, 9.42), (36.0, 9.42), (37.0, 9.42), (38.0, 9.42), (39.0, 9.42),
(40.0, 9.42), (41.0, 9.42), (42.0, 9.42), (43.0, 9.42), (44.0, 9.42), (45.0, 9.42), (46.0, 9.42), (47.0, 9.42),
(48.0, 9.42), (49.0, 9.42), (50.0, 9.42), (51.0, 9.42), (52.0, 9.42), (53.0, 9.42), (54.0, 9.42), (55.0, 9.42),
(56.0, 9.42), (57.0, 9.42), (58.0, 9.42), (59.0, 9.42), (60.0, 9.42), (61.0, 9.42), (62.0, 9.42), (63.0, 9.42),
(64.0, 9.42), (65.0, 9.42), (66.0, 9.42), (67.0, 9.42), (68.0, 9.42), (69.0, 9.42), (70.0, 9.42), (71.0, 9.42),
(72.0, 9.42)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with no stimulated demand 
(due to other factors) [pats/mth].
PCapTCCPDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 39.7), (25.0, 39.7), (26.0, 39.7), (27.0, 39.7), (28.0, 39.7), (29.0, 39.7), (30.0, 39.7), (31.0, 39.7),
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(32.0, 39.7), (33.0, 39.7), (34.0, 39.7), (35.0, 39.7), (36.0, 19.8), (37.0, 19.8), (38.0, 39.7), (39.0, 39.7),
(40.0, 39.7), (41.0, 39.7), (42.0, 39.7), (43.0, 39.7), (44.0, 39.7), (45.0, 39.7), (46.0, 19.8), (47.0, 19.8),
(48.0, 19.8), (49.0, 39.7), (50.0, 39.7), (51.0, 39.7), (52.0, 39.7), (53.0, 39.7), (54.0, 39.7), (55.0, 39.7),
(56.0, 39.7), (57.0, 39.7), (58.0, 19.8), (59.0, 19.8), (60.0, 19.8), (61.0, 39.7), (62.0, 39.7), (63.0, 39.7),
(64.0, 39.7), (65.0, 39.7), (66.0, 39.7), (67.0, 39.7), (68.0, 39.7), (69.0, 39.7), (70.0, 19.8), (71.0, 19.8),
(72.0, 19.8)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a periodic district 
service [pats/mth].
This is the elective tertiary CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable.
PCapTCCTDS = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7), (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7), (12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42), (20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(24.0, 39.7), (25.0, 39.7), (26.0, 39.7), (27.0, 39.7), (28.0, 39.7), (29.0, 39.7), (30.0, 39.7), (31.0, 39.7),
(32.0, 39.7), (33.0, 39.7), (34.0, 39.7), (35.0, 39.7), (36.0, 19.8), (37.0, 19.8), (38.0, 39.7), (39.0, 39.7),
(40.0, 39.7), (41.0, 39.7), (42.0, 39.7), (43.0, 39.7), (44.0, 39.7), (45.0, 39.7), (46.0, 39.7), (47.0, 39.7),
(48.0, 39.7), (49.0, 39.7), (50.0, 39.7), (51.0, 39.7), (52.0, 39.7), (53.0, 39.7), (54.0, 39.7), (55.0, 39.7),
(56.0, 39.7), (57.0, 39.7), (58.0, 39.7), (59.0, 39.7), (60.0, 39.7), (61.0, 39.7), (62.0, 39.7), (63.0, 39.7),
(64.0, 39.7), (65.0, 39.7), (66.0, 39.7), (67.0, 39.7), (68.0, 39.7), (69.0, 39.7), (70.0, 39.7), (71.0, 39.7),
(72.0, 39.7)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a temporary district 
service [pats/mth].
This is the elective tertiary CC capacity that would be available if it were affordable. Used for policy 
analysis.
PCapTCCW = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 39.7), (1.00, 39.7), (2.00, 39.7), (3.00, 39.7
(8.00, 39.7), (9.00, 39.7), (10.0, 39.7), (11.0, 39.7
(16.0, 9.42), (17.0, 9.42), (18.0, 9.42), (19.0, 9.42
(24.0, 9.42), (25.0, 9.42), (26.0, 9.42), (27.0, 9.42
(32.0, 4.71), (33.0, 4.71), (34.0, 4.71), (35.0, 4.71
(40.0, 4.71), (41.0, 4.71), (42.0, 4.71), (43.0, 4.71
(48.0, 4.71), (49.0, 4.71), (50.0, 4.71), (51.0, 4.71
(56.0, 4.71), (57.0, 4.71), (58.0, 4.71), (59.0, 4.71
(64.0, 4.71), (65.0, 4.71), (66.0, 4.71), (67.0, 4.71
(72.0,4.71)
DOCUMENT: Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a winter crisis
[pats/mth].
Assumes loss of capacity due to a winter crisis over 3 months where resources are diverted from elective 
investigations to emergency and treatment cases.
, (4.00, 39.7), (5.00, 39.7), (6.00, 39.7), (7.00, 39.7),
(12.0, 39.7), (13.0, 17.7), (14.0, 9.42), (15.0, 9.42),
(20.0, 9.42), (21.0, 9.42), (22.0, 9.42), (23.0, 9.42),
(28.0, 9.42), (29.0, 9.42), (30.0, 9.42), (31.0, 9.42),
(36.0, 4.71), (37.0, 4.71), (38.0, 4.71), (39.0, 4.71),
(44.0, 4.71), (45.0, 4.71), (46.0, 4.71), (47.0, 4.71),
(52.0, 4.71), (53.0, 4.71), (54.0, 4.71), (55.0, 4.71),
(60.0, 4.71), (61.0, 4.71), (62.0, 4.71), (63.0, 4.71),
(68.0, 4.71), (69.0, 4.71), (70.0, 4.71), (71.0, 4.71),
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SuppEffKCC = GRAPH(IF (SwR2=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.03), (12.5, 1.09), (15.0, 1.11), (17.5, 1.10), 
(20 .0, 1.10)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Assumes that the use of a guideline could suppress some of the stimulated demand. Used as part of the 
policy analysis.
SuppEffKOP = GRAPH(IF (SwRl=0) THEN 0 ELSE PcvdDCCInvR)
(0.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00), (7.50, 1.01), (10.0, 1.04), (12.5, 1.09), (15.0, 1.10), (17.5, 1.10), 
(20.0, 1.10)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
Assumes that the use of a guideline could suppress some of the stimulated demand. Used as part of the 
policy analysis.
SuppEffWTCC = GRAPH(IF(SwB3=0) THEN 1 ELSE TRnewCCWL)
(0.00, 1.00), (0.2, 1.00), (0.4, 1.00), (0.6, 1.00), (0.8, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00), (1.40, 1.00), (1.60,
1.00), (1.80, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Suppressed effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC
investigation [-].
There is a zero waiting time effect at Veinbridge General.
UCapDCC = GRAPH(IF (CapDCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE (DesDCCInvR/CapDCC))
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1, 0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for district-based CC [-].
By definition, this refers to elective CC investigations.
If exactly the full capacity was desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical 
difficulties. The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
UCapOP = GRAPH(IF (CapOP=0) THEN 0 ELSE (DesOPR/CapOP))
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3), (0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), 
(0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65), (0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), 
(0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 0.97), (1.05, 1.00), (1.10, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for OP appointments [-].
If exactly the full capacity was desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical 
difficulties. The use of the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
UCapTCC = GRAPH(IF(CapTCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE DesCCInvR/CapTCC)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1,0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
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DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [-].
If full capacity is desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical difficulties. The use of 
the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
UCapTCCNEDCC = GRAPH(IF(CapTCC=0) THEN 0 ELSE DesCCInvR*(l-FEDCC)/CapTCC)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), 
(1, 0.97), (1.10, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00)
DOCUMENT: Utilisation of capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigation by those not eligible to 
undergo a district-based investigation [-].
If full capacity is desired, it is assumed that it would not be available due to practical difficulties. The use of 
the IF statement ensures that a division by zero does not cause the simulation to stop.
E3. Alphabetical Listings o f Simulation Model Variable Names
The variables are listed in the following order:
1. Stocks (levels) with their corresponding in-flows and out-flows (rates), listed alphabetically by 
stock
2. Non-graphical convertors (constants and auxiliaries), listed alphabetically
3. Graphical convertors (table functions), listed alphabetically
E3a. Stocks (52)
AggJDOpSk
AvRRCC
CCWL
CFPhlDCCP
CumCC
CumCCAC
CumCCACATL
CumCCWLAdds
CumCCWLRems
CumDCCPC
CumDCCRC
CumGJDOpSk
CumLJDOpSk
CumOP
CumOPAC
CumOPWLAdds
Aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
Average rate of referrals for elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
Completed fraction of phase 1 district service preparation (completed fraction of 
a basic district site) [-].
Cumulative elective CC investigations [pats].
Cumulative CC activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative CC activity costs if all activity were carried out at the tertiary level 
[pounds].
Cumulative CC waiting list additions [pats].
Cumulative CC waiting list removals [pats]
Cumulative district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
Cumulative district CC service running costs [pounds].
Cumulative gain in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units] 
Cumulative loss in junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units] 
Cumulative OP activity [pats].
Cumulative OP activity costs [pounds].
Cumulative OP waiting list additions [pats].
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CumOPWLRems
DECCWL
DEOPWL
DETnewCCWL
DETnewOPWL
DETonCCWL
DETonOPWL
DstDemCC
DstDemOP
JDOp
MaxCCWL 
MaxOPWL 
MaxRRCC 
MaxRROP 
MaxT newCCWL
MaxTnewOPWL
MaxTonCCWL
MaxTonOPWL
MinCCWL
MinOPWL
MinRRCC
MinRROP
MinTnewCCWL
MinT ne wOP WL
MinTonCCWL
MinTonOPWL
OPWL
PrSIECCWL
PrSIEOPWL 
PrSIET onCC WL
PrSIETonOPWL
SDCCFA
STPhlDCCP
SumJTCCWL
Cumulative OP waiting list removals [pats]
Duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths]
Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time estimated for new CC 
investigation waiting list patients [mths]
Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time estimated for new OP 
waiting list patients [mths]
Duration of excessive time on waiting list for CC investigation [mths]
Duration of excessive time on OP waiting list [mths]
Duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths]
Duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths]
Number of junior district-based CC operators [doctors].
Maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
Maximum OP waiting list [pats]
Maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
Maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
Maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
Maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
Maximum average waiting time on CC waiting list [mths]
Maximum average waiting time on OP waiting list [mths]
Minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
Minimum OP waiting list [pats]
Minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth]
Minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
Minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
Minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
Minimum average waiting time on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Minimum average waiting time on OP waiting list [mths]
OP waiting list length [pats].
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC investigation waiting 
list [pressure].
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list [pressure]. 
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
CC investigation waiting list [pressure].
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
OP waiting list [pressure].
Smoothed district CC facility availability [-].
Start time of phase 1 district CC service preparation [mths].
Sum of join times for patients on CC investigation waiting list [pat.mths].
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SumJTOPWL
TOCCWLR
E3b. Flows (59) 
AccRSumCCWLJT
AccRSumOPWLJT
CCCR
CCCRATL
CCInvR
CCWLAddR
CCWLRemR
CCWLRR
DCCFASR
DCCPCR
DCCRCR
DepRSumCCWLJT
DepRSumOPWLJT
GRDECCWL
GRDEOPWL
GRDET newCC WL
GRDET newOP WL
GRDET onCC WL
GRDET onOP WL
GRDStDemCC
GRDStDemOP
GRJDOpSk
GRPrSIECCWL
GRPrSIEOPWL
GRPSIETonCCWL
GRPSIET onOP WL
JDOpDepR
JDOpRecR
Sum of join times for patients on cardiology OP waiting list [pat.mths]. 
Total rate of other CC investigation waiting list removals [pats].
Accumulation rate of join time of patients on the CC investigation waiting list 
[pats].
Accumulation rate of join time of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
CC activity cost rate [pounds/pat].
CC activity cost rate if all were carried out at the tertiary level [pounds/pat]. 
Elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth],
CC waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
CC waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
District CC investigation facility availability smoothing rate [-/mth].
District CC service preparation cost rate [pounds/mth].
District CC service running cost rate [pounds/mth].
Depletion rate of join time of patients on the CC investigation waiting list [pats]. 
Depletion rate of join time of patients on the OP waiting list [pats].
Gain rate of duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths/mth].
Gain rate of duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths/mth].
Gain rate of duration of excessive estimated average waiting time for new CC 
investigation waiting list patients [mths/mth]
Gain rate of duration of excessive estimated average waiting time for new OP 
waiting list patients [mths/mth]
Gain rate of duration of excessive time on CC investigation waiting list 
[mths/mth]
Gain rate of duration of excessive time on OP waiting list [mths/mth].
Gain rate of duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths/mth].
Gain rate of duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths/mth]
Gain rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC 
investigation waiting list [pressure/mth]
Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list 
[pressure/mth]
Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time 
spent on CC investigation waiting list [pressure/mth]
Gain rate of pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time 
spent on OP waiting list [pressure/mth].
Junior district-based CC operator departure rate [doctors/mth].
Junior district-based CC operator recruitment rate [doctors/mth].
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JDOpSkGR
JDOpSkLR
LRJDOpSk
NRRIPtoCC
OCCWLRR
OOPWLRR
OPCR
OPR
OPWLAddR
OPWLRemR
PhlDCCPR
RRCCAR
RROP
RROPWLtoCC
SRMaxCCWL
SRMaxOPWL
SRMaxRRCC
SRMaxRROP
SRMaxTnewCCWL
SRMaxT ne wOP WL
SRMaxT onCC WL
SRMaxT onOP WL
SRMinCCWL
SRMinOPWL
SRMinRRCC
SRMinRROP
Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate [skill units/mth].
Junior district-based CC operator skills loss rate [skill units/mth].
Loss rate of junior district-based CC operator skills [skill units/mth]
New referral rate from inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Other OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
OP cost rate [pounds/pat].
OP rate [pats/mth].
OP waiting list addition rate [pats/mth]
OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth]
Phase 1 district CC service preparation rate [-/mth].
Referral rate for an elective CC investigation averaging rate [pats/mth/mth]. 
Referral rate for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth]. 
Set rate of maximum CC investigation waiting list set rate [pats/mth]
Set rate of maximum OP waiting list set rate [pats/mth]
Set rate of maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation set rate 
[pats/mth/mth]
Set rate of maximum referral rate for OP appointment set rate [pats/mth/mth]
Set rate of maximum average estimated time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
Set rate of maximum average estimated time for new OP waiting list patients 
[mths/mth]
Set rate of maximum average time spent on CC waiting list [mths/mth]
Set rate of maximum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth]
Set rate of minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats/mth]
Set rate of minimum OP waiting list [pats/mth]
Set rate of minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth/mth]
Set rate of minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth/mth]
SRMinT ne wCC WL
SRMinT ne wOP WL
SRMinT onCCWL 
SRMinT onOP WL 
SRSTPhlDCCP
Set rate of minimum average estimated time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths/mth]
Set rate of minimum average estimated time for new OP waiting list patients 
[mths/mth]
Set rate of minimum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth]
Set rate of minimum average time spent on OP waiting list [mths/mth]
Set rate of start time of phase 1 district CC service preparation [mths/mth].
E3c. Non-Graphical Converters (139)
ACumDCCRC Affordability of cumulative district CC service running costs [-].
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ADesDCCF
AggJDOpSki
AMDCCRCR
APhlDCCPC
APh2DCCPC
ATRRCC
AvCCWLRRe
AvCCWLRRe&r
AvCDCC
AvCFurthCC
AvCOP
AvCTCC
AvCTCCI
AvCTCCT
AvOCCWLRR
AvOPWLRR
AvPreOPWLRR
AvRROP
AvSkJDOp
AvSkNJDOp
AvTFurthCC
AvTnewCCWLe
AvT newCC WLe&r
AvTnewOPWL
AvTonCCWL
AvTonOPWL
AvWLRT
CapDCC
CapOP
CapSEDCC
Anticipated desire for a district CC facility [-].
Initial aggregate junior district-based CC operator skill [skill units].
Affordability of monthly district CC facility running cost rate [-].
Affordability of phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Affordability of phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [-].
Averaging time of referral rate for an elective CC investigation [mths].
Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the 
Evaluation of pressure on the system [pats/mth].
Average CC investigation waiting list removal rate, used to represent the 
Evaluation of pressure on the system and the Response to that pressure 
[pats/mth].
Average cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
Average cost per further CC procedure [pounds/pat].
Average cost per OP appointment [pounds/pat].
Average cost per tertiary-based CC procedure [pounds/pat].
Average cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds/pat].
Average cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and 
treatment) [pounds/pat].
Average other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Average OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Average pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Average rate of referrals for OP appointment [pats/mth].
Average CC operator skill per junior district-based operator [skill units/doctor].
Average CC operator skill per new junior district-based CC operator [skill 
units/doctor].
Average waiting time for further CC procedure (following a district-based CC 
investigation) [mths].
Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, 
used to represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system [mths].
Average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients, 
used to represent the Evaluation of pressure on the system and the Response 
to that pressure [mths].
Average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths].
Average time spent on the CC investigation waiting list [mths].
Average time spent on the OP waiting list [mths].
Average waiting list removal time [mths].
Capacity for district-based CC [pats/mth].
Capacity for OP appointments [pats/mth].
Capacity shortfall at tertiary level with respect to patients who are eligible to 
undergo district-based CC investigation [pats/mth].
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CapTCC
CCWLi
CDesDF
CTime
CumC
CumCAL
CumDCCRCAL
DCCInvR
DesCCInvR
DesCCInvRWL
DesCCInvRWT
DesCCWL
DesCCWLAT
DesDCCInvR
DesDCCF
DesECCInvR
DesNECCInvR
DesOPR
DesOPRWL
DesOPRWT
DesOPWL
DesOPWLAT
DesTCC
DesTOP
DCCFA
DCCFAST
DR
EDesDCCF
EffCapLCC
EffCDSuppDCC
EffKCC
EffKOP
EffDDSCC
EffOFCC
EffSkCC
EffSkECC
Capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [pats/mth].
Initial CC investigation waiting list length pats]
Current desire for district facility [-].
Current time [mths].
Cumulative costs [pounds].
Cumulative costs affordability limit [pounds].
Cumulative district CC service running costs affordability limit [pounds]. 
District-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by a waiting list goal [pats/mth]. 
Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by a waiting time goal [pats/mth]. 
Desired CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
Desired CC investigation waiting list adjustment time [mths].
Desired district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desire for a district CC facility [-].
Desired eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired non-eligible CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired OP rate [pats/mth].
Desired OP rate driven by a waiting list goal [pats/mth].
Desired OP rate driven by a waiting time goal [pats/mth].
Desired OP waiting list length [pats].
Desired OP waiting list adjustment time [mths].
Desired waiting time for a CC investigation [mths].
Desired waiting time for an OP appointment [mths].
District CC facility availability [-].
District CC facility availability smoothing time [mths].
Discount rate [-].
Expressed desire for a district CC facility [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of CC investigation cost differential on support for district-based CC 
service [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
Effect of other district-based screeners on referrals for elective CC investigation 
[-]•
Effect of other factors on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of CC operator skills on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of CC operator skills of expert district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
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EffSkJCC
EffWTCC
FEDCC
FEDOp
FFurthCC
FJDOp
FOCCWLRR
FOPreOPWLRR
FOPtoCC
FRROPWLtoIPtoCC
FSuppDCC
FSuppPh2DCC
FTCCbyDO
IncOPCap
IRROP
JDOpRecD
JDOpSkGRExp
JDOpSkGRRec
JDOpTT
LEJDOp
LFJDOp
MBCheckPats
MBCheckSk
MaxSkOp
MinDCCInvR
MDCCRCR
MDCCRCRAL
NOPCap
OA
OPreOPWLRR
OPWLi
OPWLRR
Effect of CC operator skills of junior district-based operators on referrals for 
elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
Fraction of CC investigation waiting list that are eligible for district-based 
investigation [-].
Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators 
[-]•
Fraction of patients referred for further CC (following a district-based CC 
investigation) [-].
Fraction CC investigation recommendations made by expert district CC operators 
[-]•
Fractional other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
Fractional other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
Fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an 
elective CC investigation [-].
Fractional rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective 
CC investigation [-/mth].
Financial support for a district CC service [-].
Financial support for a phase 2 district CC service
Fraction of tertiary-based elective CC investigations carried out by a district- 
based CC operator [-].
Increased OP capacity [pats/mth]
Increase in referral rate for OP appointment [-]
Junior district-based CC operator recruitment delay [mths].
Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via experience [skill units/mth]. 
Junior district-based CC operator skills gain rate via recruitment [skill units/mth]. 
Junior district-based CC operator training time [mths].
Learning experiences for junior district-based CC operators [pats/mth].
(Patient activity) learning fraction of junior district-based CC operators [-].
Mass balance check on patients [pats]
Mass balance check on skills of junior district-based CC operators [skill units] 
Maximum CC skills per CC operator [skill units/doctor].
Minimum district-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Monthly district CC facility running cost rate [pounds/mth].
Monthly district CC facility running cost rate affordability limit [pounds/mth]. 
Normal OP capacity [pats/mth].
Overall affordability [-].
Other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Initial OP waiting list length [pats]
OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
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PCapDCC
PCapTCC
PcvdDCCInvR
PcvdTCapAEDCC
PDDCCInvD
PhlDCCPC
PhlDCCPCAL
PhlDCCPD
PhlDCCPMCR
PhlDCCPP
Ph2DCCPC
Ph2DCCPCAL
Ph2DCCPD
Ph2DCCPMCR
Ph2DCCPP
PostOPDisR
PreOPWLRR
RefFOPtoCC
RefRROP
RefTnewCCWL
RPrPM
RPrPP
RRCC
RRFurthCC
RROPWLtoIPtoCC
STTCapUNEDCC
SwB3
SwIOPCap
SwOC
SwPADr
SwRl
SwR2
SwTOP
TADesDF
TCapAEDCC
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations [pats/mth]. 
Potential capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigations [pats/mth]. 
Perceived district-based CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Perceived tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available 
Perception delay of district-based CC investigation rate (by GPs and patients) 
[mths].
Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
Phase 1 district CC service preparation costs affordability limit [pounds].
Phase 1 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
Phase 1 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
Phase 1 district CC service preparation period [mths].
Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs [pounds].
Phase 2 district CC service preparation costs affordablity limit [pounds].
Phase 2 district CC service preparation delay [mths].
Phase 2 district CC service preparation monthly cost rate [pounds/mth].
Phase 2 district CC service preparation period [mths].
Post-OP appointment discharge rate [pats/mth].
Pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Reference fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on 
for an elective CC investigation [-].
Reference rate of referrals for an OP appointment [pats/mth].
Reference waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list patients [mths].
Rate of pressure gain per month (spent on the waiting list) [pressure/mth/mth] 
Rate of pressure gain per patient (on the waiting list)[pressure/patient/mth] 
Referral rate for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Rate of referral (from a district-based CC investigation) to a further CC 
(treatment) procedure [pats/mth].
Rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC 
investigation [pats/mth].
Smoothing time of tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity 
Switch for feedback loop B3 [-].
Switch for increase in OP capacity [-]
Switch for overconfidence in referral behaviour of junior district-based CC 
operators [-].
Switch for patient activity driver [-].
Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
Switch for feedback loop R1 [-].
Switch for trainee district CC operator programme [-].
Time of anticipated desire for district CC facility [mths].
Tertiary-based elective CC investigation capacity available for those eligible to 
undergo district-based CC [pats/mth].
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TCapLT Tertiary capacity loss time [mths].
TCCInvR Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
TCCInvRNEDCC Tertiary-based elective CC investigation rate of those not eligible to undergo
district-based CC [pats/mth].
TDCCSFA Time district CC service first affordable [mths].
TRnewCCWL Waiting time ratio for new CC investigation waiting list patients [-].
E3d. Graphical Converters (44)
EffCapLCCB
EffCapLCCFDS
EffCapLCCN
EffCapLCCPI
EffCapLCCSPRDS
EffCapLCCS
EffCapLCCW
EffKCCPDCCS
EffKCCTDCCS
EffKOPPDCCS
EffKOPTDCCS
EffSkOJCC
EffSkUJCC
LPP
NEffKCC
NEffKOP
NEffWTCC
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation 
corresponding to the base case scenario [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation for 
the case with further district sessions [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with no district service 
[-]•
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with permanent 
increases in capacity [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a semi-permanent 
reduced district service [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for the case with a single district 
service [-].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation for 
the case with a winter crisis [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation with a 
permanent district service [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation with a 
temporary district service [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment with a permanent 
district service [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment with a temporary 
district service [-].
Effect of CC operator skills of overconfident junior district-based operators on 
referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of CC operator skills of underconfident junior district-based operators on 
referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Learning per patient [skill units/patient].
Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an elective CC investigation 
[-]•
Normal effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for an OP appointment [-].
Normal effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC 
investigation [-].
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PCapDCCB
PCapDCCET
PCapDCCFDS
PCapDCCNSDem
PCapDCCPermDS
PCapDCCPDS
PCapDCCSPRDS
PCapDCCTDS
PCapDCCW
PCapTCCB
PCapTCCET
PCapTCCFDS
PCapTCCNDS
PCapTCCNSDem
PCapTCCPDS
PCapTCCPermDS
PCapTCCSDS
PCapTCCSPRDS
PCapTCCTDS
PCapTCCW
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations corresponding to 
the base case scenario [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with an expanded 
tertiary-based service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with further 
district sessions [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with no stimulated 
demand (due to other factors) [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a permanent 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a periodic 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a semi­
permanent reduced district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a temporary 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a winter crisis 
[pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations corresponding to 
the base case scenario [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with an expanded 
tertiary-based service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with further 
district sessions [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with no district 
service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with no stimulated 
demand (due to other factors) [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a periodic 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a permanent 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with single district 
service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a semi­
permanent reduced district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective district-based CC investigations with a temporary 
district service [pats/mth].
Potential capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations with a winter 
crisis [pats/mth].
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SuppEffKCC
SuppEffKOP
SuppEffWTCC
UCapDCC
UCapOP
UCapTCC
UCapTCCNEDCC
Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation 
[-]•
Suppressed effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for OP appointments [-]. 
Suppressed effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective 
CC investigation [-].
Utilisation of capacity for district-based CC [-].
Utilisation of capacity for OP appointments [-].
Utilisation of capacity for elective tertiary-based CC investigations [-]. 
Utilisation of capacity for tertiary-based elective CC investigation by those not 
eligible to undergo a district-based investigation [-].
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E4. Efficiency Calculations
E4a. Calculations o f  Cost/Case
With a district service (investigated at the district level):
Cost/Case = Wtd cost of investigation at district level and cost of treatment procedure at tertiary level (discounted)
= l*AvCDCC + (FFurthCC* AvCTCCT)/( 1 +DR)AAvTFurthCC
Without a district service (investigated at the tertiary level):
Cost/Case = Wtd cost of investigation only and synchronous investigation and treatment
= FFurthCC* AvCTCCI+( 1 -FFurthCC)* AvCTCCT
where:
AvCDCC Avg cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds]
AvCTCCI Avg cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds]
AvCTCCT Avg cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and treatment) [pounds]
AvTFurthCC Avg waiting time for further CC procedure (following a district-based CC) [mths]
DR Discount rate [-]
FFurthCC Fraction of patients referred for further CC (following a district-based investigation) [-]
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E4b. Average Costs fo r  the Ribsley General Case
Uses March 1997 figures only. No other data was available.
Consider only patients eligible for district-based inv. as the cost/case of those not eligible is the same with or without a district service
AvCDCC Avg cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds] = £521
AvCTCCI Avg cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds]
=>Wtd Avg Cost
£450 (Day case)
£675 (Inpatient)
£525 (1/3 require inpatient procedure)
£563 (1/2 require inpatient procedure)
£600 (2/3 require inpatient procedure)
AvCTCCT Avg cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and treatmer = £450
£1,890 
£4,476 
= £3,183 
£3,442
=>Wtd Avg Cost = £1,361
£1,447
£1,817
(Day case)
(Inpatient, no stent)
(Inpatient, with stent)
(Wtd inpatient, 1/2 with stents)
(Wtd inpatient, 3/5 with stents)
(1/3 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents) 
(1/3 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents) 
(1/2 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents)
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£1,946 (1/2 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents)
£2,272 (2/3 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents)
£2,444 (2/3 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents)
E4c. Average Costs fo r the Veinbridge General Case 
Uses March 1997 figures only. No other data was available.
Consider only patients eligible for district-based inv. as the cost/case of those not eligible is the same with or without a district service
AvCDCC Avg cost of a district-based CC investigation [pounds] = £525
AvCTCCI Avg cost per tertiary-based CC investigation [pounds] = £450 (Day case)
£675 (Inpatient)
=>Wtd Avg Cost = £525 (1/3 require inpatient procedure)
£563 (1/2 require inpatient procedure)
£600 (2/3 require inpatient procedure)
AvCTCCT Avg cost per (tertiary-based) CC treatment (or synchronous investigation and treatmer = £450 (Day case)
£1,890 (Inpatient, no stent)
£4,476 (Inpatient, with stent)
= £3,183 (Wtd inpatient, 1/2 with stents)
500
=>Wtd Avg Cost
£3,442 (Wtd inpatient, 3/5 with stents)
= £1,361 (1/3 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents)
£1,447 (1/3 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents)
£1,817 (1/2 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents)
£1,946 (1/2 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents)
£2,272 (2/3 require inpatients, 1/2 with stents)
£2,444 (2/3 require inpatients, 3/5 with stents)
N.B. Stent fraction for the base case calculations is 50%. Range 30%-60% was reported by Petticrew et al (1997). It was assumed that the 
interventionalists at Veinbridge General and Heartwick Hospital would be at the more 'aggressive1 end of this range.
E4d. Efficiency Calculations fo r  Ribsley General Case
Inpatient Stent (p.a)
Fraction Fraction FFurthCC DR AvTFurthCC AvCDCC
1/3 1/2 0.10 3% 1 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 3% 1 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 3% 1 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 3% 1 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 3% 1 £521
2/3 3/5 0.10 3% 1 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 6% 1 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 6% 1 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 6% 1 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 6% 1 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 6% 1 £521
2/3 3/5 0.10 6% 1 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 3% 3 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 3% 3 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 3% 3 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 3% 3 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 3% 3 £521
Wtd Cost/Case
With No
AvCTCCI AvCTCCT District Service District Service Cost Diff
£525 £1,361 £656.77 £608.60 £48.17
£563 £1,817 £702.20 £687.90 £14.30
£600 £2,272 £747.64 £767.20 -£19.56
£525 £1,447 £665.36 £617.22 £48.14
£563 £1,946 £715.10 £700.83 £14.27
£600 £2,444 £764.84 £784.44 -£19.60
£525 £1,361 £656.44 £608.60 £47.84
£563 £1,817 £701.77 £687.90 £13.87
£600 £2,272 £747.10 £767.20 -£20.10
£525 £1,447 £665.02 £617.22 £47.80
£563 £1,946 £714.64 £700.83 £13.81
£600 £2,444 £764.26 £784.44 -£20.18
£525 £1,361 £656.10 £608.60 £47.50
£563 £1,817 £701.31 £687.90 £13.41
£600 £2,272 £746.53 £767.20 -£20.67
£525 £1,447 £664.65 £617.22 £47.43
£563 £1,946 £714.15 £700.83 £13.32
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2/3 3/5 0.10 3% 3 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 6% 3 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 6% 3 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 6% 3 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 6% 3 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 6% 3 £521
2/3 3/5 0.10 6% 3 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
2/3 3/5 0.10 3% 4.5 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
2/3 1/2 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
1/3 3/5 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
1/2 3/5 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
2/3 3/5 0.10 6% 4.5 £521
1/3 1/2 0.10 3% 6 £521
1/2 1/2 0.10 3% 6 £521
£600 £2,444 £763.64 £784.44 -£20.80
£525 £1,361 £655.13 £608.60 £46.53
£563 £1,817 £700.02 £687.90 £12.12
£600 £2,272 £744.91 £767.20 -£22.29
£525 £1,447 £663.63 £617.22 £46.41
£563 £1,946 £712.77 £700.83 £11.94
£600 £2,444 £761.90 £784.44 -£22.54
£525 £1,361 £655.60 £608.60 £47.00
£563 £1,817 £700.65 £687.90 £12.75
£600 £2,272 £745.70 £767.20 -£21.50
£525 £1,447 £664.12 £617.22 £46.90
£563 £1,946 £713.44 £700.83 £12.61
£600 £2,444 £762.75 £784.44 -£21.69
£525 £1,361 £654.16 £608.60 £45.56
£563 £1,817 £698.72 £687.90 £10.82
£600 £2,272 £743.29 £767.20 -£23.91
£525 £1,447 £662.59 £617.22 £45.37
£563 £1,946 £711.37 £700.83 £10.54
£600 £2,444 £760.16 £784.44 -£24.28
£525 £1,361 £655.10 £608.60 £46.50
£563 £1,817 £699.99 £687.90 £12.09
2/3 1/2 0.10 3% 6 £521 £600 £2,272 £744.87 £767.20 -£22.33
1/3 3/5 0.10 3% 6 £521 £525 £1,447 £663.60 £617.22 £46.38
1/2 3/5 0.10 3% 6 £521 £563 £1,946 £712.73 £700.83 £11.90
2/3 3/5 0.10 3% 6 £521 £600 £2,444 £761.85 £784.44 -£22.59
1/3 1/2 0.10 6% 6 £521 £525 £1,361 £653.19 £608.60 £44.59
1/2 1/2 0.10 6% 6 £521 £563 £1,817 £697.43 £687.90 £9.53
2/3 1/2 0.10 6% 6 £521 £600 £2,272 £741.68 £767.20 -£25.52
1/3 3/5 0.10 6% 6 £521 £525 £1,447 £661.56 £617.22 £44.34
1/2 3/5 0.10 6% 6 £521 £563 £1,946 £709.99 £700.83 £9.16
2/3 3/5 0.10 6% 6 £521 £600 £2,444 £758.42 £784.44 -£26.02
3^ Boxed figures refer to base case assumptions. Calculations indicate that district service only efficient if the inpatient percentage is high.
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E4e. Efficiency Calculations for Veinbridge General Case
Wtd Cost/Patient
Inpatient Stent (p.a) With No
Fraction Fraction FFurthCC DR AvTFurthCC AvCDCC AvCTCCI AvCTCCT District Service District Service Cost Diff
1/3 1/2 0.17 3% 1 £525 £525 £1,361 £755.80 £667.12 £88.68
1/2 1/2 0.17 3% 1 £525 £563 £1,817 £833.05 £775.68 £57.37
2/3 1/2 0.17 3% 1 £525 £600 £2,272 £910.29 £884.24 £26.05
1/3 3/5 0.17 3% 1 £525 £525 £1,447 £770.42 £681.77 £88.64
1/2 3/5 0.17 3% 1 £525 £563 £1,946 £854.97 £797.66 £57.31
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2/3 3/5 0.17 3% 1 £525
1/3 1/2 0.17 6% 1 £525
Ml 1/2 0.17 6% 1 £525
2/3 1/2 0.17 6% 1 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 6% 1 £525
1/2 3/5 0.17 6% I £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 6% 1 £525
1/3 Ml 0.17 3% 3 £525
M2 1/2 0.17 3% 3 £525
2/3 Ml 0.17 3% 3 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 3% 3 £525
Ml 3/5 0.17 3% 3 £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 3% 3 £525
1/3 1/2 0.17 6% 3 £525
Ml 1/2 0.17 6% 3 £525
2/3 Ml 0.17 6% 3 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 6% 3 £525
Ml 3/5 0.17 6% 3 £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 6% 3 £525
1/3 Ml 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
1/2 1/2 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
£600 £2,444 £939.53 £913.55 £25.98
£525 £1,361 £755.25 £667.12 £88.13
£563 £1,817 £832.31 £775.68 £56.63
£600 £2,272 £909.37 £884.24 £25.13
£525 £1,447 £769.83 £681.77 £88.06
£563 £1,946 £854.18 £797.66 £56.52
£600 £2,444 £938.54 £913.55 £24.99
£525 £1,361 £754.67 £667.12 £87.55
£563 £1,817 £831.53 £775.68 £55.85
£600 £2,272 £908.40 £884.24 £24.16
£525 £1,447 £769.21 £681.77 £87.44
£563 £1,946 £853.35 £797.66 £55.69
£600 £2,444 £937.49 £913.55 £23.94
£525 £1,361 £753.02 £667.12 £85.90
£563 £1,817 £829.34 £775.68 £53.66
£600 £2,272 £905.65 £884.24 £21.41
£525 £1,447 £767.47 £681.77 £85.69
£563 £1,946 £851.00 £797.66 £53.34
£600 £2,444 £934.54 £913.55 £20.99
£525 £1,361 £753.82 £667.12 £86.70
£563 £1,817 £830.40 £775.68 £54.72
2/3 1/2 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
1/2 3/5 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 3% 4.5 £525
1/3 1/2 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
1/2 1/2 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
2/3 1/2 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
1/2 3/5 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 6% 4.5 £525
1/3 1/2 0.17 3% 6 £525
1/2 1/2 0.17 3% 6 £525
2/3 1/2 0.17 3% 6 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 3% 6 £525
1/2 3/5 0.17 3% 6 £525
2/3 3/5 0.17 3% 6 £525
1/3 1/2 0.17 6% 6 £525
1/2 1/2 0.17 6% 6 £525
2/3 1/2 0.17 6% 6 £525
1/3 3/5 0.17 6% 6 £525
1/2 3/5 0.17 6% 6 £525
£600 £2,272 £906.98 £884.24 £22.74
£525 £1,447 £768.31 £681.77 £86.54
£563 £1,946 £852.14 £797.66 £54.48
£600 £2,444 £935.97 £913.55 £22.42
£525 £1,361 £751.37 £667.12 £84.25
£563 £1,817 £827.13 £775.68 £51.45
£600 £2,272 £902.89 £884.24 £18.65
£525 £1,447 £765.71 £681.77 £83.93
£563 £1,946 £848.64 £797.66 £50.98
£600 £2,444 £931.57 £913.55 £18.02
£525 £1,361 £752.98 £667.12 £85.86
£563 £1,817 £829.27 £775.68 £53.59
£600 £2,272 £905.57 £884.24 £21.33
£525 £1,447 £767.41 £681.77 £85.64
£563 £1,946 £850.93 £797.66 £53.27
£600 £2,444 £934.45 £913.55 £20.90
£525 £1,361 £749.73 £667.12 £82.61
£563 £1,817 £824.94 £775.68 £49.26
£600 £2,272 £900.15 £884.24 £15.91
£525 £1,447 £763.96 £681.77 £82.19
£563 £1,946 £846.29 £797.66 £48.63
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2/3 3/5 0.17 6% 6 £525 £600 £2,444
Boxed figures refer to base case assumptions. Calculations indicate that district service not efficient
£928.62 £913.55 £15.07
Inpatient Stent (P a) With No
Fraction Fraction FFurthCC DR AvTFurthCC AvCDCC AvCTCCI AvCTCCT District Service District Service Cost Diff
1/3 1/2 0.11 3% 1 £525 £525 £1,361 £674.34 £616.96 £57.38
1/2 1/2 0.11 3% 1 £525 £563 £1,817 £724.32 £700.44 £23.88
2/3 1/2 0.11 3% 1 £525 £600 £2,272 £774.31 £783.92 -£9.61
1/3 3/5 0.11 3% 1 £525 £525 £1,447 £683.80 £626.44 £57.36
1/2 3/5 0.11 3% 1 £525 £563 £1,946 £738.51 £714.66 £23.85
2/3 3/5 0.11 3% 1 £525 £600 £2,444 £793.22 £802.88 -£9.66
1/3 1/2 0.11 6% 1 £525 £525 £1,361 £673.98 £616.96 £57.02
1/2 1/2 0.11 6% 1 £525 £563 £1,817 £723.85 £700.44 £23.41
2/3 1/2 0.11 6% 1 £525 £600 £2,272 £773.71 £783.92 -£10.21
1/3 3/5 0.11 6% 1 £525 £525 £1,447 £683.42 £626.44 £56.98
1/2 3/5 0.11 6% 1 £525 £563 £1,946 £738.00 £714.66 £23.34
2/3 3/5 0.11 6% 1 £525 £600 £2,444 £792.58 £802.88 -£10.30
1/3 1/2 0.11 3% 3 £525 £525 £1,361 £673.61 £616.96 £56.65
1/2 1/2 0.11 3% 3 £525 £563 £1,817 £723.34 £700.44 £22.90
2/3 1/2 0.11 3% 3 £525 £600 £2,272 £773.08 £783.92 -£10.84
1/3 3/5 0.11 3% 3 £525 £525 £1,447 £683.02 £626.44 £56.58
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1/2 3/5 0.11
2/3 3/5 0.11
1/3 1/2 0.11
1/2 1/2 0.11
2/3 1/2 0.11
1/3 3/5 0.11
1/2 3/5 0.11
2/3 3/5 0.11
1/3 1/2 0.11
1/2 1/2 0.11
2/3 1/2 0.11
1/3 3/5 0.11
1/2 3/5 0.11
2/3 3/5 0.11
1/3 1/2 0.11
1/2 1/2 0.11
2/3 1/2 0.11
1/3 3/5 0.11
1/2 3/5 0.11
2/3 3/5 0.11
1/3 1/2 0.11
3% 3 £525
3% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
6% 3 £525
3% 4.5 £525
3% 4.5 £525
3% 4.5 £525
3% 4.5 £525
3% 4.5 £525
3% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
6% 4.5 £525
3% 6 £525
£563 £1,946 £737.46 £714.66 £22.80
£600 £2,444 £791.90 £802.88 -£10.98
£525 £1,361 £672.54 £616.96 £55.58
£563 £1,817 £721.93 £700.44 £21.49
£600 £2,272 £771.31 £783.92 -£12.61
£525 £1,447 £681.89 £626.44 £55.45
£563 £1,946 £735.94 £714.66 £21.28
£600 £2,444 £790.00 £802.88 -£12.89
£525 £1,361 £673.06 £616.96 £56.10
£563 £1,817 £722.61 £700.44 £22.17
£600 £2,272 £772.17 £783.92 -£11.75
£525 £1,447 £682.44 £626.44 £56.00
£563 £1,946 £736.68 £714.66 £22.02
£600 £2,444 £790.92 £802.88 -£11.96
£525 £1,361 £671.47 £616.96 £54.51
£563 £1,817 £720.50 £700.44 £20.06
£600 £2,272 £769.52 £783.92 -£14.40
£525 £1,447 £680.75 £626.44 £54.31
£563 £1,946 £734.41 £714.66 £19.75
£600 £2,444 £788.07 £802.88 -£14.81
£525 £1,361 £672.51 £616.96 £55.55
1/2 1/2 0.11 3% 6
2/3 1/2 0.11 3% 6
1/3 3/5 0.11 3% 6
1/2 3/5 0.11 3% 6
2/3 3/5 0.11 3% 6
1/3 1/2 0.11 6% 6
1/2 1/2 0.11 6% 6
2/3 1/2 0.11 6% 6
1/3 3/5 0.11 6% 6
1/2 3/5 0.11 6% 6
2/3 3/5 0.11 6% 6
District service only efficient if the inpatient percentage is high
£525 £563 £1,817 £721.88 £700.44 £21.44
£525 £600 £2,272 £771.25 £783.92 -£12.67
£525 £525 £1,447 £681.86 £626.44 £55.41
£525 £563 £1,946 £735.90 £714.66 £21.23
£525 £600 £2,444 £789.94 £802.88 -£12.94
£525 £525 £1,361 £670.41 £616.96 £53.45
£525 £563 £1,817 £719.08 £700.44 £18.64
£525 £600 £2,272 £767.74 £783.92 -£16.18
£525 £525 £1,447 £679.62 £626.44 £53.18
£525 £563 £1,946 £732.89 £714.66 £18.23
£525 £600 £2,444 £786.16 £802.88 -£16.72
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E5. Model-Based Experiments
E5a. List o f  Experiments
1. Ribsley General Experiments
la. Base Case Analysis
Preliminary Experiments Exp
Simulating the Base Case Behaviour Base Case R0
Basic Causes of the Base Case Behaviour No Training Programme R1
Training Programme Withdrawn R2
No Waiting Time Effect nor Knowledge Effects on Referrals R3
No Knowledge Effects on Referrals R4
No Waiting Time Effect on Referrals R5
No Effect of Significant Capacity Loss on Referrals R6
Sensitivity Analysis
Limiting the Availability of District Services No District Service R7
Single District Service R8
Limiting the Availability of Elective Capacity A Winter Crisis R9
Maintaining a Constant CC Inv Waiting Time Goal RIO
Altering the Waiting Time Effect on Demand Decreased Waiting Time Response Time R11
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Altering the Knowledge Effects on Demand 
Altering the Skills Effect on Demand
Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt
lb . Policy Analysis 
Parameter Changes
Altering the Capacity for Elective CC Investigations
Increased Waiting Time Response Time R12
Decreased GP and Patient Perception Delay R13
Increased GP and Patient Perception Delay R14
Increased Knowledge Effect on Demand for an OP Appt R15
Decreased Learning Fraction R16
Increased Learning Fraction R17
Overconfident Referral Behaviour R18
Delayed Recruitment R19
1% Increase R20a
4% Increase R20b
7% Increase R20c
Semi-Permanent Reduced District Service With Existing Guidelines R21
Semi-Permanent Reduced District Service With Modest New Guidelines R22
Semi-Permanent Reduced District Service With Strict New Guidelines R23
Permanent District Service with Existing Guidelines R24
Permanent District Service with Modest New Guidelines R25
Permanent District Service with Strict New Guidelines R26
Using Demand Management Strategies
<vi
Expanded Tertiary Service with Existing Guidelines 
Expanded Tertiary Service with Modest New Guidelines 
Expanded Tertiary Service with Strict New Guidelines 
Further District Sessions (a Periodic District Service) with Existing Guidelines 
Further District Sessions (a Periodic District Service) with Modest New Guidelines 
Further District Sessions (a Periodic District Service) with Strict New Guidelines 
Decreased GP and Patient Perception Delay 
Increased GP and Patient Perception Delay 
Use of Modest New Guidelines 
Use of Strict New Guidelines 
Increased Learning Fraction 
Base Case Assumptions About Demand 
1% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt 
2% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt 
6% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt 
7% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt 
12% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt 
13% Increase in Exog Demand for an OP Appt
Structural Changes: Seeking Different Activity Targets
Base Case Assumptions About Supply and Demand Base Case Parameters for Goals and Adj Times, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time
Base Case Parameters for Goals and Adj Times, Seeking a Desired Waiting List
Altering the CC Operator Skills Base 
Increasing the OP Capacity
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R13
R14
R33
R34
R17
R35a
R35b
R35c
R35d
R35e
R35f
R35g
RO
R36
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Consistent Parameters for Goals and Adj Times, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R37
Consistent Parameters for Goals and Adj Times, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R38
Use of New Referral Guidelines Use of Modest New Guidelines, Consistent Params, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R39
Use of Strict New Guidelines, Consistent Params, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R40
Altering (OP) Demand With Sufficient Capacity Available 0.5% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R41
0.5% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R42
0.5% Deer, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R43
0.5% Deer, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R44
Altering (OP) Demand With Insufficient Capacity Available 4% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R45
4% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R46
7% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R47
7% Incr, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R48
A Winter Crisis Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R49
Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R50
No Waiting Time, Skills or Knowledge Effects on Demand, No Capacity Constraints, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time R51
No Waiting Time, Skills or Knowledge Effects on Demand, No Capacity Constraints, Consistent Parameters, Seeking a Desired Waiting List R52
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2. Veinbridge General Experiments
2a. Base Case Analysis
Preliminary Experiments Exp
Simulating the Base Case Behaviour Base Case VO
Basic Causes of the Base Case Behaviour No Knowledge Effects on Referrals VI
No Knowledge Effects on Referrals for an OP Appt V2
No Knowledge Effects on Referrals for a CC Investigation V3
Sensitivity Analysis
Limiting the Availability of District Services No District Service V4
Temporary District Service V5
Expanded Tertiary Service V6
Periodic District Service V7
Limiting the Availability of Elective Capacity A Winter Crisis V8
Adjusting the CC Investigation Waiting Time Goal V9
Altering the Knowledge Effects on Demand Decreased GP and Patient Perception Delay V I0
Increased GP and Patient Perception Delay V I1
Increased Knowledge Effect on Demand for an OP Appt VI2
Introducing a Skills Effect on Demand V I3
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2b. Policy Analysis
Parameter Changes
Using Demand Management Strategies Decreased GP and Patient Perception Delay V 10
Increased GP and Patient Perception Delay V I1
Use of Modest New Guidelines V14
Use of Strict New Guidelines V 15
Increasing the OP Capacity V16
Structural Changes: Seeking Different Activity Targets
Base Case Assumptions About Supply and Demand Seeking a Desired Waiting Time VO
Seeking a Desired Waiting List VI7
Increased OP Capacity Seeking a Desired Waiting Time VI6
Seeking a Desired Waiting List V18
Use of New Referral Guidelines Use of Modest New Guidelines, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time V14
Use of Modest New Guidelines, Seeking a Desired Waiting List V19
Use of Strict New Guidelines, Seeking a Desired Waiting Time VI5
Use of Strict New Guidelines, Seeking a Desired Waiting List V20
A Winter Crisis Seeking a Desired Waiting Time V8
Seeking a Desired Waiting List V21
E5b. Parameter Changes for Experiments
Changes for R1-R52 refer to changes to model listing in Appendix E2a 
Changes for V1-V21 refer to changes to model listing in Appendix E2b
Exp Parameter Changes
RO No changes (Base Case for Ribsley General)
R1 AggJDOpSk(0)=0; JDOp(0)=0; SwTOP=0
R2 SwTOP=0
R3 SwB3=0; SwRl=0; SwR2=0
R4 SwRl=0; SwR2=0
R5 SwB3=0
R6 EffCapLCC=l
R7 PhlDCCPCAL=0; Ph2DCCPCAL=0; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCN; PCapTCC=PCapTCCNDS;
STTCapUNEDO>3-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)-Step(2.75,36)+Step(2.75,37)
R8 CumDCCRCAL=Step(500,TDCCSFA); EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCS; PCapTCC=PCapTCCSDS;
STTCapUNEDCC=3-Step(2.75,13) +Step(2.75,15)-Step(2.75,36) +Step(2.75,37)
R9 PCapTCC=PCapTCCW; PCapDCC=PCapDCCW; EffCapLCC = EffCapLCCW
RIO DesTCC= IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 3 ELSE 3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 60 ELSE
60
R11 Alter averaging time in AvCCWLRRe&r to 1.5
R12 Alter averaging time in AvCCWLRRe&r to 6
R13 PDDCCInvD=3
R14 PDDCCInvD=9
R15 EffKOP=IncrEffKOP
R16 LFJDOp=0.6
R17 LFJDOp=0.9
R18 SwOC=l
R19 JDOpRecD=l
R20 IRROP=0.01,0.04,0.07; Extend simulation time to 120 months.
R21 CumDCCRCAL=Step( 1200,TDCCSFA); PCapDCC=PCapDCCSPRDS; PCapTCC=
PCapTCCSPRDS; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCSPRDS; STTCapUNEDCC=3- 
Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,15)
R22 As for R21 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffKOP=SuppEffKOP
R23 As for R21 and also EffWTCC=SuppEfTWTCC (and alter function so that no stimulated demand
i.e function doesn’t exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0
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R24 CumDCCRCAL=Step(1000000, TDCCSFA); PCapDCC=PCapDCCPermDS;
PCapTCC=PCapTCCPermDS; EffKCC=EffKCCPDCCS; EffKOP=EfiEKOPPDCCS; 
EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCPI; DesTCC= IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 3 ELSE 3; DesCCWL=IF 
(SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 60 ELSE 60; STTCapUNEDCC=3-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,15)
R25 As for R24 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffKOP=SuppEffKOP
R26 As for R24 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC (and alter function so that no stimulated demand
i.e function doesn’t exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0 
R27 CumDCCRCAL=Step(500,TDCCSFA)+Step( 100,36); PCapTCOPCapTCCET;
PCapDCC=PCapDCCET; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCPI; DesCCWL=IF(SDCCFA>0.5)
THEN 60 ELSE 60; DesTCC= IF(SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 3 ELSE 3; STTCapUNEDCC=3- 
Step(2.75,13) +Step(2.75,15)-Step(2.75,36)+Step(2.75,37)
R28 As for R27 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffKOP=SuppEffKOP
R29 As for R27 and also EfFWTCC=SuppEffWTCC (and alter function so that no stimulated demand
i.e function doesn’t exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0 
R30 PCapTCC=PCapTCCFDS; PCapDCC=PCapDCCFDS; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCFDS;
CumDCCRCAL=Step(500,TDSFA) +Step(200,34) +Step( 150,46); STTCapUNEDCC=3- 
Step(2.75,13) +Step(2.75,15)-Step(2.75,34)+Step(2.75,35)
R31 As for R30 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffKOP=SuppEffKOP
R32 As for R30 and also EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC (and alter function so that no stimulated demand
i.e function doesn’t exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0 
R33 EfIWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffKOP=SuppEffKOP 
R34 EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC (and alter function so that no stimulated demand i.e function doesn’t 
exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0 
R35 SwIOPCap=l; IRROP=0,0.01,0.02,0.06,0.07,0.12,0.13; Extend simulation time to 120 months. 
R36 SwPADr=l
R37 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56 
R38 As for R3 7 and also SwPADr=l
R39 As for R37 and also SwPADr=l; EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC;
EffKOP=SuppEfIKOP
R40 As for R37 and also SwPADr=l; EffWTCC=SuppEffWTCC (and alter function so that no 
stimulated demand i.e function doesn’t exceed 1); SwRl=0; SwR2=0 
R41 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56;
IRROP=0.005. Extend simulation time to 120 months.
R42 As for R41 and also SwPADr=l
R43 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56;
IRROP= -0.005. Extend simulation time to 120 months.
R44 As for R43 and also SwPADr=l
R45 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56;
IRROP=0.04. Extend simulation time to 120 months.
R46 As for R45 and also SwPADr=l
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R47 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56;
IRROP=0.07. Extend simulation time to 120 months.
R48 As for R47 and also SwPADr=l
R49 DesOPWLAT=3; DesCCWLAT=3; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 28 ELSE 56;
PCapTCC=PCapTCCW; PCapDCC=PCapDCCW; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCW 
R50 As for R49 and also SwPADr=l
R51 EffWTCC=0.95; EffSkCC=0.667; EffKCC=l; EffCapLCC=l; CCWLAT=3; OPWLAT=3;
DesCCWL=56; PCapTCC=100 (unconstrained)
R52 As for R51 and SwPADr=l
Exp Parameter Changes
VO No changes (Base Case for Veinbridge General)
VI SwRl=0; SwR2=0
V2 SwRl=0
V3 SwR2=0
V4 CumDCCRCAL=0; Ph 1 DCCPCAL=0; Ph2DCCPCAL=0; EffOFCC= 1;
EfPCapLCC=EffCapLCCN; PCapTCC=PCapTCCNDS; FEDCC=0.9; STTCapUNEDCC=3- 
Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)-Step(2.75,36)+Step(2.75,37)
V5 CumDCCRCAL=Step(550,TDCCSFA)+Step(100,36); Ph2DCCPCAL=0; EffOFCC=l for
t=0...13, 1.18 for t=14, 1.2 for t= l5...24, 1.18 for t=25, 1 for t=26...72; 
EffKOP=EffKOPTDCCS; EffKCC=EffKCCTDCCS; PCapTCC=PCapTCCTDS; 
PCapDCC=PCapDCCTDS; STTCapUNEDCC=3-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)- 
Step(2.75,36) +Step(2.75,37); FEDCC=0.9 
V6 CumDCCRCAL=Step(550,TDCCSFA)+Step(100,36); Ph2DCCPCAL=0;
PCapTCC=PCapTCCET; PCapDCC=PCapDCCET; EffKOP=EffKOPTDCCS; 
EffKCC=EffKCCTDCCS; STTCapUNEDCC=3-Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)- 
Step(2.75,36)+Step(2.75,37); FEDCC=0.9; EffOFCC=l for t=0...13, 1.18 for t=14, 1.2 for 
t=15...24, 1.48 at 1=25, 1.6 for t=26...72
V I  CumDCCRCAL=Step(550, TDCCSFA) +Step(100,36) +Step(150,46) +Step(150,58)
+Step( 150,70); Ph2DCCPCAL=0; PCapTCC=PCapTCCPDS; PCapDCC=PCapDCCPDS; 
EffKOP^EffKOPTDCCS; EffKCC-EffKCCTDCCS; FEDCC=0.9; STTCapUNEDCC=3- 
Step(2.75,13)+Step(2.75,14)-Step(2.75,36)+Step(2.75,37) -Step(2.75,46)+Step(2.75,47)- 
Step(2.75,58)+Step(2.75,59) -Step(2.75,70) +Step(2.75,71); EffO FO >l for t=0...13, 1.18 
fort=14, 1.2 for t= l5...24, 1.18 for t=25, 1 for t=26...72;
V8 PCapTCC=PCapTCCW; PCapDCC=PCapDCCW; EffOFCC= 1 for t=0... 13, 1.18 for t=14, 1.2
for t=15...35, 1.36 for t=36, 1.4 for t=37...72; EffCapLCC=EffCapLCCW 
V9 DesTCC= IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 1.75 ELSE 3.5; DesCCWL=IF (SDCCFA>0.5) THEN 64 
ELSE 128 
VI0 PDDCCInvD=3
V II PDDCCInvD=9 
V12 EffKOP=IncrEffKOP
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V13 FEDOp= IF (JDOp=0) THEN 1 ELSE 0.333; FJDOp=IF(JDOp=0) THEN 0 ELSE 0.333;
OPWLi=468; FRROPWLtoIPtoCC=0.002; FOPreOPWLRR=0.023; RefRROP=506.98; 
NOPCap=582.69; SumJTOPWL(0)=25307.99 
V14 EffKOP=SuppEffKOP; EffKCC=SuppEffKCC; EffOFCC=l for t=13, 1.08 for t=14, 1.1 for 
t=15...34, 1.16 for t=35, 1.2 for t=36 
V I5 SwRl=0; SwR2=0; EffOFCC=l; PCapTCOPCapTCCNSDem; PCapDCC=PCapDCCNSDem 
V I6 SwIOPCap=l 
V17 SwPADr=l 
V I8 SwPADr=l; SwIOPCap=l 
V 19 As for V 14 and also SwPADr= 1
V20 As for V I5 and also SwPADr=l
V21 As for V8 and also SwPADr=l
E5c. List o f  Performance Measures 
Waiting Lists:
PrSIEOPWL Pressure summary index associated with an excessive OP waiting list [pressure]
MaxOPWL Maximum OP waiting list [pats]
MinOPWL Minimum OP waiting list [pats]
DEOPWL Duration of excessive OP waiting list [mths]
PrSIECCWL Pressure summary index associated with an excessive CC investigation waiting list
[pressure]
MaxCCWL Maximum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
MinCCWL Minimum CC investigation waiting list [pats]
DECCWL Duration of excessive CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Waiting Times: 
PrSIET onOP WL
MaxTonOPWL
MinTonOPWL
DETonOPWL
MaxTnewOPWL
MinTnewOPWL
DETnewOPWL
PrSIET onCCWL
MaxTonCCWL
MinTonCCWL
DETonCCWL
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
OP waiting list [pressure]
Maximum average waiting time on OP waiting list [mths]
Minimum average waiting time on OP waiting list [mths]
Duration of excessive time on OP waiting list [mths]
Maximum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
Minimum average estimated waiting time for new OP waiting list patients [mths] 
Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time estimated for new OP 
waiting list patients [mths]
Pressure summary index associated with an excessive average time spent on the 
CC investigation waiting list [pressure]
Maximum average waiting time on CC waiting list [mths]
Minimum average waiting time on CC investigation waiting list [mths]
Duration of excessive time on waiting list for CC investigation [mths]
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MaxTnewCCWL
MinTnewCCWL
DETnewCCWL
Resource Use:
CumOP
CumOPAC
CumCC
CumCCAC
CumCCACATL
CumC
Referrals:
CumOPWLAdds
MaxRROP
MinRROP
DstDemOP
CumCCWLAdds
MaxRRCC
MinRRCC
DstDemCC
Maximum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
Minimum average estimated waiting time for new CC investigation waiting list 
patients [mths]
Duration of excessive average estimated waiting time estimated for new CC 
investigation waiting list patients [mths]
Cumulative OP activity [pats]
Cumulative OP activity costs [pounds]
Cumulative elective CC investigations [pats]
Cumulative CC activity costs [pounds]
Cumulative CC activity costs if all activity were carried out at the tertiary level 
[pounds]
Cumulative costs [pounds]
Cumulative OP waiting list additions [pats]
Maximum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth] 
Minimum referral rate for OP appointment [pats/mth]
Duration of stimulated demand for OP appointment [mths] 
Cumulative CC waiting list additions [pats]
Maximum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth] 
Minimum referral rate for elective CC investigation [pats/mth] 
Duration of stimulated demand for CC investigation [mths]
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E5d. Consistency Calculations for Structural Change Experiments
1. Consistency Calculations for the Ribsley General Case
la. To Produce Consistency Between the Waiting List and Waiting Time Goals
Assume no capacity constraints, equilibrium and the demand multipliers fixed at their starting values.
CCWLRR = CCInvR + OCCWLRR
No capacity constraints s  CCInvR = DesCCInvR
=> CCWLRR -  DesCCInvR + OCCWLRR (1)
DesCCInvR = SwPADr*DesCCInvRWL + (l-SwPADr)*DesCCInvRWT 
Seeking a desired waiting tim es SwPADr=0 s  DesCCInvR = DesCCInvRWT
= IF (DesTCC=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR)
Assuming DesTCC^O => DesCCInvR = (CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR 
Equilibrium s  CCWL= DesCCWL
and AvOCCWLRR=OCCWLRR
sDesCCInvR=(DesCCWL/DesTCC)-OCCWLRR.
(1) & (2) sCCWLRR=DesCCWL/DesTCC...........
Equilibriums CCWLRR = RRCC
(2)
•(3)
= RROPWLtoCC+NRRIPtoCC 
= OPR*FOPtoCC+RROP WLtoIPtoCC+NRRIPtoCC
= OPR*RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*MIN(EfICapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffOFCC) + OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC + NRRIPtoCC 
No capacity constraintssOPR=DesOPR
(4)
Seeking a desired waiting time=> SwPADr=0 => DesOPR = DesOPRWT
= IF (DesTOP=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((OPWL/DesTOP)-AvPreOPWLRR
DesTOP*0 => DesOPR = (OPWL/DesTOP)-AvPreOPWLRR 
Equilibriums AvPreOPWLRR=PreOPWLRR 
sDesO PR =(OPWL/DesTOP)-PreOPWLRR
=(OPWL/DesTOP)-(RROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPreOPWLRR)
=(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)....................................................................
(3M5)sDesCCWL/DesTCC=[(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]*RefFOPtoCC*EfISkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffOFCC) + OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC + NRRIPtoCC.... 
=>DesCCWL=DesTCC*{[(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]* RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffOFCC) + OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC + NRRIPtoCC} 
Therefore, a waiting list goal of DesTCC*{see above} is consistent with a waiting time goal of DesTCC
Inputting the figures for the case of Ribsley General,
DesCCWL = 3*{[(424/1.15)-(424*0.002+424*0.048)]*0.05625*0.667*MIN(l,l*0.95*l)+424*0.002+5.5}
= 3*{12.38+0.85+5.5}
= 3*18.73 
= 56 patients
lb. To Produce Consistency in the Paths to These Consistent Goals.
From CCWL(O) (where CCWL*DesCCWL), consider DesCCInvRWT=DesCCInvRWL 
DesCCInvRWT = IF (DesTCC=0) THEN 999 ELSE ((CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR)
DesCCInvRWL = MAX(MIN(AvRRCC+(CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT-AvOCCWLRR,CCWL/AvWLRT+AvRRCC),0)
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Assuming DesTCOO, there are sufficient patients on the CC investigation waiting list and the desired waiting list does not force the desired investigation rate to become 
negative,
=>(CCWL/DesTCC)-AvOCCWLRR = AvRRCC+(CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT-AvOCCWLRR
=>CCWL/DesTCC=AvRRCC+(CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT}....................................................................................................................................................................(7)
Equilibrium => AvRRCC=RRCC
From (4) and (5), RRCC = [(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]* RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffDFCC) + OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC + NRRIPtoCC 
CCWL/DesTCC = [(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]* RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffOFCC) + OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC + NRRIPtoCC + (CCWL- 
DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT
=> (CCWL-DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT={CCWL/DesTCC-[(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]* RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EffDFCC) - OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC - NRRIPtoCC}
=> DesCCWLAT=(CCWL-DesCCWL)/{CCWL/DesTCC-[(OPWL/DesTOP)-(OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC+OPWL*FOPreOPWLRR)]* RefFOPtoCC*EffSkCC*
MIN(EffCapLCC,EffKCC*EffWTCC*EfTOFCC) - OPWL*FRROPWLtoIPtoCC - NRRIPtoCC 
Therefore, when the CC investigation referral rate is constant, a waiting list adjustment time of (CCWL-DesCCWL)/{see above} will produce the same desired activity 
rate when seeking a waiting list or waiting time goal.
Inputting the figures for the case of Ribsley General, 
DesCCWLAT = (88-56)7(88/3-18.73) = 3 months
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2. Consistency Calculations for the Veinbridge General Case
2a. To Produce Consistency Between the Waiting List and Waiting Time Goals
For the case of Veinbridge General, the assumptions of no capacity constraints and equilibrium for CC investigations were in fact the base case assumptions, unlike the 
case of Ribsley General.
CCWL(O) was constructed from the above assumptions and the given information about CCInvR 
As for the Ribsley calculations,
DesCCInvR=(DesCCWL/DesTCC)-OCCWLRR..................................................................................................................................................................................................... (2)
=>DesCCWL=DesTCC*(DesCCInvR+OCCWLRR)
Equilibrium => CCInvR=DesCCInvR 
and CCWL=DesCCWL
=>CCWL=DesTCC*(CCInvR+OCCWLRR)
Inputting the figures for the case of Veinbridge General,
=>CCWL(0) =3.5*(35.7+l) =128 = DesCCWL
Therefore in calibrating the model to the Veinbridge General case, a waiting list goal of 128 patients was already consistent with a waiting time goal of 3.5 months. 
Therefore, there was no need to re-parameterise for the structural change experiments.
2b. To Produce Consistency in the Paths to These Consistent Goals.
As for the Ribsley calculations, 
CCWL/DesTCC=AvRRCC+(CCWL- 
DesCCWL)/DesCCWLAT} ................ (7)
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As CCWL=DesCCWL, this equation will hold for all values of DesCCWLAT. Therefore, there was no need to re-parameterise for the structural change experiments, 
where:
AvOCCWLRR
AvPreOPWLRR
AvRRCC
AvWLRT
CapOP
CCInvR
CCWL
CCWLRR
DesCCInvR
DesCCInvRWL
DesCCInvRWT
DesCCWL
DesCCWLAT
DesOPR
DesOPRWL
DesOPRWT
DesTCC
DesTOP
EffCapLCC
EffKCC
EffKOP
Average other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Average pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Average rate of referrals for elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Average waiting list removal time [mths].
Capacity for OP appointments [pats/mth].
Elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
CC investigation waiting list length [pats],
CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Desired elective CC investigation rate [pats/mth].
Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by a waiting list goal [pats/mth]. 
Desired elective CC investigation rate driven by a waiting time goal [pats/mth]. 
Desired CC investigation waiting list length [pats].
Desired CC investigation waiting list adjustment time [mths].
Desired OP rate [pats/mth].
Desired OP rate driven by a waiting list goal [pats/mth].
Desired OP rate driven by a waiting time goal [pats/mth].
Desired waiting time for a CC investigation [mths].
Desired waiting time for a OP appointment [mths].
Effect of significant capacity loss on referrals for elective CC investigation [-]. 
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of knowledge of CC on referrals for a OP appointment [-].
EffOFCC
EffSkCC
EffWTCC
FOPreOPWLRR
FOPtoCC
FRROPWLtoIPtoCC
NRRIPtoCC
OCCWLRR
OPR
OPreOPWLRR
OPWL
PreOPWLRR
RefFOPtoCC
RRCC
RROPWLtoCC
RROPWLtoIPtoCC
SwPADr
UCapOP
Effect of other factors on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of CC operator skills on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Effect of waiting time for CC investigation on referrals for elective CC investigation [-].
Fractional other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [-/mth].
Fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an elective CC investigation [-]. 
Fractional rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC investigation [-/mth].
New referral rate from inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Other CC investigation waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
OP rate [pats/mth].
Other pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
OP waiting list length [pats].
Pre-appointment OP waiting list removal rate [pats/mth].
Reference fraction of patients assessed at an OP appointment who are referred on for an elective CC investigation [-]. 
Referral rate for an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Rate of referrals from OP waiting list to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Rate of referrals from the OP waiting list via inpatients to an elective CC investigation [pats/mth].
Switch for patient activity driver [-].
Utilisation of capacity for OP appointments [-].
E5e. Results o f Experiments
* indicates division by zero
For R1-R36 - % changes from RO (base case)
For R38-R40 - % changes from R37 
For R42 - % changes from R41 
For R44 - % changes from R43 
For R46 - % changes from R45 
For R48 - % changes from R47 
For R50 - % changes from R49 
For R52 - % changes from R51
For R20 and R35b-R35g - results are not listed in the table because timescale was extended from 54 months 
to 120 months, and therefore, comparisons with the base case and other experiments are meaningless.
For V1-V20 - % changes from VO (base case)
For V21 - % changes from V8
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1. Results o f Experiments for the Ribsley General Case
P e rfo rm a n c e  M e a su re RO R1
PrSIEO PW L [pressure] 154.75 150.43 -2.8%
M axO PW L [pats] 442 442 0.0%
M inO PW L [pats] 424 424 0.0%
D EO PW L [m ths] 20.88 20.63 -1.2%
PrSIEC C W L [pressure] 890.61 815.98 -8.4%
M axC C W L [pats] 114 108 -4.9%
M inC C W L [pats] 35 33 -4.5%
D EC C W L [mths] 40.63 40.63 0.0%
PrSIET onO PW L  [pressure] 0.15 0.14 -6.7%
M axT onO PW L  [mths] 1.18 1.18 0.0%
M inT onO PW L  [mths] 1.15 1.15 0.0%
D E T onO PW L  [mths] 12.63 12.38 -2.0%
M axT new O PW L  [mths] 1.17 1.17 0.0%
M inT new O PW L  [mths] 1.15 1.15 0.0%
D E T new O PW L  [m ths] 9.88 9.75 -1.3%
PrSIET onC C W L  [pressure] 50.13 47.27 -5.7%
M axT onC C W L  [mths] 5.12 4.97 -2.9%
M inT onC C W L  [ m ths] 1.69 1.68 -0.6%
D E T onC C W L  [mths] 41.5 39 -6.0%
M axT new C C W L  [m ths] 7.87 7.54 -4.2%
M inT new C C W L  [m ths] 1.5 1.46 -2.7%
D E T new C C W L  [m ths] 50.25 49.25 -2.0%
C um O P [pats] 18,784 18,782 0.0%
C um O PA C  [pounds] 1,878,361 1,878,179 0.0%
C um C C  [pats] 848 841 -0.8%
C um C C A C  [pounds] 529,150 524,557 -0.9%
C um C C A C A TL  [pounds] 516,193 511,808 -0.8%
C um C  [pounds] 2,439,461 2,434,687 -0.2%
C um O PW L A dds [pats] 19,937 19,935 0.0%
M axR R O P [pats/m th] 377.07 377.07 0.0%
M inR R O P [pats/m th] 367.87 367.87 0.0%
D StD em O P [m ths] 9.63 9.5 -1.3%
C um C C W L A dds [pats] 947 934 -1.4%
M ax R R C C  [pats/m th] 22.31 20.93 -6.2%
M inR R C C  [pats/m th] 9.6 9.31 -3.0%
D StD em C C  [m ths] 11.75 12 2.1%
R2
161.47 4.3%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
22.00 5.4%
1,240.19 39.3%
114 0.0%
37 6.7%
44.5 9.5%
0.16 6.7%
1.18 0.0%
1.14 -0.9%
13.13 4.0%
1.18 0.9%
1.15 0.0%
10.25 3.7%
60.7 21.1%
5.16 0.8%
1.88 11.2%
45.38 9.3%
7.87 0.0%
1.58 5.3%
51.63 2.7%
18,787 0.0%
1,878,650 0.0%
862 1.6%
537,922 1.7%
524,378 1.6%
2,448,522 0.4%
19,940 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.88 2.6%
987 4.2%
22.32 0.0%
9.6 0.0%
10.88 -7.4%
R3
23.62 -84.7%
424 -4.0%
424 0.0%
0 -100.0%
947.95 6.4%
118 3.2%
31 -10.6%
39 -4.0%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -2.5%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
51.23 2.2%
5.14 0.4%
1.8 6.5%
38.75 -6.6%
8.07 2.5%
1.43 -4.7%
48.5 -3.5%
18,719 -0.3%
1,871,855 -0.3%
840 -0.9%
524,149 -0.9%
511,455 -0.9%
2,427,954 -0.5%
19,865 -0.4%
367.87 -2.4%
367.87 0.0%
0 -100.0%
943 -0.4%
19.35 -13.3%
9.6 0.0%
0 -100.0%
R4
23.62 -84.7%
424 -4.0%
424 0.0%
0 -100.0%
845.16 -5.1%
114 0.0%
33 -6.0%
38.75 -4.6%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -2.5%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
48.45 -3.4%
5.12 0.0%
1.72 1.8%
39.25 -5.4%
7.87 0.0%
1.44 -4.0%
48.75 -3.0%
18,719 -0.3%
1,871,855 -0.3%
841 -0.8%
524,762 -0.8%
512,048 -0.8%
2,428,567 -0.4%
19,865 -0.4%
367.87 -2.4%
367.87 0.0%
0 -100.0%
936 -1.1%
20.58 -7.8%
9.6 0.0%
9.63 -18.0%
R5
153.52 -0.8%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.75 -0.6%
995.46 11.8%
118 3.2%
34 -4.0%
40.88 0.6%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.63 0.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.75 -1.3%
52.92 5.6%
5.14 0.4%
1.77 4.7%
41.88 0.9%
8.07 2.5%
1.51 0.7%
50.25 0.0%
18,783 0.0%
1,878,306 0.0%
847 -0.1%
528,371 -0.1%
515,451 -0.1%
2,438,627 0.0%
19,936 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.5 -1.3%
953 0.7%
20.95 -6.1%
9.6 0.0%
12.75 8.5%
528
Performance Measure R6 R7
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 162.64 5.1% 23.62 -84.7%
MaxOPWL [pats] 442 0.0% 424 -4.0%
MinOPWL [pats] 424 0.0% 424 0.0%
DEOPWL [mths] 23.38 12.0% 0 -100.0%
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 1,561.71 75.4% 5,152.86 478.6%
MaxCCWL [pats] 121 6.0% 206 80.8%
MinCCWL [pats] 38 8.8% 72 106.4%
DECCWL [mths] 52.13 28.3% 54 32.9%
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 0.16 6.7% 0 -100.0%
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 1.18 0.0% 1.15 -2.5%
MinTonOPWL [mths] 1.14 -0.9% 1.15 0.0%
DETonOPWL [mths] 13.13 4.0% 0 -100.0%
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1.18 0.9% 1.15 -1.7%
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 1.15 0.0% 1.15 0.0%
DETnewOPWL [mths] 10.25 3.7% 0 -100.0%
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 76.11 51.8% 260.44 419.5%
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 5.51 7.6% 11.16 118.0%
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 1.98 17.2% 2.4 42.0%
DETonCCWL [mths] 47.88 15.4% 52.63 26.8%
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 8.24 4.7% 34.51 338.5%
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 1.59 6.0% 3.1 106.7%
DETnewCCWL [mths] 53.5 6.5% 54 7.5%
CumOP [pats] 18,787 0.0% 18,719 -0.3%
CumOPAC [pounds] 1,878,711 0.0% 1,871,855 -0.3%
CumCC [pats] 864 1.9% 584 -31.1%
CumCCAC [pounds] 539,773 2.0% 355,499 -32.8%
CumCCACATL [pounds] 526,104 1.9% 355,499 -31.1%
CumC [pounds] 2,450,434 0.4% 2,227,355 -8.7%
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 19,941 0.0% 19,865 -0.4%
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 377.07 0.0% 367.87 -2.4%
MinRROP [pats/mth] 367.87 0.0% 367.87 0.0%
DStDemOP [mths] 10 3.8% 0 -100.0%
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 1007 6.4% 912 -3.6%
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 22.32 0.0% 19.23 -13.8%
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 15.61 62.6% 9.53 -0.7%
DStDemCC [mths] 16.13 37.3% 0 -100.0%
R8
154.75 0.0%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.88 0.0%
1,496.73 68.1%
135 18.0%
35 0.0%
48.13 18.5%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.63 0.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.88 0.0%
80.22 60.0%
6.33 23.6%
1.69 0.0%
45.63 10.0%
9.4 19.4%
1.5 0.0%
51.88 3.2%
18,784 0.0%
1,878,361 0.0%
785 -7.4%
487,375 -7.9%
477,876 -7.4%
2,397,486 -1.7%
19,937 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
941 -0.6%
22.31 0.0%
9.53 -0.7%
8.75 -25.5%
R9
154.75 0.0%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.88 0.0%
1,029.13 15.6%
114 0.0%
35 0.0%
44.5 9.5%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.63 0.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.88 0.0%
64.36 28.4%
5.12 0.0%
1.69 0.0%
45.63 10.0%
15.97 102.9%
1.5 0.0%
51.63 2.7%
18,784 0.0%
1,878,361 0.0%
813 -4.2%
506,789 -4.2%
494,523 -4.2%
2,417,049 -0.9%
19,937 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
925 -2.3%
22.31 0.0%
8.79 -8.4%
9.25 -21.3%
R10
87.43 -43.5%
437 -1.2%
424 0.0%
17.25 -17.4%
1,029.14 15.6%
114 0.0%
57 62.4%
49.13 20.9%
0.06 -60.0%
1.17 -0.8%
1.15 0.0%
8.38 -33.7%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
7.25 -26.6%
68.58 36.8%
5.14 0.4%
2.4 42.0%
52.63 26.8%
7.87 0.0%
2.87 91.3%
51.88 3.2%
18,756 -0.1%
1,875,557 -0.1%
797 -6.1%
495,346 -6.4%
484,863 -6.1%
2,402,853 -1.5%
19,905 -0.2%
376.52 -0.1%
367.87 0.0%
7.75 -19.5%
928 -2.0%
20.57 -7.8%
9.6 0.0%
5.88 -50.0%
R ll
155.08 0.2%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.88 0.0%
895.12 0.5%
114 0.0%
35 0.5%
40.63 0.0%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.63 0.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.88 0.0%
50.31 0.4%
5.12 0.0%
1.7 0.6%
41.88 0.9%
7.87 0.0%
1.51 0.7%
50.38 0.3%
18,784 0.0%
1,878,375 0.0%
849 0.1%
529,510 0.1%
516,532 0.1%
2,439,834 0.0%
19,937 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
947 0.1%
22.31 0.0%
9.6 0.0%
11.5 -2.1%
529
Performance Measure R12 R13
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 154.26 -0.3% 203.19
MaxOPWL [pats] 442 0.0% 443
MinOPWL [pats] 424 0.0% 424
DEOPWL [mths] 20.75 -0.6% 32.13
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 892.46 0.2% 891.09
MaxCCWL [pats] 114 0.0% 114
MinCCWL [pats] 35 -0.7% 36
DECCWL [mths] 41 0.9% 40
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 0.15 0.0% 0.2
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 1.18 0.0% 1.18
MinTonOPWL [mths] 1.15 0.0% 1.14
DETonOPWL [mths] 12.63 0.0% 19.63
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1.17 0.0% 1.18
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 1.15 0.0% 1.15
DETnewOPWL [mths] 9.88 0.0% 13.75
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 50.23 0.2% 49.84
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 5.12 0.0% 5.12
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 1.69 0.0% 1.72
DETonCCWL [mths] 41.75 0.6% 40.63
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 7.87 0.0% 7.87
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 1.49 -0.7% 1.52
DETnewCCWL [mths] 49.88 -0.7% 50.38
CumOP [pats] 18,783 0.0% 18,810
CumOPAC [pounds] 1,878,340 0.0% 1,881,004
CumCC [pats] 848 -0.1% 851
CumCCAC [pounds] 528,776 -0.1% 531,103
CumCCACATL [pounds] 515,842 -0.1% 518,015
CumC [pounds] 2,439,066 0.0% 2,444,057
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 19,936 0.0% 19,965
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 377.07 0.0% 377.07
MinRROP [pats/mth] 367.87 0.0% 367.87
DStDemOP [mths] 9.63 0.0% 12.88
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 946 0.0% 950
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 22.31 0.0% 22.37
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 9.6 0.0% 9.6
DStDemCC [mths] 12.25 4.3% 9.63
31.3%
0 . 1%
0 .0%
53.9%
0 . 1%
0 .0%
2.4%
- 1 .6 %
33.3%
0 .0%
-0.9%
55.4%
0.9%
0 .0%
39.2%
- 0 .6%
0 .0%
1.8%
- 2 . 1%
0 .0%
1.3%
0.3%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0 .2%
0 . 1%
0 .0%
0 .0%
33.7%
0.3%
0.3%
0 .0%
-18.0%
R14
107.97 -30.2%
439 -0.8%
424 0.0%
18.63 -10.8%
897.17 0.7%
114 0.0%
34 -3.7%
40.88 0.6%
0.09 -40.0%
1.17 -0.8%
1.15 0.0%
9.88 -21.8%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
8.38 -15.2%
50.62 1.0%
5.12 0.0%
1.69 0.0%
42.38 2.1%
7.87 0.0%
1.49 -0.7%
49.63 -1.2%
18,765 -0.1%
1,876,452 -0.1%
845 -0.3%
527,271 -0.4%
514,432 -0.3%
2,435,673 -0.2%
19,915 -0.1%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9 -6.5%
944 -0.2%
21.97 -1.5%
9.6 0.0%
13.25 12.8%
R15
255.86 65.3%
459 3.9%
424 0.0%
22.75 9.0%
899.63 1.0%
114 0.0%
35 0.0%
41.13 1.2%
0.29 93.3%
1.2 1.7%
1.14 -0.9%
13.75 8.9%
1.2 2.6%
1.15 0.0%
10.5 6.3%
50.6 0.9%
5.12 0.0%
1.69 0.0%
42.38 2.1%
7.87 0.0%
1.5 0.0%
50.25 0.0%
18,822 0.2%
1,882,248 0.2%
849 0.1%
529,457 0.1%
516,487 0.1%
2,443,655 0.2%
19,981 0.2%
386.26 2.4%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
948 0.1%
22.52 0.9%
9.6 0.0%
11.75 0.0%
R16
152.43 -1.5%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.63 -1.2%
830.28 -6.8%
114 -0.1%
33 -4.8%
39.88 -1.8%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.5 -1.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.75 -1.3%
48.88 -2.5%
5.17 1.0%
1.67 -1.2%
39.75 -4.2%
7.86 -0.1%
1.45 -3.3%
48.75 -3.0%
18,783 0.0%
1,878,262 0.0%
844 -0.5%
526,388 -0.5%
513,594 -0.5%
2,436,600 -0.1%
19,935 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.5 -1.3%
936 -1.1%
22.25 -0.3%
9.6 0.0%
12 2.1%
R17
156.15 0.9%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.88 0.0%
936.47 5.1%
114 0.1%
36 1.9%
41.25 1.5%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.75 1.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
10 1.2%
51.28 2.3%
5.08 -0.8%
1.71 1.2%
43.25 4.2%
7.87 0.0%
1.54 2.7%
50.5 0.5%
18,784 0.0%
1,878,421 0.0%
851 0.3%
530,895 0.3%
517,826 0.3%
2,441,266 0.1%
19,937 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
953 0.7%
22.32 0.0%
9.6 0.0%
11.75 0.0%
530
Performance Measure
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 
MaxOPWL [pats] 
MinOPWL [pats]
DEOPWL [mths] 
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 
MaxCCWL [pats] 
MinCCWL [pats] 
DECCWL [mths] 
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 
MinTonOPWL [mths] 
DETonOPWL [mths] 
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 
DETnewOPWL [mths] 
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 
DETonCCWL [mths] 
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 
DETnewCCWL [mths] 
CumOP [pats]
CumOPAC [pounds] 
CumCC [pats]
CumCCAC [pounds] 
CumCCACATL [pounds] 
CumC [pounds] 
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 
MinRROP [pats/mth] 
DStDemOP [mths] 
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 
DStDemCC [mths]
R18 R19
159.15 2.8% 152.79
442 0.0% 442
424 0.0% 424
21.13 1.2% 20.63
1,059.46 19.0% 928.62
115 0.9% 114
36 4.3% 32
42.38 4.3% 42.75
0.15 0.0% 0.15
1.18 0.0% 1.18
1.15 0.0% 1.15
13 2.9% 12.63
1.17 0.0% 1.17
1.15 0.0% 1.15
10.13 2.5% 9.75
54.96 9.6% 52.47
5.08 -0.8% 5.18
1.78 5.3% 1.7
45.5 9.6% 40.13
7.93 0.8% 7.87
1.58 5.3% 1.48
51 1.5% 48.63
18,785 0.0% 18,783
1,878,549 0.0% 1,878,273
856 1.0% 847
534,410 1.0% 528,218
521,110 1.0% 515,287
2,444,910 0.2% 2,438,441
19,939 0.0% 19,936
377.07 0.0% 377.07
367.87 0.0% 367.87
9.75 1.2% 9.5
969 2.3% 944
22.78 2.1% 22.06
9.6 0.0% 9.59
11.38 -3.1% 11.63
-1.3%
0 .0%
0 .0%
- 1 .2 %
4.3%
0 .0%
-8.4%
5.2%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
-1.3%
4.7%
1.2%
0 .6%
-3.3%
0.0%
-1.3%
-3.2%
0 .0%
0.0%
-0.2%
-0.2%
-0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
-1.3%
-0.3%
- 1. 1%
- 0 . 1%
- 1.0%
R21
254.34 64.4%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
29.13 39.5%
1,353.32 52.0%
114 0.0%
50 42.9%
50.25 23.7%
0.24 60.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
20.75 64.3%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
19.38 96.2%
73.55 46.7%
5.12 0.0%
2.4 42.0%
51.88 25.0%
7.87 0.0%
2.45 63.3%
54 7.5%
18,834 0.3%
1,883,384 0.3%
868 2.3%
544,244 2.9%
527,965 2.3%
2,460,079 0.8%
19,992 0.3%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
20.63 114.2%
981 3.7%
21.34 -4.3%
9.6 0.0%
19.5 66.0%
R22
110.27 -28.7%
431 -2.4%
424 0.0%
25.88 23.9%
1,116.09 25.3%
114 0.0%
39 11.1%
46.25 13.8%
0.04 -73.3%
1.16 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
14.25 12.8%
1.16 -0.9%
1.15 0.0%
11.25 13.9%
62.56 24.8%
5.12 0.0%
1.99 17.8%
46.38 11.8%
7.87 0.0%
1.94 29.3%
52.5 4.5%
18,779 0.0%
1,877,949 0.0%
867 2.3%
544,114 2.8%
527,834 2.3%
2,454,513 0.6%
19,930 0.0%
372.65 -1.2%
367.87 0.0%
20.25 110.3%
965 1.9%
20.36 -8.7%
9.6 0.0%
19.5 66.0%
R23
23.62 -84.7%
424 -4.0%
424 0.0%
0 -100.0%
971.95 9.1%
114 0.0%
29 -18.1%
40.25 -0.9%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -2.5%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
56.88 13.5%
5.12 0.0%
1.53 -9.5%
43.38 4.5%
7.87 0.0%
1.47 -2.0%
48.63 -3.2%
18,719 -0.3%
1,871,855 -0.3%
861 1.5%
539,917 2.0%
523,761 1.5%
2,444,222 0.2%
19,865 -0.4%
367.87 -2.4%
367.87 0.0%
0 -100.0%
949 0.2%
19.35 -13.3%
9.6 0.0%
0 -100.0%
R24
13,847.55 8848.3%
1017 130.0%
424 0.0%
35.5 70.0%
904.65 1.6%
114 0.0%
58 66.1%
51.13 25.8%
25.01 16573.3%
2.37 100.8%
1.12 -2.6%
30.63 142.5%
2.43 107.7%
1.15 0.0%
35.25 256.8%
41.04 -18.1%
5.12 0.0%
2.4 42.0%
52.63 26.8%
7.87 0.0%
3.07 104.7%
54 7.5%
19,436 3.5%
1,943,567 3.5%
975 14.9%
618,360 16.9%
593,102 14.9%
2,595,177 6.4%
21,866 9.7%
441.44 17.1%
367.87 0.0%
35.63 270.0%
1073 13.4%
22.55 1.1%
9.6 0.0%
35.13 199.0%
Performance Measure R 2 5 R 2 6
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 4,032.64 2505.9% 23.62 -84.7%
MaxOPWL [pats] 569 28.7% 424 -4.0%
MinOPWL [pats] 424 0.0% 424 0.0%
DEOPWL [mths] 35.5 70.0% 0 -100.0%
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 558.28 -37.3% 512.09 -42.5%
MaxCCWL [pats] 114 0.0% 114 0.0%
MinCCWL [pats] 56 61.2% 50 42.0%
DECCWL [mths] 38 -6.5% 19.38 -52.3%
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 6.78 4420.0% 0 -100.0%
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 1.43 21.2% 1.15 -2.5%
MinTonOPWL [mths] 1.14 -0.9% 1.15 0.0%
DETonOPWL [mths] 31 145.4% 0 -100.0%
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1.43 22.2% 1.15 -1.7%
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 1.15 0.0% 1.15 0.0%
DETnewOPWL [mths] 35.25 256.8% 0 -100.0%
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 32.91 -34.4% 32.27 -35.6%
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 5.12 0.0% 5.12 0.0%
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 2.4 42.0% 2.4 42.0%
DETonCCWL [mths] 40.5 -2.4% 36.5 -12.0%
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 7.87 0.0% 7.87 0.0%
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 2.89 92.7% 2.76 84.0%
DETnewCCWL [mths] 46.38 -7.7% 38.38 -23.6%
CumOP [pats] 19,429 3.4% 18,719 -0.3%
CumOPAC [pounds] 1,942,864 3.4% 1,871,855 -0.3%
CumCC [pats] 956 12.7% 909 7.1%
CumCCAC [pounds] 605,976 14.5% 575,077 8.7%
CumCCACATL [pounds] 581,605 12.7% 552,922 7.1%
CumC [pounds] 2,582,089 5.8% 2,480,182 1.7%
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 20,911 4.9% 19,865 -0.4%
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 404.66 7.3% 367.87 -2.4%
MinRROP [pats/mth] 367.87 0.0% 367.87 0.0%
DStDemOP [mths] 35.63 270.0% 0 -100.0%
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 1025 8.3% 967 2.1%
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 21.11 -5.4% 19.35 -13.3%
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 9.6 0.0% 9.6 0.0%
DStDemCC [mths] 34.75 195.7% 0 -100.0%
R 2 7
86.7 -44.0%
437 -1.2%
424 0.0%
17.13 -18.0%
530.19 -40.5%
114 0.0%
53 52.1%
26.75 -34.2%
0.06 -60.0%
1.17 -0.8%
1.15 0.0%
8.25 -34.7%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
7.13 -27.8%
33.97 -32.2%
5.12 0.0%
2.4 42.0%
46.38 11.8%
7.87 0.0%
2.92 94.7%
48 -4.5%
18,755 -0.2%
1,875,515 -0.2%
928 9.4%
573,375 8.4%
564,934 9.4%
2,480,734 1.7%
19,905 -0.2%
376.57 -0.1%
367.87 0.0%
7.63 -20.8%
991 4.7%
20.72 -7.1%
9.6 0.0%
20.63 75.6%
R 2 8
47.46 -69.3%
429 -2.9%
424 0.0%
13.63 -34.7%
515.46 -42.1%
114 0.0%
53 51.4%
23.13 -43.1%
0.01 -93.3%
1.16 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
4.88 -61.4%
1.16 -0.9%
1.15 0.0%
5 -49.4%
33.63 -32.9%
5.12 0.0%
2.4 42.0%
46.13 11.2%
7.87 0.0%
2.91 94.0%
47.75 -5.0%
18,737 -0.2%
1,873,738 -0.2%
923 8.8%
569,842 7.7%
561,443 8.8%
2,475,423 1.5%
19,885 -0.3%
372.31 -1.3%
367.87 0.0%
7.38 -23.4%
984 4.0%
20.01 -10.3%
9.6 0.0%
17.63 50.0%
R 2 9
23.62 -84.7%
424 -4.0%
424 0.0%
0 -100.0%
512.09 -42.5%
114 0.0%
53 51.1%
19.38 -52.3%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -2.5%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
1.15 -1.7%
1.15 0.0%
0 -100.0%
33.47 -33.2%
5.12 0.0%
2.4 42.0%
45.25 9.0%
7.87 0.0%
2.91 94.0%
47.75 -5.0%
18,719 -0.3%
1,871,855 -0.3%
918 8.2%
566,804 7.1%
558,441 8.2%
2,470,503 1.3%
19,865 -0.4%
367.87 -2.4%
367.87 0.0%
0 -100.0%
979 3.4%
19.31 -13.4%
9.6 0.0%
0 -100.0%
R 3 0
154.75 0.0%
442 0.0%
424 0.0%
20.88 0.0%
796.12 -10.6%
114 0.0%
35 0.0%
35.75 -12.0%
0.15 0.0%
1.18 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
12.63 0.0%
1.17 0.0%
1.15 0.0%
9.88 0.0%
49.22 -1.8%
5.12 0.0%
1.69 0.0%
38.38 -7.5%
7.87 0.0%
1.5 0.0%
48.5 -3.5%
18,784 0.0%
1,878,361 0.0%
884 4.3%
553,613 4.6%
538,213 4.3%
2,464,074 1.0%
19,937 0.0%
377.07 0.0%
367.87 0.0%
9.63 0.0%
933 -1.4%
22.31 0.0%
9.6 0.0%
13.5 14.9%
532
Performance Measure
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 
MaxOPWL [pats] 
MinOPWL [pats] 
DEOPWL [mths] 
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 
MaxCCWL [pats] 
MinCCWL [pats] 
DECCWL [mths] 
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 
MinTonOPWL [mths] 
DETonOPWL [mths] 
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 
DETnewOPWL [mths] 
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 
DETonCCWL [mths] 
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 
DETnewCCWL [mths] 
CumOP [pats]
CumOPAC [pounds] 
CumCC [pats]
CumCCAC [pounds] 
CumCCACATL [pounds] 
CumC [pounds] 
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 
MinRROP [pats/mth] 
DStDemOP [mths] 
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 
DStDemCC [mths]
R31 R32
72.75 -53.0% 23.62
431 -2.4% 424
424 0.0% 424
17 -18.6% 0
759.86 -14.7% 736.06
114 0.0% 114
33 -5.7% 31
34.75 -14.5% 33.88
0.03 -80.0% 0
1.16 -1.7% 1.15
1.15 0.0% 1.15
8.13 -35.6% 0
1.16 -0.9% 1.15
1.15 0.0% 1.15
8.13 -17.7% 0
48.19 -3.9% 47.64
5.12 0.0% 5.12
1.71 1.2% 1.73
34.88 -16.0% 34
7.87 0.0% 7.87
1.43 -4.7% 1.39
46.63 -7.2% 45.5
18,752 -0.2% 18,719
1,875,212 -0.2% 1,871,855
876 3.3% 869
548,188 3.6% 543,543
533,096 3.3% 528,701
2,455,501 0.7% 2,447,498
19,901 -0.2% 19,865
372.65 -1.2% 367.87
367.87 0.0% 367.87
9.25 -3.9% 0
921 -2.7% 912
20.77 -6.9% 19.35
9.6 0.0% 9.6
12.63 7.5% 0
-84.7%
-4.0%
0 .0%
100.0%
-17.4%
0 .0%
-11.7%
-16.6%
100.0%
-2.5%
0 .0%
100.0%
-1.7%
0 .0%
100 .0%
-5.0%
0 .0%
2.4%
-18.1%
0 .0%
-7.3%
-9.5%
-0.3%
-0.3%
2.4%
2.7%
2.4%
0.3%
-0.4%
-2.4%
0 .0%
100.0%
-3.7%
-13.3%
0 .0%
100 .0%
R33
72.75
431
424
17
846.36
114
33
39.25 
0.03 
1.16
1.15
8.13
1.16 
1.15
8.13 
48.7 
5.12 
1.71
39.25 
7.87 
1.43 
48.63 
18,752
1,875,212
841
524,266
511,590
2,431,428
19,901
372.65
367.87
9.25 
936
20.77
9.6
10.88
-53.0%
-2.4%
0 .0%
-18.6%
-5.0%
0 .0%
-5.7%
-3.4%
-80.0%
-1.7%
0 .0%
-35.6%
-0.9%
0 .0%
-17.7%
-2.9%
0 .0%
1.2 %
-5.4%
0 .0%
-4.7%
-3.2%
- 0 .2%
- 0 .2%
-0.9%
-0.9%
-0.9%
-0.3%
- 0 .2%
- 1 .2 %
0 .0%
-3.9%
- 1 . 2 %
-6.9%
0 .0%
-7.4%
R34
23.62
424
424
0
818.09
114
31
38.13
0
1.15
1.15 
0
1.15
1.15 
0
47.9
5.12
1.73
38.38
7.87
1.39
47.75
18,719
1,871,855
834
519,997
507,555
2,423,802
19,865
367.87
367.87 
0
927
19.35
9.6
0
-84.7%
-4.0%
0 .0%
- 100.0%
- 8 . 1%
0 .0%
-11.7%
- 6 .2%
- 100.0%
-2.5%
0 .0%
- 100 .0%
-1.7%
0 .0%
- 100.0%
-4.4%
0 .0%
2.4%
-7.5%
0 .0%
-7.3%
-5.0%
-0.3%
-0.3%
-1.7%
-1.7%
-1.7%
- 0 .6%
-0.4%
-2.4%
0 .0%
- 100.0%
- 2 . 1%
-13.3%
0.0%
- 100.0%
R35a
106.29
435
424
18.75 
889.62
114
35
40.63 
0.03 
1.16
1.14
6.63 
1.16
1.15 
5
50.09
5.12
1.69
41.38 
7.87
1.5 
50.13 
18,786
1,878,607
848
529,204
516,245
2,439,761
19,937
377.07
367.87
9.63 
947
22.38
9.6
11.75
-31.3%
- 1.6%
0 .0%
- 10 .2%
- 0 . 1%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
-80.0%
-1.7%
-0.9%
-47.5%
-0.9%
0 .0%
-49.4%
- 0 . 1%
0 .0%
0 .0%
-0.3%
0 .0%
0 .0%
- 0 .2%
0.0%
0 .0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0.3%
0 .0%
0 .0%
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P e r f o r m a n c e  M e a s u r e R O R 3 6 R 3 7 R 3 8 R 3 9 R 4 0
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 154.75 -29.9% 108.5 154.75 128.4 -17.0% 41.28 -73.3% 0 -100.0%
MaxOPWL [pats] 442 -0.5% 440 442 443 0.2% 431 -2.6% 424 -4.1%
MinOPWL [pats] 424 -0.6% 422 424 422 -0.5% 422 -0.5% 424 0.0%
DEOPWL [mths] 20.88 -47.9% 10.88 20.88 11.75 -43.7% 9.13 -56.3% 0 -100.0%
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 890.61 18.3% 1,053.78 1,030.75 1,173.01 13.8% 1,143.20 10.9% 1,126.14 9.3%
MaxCCWL [pats] 114 0.0% 114 114 114 0.0% 114 0.0% 114 0.0%
MinCCWL [pats] 35 8.7% 38 35 41 16.3% 39 11.3% 37 6.9%
DECCWL [mths] 40.63 12.6% 45.75 42.75 45.75 7.0% 45.38 6.2% 45.13 5.6%
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 0.15 -46.7% 0.08 0.15 0.14 -6.7% 0.01 -93.3% 0 -100.0%
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 1.18 -0.8% 1.17 1.18 1.18 0.0% 1.16 -1.7% 1.15 -2.5%
MinTonOPWL [mths] 1.15 -0.9% 1.14 1.15 1.14 -0.9% 1.15 0.0% 1.15 0.0%
DETonOPWL [mths] 12.63 -39.6% 7.63 12.63 9 -28.7% 3 -76.2% 0 -100.0%
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1.17 0.0% 1.17 1.17 1.18 0.9% 1.16 -0.9% 1.15 -1.7%
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 1.15 -0.9% 1.14 1.15 1.14 -0.9% 1.14 -0.9% 1.15 0.0%
DETnewOPWL [mths] 9.88 -12.7% 8.63 9.88 9.38 -5.1% 6.63 -32.9% 0 -100.0%
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 50.13 22.3% 61.33 50.13 59.43 18.6% 59.08 17.9% 59.01 17.7%
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 5.12 0.0% 5.12 5.12 5.12 0.0% 5.12 0.0% 5.12 0.0%
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 1.69 11.2% 1.88 1.69 2.06 21.9% 2.13 26.0% 2.19 29.6%
DETonCCWL [mths] 41.5 13.6% 47.13 41.5 46.63 12.4% 46.63 12.4% 46.63 12.4%
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 7.87 0.0% 7.87 7.87 7.87 0.0% 7.87 0.0% 7.87 0.0%
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 1.5 11.3% 1.67 1.5 1.79 19.3% 1.82 21.3% 1.83 22.0%
DETnewCCWL [mths] 50.25 5.0% 52.75 50.25 52.25 4.0% 52.13 3.7% 52.25 4.0%
CumOP [pats] 18,784 0.0% 18,785 18,784 18,782 0.0% 18,753 -0.2% 18,720 -0.3%
CumOPAC [pounds] 1,878,361 0.0% 1,878,541 1,878,361 1,878,176 0.0% 1,875,254 -0.2% 1,872,018 -0.3%
CumCC [pats] 848 -1.9% 832 848 835 -1.6% 826 -2.7% 819 -3.4%
CumCCAC [pounds] 529,150 -1.9% 518,934 529,150 520,347 -1.7% 514,501 -2.8% 510,316 -3.6%
CumCCACATL [pounds] 516,193 -1.9% 506,144 516,193 507,962 -1.6% 502,436 -2.7% 498,456 -3.4%
CumC [pounds] 2,439,461 -0.4% 2,429,425 2,439,461 2,430,473 -0.4% 2,421,705 -0.7% 2,414,284 -1.0%
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 19,937 0.0% 19,935 19,937 19,932 0.0% 19,898 -0.2% 19,865 -0.4%
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 377.07 0.0% 377.07 377.07 377.07 0.0% 372.65 -1.2% 367.87 -2.4%
MinRROP [pats/mth] 367.87 0.0% 367.87 367.87 367.87 0.0% 367.87 0.0% 367.87 0.0%
DStDemOP [mths] 9.63 0.0% 9.63 9.63 9.38 -2.6% 9 -6.5% 0 -100.0%
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 947 -0.3% 943 947 942 -0.5% 932 -1.6% 924 -2.3%
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 22.31 -0.1% 22.29 22.31 22.21 -0.4% 20.69 -7.3% 19.35 -13.3%
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 9.6 -0.1% 9.59 9.6 9.59 -0.1% 9.59 -0.1% 9.6 0.0%
DStDemCC [mths] 11.75 -13.8% 10.13 11.75 10.5 -10.6% 9.5 -19.1% 0 -100.0%
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Performance Measure
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 
MaxOPWL [pats] 
MinOPWL [pats] 
DEOPWL [mths] 
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 
MaxCCWL [pats] 
MinCCWL [pats] 
DECCWL [mths] 
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 
MinTonOPWL [mths] 
DETonOPWL [mths] 
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 
DETnewOPWL [mths] 
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 
DETonCCWL [mths] 
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 
DETnewCCWL [mths] 
CumOP [pats]
CumOPAC [pounds] 
CumCC [pats]
CumCCAC [pounds] 
CumCCACATL [pounds] 
CumC [pounds] 
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 
MinRROP [pats/mth] 
DStDemOP [mths] 
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 
DStDemCC [mths]
R41 R42
334.33 -56.9% 144.19
442 0.2% 443
424 -0.5% 422
92.75 -75.7% 22.5
8,296.79 3.4% 8,580.80
208 0.5% 209
35 16.3% 41
108.75 2.8% 111.75
0.15 -6.7% 0.14
1.18 0.0% 1.18
1.15 -0.9% 1.14
12.63 -28.7% 9
1.17 0.9% 1.18
1.15 -0.9% 1.14
12.13 -22.7% 9.38
415.47 4.3% 433.46
11.35 0.5% 11.41
1.69 21.9% 2.06
107.5 4.8% 112.63
12.31 0.3% 12.35
1.5 19.3% 1.79
116.25 1.7% 118.25
41,785 0.0% 41,794
4,178,516 0.0% 4,179,355
1,624 -0.8% 1,610
1,001,119 -0.9% 992,316.
988,162 -0.8% 979,932
5,211,585 -0.2% 5,203,621
44,348 0.0% 44,344
377.07 0.0% 377.07
367.87 0.0% 367.87
9.63 -2.6% 9.38
2,104 -0.2% 2,100
22.31 -0.4% 22.21
9.6 -0.1% 9.59
11.75 -10.6% 10.5
R43 R44
152.13 -15.6% 128.4
442 0.2% 443
422 -0.1% 422
20.88 -43.7% 11.75
8,114.62 3.5% 8,396.38
204 0.5% 205
35 16.3% 41
108.75 2.8% 111.75
0.16 156.3% 0.41
1.18 0.0% 1.18
1.15 -0.9% 1.14
15.63 368.7% 73.25
1.17 0.9% 1.18
1.15 -0.9% 1.14
9.88 665.5% 75.63
411.19 4.4% 429.11
11.22 0.5% 11.28
1.69 21.9% 2.06
107.5 4.8% 112.63
12.15 0.3% 12.19
1.5 19.3% 1.79
116.25 1.7% 118.25
41,540 0.0% 41,530
4,153,954 0.0% 4,153,034
1,624 -0.8% 1,610
1,001,119 -0.9% 992,316
988,162 -0.8% 979,932
5,187,023 -0.2% 5,177,300
44,084 0.0% 44,079
377.07 0.0% 377.07
366.03 0.0% 366.03
9.63 -2.6% 9.38
2,096 -0.2% 2,092
22.31 -0.4% 22.21
9.6 -0.1% 9.59
11.75 -10.6% 10.5
R45 R46
3,350.92 15.3% 3,861.95
456 1.2% 462
424 -0.5% 422
122.75 -7.4% 113.63
14,190.08 2.1% 14,488.72
242 0.2% 243
35 16.3% 41
138.75 2.2% 141.75
3.85 35.8% 5.23
1.19 1.7% 1.21
1.14 0.0% 1.14
111.75 -3.1% 108.25
1.19 1.7% 1.21
1.15 -0.9% 1.14
111.75 -0.4% 111.25
708.34 2.7% 727.18
12.8 0.3% 12.84
1.69 21.9% 2.06
137.5 3.7% 142.63
13.63 0.1% 13.65
1.5 19.3% 1.79
146.25 1.4% 148.25
53,373 -0.1% 53,339
5,337,338 -0.1% 5,333,864
1,976 -0.7% 1,963
1,215,651 -0.7% 1,206,848
1,202,694 -0.7% 1,194,463
6,584,939 -0.2% 6,572,662
56,753 0.0% 56,749
382.58 0.0% 382.58
367.87 0.0% 367.87
9.63 -2.6% 9.38
2683 -0.2% 2678
22.31 -0.4% 22.21
9.6 -0.1% 9.59
11.75 -10.6% 10.5
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Performance Measure R47 R48 R49
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 7,579.42 2.0% 7,731.43 154.75
MaxOPWL [pats] 505 0.0% 506 442
MinOPWL [pats] 424 -0.5% 422 424
DEOPWL [mths] 122.75 -7.4% 113.63 20.88
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 15,104.87 2.0% 15,405.46 1,186.06
MaxCCWL [pats] 256 0.2% 256 114
MinCCWL [pats] 35 16.3% 41 35
DECCWL [mths] 138.75 2.2% 141.75 46.13
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 11.11 3.9% 11.54 0.15
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 1.28 0.0% 1.28 1.18
MinTonOPWL [mths] 1.13 0.0% 1.13 1.15
DETonOPWL [mths] 112 -3.1% 108.5 12.63
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1.28 0.0% 1.28 1.17
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 1.15 -0.9% 1.14 1.15
DETnewOPWL [mths] 111.75 -0.4% 111.25 9.88
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 730.68 2.6% 749.44 64.36
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 13.21 0.2% 13.24 5.12
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 1.69 21.9% 2.06 1.69
DETonCCWL [mths] 137.5 3.7% 142.63 45.63
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 14.13 0.1% 14.15 15.97
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 1.5 19.3% 1.79 1.5
DETnewCCWL [mths] 146.25 1.4% 148.25 51.63
CumOP [pats] 54,238 0.0% 54,227 18,784
CumOPAC [pounds] 5,423,824 0.0% 5,422,689 1,878,361
CumCC [pats] 1,976 -0.7% 1,963 813
CumCCAC [pounds] 1,215,651 -0.7% 1,206,848 506,789
CumCCACATL [pounds] 1,202,694 -0.7% 1,194,463 494,523
CumC [pounds] 6,671,425 -0.1% 6,661,487 2,417,049
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 57,879 0.0% 57,874 19,937
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 393.62 0.0% 393.62 377.07
MinRROP [pats/mth] 367.87 0.0% 367.87 367.87
DStDemOP [mths] 9.63 -2.6% 9.38 9.63
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 2719 -0.2% 2715 925
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 22.31 -0.4% 22.21 22.31
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 9.6 -0.1% 9.59 8.79
DStDemCC [mths] 11.75 -10.6% 10.5 9.25
R50 R51 R52
-17.0% 128.4 23.62 -100.0% 0
0.2% 443 424 -0.1% 424
-0.5% 422 424 0.0% 424
-43.7% 11.75 0 * 0
12.0% 1,327.85 539.38 -1.0% 533.88
0.0% 114 133 -0.1% 133
16.3% 41 56 -0.2% 56
7.8% 49.75 38 -4.6% 36.25
-6.7% 0.14 0 * 0
0.0% 1.18 1.15 0.0% 1.15
-0.9% 1.14 1.15 0.0% 1.15
-28.7% 9 0 ♦ 0
0.9% 1.18 1.15 0.0% 1.15
-0.9% 1.14 1.15 0.0% 1.15
-5.1% 9.38 0 * 0
13.0% 72.74 21.91 -1.3% 21.63
0.0% 5.12 4.84 -0.2% 4.83
21.9% 2.06 2.4 0.0% 2.4
2.2% 46.63 52.25 -2.6% 50.88
2.8% 16.41 32.95 0.0% 32.94
19.3% 1.79 2.76 0.0% 2.76
2.4% 52.88 6.88 0.0% 6.88
0.0% 18,782 18,719 0.0% 18,720
0.0% 1,878,176 1,871,855 0.0% 1,872,018
-1.3% 802 953 0.0% 953
-1.4% 499,741 579,875 0.0% 580,034
-1.3% 487,952 579,875 0.0% 580,034
-0.3% 2,409,817 2,451,730 0.0% 2,452,052
0.0% 19,932 19,865 0.0% 19,865
0.0% 377.07 367.87 0.0% 367.87
0.0% 367.87 367.87 0.0% 367.87
-2.6% 9.38 0 * 0
-0.4% 921 1010 0.0% 1010
-0.4% 22.21 18.7 0.0% 18.7
0.0% 8.79 18.69 0.1% 18.7
-5.4% 8.75 0 * 0
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2. Results o f Experiments for the Veinbridge General Case
Performance Measure
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 
MaxOPWL [pats] 
MinOPWL [pats] 
DEOPWL [mths] 
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 
MaxCCWL [pats] 
MinCCWL [pats] 
DECCWL [mths] 
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 
MinTonOPWL [mths] 
DETonOPWL [mths] 
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 
DETnewOPWL [mths] 
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 
DETonCCWL [mths] 
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 
DETnewCCWL [mths] 
CumOP [pats]
CumOPAC [pounds] 
CumCC [pats]
CumCCAC [pounds] 
CumCCACATL [pounds] 
CumC [pounds] 
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 
MinRROP [pats/mth] 
DStDemOP [mths] 
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 
DStDemCC [mths]
VO VI
11,262.63 0.16
650 338
338 338
54.88 0
5,043.48 2,041.30
235 171
128 128
58.88 58.88
16.89 0
1.47 0.92
0.88 0.92
50.63 0
1.49 0.92
0.92 0.92
54.88 0
0 0.97
3.5 3.59
3.23 3.39
0.5 17.63
4.3 4.3
3.49 3.49
46.13 34.88
29,092 25,755
2,909,213 2,575,511
3,922 3,089
2,882,470 2,254,412
2,616,239 2,060,416
6,801,121 5,839,361
30,295 26,364
439.39 366.16
366.16 366.16
55.25 0
4,140 3,219
67.1 48.77
36.7 36.7
58.88 58.88
- 100 .0 %
-48.0%
0 .0%
- 100 .0%
-59.5%
-27.3%
0 .0%
0 .0%
- 100.0%
-37.4%
4.5%
- 100 .0 %
-38.3%
0 .0%
- 100 .0%
*
2 .6%
5.0%
3426.0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
-24.4%
-11.5%
-11.5%
- 21 .2%
- 2 1 .8%
- 21 .2%
-14.1%
-13.0%
-16.7%
0 .0%
- 100.0%
- 22 .2%
-27.3%
0 .0%
0.0%
V2
0.16 -100.0%
338 -48.0%
338 0.0%
0 -100.0%
3,458.85 -31.4%
200 -14.7%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -37.4%
0.92 4.5%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -38.3%
0.92 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0 *
3.5 0.0%
3.37 4.3%
0.5 0.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.49 0.0%
42.25 -8.4%
25,755 -11.5%
2,575,511 -11.5%
3,482 -11.2%
2,550,975 -11.5%
2,322,870 -11.2%
6,135,924 -9.8%
26,364 -13.0%
366.16 -16.7%
366.16 0.0%
0 -100.0%
3,653 -11.8%
57.22 -14.7%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V3
11,262.19 0.0%
650 0.0%
338 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
3,380.28 -33.0%
200 -14.8%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
16.89 0.0%
1.47 0.0%
0.88 0.0%
50.63 0.0%
1.49 0.0%
0.92 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
0.02 ♦
3.52 0.6%
3.36 4.0%
2.25 350.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.49 0.0%
46 -0.3%
29,092 0.0%
2,909,208 0.0%
3,460 -11.8%
2,534,520 -12.1%
2,308,308 -11.8%
6,453,166 -5.1%
30,295 0.0%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
55.25 0.0%
3,630 -12.3%
57.16 -14.8%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V4
0.16 -100.0%
338 -48.0%
338 0.0%
0 -100.0%
6,027.37 19.5%
356 51.5%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -37.4%
0.92 4.5%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -38.3%
0.92 0.0%
0 -100.0%
166.58 *
8.99 156.9%
3.5 8.4%
58.88 11676.0%
29.64 589.3%
3.5 0.3%
63.5 37.7%
25,755 -11.5%
2,575,511 -11.5%
2,427 -38.1%
1,618,850 -43.8%
1,618,850 -38.1%
4,194,362 -38.3%
26,364 -13.0%
366.16 -16.7%
366.16 0.0%
0 -100.0%
2,552 -38.4%
36.7 -45.3%
14.06 -61.7%
0 -100.0%
V5
201.58 -98.2%
355 -45.4%
338 0.0%
15.88 -71.1%
1,347.84 -73.3%
197 -16.2%
128 0.0%
57.38 -2.5%
0.04 -99.8%
0.94 -36.1%
0.91 3.4%
5.75 -88.6%
0.94 -36.9%
0.91 -1.1%
5.25 -90.4%
18.99 *
4.74 35.4%
3.4 5.3%
47 9300.0%
4.78 11.2%
3.45 -1.1%
54.75 18.7%
25,968 -10.7%
2,596,827 -10.7%
2,723 -30.6%
1,849,855 -35.8%
1,816,304 -30.6%
4,453,820 -34.5%
26,582 -12.3%
384.47 -12.5%
366.16 0.0%
13.25 -76.0%
2,805 -32.2%
50.29 -25.1%
36.7 0.0%
25 -57.5%
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Performance Measure V6 V7
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 201.58 -98.2% 201.58 -98.2%
MaxOPWL [pats] 355 -45.4% 355 -45.4%
MinOPWL [pats] 338 0.0% 338 0.0%
DEOPWL [mths] 15.88 -71.1% 15.88 -71.1%
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 3,707.92 -26.5% 1,398.19 -72.3%
MaxCCWL [pats] 222 -5.6% 197 -16.2%
MinCCWL [pats] 128 0.0% 128 0.0%
DECCWL [mths] 58.88 0.0% 58.88 0.0%
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 0.04 -99.8% 0.04 -99.8%
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 0.94 -36.1% 0.94 -36.1%
MinTonOPWL [mths] 0.91 3.4% 0.91 3.4%
DETonOPWL [mths] 5.75 -88.6% 5.75 -88.6%
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 0.94 -36.9% 0.94 -36.9%
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 0.91 -1.1% 0.91 -1.1%
DETnewOPWL [mths] 5.25 -90.4% 5.25 -90.4%
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 2.95 * 19.9 *
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 3.73 6.6% 4.74 35.4%
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 3.16 -2.2% 3.4 5.3%
DETonCCWL [mths] 39.38 7776.0% 47 9300.0%
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 4.3 0.0% 4.78 11.2%
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 3.5 0.3% 3.45 -1.1%
DETnewCCWL [mths] 42.13 -8.7% 61.63 33.6%
CumOP [pats] 25,968 -10.7% 25,968 -10.7%
CumOPAC [pounds] 2,596,827 -10.7% 2,596,827 -10.7%
CumCC [pats] 3,524 -10.1% 2,721 -30.6%
CumCCAC [pounds] 2,386,208 -17.2% 1,859,679 -35.5%
CumCCACATL [pounds] 2,351,207 -10.1% 1,815,319 -30.6%
CumC [pounds] 4,990,166 -26.6% 4,464,013 -34.4%
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 26,582 -12.3% 26,582 -12.3%
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 384.47 -12.5% 384.47 -12.5%
MinRROP [pats/mth] 366.16 0.0% 366.16 0.0%
DStDemOP [mths] 13.25 -76.0% 13.25 -76.0%
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 3,689 -10.9% 2,808 -32.2%
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 64.87 -3.3% 50.29 -25.1%
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 36.7 0.0% 36.7 0.0%
DStDemCC [mths] 58.88 0.0% 33.5 -43.1%
V8
11,262.63 0.0%
650 0.0%
338 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
4,891.64 -3.0%
235 0.0%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
16.89 0.0%
1.47 0.0%
0.88 0.0%
50.63 0.0%
1.49 0.0%
0.92 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
5.35 *
4.87 39.1%
3.23 0.0%
9 1700.0%
6.76 57.2%
3.5 0.3%
50.88 10.3%
29,092 0.0%
2,909,213 0.0%
3,798 -3.2%
2,789,920 -3.2%
2,533,436 -3.2%
6,708,570 -1.4%
30,295 0.0%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
55.25 0.0%
4,014 -3.0%
67.1 0.0%
15.87 -56.8%
55 -6.6%
V9
11,685.63 3.8%
654 0.5%
338 0.0%
55.63 1.4%
2,771.85 -45.0%
135 -42.3%
94 -26.7%
58.88 0.0%
17.64 4.4%
1.48 0.7%
0.87 -1.1%
52 2.7%
1.5 0.7%
0.92 0.0%
55.63 1.4%
6.14 *
3.5 0.0%
1.69 -47.7%
23.88 4676.0%
4.12 -4.2%
1.74 -50.1%
34.38 -25.5%
29,171 0.3%
2,917,112 0.3%
4,106 4.7%
3,021,232 4.8%
2,739,041 4.7%
6,947,781 2.2%
30,387 0.3%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
56 1.4%
4,160 0.5%
67.11 0.0%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V10
12,004.38 6.6%
656 0.8%
338 0.0%
56.5 3.0%
5,168.84 2.5%
235 0.0%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
18.21 7.8%
1.49 1.4%
0.87 -1.1%
53 4.7%
1.5 0.7%
0.92 0.0%
56.63 3.2%
0 *
3.5 0.0%
3.2 -0.9%
0.5 0.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.49 0.0%
45.63 -1.1%
29,234 0.5%
2,923,406 0.5%
3,957 0.9%
2,908,733 0.9%
2,639,481 0.9%
6,841,576 0.6%
30,461 0.5%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
56.88 3.0%
4,176 0.9%
67.12 0.0%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
VII
10,566.53 -6.2%
645 -0.8%
338 0.0%
53.25 -3.0%
4,925.58 -2.3%
235 0.0%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
15.65 -7.3%
1.46 -0.7%
0.88 0.0%
48.38 -4.4%
1.48 -0.7%
0.92 0.0%
53.38 -2.7%
0.08 *
3.54 1.1%
3.23 0.0%
3.5 600.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.5 0.3%
46.75 1.3%
28,959 -0.5%
2,895,900 -0.5%
3,889 -0.8%
2,857,773 -0.9%
2,594,382 -0.8%
6,763,110 -0.6%
30,139 -0.5%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
53.75 -2.7%
4,106 -0.8%
67.09 0.0%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
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Performance Measure
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 
MaxOPWL [pats] 
MinOPWL [pats]
DEOPWL [mths] 
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 
MaxCCWL [pats] 
MinCCWL [pats] 
DECCWL [mths] 
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 
MinTonOPWL [mths] 
DETonOPWL [mths] 
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 
DETnewOPWL [mths] 
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 
DETonCCWL [mths] 
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 
DETnewCCWL [mths] 
CumOP [pats]
CumOPAC [pounds] 
CumCC [pats]
CumCCAC [pounds] 
CumCCACATL [pounds] 
CumC [pounds] 
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 
MinRROP [pats/mth] 
DStDemOP [mths] 
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 
DStDemCC [mths]
V12
79,633.84 607.1%
2,793 329.4%
338 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
5,694.71 12.9%
256 9.3%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
127.74 656.3%
5.2 253.7%
0.84 -4.5%
51 0.7%
5.7 282.6%
0.92 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
0 *
3.5 0.0%
3.22 -0.3%
0.5 0.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.5 0.3%
63.5 37.7%
29,111 0.1%
2,911,117 0.1%
4,102 4.6%
3,018,599 4.7%
2,736,711 4.6%
6,939,154 2.0%
34,168 12.8%
512.62 16.7%
366.16 0.0%
55.25 0.0%
4,347 5.0%
73.53 9.6%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V13
24,924.20 121.3%
900 38.4%
468 38.5%
72 31.2%
4,934.20 -2.2%
234 -0.3%
118 -7.5%
58.88 0.0%
16.85 -0.2%
1.47 0.0%
0.88 0.0%
50.63 0.0%
1.49 0.0%
0.92 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
0.58 *
3.74 6.9%
3.23 0.0%
7.75 1450.0%
4.31 0.2%
3.33 -4.6%
59.38 28.7%
40,278 38.5%
4,027,818 38.5%
3,884 -1.0%
2,855,019 -1.0%
2,591,324 -1.0%
7,892,274 16.0%
41,942 38.4%
608.38 38.5%
506.98 38.5%
55.25 0.0%
4,101 -0.9%
72.48 8.0%
25 -31.9%
58.88 0.0%
V14
1,784.22 -84.2%
372 -42.8%
338 0.0%
54.75 -0.2%
2,409.03 -52.2%
177 -24.7%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -37.4%
0.9 2.3%
0 -100.0%
0.95 -36.2%
0.92 0.0%
6.5 -88.2%
0.32 *
3.6 2.9%
3.44 6.5%
8.25 1550.0%
4.25 -1.2%
3.49 0.0%
39.88 -13.5%
27,646 -5.0%
2,764,573 -5.0%
3,191 -18.6%
2,331,326 -19.1%
2,128,484 -18.6%
6,105,337 -10.2%
28,333 -6.5%
402.78 -8.3%
366.16 0.0%
55.25 0.0%
3,330 -19.6%
50.44 -24.8%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V15
0.16 -100.0%
338 -48.0%
338 0.0%
0 -100.0%
128.75 -97.4%
141 -40.1%
126 -1.2%
21.13 -64.1%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -37.4%
0.92 4.5%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -38.3%
0.92 0.0%
0 -100.0%
2.79 *
3.74 6.9%
3.46 7.1%
23.75 4650.0%
4.21 -2.1%
3.4 -2.6%
16.13 -65.0%
25,755 -11.5%
2,575,511 -11.5%
2,569 -34.5%
1,847,355 -35.9%
1,713,735 -34.5%
5,432,304 -20.1%
26,364 -13.0%
366.16 -16.7%
366.16 0.0%
0 -100.0%
2,642 -36.2%
36.7 -45.3%
36.7 0.0%
0 -100.0%
V16
3,562.03 -68.4%
406 -37.6%
338 0.0%
54.88 0.0%
5,165.12 2.4%
236 0.7%
128 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0.92 -37.4%
0.88 0.0%
0 -100.0%
0.98 -34.2%
0.92 0.0%
7.25 -86.8%
0 *
3.5 0.0%
3.22 -0.3%
0.5 0.0%
4.3 0.0%
3.49 0.0%
43 -6.8%
29,530 1.5%
2,952,973 1.5%
3,955 0.9%
2,907,927 0.9%
2,638,768 0.9%
6,870,337 1.0%
30,295 0.0%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
55.25 0.0%
4,176 0.9%
67.56 0.7%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
V17
11,481.19 1.9%
652 0.3%
338 0.0%
55 0.2%
276.35 -94.5%
148 -37.1%
128 0.0%
42.25 -28.2%
17.32 2.5%
1.48 0.7%
0.88 0.0%
51.25 1.2%
1.49 0.0%
0.92 0.0%
55.13 0.5%
0.05 *
3.51 0.3%
1.91 -40.9%
8.75 1650.0%
4.09 -4.9%
1.91 -45.3%
8.38 -81.8%
29,108 0.1%
2,910,827 0.1%
4,071 3.8%
2,994,675 3.9%
2,715,561 3.8%
6,914,939 1.7%
30,318 0.1%
439.39 0.0%
366.16 0.0%
55.38 0.2%
4,145 0.1%
67.11 0.0%
36.7 0.0%
58.88 0.0%
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Performance Measure V18 V19 V20 V8 V21
PrSIEOPWL [pressure] 439.39 -96.1% 219.7 -98.0% 0 -100.0% 11,262.63 1.9% 11,481.19
MaxOPWL [pats] 402 -38.2% 370 -43.1% 338 -48.0% 650 0.3% 652
MinOPWL [pats] 338 0.0% 338 0.0% 338 0.0% 338 0.0% 338
DEOPWL [mths] 22 -59.9% 19.5 -64.5% 0 -100.0% 54.88 0.2% 55.00
PrSIECCWL [pressure] 279.7 -94.5% 171.77 -96.6% 67.86 -98.7% 4,891.64 -92.0% 391.34
MaxCCWL [pats] 149 -36.6% 140 -40.4% 137 -41.6% 235 -34.3% 154
MinCCWL [pats] 128 -0.1% 128 -0.1% 126 -1.2% 128 -1.9% 126
DECCWL [mths] 39.75 -32.5% 36.88 -37.4% 19.75 -66.5% 58.88 -24.6% 44.38
PrSIETonOPWL [pressure] 0 -100.0% 0 -100.0% 0 -100.0% 16.89 2.5% 17.32
MaxTonOPWL [mths] 0.92 -37.4% 0.92 -37.4% 0.92 -37.4% 1.47 0.7% 1.48
MinTonOPWL [mths] 0.77 -12.5% 0.84 -4.5% 0.92 4.5% 0.88 0.0% 0.88
DETonOPWL [mths] 0 -100.0% 0 -100.0% 0 -100.0% 50.63 1.2% 51.25
MaxTnewOPWL [mths] 1 -32.9% 0.96 -35.6% 0.92 -38.3% 1.49 0.0% 1.49
MinTnewOPWL [mths] 0.77 -16.3% 0.84 -8.7% 0.92 0.0% 0.92 0.0% 0.92
DETnewOPWL [mths] 4.38 -92.0% 4.13 -92.5% 0 -100.0% 54.88 0.5% 55.13
PrSIETonCCWL [pressure] 0.05 * 0.05 * 1.44 * 5.35 -99.1% 0.05
MaxTonCCWL [mths] 3.51 0.3% 3.51 0.3% 3.65 4.3% 4.87 -27.9% 3.51
MinTonCCWL [ mths] 1.89 -41.5% 2.54 -21.4% 3.46 7.1% 3.23 -40.9% 1.91
DETonCCWL [mths] 8.75 1650.0% 10.25 1950.0% 27.88 5476.0% 9 -2.8% 8.75
MaxTnewCCWL [mths] 4.09 -4.9% 4.08 -5.1% 4.08 -5.1% 6.76 -35.1% 4.39
MinTnewCCWL [mths] 1.89 -45.8% 2.54 -27.2% 3.41 -2.3% 3.5 -45.4% 1.91
DETnewCCWL [mths] 8.38 -81.8% 9.13 -80.2% 11.5 -75.1% 50.88 -76.2% 12.13
CumOP [pats] 29,699 2.1% 27,727 -4.7% 25,755 -11.5% 29,092 0.1% 29,108
CumOPAC [pounds] 2,969,878 2.1% 2,772,689 -4.7% 2,575,512 -11.5% 2,909,213 0.1% 2,910,827
CumCC [pats] 4,117 5.0% 3,261 -16.8% 2,570 -34.5% 3,798 3.9% 3,944
CumCCAC [pounds] 3,029,578 5.1% 2,384,560 -17.3% 1,848,017 -35.9% 2,789,920 4.0% 2,900,576
CumCCACATL [pounds] 2,746,450 5.0% 2,175,618 -16.8% 1,714,342 -34.5% 2,533,436 3.9% 2,631,387
CumC [pounds] 7,008,894 3.1% 6,166,686 -9.3% 5,432,966 -20.1% 6,708,570 1.7% 6,820,841
CumOPWLAdds [pats] 30,318 0.1% 28,341 -6.4% 26,364 -13.0% 30,295 0.1% 30,318
MaxRROP [pats/mth] 439.39 0.0% 402.78 -8.3% 366.16 -16.7% 439.39 0.0% 439.39
MinRROP [pats/mth] 366.16 0.0% 366.16 0.0% 366.16 0.0% 366.16 0.0% 366.16
DStDemOP [mths] 55.38 0.2% 55.25 0.0% 0 -100.0% 55.25 0.2% 55.38
CumCCWLAdds [pats] 4,191 1.2% 3,334 -19.5% 2,642 -36.2% 4,014 0.1% 4,019
Max RRCC [pats/mth] 67.65 0.8% 50.45 -24.8% 36.7 -45.3% 67.1 0.0% 67.11
MinRRCC [pats/mth] 36.7 0.0% 36.7 0.0% 36.7 0.0% 15.87 0.1% 15.89
DStDemCC [mths] 58.88 0.0% 58.88 0.0% 0 -100.0% 55 0.0% 55
